{"id":113253,"date":"2024-01-30T13:41:05","date_gmt":"2024-01-30T11:41:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/uyazvimosti-v-realizaczii-jpeg-xl-iz-sostava-ffmpeg"},"modified":"2024-01-30T13:41:05","modified_gmt":"2024-01-30T11:41:05","slug":"uyazvimosti-v-realizaczii-jpeg-xl-iz-sostava-ffmpeg","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/uyazvimosti-v-realizaczii-jpeg-xl-iz-sostava-ffmpeg","title":{"rendered":"Vulnerabilities in the implementation of JPEG XL from FFmpeg","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"
Details have emerged about two vulnerabilities in the JPEG XL format decoder supplied with the FFmpeg package, which could allow an attacker to execute code when processing specially crafted images in FFmpeg. The issues were resolved in the FFmpeg 6.1 release, but since support for JPEG XL is included starting from branch 6.1, the vulnerability affects only systems using experimental builds of FFmpeg 6.1 or carrying changes from it. <\/p>\n
The first vulnerability (CVE-2024-22860) is caused by an integer overflow in the JPEG XL parser, resulting from the lack of a size overflow check for the int type. The second vulnerability (CVE-2024-22862) arose due to an integer overflow in the jpegxl_anim_read_packet function, used for decoding animations, and is related to the use of a signed int64_t type instead of an unsigned uint64_t. These issues are specific to FFmpeg and do not manifest in the reference implementation of libjxl. \n Source: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"