{"id":184233,"date":"2026-11-12T11:41:15","date_gmt":"2026-11-12T09:41:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/news\/udostoveryayushhij-czentr-emudhra-otozval-eshhyo-8-promezhutochnyh-kornevyh-sertifikatov"},"modified":"2026-11-12T11:41:21","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T09:41:21","slug":"emudhra-certificate-authority-revokes-8-more-intermediate-root-certificates","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/emudhra-certificate-authority-revokes-8-more-intermediate-root-certificates","title":{"rendered":"The eMudhra certification authority has revoked another 8 intermediate root certificates","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"
eMudhra has revealed additional details regarding an incident in which eight root certificates of a certification authority had easily guessable private keys, possessing only 1 byte of entropy instead of 48. In addition to the initially identified problematic intermediate root certificates, another 8 have been revoked, but not due to entropy issues. The analysis showed that the source of the entropy problems was a self-written Python script used to transfer private keys between hardware security modules (HSM) from different manufacturers. The transfer of keys was necessitated by delays in the delivery of upgraded HSM models that meet the new requirements for certification authorities. <\/p>\n
Due to an error, the size of the ECDSA private keys was cut down to 1 byte. Additionally, during the transfer of keys between HSM, the script processed private keys in the unprotected RAM of the computer on which it was running, whereas operations with private keys should only be performed inside the HSM. HSM logs confirmed that the hardware storage operated correctly, and the problem was caused by the use of a homemade script. <\/p>\n