{"id":33659,"date":"2019-10-31T21:53:59","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:53:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T21:53:59","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:53:59","slug":"predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","title":{"rendered":"A new class of vulnerabilities has been introduced in Intel processors.","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Intel Corporation <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/security-center\/advisory\/intel-sa-00233.html\">released<\/a><\/noindex> Information about the new <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">class of vulnerabilities<\/a><\/noindex> in its processors \u2014 <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">MDS<\/a><\/noindex> (Microarchitectural Data Sampling). Like previous Spectre class attacks, the new issues may lead to the leakage of sensitive data from the operating system, virtual machines, and other processes. It is claimed that the problems were first identified by Intel employees and partners during an internal audit, after which independent researchers were informed about similar issues at Intel. AMD and ARM processors are not affected by the problem.<\/p>\n<p>Based on the identified issues, researchers from Graz University of Technology (Austria) <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cpu.fail\/\">developed<\/a><\/noindex> several practical attacks via side channels:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/\">ZombieLoad<\/a><\/noindex>  (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/zombieload.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) \u2014 allows the extraction of confidential information from other processes, the operating system, virtual machines, and trusted enclaves (TEE, Trusted Execution Environment). For example, the ability to determine the browsing history in the Tor browser running in another virtual machine has been demonstrated, as well as the identification of access keys and passwords used in applications;\n<p><center><br \/>\n<video controls=\"\" style=\"width: 720px; max-width:100%\" poster=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/images\/demo.jpg\"  src=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/videos\/demo_720.mp4\"><source src=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/videos\/demo_720.mp4\" type=\"video\/mp4\" label=\"720p\"><\/video><\/center><\/p>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">RIDL<\/a><\/noindex> (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/files\/ridl.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) \u2014 enables information leaks between various isolated areas in Intel processors, such as fill buffers, store buffers, and load ports. Examples of attacks have shown how to facilitate leaks from other processes, the operating system, virtual machines, and trusted enclaves. For instance, it has been demonstrated how to retrieve the contents of the root password hash from \/etc\/shadow during periodic authentication attempts (the attack took 24 hours);\n<p><center><div class=\"youtube-placeholder\" data-id=\"JXPebaGY8RA\" onclick=\"loadVideo(this)\">\r\n        <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/img.youtube.com\/vi\/JXPebaGY8RA\/hqdefault.jpg\" alt=\"Play video\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"480\" height=\"360\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;\">\r\n        <div class=\"play-button\"><\/div>\r\n    <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n<p>Additionally, an example of conducting an attack using JavaScript and WebAssembly when opening a malicious page in the SpiderMonkey engine was shown (in modern full-featured browsers, such an attack is unlikely due to timer precision restrictions and protections against Spectre);<\/p>\n<p><center><div class=\"youtube-placeholder\" data-id=\"KAgoDQmod1Y\" onclick=\"loadVideo(this)\">\r\n        <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/img.youtube.com\/vi\/KAgoDQmod1Y\/hqdefault.jpg\" alt=\"Play video\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"480\" height=\"360\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;\">\r\n        <div class=\"play-button\"><\/div>\r\n    <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">Fallout<\/a><\/noindex> (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/files\/fallout.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) \u2014 allows reading data recently written by the operating system and determining the memory layout of the OS to simplify the execution of other attacks;\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cpu.fail\/store_to_leak_forwarding.pdf\">Store-To-Leak Forwarding<\/a><\/noindex> \u2014 exploits CPU optimizations related to working with store buffers and can be used to bypass the Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) mechanism, for monitoring the operating state of the system or for <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cyberus-technology.de\/posts\/2019-05-14-zombieload.html\">organizing<\/a><\/noindex> leaks in combination with gadgets based on Spectre methods.\n<\/ul>\n<p>Identified <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/microarchitectural-data-sampling\">a vulnerability<\/a><\/noindex>:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12126 \u2014 MSBDS (Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling), recovery of the contents of store buffers. Used in the Fallout attack. The threat level is rated at 6.5 (CVSS);\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12127 \u2014 MLPDS (Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling), recovery of the contents of load ports. Used in the RIDL attack. CVSS 6.5;\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12130 \u2014 MFBDS (Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling), recovery of the contents of fill buffers. Used in the ZombieLoad and RIDL attacks. CVSS 6.5;\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2019-11091 \u2014 MDSUM (Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory), recovery of the contents of uncacheable memory. Used in the RIDL attack. CVSS 3.8.\n<\/ul>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/insights\/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling\">Essence<\/a><\/noindex> Identified issues in the applicability of side-channel analysis methods to data in microarchitectural structures that applications do not have direct access to. This refers to low-level structures such as fill buffers, store buffers, and load ports, which are smaller components than level 1 (L1D) cache, data load cache (RDCL), or L1TF (L1 Terminal Fault), and thus contain less information and are updated more frequently.<br \/>\n<center><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"A new class of vulnerabilities has been introduced in Intel processors.\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/205ff034e070b8b057f01c02d6381c2a.png\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/center><\/p>\n<p>Side-channel attacks on microarchitectural structures are significantly more complex to conduct compared to cache content recovery methods and require tracking and analyzing large amounts of data to identify their relationship with specific memory addresses (essentially, an attacker cannot directly intercept specific data but can collect leaks over time and use statistical methods to reconstruct certain types of data). Additionally, the attack only affects data on the same physical CPU core as the attacker's code.<\/p>\n<p>Proposed methods for determining the content of microarchitectural structures are based on the fact that these structures are utilized during speculative exception (fault) or load and store operations.<br \/>\nDuring speculative execution, the content of internal structures is redirected for processing into registers or cache. Speculative operations do not complete, and the result is discarded, but the redirected content can be identified using side-channel cache analysis methods.<\/p>\n<p>Loading ports are used by the processor to obtain data from memory or the input\/output subsystem and provide the retrieved information into CPU registers. Due to the implementation specifics, data from previous loading operations remains in the ports until overwritten by new data, which allows for an indirect determination of data state in the loading port through manipulations with exceptions (faults) and SSE\/AVX\/AVX-512 instructions that load more than 64 bits of data. In such conditions, loading operations speculatively expose outdated data values from internal structures into dependent operations. A similar leakage is organized through the storage buffer, used to accelerate writes to the CPU cache and includes a table of addresses, values, and flags, as well as through the fill buffer, which contains data not yet available in L1 cache (cache miss) while loading from other level caches.<\/p>\n<p><center><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/pics_base\/0_1557869220.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"A new class of vulnerabilities has been introduced in Intel processors.\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/1f8bf290cd6ecbec5a5f17cc3103010d.png\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/a><\/noindex><\/center><\/p>\n<p>The Problem <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/engineering-new-protections-into-hardware.html\">affects<\/a><\/noindex> Intel processor models released since 2011 (starting from the 6th generation). At the same time, hardware vulnerabilities are blocked starting from certain models of the 8th and 9th generations of Intel Core and the 2nd generation of Intel Xeon Scalable (which can be checked via the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR). Vulnerabilities are also <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">four vulnerabilities have been fixed<\/a><\/noindex> at the firmware, microcode, and operating system levels. According to Intel, the performance loss after the activation of the patch for most users <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">does not exceed<\/a><\/noindex> 3%. When disabling Hyper-Threading, the performance drop can reach 9% in the SPECint_rate_base test, up to 11% during active integer computations, and up to 19% when running server Java applications (with HT enabled, performance loss is almost non-existent). The patches practically have no impact on the performance of I\/O related operations.<\/p>\n<p>In the Linux kernel, protection against MDS <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/git.kernel.org\/pub\/scm\/linux\/kernel\/git\/torvalds\/linux.git\/commit\/?id=fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5\">has added<\/a><\/noindex> is in today's <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/\">updates<\/a><\/noindex>  \t5.1.2, 5.0.16,<br \/>\n4.19.43, 4.14.119, and 4.9.176. The protection method <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/doc\/html\/latest\/x86\/mds.html#mds\">is based<\/a><\/noindex> on clearing the contents of microarchitectural buffers at the moment of returning from kernel to user space or when passing control to a guest system, using the VERW instruction. For the protections to work, the MD_CLEAR mode support implemented in the latest microcode update is required. For complete protection, it is also recommended to disable Hyper-Threading. To check the system's vulnerability to the exploit in the Linux kernel. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/doc\/html\/latest\/admin-guide\/hw-vuln\/mds.html\">implemented<\/a><\/noindex> handler \u2018\/sys\/devices\/system\/cpu\/vulnerabilities\/mds\u2019. To manage the enabling of various blocking vulnerability modes, a parameter \u2018mds=\u2019 has been added to the kernel, which can take the values \u2018full\u2019, \u2018full,nosmt\u2019 (disabling Hyper-Threads), \u2018vmwerv\u2019 and \u2018off\u2019.<\/p>\n<p> Package updates have already been released for <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/bugzilla.redhat.com\/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-12127\">SUSE\/openSUSE<\/a><\/noindex> and <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/people.canonical.com\/~ubuntu-security\/cve\/2018\/CVE-2018-12127.html\">Ubuntu<\/a><\/noindex>, but remain unavailable for <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/security-tracker.debian.org\/tracker\/CVE-2018-12130\">Debian<\/a><\/noindex>, <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/bodhi.fedoraproject.org\/updates\/?releases=F30&#038;type=security\">Alpine<\/a><\/noindex> and <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.suse.com\/security\/cve\/CVE-2018-12127\/\">openSUSE<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nThe fix for blocking data leaks from virtual machines also <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/xenbits.xen.org\/xsa\/advisory-297.html\">has been formed<\/a><\/noindex> for the Xen hypervisor. To protect virtualization systems calling the L1D_FLUSH command before handing control over to another virtual machine, and to secure Intel SGX enclaves, a microcode update is sufficient.  <\/p>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"link\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<p>Source: <a \ncontent=\"nofollow\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=50684\">opennet.ru<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0445 &#8212; MDS (Microarchitectural Data Sampling). \u041a\u0430\u043a \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0430 Spectre \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043a \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b, \u0432\u0438\u0440\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043c\u0430\u0448\u0438\u043d \u0438 \u0447\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432. \u0423\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0430 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u044b \u0441\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0438 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043d\u0451\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 Intel \u0432 \u0445\u043e\u0434\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0430, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043e\u0431 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":25348,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-33659","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.1.1 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"max-image-preview:large\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Yuri Gagarin\"\/>\n\t<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"generator\" content=\"All in One SEO (AIOSEO) 5.0.1.1\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"\ud83e\udd47\u041f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0445 Intel | ProHoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:secure_url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2019-10-31T18:53:59+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2019-10-31T18:53:59+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO -->\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47A new class of vulnerabilities has been introduced in Intel processors | ProHoster","description":"Intel has published information about a new","canonical_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","robots":"max-image-preview:large","keywords":"","webmasterTools":{"miscellaneous":""},"schema":null,"og:locale":"en_US","og:site_name":"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b","og:type":"article","og:title":"\ud83e\udd47\u041f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0445 Intel | ProHoster","og:description":"\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c","og:url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","og:image":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:secure_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:width":350,"og:image:height":350,"article:published_time":"2019-10-31T18:53:59+00:00","article:modified_time":"2019-10-31T18:53:59+00:00","article:publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster","article:author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster"},"aioseo_meta_data":{"post_id":"33659","title":null,"description":null,"keywords":null,"keyphrases":null,"primary_term":null,"canonical_url":null,"og_title":null,"og_description":null,"og_object_type":"default","og_image_type":"default","og_image_url":null,"og_image_width":null,"og_image_height":null,"og_image_custom_url":null,"og_image_custom_fields":null,"og_video":null,"og_custom_url":null,"og_article_section":null,"og_article_tags":null,"twitter_use_og":false,"twitter_card":"default","twitter_image_type":"default","twitter_image_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_fields":null,"twitter_title":null,"twitter_description":null,"schema":{"blockGraphs":[],"customGraphs":[],"default":{"data":{"Article":[],"Course":[],"Dataset":[],"FAQPage":[],"Movie":[],"Person":[],"Product":[],"ProductReview":[],"Car":[],"Recipe":[],"Service":[],"SoftwareApplication":[],"WebPage":[]},"graphName":"","isEnabled":true},"graphs":[]},"schema_type":null,"schema_type_options":null,"pillar_content":false,"robots_default":true,"robots_noindex":false,"robots_noarchive":false,"robots_nosnippet":false,"robots_nofollow":false,"robots_noimageindex":false,"robots_noodp":false,"robots_notranslate":false,"robots_max_snippet":null,"robots_max_videopreview":null,"robots_max_imagepreview":"large","priority":null,"frequency":null,"local_seo":null,"seo_analyzer_scan_date":"2026-01-21 16:12:19","breadcrumb_settings":null,"limit_modified_date":false,"reviewed_by":null,"ai":null,"created":"2021-03-01 02:36:34","updated":"2026-01-21 16:12:19","focus_keyword":null,"additional_keywords":null,"truseo_locale":null},"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33659","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=33659"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/33659\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/25348"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=33659"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=33659"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=33659"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}