{"id":103534,"date":"2022-03-14T15:36:53","date_gmt":"2022-03-14T13:36:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/dostupen-tuf-1-0-frejmvork-dlya-organizaczii-bezopasnoj-dostavki-obnovlenij"},"modified":"2022-03-14T15:36:53","modified_gmt":"2022-03-14T13:36:55","slug":"dostupen-tuf-1-0-frejmvork-dlya-organizaczii-bezopasnoj-dostavki-obnovlenij","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/dostupen-tuf-1-0-frejmvork-dlya-organizaczii-bezopasnoj-dostavki-obnovlenij","title":{"rendered":"TUF 1.0 is now available, a framework for organizing secure delivery of updates.","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"
The TUF 1.0 (The Update Framework) release has been published, providing tools for the secure verification of the existence and downloading of updates. The primary goal of the project is to protect clients from common attacks on repositories and infrastructures, including countering the promotion of malicious fake updates created after gaining access to keys for generating digital signatures or compromising repositories. The project is developed under the auspices of the Linux Foundation and is used to enhance the security of update delivery in projects like Docker, Fuchsia, Automotive Grade Linux, Bottlerocket, and PyPI (verification of downloads and metadata in PyPI is expected soon). The reference implementation code for TUF is written in Python and is distributed under the Apache 2.0 license. <\/p>\n
The project is developing a series of libraries, file formats, and tools that can easily integrate into existing application update systems, providing protection in case of key compromise on the software developers' side. To use TUF, it is sufficient to add the necessary metadata to the repository and integrate the provided TUF procedures for downloading and verifying files into the client code. <\/p>\n
The TUF framework takes on the tasks of checking for updates, downloading updates, and verifying their integrity. The update installation system does not directly overlap with the additional metadata, which is managed by TUF for verification and download. A low-level API is offered for integration with applications and update installation systems to access metadata, as well as a high-level client API (ngclient) that is ready for integration with applications. <\/p>\n
Among the attacks that TUF can counter are the substitution of old releases as updates with the aim of blocking patches for vulnerabilities in the software or rolling back users to an old vulnerable version, as well as the promotion of malicious updates correctly signed using compromised keys, and executing DoS attacks on clients, such as endlessly filling the disk with updates. <\/p>\n
Protection against the compromise of the software vendor's infrastructure is achieved by maintaining separate verifiable records of the state of the repository or application. Verifiable TUF metadata includes information about trustworthy keys, cryptographic hashes for assessing file integrity, additional digital signatures for attesting metadata, version numbers, and expiration data for records. The keys used for verification have a limited lifespan and require constant updating to protect against signatures being formed by old keys. <\/p>\n
The risk of compromising the entire system is mitigated by using a model of trust separation, in which each party is limited to the area for which it is directly responsible. The system employs a hierarchy of roles with their own keys; for example, the root role signs keys for roles responsible for metadata in the repository, the timestamps for updates, and target builds. In turn, the role responsible for builds signs roles related to the attestation of delivered files.
<\/center> <\/p>\n
To protect against key compromise, an operational key revocation and replacement mechanism is employed. Each individual key is concentrated with only the minimally necessary permissions, and multiple keys are required for attestation operations (the leakage of a single key does not immediately allow an attack on the client, and compromising the entire system requires capturing the keys of all participants). The client can only accept files created later than those already received, and data is loaded only in accordance with the size specified in the attested metadata. <\/p>\n
The released version TUF 1.0.0 offers a completely rewritten and stabilized reference implementation of the TUF specification, which can be used as a ready-made example when creating your own implementations or for integration into your projects. The new implementation contains significantly less code (1400 lines instead of 4700), is easier to maintain, and can be easily extended, for example, when adding support for specific network stacks, storage systems, or encryption algorithms. \n Source: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
![\"TUF](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/e88156df6bdc88b840e7f230c7588cbb.jpg\")
<\/center> <\/p>\n