There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed

We are talking about what DANE technology is for DNS domain name authentication and why it is not widely used in browsers.

There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed
/Unsplash/ Paulius Dragunas

What is DANE

Certification Authorities (CAs) are organizations that deal cryptographic certificate SSL certificates. They put their electronic signature on them, confirming the authenticity. However, sometimes situations arise when certificates are issued with violations. For example, last year Google initiated a β€œtrust termination procedure” for Symantec certificates due to their compromise (we covered this story in detail in our blog - time ΠΈ two).

To avoid such situations, a few years ago at the IETF began to develop DANE technology (but it is not widely used in browsers - why it happened, we'll talk further).

DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities) is a set of specifications that allows DNSSEC (Name System Security Extensions) to be used to validate SSL certificates. DNSSEC is an extension to the Domain Name System that minimizes address spoofing attacks. Using these two technologies, a webmaster or client can contact one of the DNS zone operators and confirm the validity of the certificate used.

In fact, DANE acts as a self-signed certificate (the guarantor of its reliability is DNSSEC) and complements the functions of CA.

How it works

The DANE specification is described in RFC6698. According to the document, DNS resource records A new type has been added - TLSA. It contains information about the transmitted certificate, the dimension and type of the transmitted data, as well as the data itself. The webmaster creates a thumbprint of the certificate, signs it using DNSSEC, and places it in TLSA.

The client connects to a site on the Internet and compares its certificate with the "copy" received from the DNS operator. If they match, then the resource is considered trusted.

The DANE wiki page provides the following example of a DNS query to the example.org server on TCP port 443:

IN TLSA _443._tcp.example.org

The answer looks like this:

 _443._tcp.example.com. IN TLSA (
   3 0 0 30820307308201efa003020102020... )

DANE has several extensions that work with DNS records other than TLSA. The first is an SSHFP DNS entry for checking keys on SSH connections. It is described in RFC4255RFC6594 ΠΈ RFC7479. The second is the OPENPGPKEY entry for PGP key exchange (RFC7929). Finally, the third is the SMIMEA record (the standard is not formalized in the RFC, there is only his draft) for cryptographic key exchange over S/MIME.

What is the problem with DANE

In mid-May, the DNS-OARC conference (this is a non-profit organization that deals with security, stability and development of the domain name system) was held. On one of the panels, experts came to the conclusionthat DANE has failed in browsers (at least in the current implementation). Conference attendee Geoff Huston, Principal Scientist APNIC, one of the five regional Internet registrars, responded about DANE as a "dead technology".

Popular browsers do not support certificate authentication with DANE. On the market there are special plugins, which expose the functionality of TLSA records, but also their support gradually stop.

Problems with the distribution of DANE in browsers are associated with the duration of the DNSSEC validation process. The system is forced to perform cryptographic calculations to verify the authenticity of the SSL certificate and go through the entire chain of DNS servers (from the root zone to the host domain) when it first connects to the resource.

There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed
/Unsplash/ Kaley Dykstra

Mozilla tried to eliminate this shortcoming using the mechanism DNSSEC Chain Extension for TLS. He was supposed to reduce the number of DNS records that the client had to look up during authentication. However, disagreements arose within the development team that could not be resolved. As a result, the project was abandoned, although it was approved by the IETF in March 2018.

Another reason for the low popularity of DANE is the low prevalence of DNSSEC in the world - only 19% of resources work with it. The experts felt that this was not enough for the active promotion of DANE.

Most likely, the industry will develop in a different direction. Instead of using DNS to verify SSL/TLS certificates, market players, on the contrary, will promote the DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) protocols. The latter we mentioned in one of our previous materials on Habr. They encrypt and verify user requests to the DNS server, preventing attackers from spoofing data. At the beginning of the year DoT already introduced to Google for their Public DNS. As for DANE, whether the technology will be able to β€œreturn to the saddle” and still become mainstream remains to be seen in the future.

What else do we have for further reading:

There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed How to automate IT infrastructure management - discussing three trends
There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed JMAP is an open protocol that will replace IMAP when exchanging emails.

There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed How to save money with the API
There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed DevOps in a cloud service using the example of 1cloud.ru
There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed The evolution of cloud architecture 1cloud

There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed How 1cloud technical support works
There is an opinion: DANE technology for browsers has failed Cloud Myths

Source: habr.com

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