{"id":55763,"date":"2020-01-28T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2020-01-27T21:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/blog_prohoster\/l1des-cacheout-i-vrs-novye-uyazvimosti-v-mikroarhitekturnyh-strukturah-cpu-intel"},"modified":"2020-02-18T14:03:54","modified_gmt":"2020-02-18T11:03:54","slug":"l1des-cacheout-i-vrs-novye-uyazvimosti-v-mikroarhitekturnyh-strukturah-cpu-intel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/da\/blog\/news\/l1des-cacheout-i-vrs-novye-uyazvimosti-v-mikroarhitekturnyh-strukturah-cpu-intel","title":{"rendered":"L1DES (CacheOut) og VRS \u2012 nye s\u00e5rbarheder i mikroarkitekturelle strukturer af Intel CPU'er","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Intel <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.intel.com\/technology\/2020\/01\/ipas-intel-sa-00329\/\">afsl\u00f8ret<\/a><\/noindex> oplysninger om to nye s\u00e5rbarheder i Intel CPU'er, for\u00e5rsaget af data l\u00e6kager fra L1D cache (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/l1d-eviction-sampling\">CVE-2020-0549<\/a><\/noindex>, L1DES \u2014 L1D Eviction Sampling) og vektorrestrukturer (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/vector-register-sampling\">CVE-2020-0548<\/a><\/noindex>, VRS \u2014 Vector Register Sampling). S\u00e5rbarheder falder ind under klassen <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=50684\">MDS<\/a><\/noindex> (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) og er baseret p\u00e5 metoder til analyse af sidekanaler til data i mikroarkitekturelle strukturer. AMD, ARM og andre processorer er ikke s\u00e5rbare over for disse problemer.<\/p>\n<p>Den st\u00f8rste fare er s\u00e5rbarheden L1DES, som  <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/access.redhat.com\/solutions\/l1d-cache-eviction-and-vector-register-sampling\">giver mulighed for<\/a><\/noindex> afs\u00e6tning af cachelinjer, der bliver udskiftet fra L1D-cachen, i fyldbufferen (Fill Buffer), som p\u00e5 dette tidspunkt skal v\u00e6re tom. For at identificere data, der er blevet afsat i fyldbufferen, kan metoder til analyse af sidekanaler anvendes, som tidligere er foresl\u00e5et i angreb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=50684\">MDS<\/a><\/noindex> (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) og <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=51852\">TAA<\/a><\/noindex> (Transactional Asynchronous Abort). Essensen af den tidligere implementerede beskyttelse mod<br \/>\nMDS og TAA er at rydde mikroarkitekturelle buffere f\u00f8r kontekstskift, men som det viser sig, bliver data under visse betingelser spekulativt nulstillet i buffere efter rydningsoperationen, derfor forbliver metoderne MDS og TAA anvendelige.<\/p>\n<p><center><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"L1DES (CacheOut) og VRS - nye s\u00e5rbarheder i mikroarkitektoniske strukturer i Intel CPU&#039;er\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/0a5f61b0703517504135e27e32c762bc.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/center><\/p>\n<p>Som et resultat kan en angriber bestemme de udskiftede data fra f\u00f8rste niveau cache, der blev \u00e6ndret under udf\u00f8relsen af et program, tidligere k\u00f8rende p\u00e5 den nuv\u00e6rende CPU-kerne, eller programmer, der k\u00f8rer parallelt i andre logiske tr\u00e5de (hyperthread) p\u00e5 den samme CPU-kerne (deaktivering af HyperThreading reducerer angrebseffektiviteten). I mods\u00e6tning til angrebet <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=49134\">L1TF<\/a><\/noindex>, L1DES tillader ikke valg af specifikke fysiske adresser til kontrol, men giver mulighed for passiv overv\u00e5gning af aktivitet i andre logiske tr\u00e5de, relateret til indl\u00e6sning eller gemme v\u00e6rdier i hukommelsen.<\/p>\n<p>Baseret p\u00e5 L1DES har forskellige forskerhold udviklet flere angrebsmetoder, som potentielt g\u00f8r det muligt at udtr\u00e6kke fortrolig information fra andre processer, operativsystemer, virtuelle maskiner og sikre SGX-enklaver. <\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"l\"> VUSec-holdet <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/#ridl-nng\">har tilpasset<\/a><\/noindex> RIDL angrebsmetoden til L1DES s\u00e5rbarheden. En prototype af et exploit er tilg\u00e6ngelig <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/vusec\/ridl\/blob\/master\/pocs\/verw_bypass_l1des.c\">prototype af exploit<\/a><\/noindex>, som blandt andet omg\u00e5r den foresl\u00e5ede Intel-metode til beskyttelse mod MDS, der er baseret p\u00e5 brugen af instruktionen VERW til at rense indholdet af mikroarkitekturpuffer i det \u00f8jeblik, der skiftes fra kernerum til brugeromr\u00e5de, eller n\u00e5r kontrollen overdrages til g\u00e6stesystemet (forskere har oprindeligt insisteret p\u00e5, at VERW (rensning af mikroarkitekturpuffer) ikke er tilstr\u00e6kkeligt til at beskytte, og at der kr\u00e6ves en komplet nulstilling af L1-cache ved hver konteksskift).\n<li class=\"l\"> Kommandoen <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/\">ZombieLoad<\/a><\/noindex>  har opdateret sin <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/zombieload.pdf\">angrebsmetode<\/a><\/noindex> under hensyntagen til L1DES-anfaldet.\n<li class=\"l\"> Forskere fra Michigan State University har udviklet deres egen angrebsmetode <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cacheoutattack.com\/\">CacheOut<\/a><\/noindex> (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cacheoutattack.com\/CacheOut.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>), der muligg\u00f8r udtr\u00e6kning af fortrolig information fra operativsystemets kerne, virtuelle maskiner og sikre enclaves i SGX. Metoden er baseret p\u00e5 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=51852\">manipulationer<\/a><\/noindex> med mekanismen til asynkrone operation interruption (TAA, TSX Asynchronous Abort) for at bestemme indholdet af fyldpufferen efter datal\u00e6k fra L1D-cachen.\n<p><center><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/pics_base\/0_1580195677.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"L1DES (CacheOut) og VRS - nye s\u00e5rbarheder i mikroarkitektoniske strukturer i Intel CPU&#039;er\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/68cf9a4cf24206c7d226e0f69b8cad55.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/a><\/noindex><\/center><\/p>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Den anden s\u00e5rbarhed VRS (Vector Register Sampling) <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/vector-register-sampling\">er relateret<\/a><\/noindex> til l\u00e6kagen i bufferlagringen (Store Buffer) af resultater fra l\u00e6seoperationer fra vektorregistre, som er blevet \u00e6ndret under udf\u00f8relsen af vektorinstruktioner (SSE, AVX, AVX-512) p\u00e5 den samme CPU-kerne. L\u00e6kagen opst\u00e5r under tilstr\u00e6kkeligt sj\u00e6ldne omst\u00e6ndigheder og skyldes, at en spekuleret udf\u00f8rende operation, der f\u00f8rer til refleksion af tilstanden i vektorregistrene i bufferlagringen, bliver forsinket og afsluttet efter rensningen af bufferen og ikke f\u00f8r. I lighed med s\u00e5rbarheden L1DES kan indholdet af bufferlagringen derefter bestemmes ved hj\u00e6lp af metoderne for angreb fra MDS og TAA.  <\/p>\n<p>Forskere fra VUSec-gruppen <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/#ridl-nng\">har forberedt<\/a><\/noindex> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/vusec\/ridl\/blob\/master\/pocs\/vrs.c\">prototype af exploit<\/a><\/noindex>, som muligg\u00f8r bestemmelse af v\u00e6rdierne i vektorregistrene, der er opn\u00e5et som f\u00f8lge af beregninger i en anden logisk tr\u00e5d p\u00e5 den samme CPU-kerne. Virksomheden Intel <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/vector-register-sampling\">har vurderet<\/a><\/noindex> s\u00e5rbarheden VRS som for kompleks til at udf\u00f8re reelle angreb og tildelt den en minimal farevurdering (2.8 CVSS).<\/p>\n<p>Oplysninger om problemerne blev sendt til Intel i maj 2019 af Zombieload-teamet fra Graz Teknisk Universitet (\u00d8strig) og VUSec-gruppen fra Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, og senere, efter analyse af andre angrebsvektorer for MDS-angrebet, blev s\u00e5rbarhederne bekr\u00e6ftet af nogle andre forskere. I den f\u00f8rste MDS-rapport blev information om L1DES- og VRS-problemerne ikke inkluderet, da der ikke var nogen l\u00f8sning tilg\u00e6ngelig. L\u00f8sningen er stadig ikke tilg\u00e6ngelig, men de angivne fortrolighedsfrister er udl\u00f8bet.<br \/>\nSom en workaround til beskyttelse anbefales det at deaktivere HyperThreading. For at blokere s\u00e5rbarheden p\u00e5 kerne-niveau foresl\u00e5s det at nulstille L1-cache ved hver kontekstskift (MSR bit MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD) og deaktivere TSX-udvidelsen (MSR bits MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL og MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT).<\/p>\n<p>Intel <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/blogs.intel.com\/technology\/2020\/01\/ipas-intel-sa-00329\/\">lover<\/a><\/noindex> at udsende en mikrocodeopdatering med implementering af mekanismer til at blokere problemerne snart. Intel bem\u00e6rker ogs\u00e5, at anvendelsen af de foresl\u00e5ede beskyttelsesmetoder mod angrebene fra 2018 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=49134\">L1TF<\/a><\/noindex> (L1 Terminal Fault) muligg\u00f8r blokering af udnyttelse af L1DES s\u00e5rbarheden fra virtuelle milj\u00f8er. Angrebet <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/insights\/processors-affected-l1d-eviction-sampling\">er modtageligt for<\/a><\/noindex> Intel Core-processorer, der begynder fra sjette generation (Sky, Kaby, Coffee, Whiskey, Amber Lake osv.), samt nogle modeller af Intel Xeon og Xeon Scalable.<\/p>\n<p>Yderligere kan det n\u00e6vnes <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/#ridl-nng\">forbedringen<\/a><\/noindex> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/github.com\/vusec\/ridl\/\">af exploit-en<\/a><\/noindex>, der muligg\u00f8r anvendelse af angrebsmetoderne <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">RIDL<\/a><\/noindex> til at bestemme indholdet af root-password-hash fra \/etc\/shadow ved periodiske autentifikationsfors\u00f8g. Hvis den oprindeligt foresl\u00e5ede exploit kunne bestemme password-hash'en p\u00e5 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=JXPebaGY8RA\">24 timer<\/a><\/noindex>, og efter anvendelse af l\u00e6kagen under drift af den asynkrone afbrydelsesmekanisme (TAA, TSX Asynchronous Abort) udf\u00f8rte en tilsvarende operation p\u00e5 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=zaTxBZXE9pQ\">36 sekunder<\/a><\/noindex>, s\u00e5 udf\u00f8rer den nye variant angrebet p\u00e5 4 sekunder.<\/p>\n<p><center><div class=\"youtube-placeholder\" data-id=\"4DQAcCfg3b8\" onclick=\"loadVideo(this)\">\r\n        <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/img.youtube.com\/vi\/4DQAcCfg3b8\/hqdefault.jpg\" alt=\"Afspil video\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"480\" height=\"360\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;\">\r\n        <div class=\"play-button\"><\/div>\r\n    <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"link\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<p>Kilde: <a \ncontent=\"nofollow\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=52260\">opennet.ru<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0445 \u0432 CPU Intel, \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u044d\u0448\u0430 L1D (CVE-2020-0549, L1DES &#8212; L1D Eviction Sampling) \u0438 \u0432\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432 (CVE-2020-0548, VRS &#8212; Vector Register Sampling). \u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0441\u044f\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043a \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0443 MDS (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) \u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u043e\u0432 \u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043c \u043a\u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0430\u043c \u043a \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u0432 \u043c\u0438\u043a\u0440\u043e\u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0445. AMD, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55763","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.3 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0445 \u0432 CPU Intel, \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u044d\u0448\u0430.\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"max-image-preview:large\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Yuri Gagarin\"\/>\n\t<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/da\/blog\/news\/l1des-cacheout-i-vrs-novye-uyazvimosti-v-mikroarhitekturnyh-strukturah-cpu-intel\" \/>\n\t\t<meta name=\"generator\" content=\"All in One SEO (AIOSEO) 5.0.3\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"da_DK\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"\ud83e\udd47L1DES (CacheOut) \u0438 VRS \u2014 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0432 \u043c\u0438\u043a\u0440\u043e\u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0445 CPU Intel | ProHoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044f\u0445 \u0432 CPU Intel, \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u044d\u0448\u0430.\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/da\/blog\/news\/l1des-cacheout-i-vrs-novye-uyazvimosti-v-mikroarhitekturnyh-strukturah-cpu-intel\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:secure_url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2020-01-27T21:00:00+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2020-02-18T11:03:54+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO -->\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47L1DES (CacheOut) og VRS - 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