{"id":144093,"date":"2025-10-04T05:11:54","date_gmt":"2025-10-04T03:11:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/uyazvimost-v-red-hat-openshift-ai-dopuskayushhaya-root-dostup-k-uzlam-klastera"},"modified":"2025-10-04T05:11:54","modified_gmt":"2025-10-04T03:11:54","slug":"uyazvimost-v-red-hat-openshift-ai-dopuskayushhaya-root-dostup-k-uzlam-klastera","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/uyazvimost-v-red-hat-openshift-ai-dopuskayushhaya-root-dostup-k-uzlam-klastera","title":{"rendered":"Vulnerability in Red Hat OpenShift AI allowing root access to cluster nodes","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"
A vulnerability (CVE-2025-10725) has been identified in the OpenShift AI Service platform, which allows the organization of a cluster for running and training AI models. This vulnerability enables an unprivileged user to gain administrator rights to the cluster. Following a successful attack, the attacker gains control over the cluster, full access to all services, data, and applications running in the cluster, as well as root access to the cluster nodes. <\/p>\n
An attack can be executed with any non-privileged authenticated access to the platform; for example, an OpenShift AI researcher using a Jupyter notebook could carry out the attack. The issue has been assigned a critical danger level \u2014 9.9 out of 10. <\/p>\n
The vulnerability is caused by incorrect role assignment of the \u2018kueue-batch-user-role\u2019, which was mistakenly tied to the \u2018system:authenticated\u2019 group, allowing any service user to create a job (OpenShift Job) in any namespace. Among other things, any user could create a job in the privileged namespace \u2018openshift-apiserver-operator\u2019 and configure it to run with ServiceAccount privileges. <\/p>\n
In the environment for executing code with ServiceAccount privileges, an access token with ServiceAccount rights is available, which the attacker could extract and use to compromise more privileged accounts. Ultimately, the attack could escalate to gaining root access to master nodes, after which the attacker would have full control over all cluster contents. \n Source: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"