An overview of the key components of the "Autonomous Logistics Information System" (ALIS) of the F-35 Unified Strike Fighter. A detailed analysis of the “combat use support unit” and its four key components: 1) human-system interface, 2) executive-control system, 3) on-board immune system, 4) avionics system. Some information about the F-35 fighter software and hardware and about the tools that are used for its on-board software. A comparison with earlier models of combat fighters is given, and prospects for the further development of army aviation are also indicated.
The F-35 fighter is a flying swarm of all sorts of high-tech sensors, providing a total of "360-degree situational awareness."
Introduction
Air force hardware systems have become more and more complex over time. [27] Gradually, their cyber infrastructure (software and hardware components that require fine algorithmic tuning) is also becoming more complex. Using the example of the US Air Force, one can see how the cyber infrastructure of combat aviation, in comparison with its traditional hardware components, has gradually expanded from less than 5% (for the F-4, a third generation fighter) to more than 90% (for the F-35, fifth generation fighter). [5] Algorithmic fine-tuning of this cyber infrastructure in the F-35 is the responsibility of the latest software specially developed for this purpose: the "Autonomous Logistics Information System" (ALIS).
Autonomous Logistics Information System
In the era of 5th generation fighters, combat superiority is measured primarily by the quality of situational awareness. [10] Therefore, the F-35 fighter is a flying swarm of all kinds of high-tech sensors, providing a total of 360-degree situational awareness. [11] A new popular hit in this regard is the so-called. "Integrated Sensor Architecture" (ISA), which includes sensors that independently interact dynamically with each other (not only in a calm, but also in a contested tactical environment), - which, in theory, should lead to an even greater increase in the quality of situational awareness. [7]. However, in order for this theory to be put into practice, high-quality algorithmic processing of all data coming from sensors is necessary.
Therefore, the F-35 constantly carries software on its board, the total size of the source codes of which exceeds 20 million lines, for which it is often called a "flying computer". [6] Since in the current fifth era of strike fighters, combat superiority is measured by the quality of situational awareness, almost 50% of this program code (8,6 million lines) conducts the most complex algorithmic processing - to glue all the data coming from the sensors into a single picture of the theater of operations. In real time.
The dynamics of shifting the onboard functionality of US combat fighters towards software
Responsible for this on board the F-35 is the "Autonomous Logistics Information System" (ALIS), which provides the fighter with skills such as 1) planning (through advanced avionics systems), 2) maintenance (the ability to act as a leading combat unit) and 3) strengthening (the ability to act as a slave combat unit). [4] The glue code is the main component of ALIS, which accounts for 95% of the F-35's onboard code. The other 50% of the ALIS code performs somewhat minor but also algorithmically very intensive operations. [12] Therefore, the F-35 is one of the most complex combat systems ever developed. [6]
ALIS is a conditionally autopilot system that combines an integrated complex of a wide variety of onboard subsystems; and also includes effective communication with the pilot by providing him with quality information about the theater of operations (situational awareness). The ALIS software core is constantly running in the background, assisting the pilot in making decisions and giving him hints at critical moments in the flight. [13]
Combat use support unit
One of the most important ALIS subsystems is the “combat use support unit”, which consists of five main elements [13]:
1) "Human-system interface" - provides high-quality visualization of the theater of operations (ergonomic, comprehensive, concise). [12] Observing this theatre, the pilot makes tactical decisions and issues combat commands, which are in turn processed by the IKS unit.
2) "Executive-control system" (ICS) - interacting with the control units of onboard weapons, ensures the execution of combat commands, which are given by the pilot through the human-system interface. The ICS also registers the actual damage from the use of each combat command (by means of feedback sensors) for its subsequent analysis by the avionics system.
3) "Onboard immune system" (BIS) - monitors external threats and, when they are detected, takes countermeasures necessary to eliminate threats. At the same time, the BIS can use the support of friendly combat units participating in a joint tactical operation. [8] To do this, LSI closely interacts with avionics systems - through a communication system.
4) "Avionics System" - converts the raw stream of data coming from various sensors into high-quality situational awareness, available to the pilot through a human-system interface.
5) "Communication system" - manages on-board and external network traffic, etc. serves as a link between all on-board systems; as well as between all combat units participating in the joint tactical operation.
Human-system interface
To meet the demand for high-quality and comprehensive situational awareness, communications and visualization in the cockpit of a fighter aircraft are critical. The face of ALIS in general and the combat use support unit in particular is the “panoramic visualization display subsystem” (L-3 Communications Display Systems). It includes a large high-definition touch screen (LADD) and a broadband link. The L-3 software runs on the Integrity 178B OS (Green Hills Software's real-time operating system), which is the F-35's main on-board operating system.
The F-35 Cyber Infrastructure Architects chose the Integrity 178B OS based on six operating system-specific features: 1) adherence to open architecture standards, 2) Linux compatibility, 3) POSIX API compatibility, 4) secure memory allocation, 5) meeting specific requirements security and 6) support for the ARINC 653 specification. [12] ARINC 653 is an application software interface for avionics applications. This interface regulates the temporal and spatial division of aviation computing system resources in accordance with the principles of integrated modular avionics; and also defines the programming interface that the application software must use to access the resources of the computing system.
Display subsystem for panoramic imaging
Executive control system
As noted above, the ICS, interacting with the onboard weapons control units, ensures the execution of combat commands and the registration of actual damage from the use of each combat command. The heart of the IKS is a supercomputer, which is quite naturally also referred to as "airborne weapons".
Since the volume of tasks assigned to the onboard supercomputer is colossal, it has increased strength and meets high requirements for fault tolerance and computing power; it is also equipped with an efficient liquid cooling system. All these measures are taken to ensure that the on-board computer system is able to efficiently process huge amounts of data and perform advanced algorithmic processing - which provide the pilot with effective situational awareness: give him comprehensive information about the theater of operations. [12]
The on-board supercomputer of the F-35 fighter is capable of continuously performing 40 billion operations per second, thanks to which it provides multi-tasking execution of resource-intensive advanced avionics algorithms (including the processing of electro-optical, infrared and radar data). [9] In real time. For the F-35 fighter, it is not possible to conduct all these algorithmically intensive calculations on the side (so as not to equip each combat unit with a supercomputer), because the intensity of the total flow of data coming from all sensors exceeds the bandwidth of the fastest communication systems - at least 1000 times. [12]
To ensure increased reliability, all critical on-board systems of the F-35 fighter (including, to some extent, the on-board supercomputer) are implemented using the principle of redundancy: so that several different devices can potentially perform the same task on board. Moreover, the redundancy requirement is such that duplicate elements are developed by alternative manufacturers and have an alternative architecture. Due to this, the probability of simultaneous failure of the original and the duplicate is reduced. [1, 2] This is also why the host computer runs a Linux-like operating system, while the slave computers run Windows. [2] Also, in order to ensure that if one of the computers fails, the combat use support unit can continue to function (at least in emergency mode), the ALIS core architecture is built on the principle of "multi-threaded client-server for distributed computing". [18]
Onboard immune system
In a contested tactical environment, maintaining airborne immunity requires an effective combination of robustness, redundancy, diversity, and distributed functionality. Yesterday's military aviation did not have a unified onboard immune system (BIS). Her, aviation, BIS was fragmented and consisted of several independent components. Each of these components has been optimized to withstand a certain narrow set of weapons systems: 1) ballistic projectiles, 2) missiles aimed at a source of radio frequency or electro-optical signal, 3) laser radiation, 4) radar radiation, etc. When an attack was detected, the corresponding LSI subsystem was automatically activated and took countermeasures.
The components of yesterday's BIS were designed and developed independently of each other - by different contractors. Because these components typically had a closed architecture, LSI upgrades, as new technologies and new weapon systems emerged, came down to adding another independent LIS component. The fundamental disadvantage of such a fragmented LSI, consisting of independent components with a closed architecture, is that its fragments cannot interact with each other and are not amenable to centralized coordination. In other words, they cannot communicate with each other and perform joint operations, which limits the reliability and adaptability of the entire LSI as a whole. For example, if one of the immune subsystems fails or is destroyed, other subsystems cannot effectively compensate for this loss. In addition, LSI fragmentation very often leads to duplication of high-tech components, such as processors and displays [8], which, in the context of the “evergreen problem”, reducing SWaP (size, mass and power consumption) [16] is very wasteful. Not surprisingly, these early LSIs are slowly becoming obsolete.
The fragmented LSI is being replaced by a single distributed onboard immune system, controlled by an “intellectual-cognitive controller” (ICC). The ICC is a special program - the onboard central nervous system - functioning on top of the integrated subsystems included in the BIS. This program unites all LSI subsystems into a single distributed network (with common information and common resources), and also connects all LSI with the central processor and other on-board systems. [8] The basis for such a combination (including integration with components that will be developed in the future) is the generally accepted concept of “system of systems” (SoS), [3] - with its distinctive characteristics such as scalability, public specification and open architecture software and hardware.
ICC has access to information of all BIS subsystems; its function is to compare and analyze the information coming from LSI subsystems. The ICC constantly works in the background, continuously interacting with all LSI subsystems - identifying each potential threat, localizing it, and finally, recommending to the pilot the optimal set of countermeasures (taking into account the unique capabilities of each of the LSI subsystems). For this, the ICC uses advanced cognitive algorithms [17–25].
That. Each aircraft has its own individual ICC. However, in order to achieve even greater integration (and, as a result, greater reliability), the ICC of all aircraft participating in a tactical operation are combined into a single common network, which is coordinated by the “Autonomous Logistics Information System” (ALIS). [4] When one of the ICCs identifies a threat, ALIS calculates the most effective countermeasures - using the information of all the ICCs and the support of all combat units participating in the tactical operation. ALIS "knows" the individual characteristics of each ICC, and uses them to implement coordinated response countermeasures.
A distributed LSI deals with external (related to enemy combat operations) and internal (related to piloting style and operational nuances) threats. On board the F-35 fighter, the avionics system is responsible for processing external threats, and VRAMS (Intelligent Risk Information System associated with dangerous maneuvers for equipment) is responsible for processing internal threats. [13] The main objective of VRAMS is to extend the periods of operation of the aircraft between necessary maintenance sessions. To do this, VRAMS collects real-time information about the health of the basic onboard subsystems (aircraft engine, auxiliary drives, mechanical components, electrical subsystems) and analyzes their technical condition; taking into account parameters such as temperature peaks, pressure drops, vibration dynamics and all sorts of interference. Based on this information, VRAMS gives the pilot advance advice on how to proceed in order to keep the aircraft safe and sound. VRAMS "predicts" what consequences certain actions of the pilot can lead to, and also gives recommendations on how to avoid them. [13]
The benchmark that VRAMS aims for is zero maintenance while maintaining ultra-reliability and reduced structural fatigue. To achieve this goal, research laboratories are working to create materials with a smart structure - which will be able to work effectively in zero maintenance conditions. Researchers at these labs are developing methods to detect microcracks and other pre-failure phenomena in order to prevent possible failures in advance. Research is also underway towards a better understanding of the phenomenon of structural fatigue, in order to use this data to regulate aircraft maneuvers in order to reduce structural fatigue - and so on. extend the useful life of the aircraft. [13] In this regard, it is interesting to note that about 50% of the articles in the Advanced in Engineering Software journal are devoted to the analysis of the strength and vulnerability of reinforced concrete and other structures.
Intelligent system for informing about the risks associated with dangerous maneuvers for equipment
Advanced Avionics System
The F-35 airborne combat support unit includes an advanced avionics system, which is designed to solve an ambitious task:
Yesterday's avionics systems included several independent subsystems (controlling infrared and ultraviolet sensors, radar, sonar, electronic warfare and others), each of which was equipped with its own display. Because of what the pilot had to take turns looking at each of the displays and manually analyze and compare the data coming from them. On the other hand, today's avionics system, which in particular is equipped with the F-35 fighter, presents all the data that was previously disparate as a single resource; on one common display. That. a modern avionics system is an integrated network-centric data fusion complex that provides the pilot with the most effective situational awareness; thus relieving him of the need to perform complex analytical calculations. As a result, due to the elimination of the human factor from the analytical loop, the pilot can now not be distracted from the main combat mission.
One of the first significant attempts to eliminate the human factor from the avionics analytical loop was implemented in the cyber infrastructure of the F-22 fighter. On board this fighter, an algorithmically intensive program is responsible for high-quality gluing of data coming from various sensors, the total size of the source codes of which is 1,7 million lines. At the same time, 90% of the code is written in Ada. However, the modern avionics system - controlled by the ALIS program - that the F-35 fighter is equipped with has advanced significantly compared to the F-22 fighter.
The prototype of ALIS was the software of the F-22 fighter. However, data gluing is no longer 1,7 million lines of code, but 8,6 million. At the same time, the vast majority of the code is written in C/C++. The main task of all this algorithmically intensive code is to evaluate what information will be relevant for the pilot. As a result, by keeping only critical data in the theater picture, the pilot is now able to make faster and more effective decisions. That. the modern avionics system, which in particular the F-35 fighter is equipped with, removes the analytical burden from the pilot, and finally allows him to just fly. [12]
Avionics of the old type
Sidebar: Development tools used on board the F-35
Some [small] software components of the F-35 onboard cyber infrastructure are written in such relic languages as Ada, CMS-2Y, FORTRAN. Software blocks written in Ada are usually borrowed from the F-22 fighter. [12] However, the code written in these relic languages is only a small part of the F-35's software. The main programming language for the F-35 is C/C++. Also on board the F-35 are relational and object-oriented databases. [14] Databases are used on board to work effectively with big data. To enable this work to be done in real time, databases are used in conjunction with a hardware graph analysis accelerator. [15]
Sidebar: Backdoors in the F-35
All components that make up modern American military equipment are 1) either custom-made, 2) either customized from available commercial products, 3) or are a boxed commercial solution. At the same time, in all these three cases, manufacturers, either of individual components or of the entire system as a whole, have a dubious pedigree, which, as a rule, originates outside the country. As a result, there is a risk that in some of the links in the supply chain (which is often stretched all over the world) - a backdoor or malware will be built into the software and hardware component (either at the software or hardware level). In addition, the US Air Force is known to use more than 1 million counterfeit electronic components, which also increases the likelihood of malicious code and backdoors on board. Not to mention that a counterfeit is usually a low-quality and unstable copy of the original, with all the consequences. [5]
ALIS core architecture
Summarizing the description of all onboard systems, we can say that the main requirements for them are reduced to the following theses: integrativity and scalability; public specification and open architecture; ergonomics and conciseness; stability, redundancy, diversity, increased fault tolerance and durability; distributed functionality. The ALIS core architecture is a comprehensive response to all these broad and ambitious conflicting demands that are placed on the F-35 unified strike fighter.
However, this architecture, like everything ingenious, is simple. It was based on the concept of finite automata. The application of this concept within ALIS is realized in the fact that all components of the on-board software of the F-35 fighter have a unified structure. In combination with a multi-threaded client-server architecture for distributed computing, the ALIS automaton kernel meets all the conflicting requirements described above. Each ALIS software component consists of an interface ".h-file" and an algorithmic configuration ".cpp-file". Their generalized structure is given in the source files attached to the article (see the following three spoilers).
automata1.cpp
#include "battle.h"
CBattle::~CBattle()
{
}
BOOL CBattle::Battle()
{
BATTLE_STATE state;
switch (m_state)
{
case AU_BATTLE_STATE_1:
if (!State1Handler(...))
return FALSE;
m_state = AU_STATE_X;
break;
case AU_BATTLE_STATE_2:
if (!State2Handler(...))
return FALSE;
m_state = AU_STATE_X;
break;
case AU_BATTLE_STATE_N:
if (!StateNHandler(...))
return FALSE;
m_state = AU_STATE_X;
break;
}
return TRUE;
}automata1.h
#ifndef AUTOMATA1_H
#define AUTOMATA1_H
typedef enum AUTOMATA1_STATE { AU1_STATE_1, AU1_STATE_2, ... AU1_STATE_N };
class CAutomata1
{
public:
CAutomata1();
~CAutomata1();
BOOL Automata1();
private:
BOOL State1Habdler(...);
BOOL State2Handler(...);
...
BOOL StateNHandler(...);
AUTOMATA1 m_state;
};
#endifmain.cpp
#include "automata1.h"
void main()
{
CAutomata1 *pAutomata1;
pAutomata1 = new CAutomata1();
while (pAutomata->Automata1()) {}
delete pAutomata1;
}Summing up, it can be noted that in the contested tactical environment, combat superiority is possessed by such combat units of the Air Force, whose airborne cyber infrastructure effectively combines resilience, redundancy, diversity and distributed functionality. ICC and ALIS of modern aviation meet these requirements. However, the degree of their integration in the future will also be expanded to interaction with other army units, while now the effective integration of the Air Force covers only its own unit.
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PS. The article was originally published in .
Source: habr.com