{"id":36826,"date":"2019-10-31T22:14:01","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T19:14:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/aleksej-savvateev-nobelevskaya-premiya-zhana-tirolya-za-analiz-nesovershennyh-rynkov-2014-i-kollektivnuyu-reputatsiyu\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T22:14:01","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T19:14:01","slug":"aleksej-savvateev-nobelevskaya-premiya-zhana-tirolya-za-analiz-nesovershennyh-rynkov-2014-i-kollektivnuyu-reputatsiyu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/aleksej-savvateev-nobelevskaya-premiya-zhana-tirolya-za-analiz-nesovershennyh-rynkov-2014-i-kollektivnuyu-reputatsiyu","title":{"rendered":"Alexey Savvateev: The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences awarded to Jean Tirole for his analysis of imperfect markets (2014) and collective reputation","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Alexey
\n
\nIf I were to award the Nobel Prize to Jean Tirole, I would do so for his game-theoretic analysis of reputation, or at least include that in the formulation. It seems to me that this is one of those cases where our intuition aligns well with the model, even though it is challenging to test this model. This belongs to a category of models that are difficult or impossible to verify and falsify. However, I believe the idea is absolutely brilliant.<\/p>\n

Nobel Prize<\/h3>\n

\nThe background of the prize is a final departure from the unified concept of general equilibrium as an analysis of any economic situation.<\/p>\n

I apologize to the economists in this room; I will outline the basics of general equilibrium theory in 20 minutes.<\/p>\n

1950<\/h3>\n

\nThe prevailing view is that the economic system is subject to strict laws (like physical reality to Newton's laws). This was a triumph of the approach uniting all sciences under a common roof. What does this roof look like?
\n<\/a><\/noindex>
\nThere is a market. There is a certain number (n) of households, consumers of goods, those for whom the market operates (goods are consumed). And a certain number (J) of subjects in this market (producers of goods). The profit of each producer is somehow divided among consumers.<\/p>\n

There are goods 1, 2\u2026L. A good is something that can be consumed. If the physical good is the same, but consumed at different times or in different locations, then these are considered different goods.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nA good at the moment of consumption at a given point. In particular, the good cannot be of durable use. (Not cars, but rather food, and even then, not all food).<\/p>\n

We have the space RL of production plans. An L-dimensional space where each vector is interpreted as follows. We take the coordinates where negative numbers stand, put them into the 'black box' of production, and output the positive components of the same vector. <\/p>\n

For example, (2, -1, 3) means that from 1 unit of the second good we can produce 2 units of the first and three units of the third simultaneously. If this vector belongs to the set of production possibilities.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nY1, Y2\u2026 YJ are subsets in RL. Each production is a 'black box.'<\/p>\n

Prices (p1, p2\u2026 pL)\u2026 what do they do? They fall from the ceiling.<\/p>\n

You are a manager of a firm. The firm is a set of production plans that can be implemented. What should you do if you receive a signal like this \u2014 (p1, p2\u2026 pL)?<\/p>\n

Classical economics dictates that you assess all vectors of pV that are permissible for you, evaluated at these prices.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nAnd we maximize pV, where V comes from Yj. This is called Pj(p).<\/p>\n

Prices are falling on you, you are informed, and you must unconditionally believe that the prices will be as such. This is called 'price taking behavior'. <\/p>\n

Upon receiving signals from the 'prices', each of the firms issued P1(p), P2(p)\u2026 PJ(p). What happens to them? The left half, consumers, each of whom has initial resources w1(p), w2\u2026wJ(p) and shares of profits in the firms \u03b411, \u03b412\u2026\u03b41J, which will be generated on the right.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThere may be low initial w, but there can be high shares, then the player will proceed from a large budget.<\/p>\n

Additionally, the consumer has preferences \u05d0. They are predetermined and immutable. Preferences will allow him to compare any vectors from RL with each other, based on 'quality' from his perspective. A complete understanding of himself. You've never tried a 'banana' (I tried it at age 10), but you have an idea of it, how you would like it. A very strong informational assumption. <\/p>\n

The consumer makes an evaluation based on the prices of his initial stock pwi and adds profit shares:<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThe consumer also unconditionally believes the incoming prices and assesses his income. Then he starts to spend it and reaches the limits of his monetary capabilities.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThe consumer maximizes his preferences. The utility function. Which xi will bring him the greatest utility. The paradigm of rational behavior. <\/p>\n

There is complete decentralization. Prices fall from the sky. At these prices, all firms maximize their profits. All consumers receive their vouchers and do whatever they want with them, as they wish (maximizing the utility function) spending on available goods at the prevailing prices. Optimized Xi(p) emerges.<\/p>\n

Further, it is stated that prices are in equilibrium, p*, if all decisions of economic agents are consistent with each other. What does consistency mean?<\/p>\n

What was there? Initial stocks, each firm added its own production plan:<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThis is what we have. And this must be equal to what the consumers demanded:<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nEquilibrium prices are called so if this equality is realized. It has as many equations as there are goods.<\/p>\n

It is the year 1880, L\u00e9on Walras<\/a><\/noindex> advocated it in various ways and for 79 years mathematicians-economists sought proof that such an equilibrium vector exists. It came down to very difficult topology, and it could not be proven until 1941 when the Kakutani theorem<\/a><\/noindex>was fully proven in 1951 regarding the existence of equilibrium. <\/p>\n

Gradually, this model has transitioned into the class of the history of economic thought.<\/p>\n

One must go through the entire path oneself and study outdated models. Analyze why they did not work. Where exactly were the objections. Then you will have experience, a good historical insight.<\/p>\n

The history of economics should study the above-described model in detail because all modern market models stem from it.<\/p>\n

Objections<\/h3>\n

\n1. All goods are described extremely abstractly.<\/b> The consumption structure of these goods and durable goods is not taken into account.<\/p>\n

2. Each production, firm is a 'black box'.<\/b>It is described purely axiomatically. A multitude of vectors is taken, and declared permissible.<\/p>\n

3. The 'invisible hand of the market',<\/b>prices fall from the sky.<\/p>\n

4. Firms blindly maximize profit.<\/b><\/p>\n

5. The mechanism for reaching equilibrium.<\/b>Any physicist starts laughing here: how to 'sense' it?). How to prove its uniqueness and stability (at least).<\/p>\n

6. Non-falsifiability of the model<\/b>.<\/p>\n

Falsifiability.<\/b> I have a model, and according to it, I say that such and such scenarios cannot happen in life. These can happen, but those never can, because my model guarantees that there can be no equilibrium in that class. If you present a counterexample, I will say \u2014 that is the boundary of applicability, my model falters for various reasons at that point. This is impossible with the theory of general equilibrium, and here\u2019s why.<\/p>\n

Because... What determines the behavior of the economic system outside of equilibrium? For some 'r'? One can construct a demand exceeding supply.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nWe set prices from the top down and know exactly which products will be in short supply and which will be in excess. Regarding this vector, we can definitively assert (theorem from 1970) that if trivial properties are satisfied, then it is always possible to construct an economic system (specifying initial data) in which this function will represent excess demand. For any specified prices, the corresponding value of the excess vector will be provided. Any reasonable observable behavior can be simulated using the general equilibrium model. Therefore, this model is unfalsifiable. It can predict any behavior, which diminishes its practical relevance.<\/p>\n

In two instances, the general equilibrium model continues to function in an explicit form. There are computable general equilibrium models that assess the macroeconomies of countries at a high level of aggregation. This may not be ideal, but it does provide calculations. <\/p>\n

Second \u2014 there is a very good small specification where the production part changes while the consumption part remains nearly the same. These are models of monopolistic competition. Instead of a 'black box,' a formula emerges that describes how production works, and instead of the 'invisible hand of the market,' it appears that each firm possesses a certain degree of monopolistic power. The main part of the global market is monopolistic.<\/p>\n

It is important to note that accusations against economics are of a rigid nature: 'The model should predict what will happen tomorrow' and 'What should be done if the situation is poor.' These questions within the framework of general equilibrium theory are completely meaningless. There is a theorem (first welfare theorem): 'General equilibrium is always Pareto efficient.' This means that you cannot improve the situation in this system for everyone at once. If you improve for someone, it comes at someone else's expense.<\/p>\n

This theorem sharply contrasts with what we see around us, including point seven:
\n7. 'All goods are private and there are no externalities.'<\/b>.<\/p>\n

In reality, a huge number of goods are interconnected. There are many examples where economic activities influence one another (such as discharging waste into a river, etc.). Intervention may yield improvements for all parties involved.<\/p>\n

Tyrol's main book: 'The Theory of Industrial Organization.'<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nWe cannot expect markets to interact effectively and produce efficient outcomes, as we see around us.<\/p>\n

The question is this: How to intervene to correct the situation?<\/b> Without making it worse?<\/p>\n

There are cases where, theoretically, intervention is necessary, but practically:
\n8. There is a lack of information needed to intervene correctly.<\/b><\/p>\n

In the model of general equilibrium \u2014 it is complete.<\/p>\n

I have already mentioned that this concerns people's preferences. When intervening, it's necessary to understand these preferences. Imagine that you are intervening in a situation and trying to 'improve' it. You need to know information about who and how will be 'harmed' by this. It's probably clear that economic agents who are slightly harmed will claim that they are significantly affected. Meanwhile, those who will benefit slightly will assert that their gains are substantial. If we cannot verify this, delve into a person's mind and uncover their utility function.<\/p>\n

In the 'invisible hand of the market' there is no pricing mechanism, and in
\n9. Competition is perfect<\/b>.<\/p>\n

The modern approach to understanding how prices arise, particularly popular, is that prices are set by someone who organizes the market. A significant percentage of today's transactions occur through auctions. A really good alternative to this model, regarding distrust in the invisible hand of the market, is auction theory. The key point here is information. What information does the auctioneer have? I am currently involved as an official opponent in a dissertation that was done at Yandex. Yandex conducts advertising auctions. They are 'selling you on'. Yandex is working on how to best 'sell you on'. The dissertation is outstanding, and one of the conclusions is quite unexpected: 'It is critically important to know exactly that there is a player with a very high bid.' Not an average (for example, 30% of advertisers with a very strong position and queries), that information is nothing compared to knowing that one player is in the market and is trying to insert their ad right now. This additional information significantly changes the threshold for participation, greatly increasing the revenues from selling advertising space, which is astonishing. I had never thought about this, but when they explained the mechanism and showed me the mathematics, I had to admit it was true. Yandex implemented this and indeed achieved a profit increase.<\/p>\n

If you interfere with market actions, you need to understand everyone's preferences. It becomes unclear when intervention is necessary.<\/p>\n

There is also a superficial understanding that can turn out to be completely incorrect. For example, a superficial understanding of monopoly suggests that it is better to regulate the monopoly by breaking it up into two, three, or four firms, leading to an oligopoly and an increase in public welfare. This is typical information from textbooks. However, it depends on the circumstances. If you have durable goods, this model of behavior for the government could turn out to be completely detrimental. Zero years ago, there was a real example.<\/p>\n

They began to release records titled \"Rock Encyclopedia.\" At our school, there were some copies that claimed to be limited editions and were sold for 40 rubles. A couple of months passed, and these records flooded all the shelves, costing 3 rubles. These people were trying to mystify the public into thinking it was a perfect exclusive. A monopolist, when producing durable goods, starts to compete with \"themselves tomorrow.\" If they try to sell at a high price today, tomorrow it can be resold or repurchased. It's hard for them to convince today's buyers not to wait until tomorrow. Prices end up being lower than usual. That was proved by Coase<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n

There is the \"Coase Hypothesis,\" which states that a monopolist with durable goods, who frequently revises their pricing policy, completely loses their monopoly power. This was later rigorously proven based on game theory.<\/p>\n

Suppose you are unaware of these results and decided to split such a monopoly. An oligopoly with durable goods has emerged. It needs to be dynamically modeled. As a result, they maintain the monopolistic price! Everything is the opposite. A detailed market analysis is extremely important.<\/p>\n

10. Demand<\/b><\/p>\n

There are millions of consumers in the country, and the model will aggregate them. Instead of a huge number of small consumers, there will be an aggregated consumer. This entails many problems of both theoretical and practical significance. <\/p>\n

Aggregation contradicts preferences and utility functions. (Borman, 1953). Aggregation can only occur with identical consumers with very simple preferences. The model will have losses.<\/p>\n

In the aggregated model, demand is a black box.<\/p>\n

There was an airline. It had one flight a day to Yekaterinburg. Then it became two. And one of them departs at 6 AM from Moscow. Why?<\/p>\n

You fragment the market, and for the \"wealthy\" who do not want to fly early, you set a higher price.<\/p>\n

There is also the objection of rationality. That people behave irrationally. But with large numbers, a rational trend gradually emerges.<\/p>\n

If you want to study economics, first learn the general model. Then \"start to doubt\" and study each objection. Each of them launches an entire science! If you study all these \"chapters,\" you will become a very knowledgeable economist.<\/p>\n

Tyrol stood out in addressing several \"objections.\" But I would award him a Nobel Prize not for that.<\/p>\n

How to Build a Reputation<\/h3>\n

\nI suggest we think about the following stories. And when I talk about reputation\u2014we'll discuss it.<\/p>\n

In 2005, an unprecedented reform was carried out in Georgia. The ENTIRE police force of the country was dismissed. This is the first story.<\/p>\n

The second story. After the dispersal of protests in 2011-2012 in Moscow, all police officers received armbands and name patches.<\/p>\n

These are two different approaches to the same problem. How does a country or a group of people cope with an extremely negative reputation of a certain community within?<\/p>\n

\"Fire everyone and hire new ones\" or \"personalize the violence.\"<\/p>\n

I assert, and will refer to Tyrol, that we chose a more informed path.<\/p>\n

I present you with three models of reputation. Two were known before Tyrol, and the third he invented.<\/p>\n

What is reputation? There is some dentist you go to and recommend to others. This is his personal reputation; he created it himself. We will, however, examine collective reputation.<\/p>\n

There is a community\u2014police officers, businessmen, nationality, race (some terms the West prefers not to discuss).<\/p>\n

Model 1<\/h3>\n

\nThere is a collective. Within it, each participant has something written on their forehead. Once they leave there, they have some kind of mark. But you cannot determine if someone is from that group or not. For example, when students from NES are accepted into PhD programs in the USA.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nIn general, America despises the rest of the world. If there are no rockets \u2014 it despises; if there are rockets \u2014 it despises and fears. This is how it relates to the world while simultaneously casting a line like a fisherman\u2026 Oh, a good fish! You will become an American fish. This country is built not on initial fascist principles but on those created. We will gather all the best, and therefore we are the best.<\/p>\n

Someone from the 'third world' arrives in America, and it turns out he graduated from NES. And then something ignites in the eyes of employers. A test score is less important than the fact that he came from NES.<\/p>\n

This is a very superficial model.<\/p>\n

Model 2<\/h3>\n

\nCompletely politically incorrect.<\/p>\n

Reputation as an institutional trap.<\/p>\n

A Black man comes to work for you. (In America) You are the employer, looking at him: 'Ah, he\u2019s Black, I basically have nothing against Black people, I\u2019m not racist. But they are generally just dumb. So I won\u2019t hire him.' And you become a 'practical' racist, not a theoretical one.<\/p>\n

'I don\u2019t know, man, if you\u2019re smart, but on average, guys like you are stupid. So, just in case, I\u2019ll reject you.' <\/p>\n

What constitutes the institutional trap. Ten years ago, this guy went to school. And he thinks: 'Will I study as well as my white classmate? Why bother? They\u2019ll only hire me for low-skilled work anyway. Even if I work hard and get a diploma, I can\u2019t prove anything to anyone. I know how it works\u2014they\u2019ll see my Black face and think I\u2019m just like everyone else in my group.' This creates a bad equilibrium. Black people don\u2019t study because they aren\u2019t hired afterward, and they aren\u2019t hired because they don\u2019t study. A stable combination of strategies from all players.<\/p>\n

Model 3<\/h3>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThere is some interaction happening between a randomly chosen person from this population (the people) and (the police). Or businessmen-customs.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nI have an acquaintance who is a businessman and often interacts with customs; he confirms this model.<\/p>\n

There is a need\/desire from an individual (from the people\/businessman) to approach (the police\/customs) and give them a certain 'task.' To clarify the situation, to bring goods through. And he expresses, in this way, an act of trust. The person on site makes the decision. There\u2019s no stamp on their forehead (Model 1), nor a past decision to invest in themselves (Model 2), and nothing that predetermined how they will operate today. Only their goodwill for today. <\/p>\n

Let\u2019s analyze what this choice depends on and where the trap arises?<\/p>\n

A person is looking at a public official. Tyrol suggested just one thing, a questionable notion at best. But it explains everything. He speculated that there are dubious aspects associated with this official's past actions. In other words, everyone has a story. For this police officer, it may come to light that he once extorted money for doing his job. About this customs officer, there are stories of him detaining goods. But maybe not everyone has heard those.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\nThere is a parameter theta ranging from 0 to 1, such that if it leans towards zero, everything is overlooked. Roughly speaking, if a police officer has no identification numbers, he can rough up anyone and no one will find out or hold him accountable. But if there is an identification number, then theta is close to one. He will face significant consequences.<\/p>\n

In Georgia, the complete lack of faith decided to be cut off decisively. They recruited new police officers and think that the old reputation will die off. Tyrol asserts that the dynamic equilibria present here...<\/p>\n

How equilibria are structured. If a public official is approached, it indicates that they are considered honest. The individual can act genuinely honorably or poorly. This will partially define my 'credit history'. Tomorrow, no one will approach me if they find out I acted dishonestly. The average trust towards unnamed officials is very low. The next day, there is a small chance someone will approach you. If they do reach out, it\u2019s rare, and one should extract the 'maximum' from it and take advantage. We are all thieves and swindlers here, and no one will approach us regardless. We will continue to be thieves and swindlers.<\/p>\n

Another type of dynamic equilibrium exists where people believe that officials behave well and a lot of them are approached. Therefore, tomorrow, if you have a clean reputation, you will have many offers. But if you tarnish your name, the number of approaches may decrease. This is an important aspect. If such faith exists, you lose a lot from bad behavior.<\/p>\n

Tyrol demonstrates that in dynamics, the type of equilibrium that emerges critically depends on theta, not on initial conditions.<\/p>\n

By introducing the thesis, you increase the individual's personal responsibility. If they perform well, it will be noted, and they will be referred to, even if others are not.<\/p>\n

\"Alexey
\n
\n

\r\n \"Play\r\n
<\/div>\r\n <\/div><\/center>
\n
Source: habr.com<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u0415\u0441\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u044b \u044f \u0434\u0430\u0432\u0430\u043b \u041d\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0443\u044e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0438\u044e \u0416\u0430\u043d\u0443 \u0422\u0438\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044e, \u044f \u0431\u044b \u0434\u0430\u043b \u0437\u0430 \u0435\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0435\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043a\u043e-\u0438\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437 \u0440\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0445\u043e\u0442\u044f \u0431\u044b \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0438\u043b \u0432 \u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0443. \u041c\u043d\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0442\u043e\u0442 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0439, \u043a\u043e\u0433\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430\u0448\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0443\u0438\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0445\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043e \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438, \u0445\u043e\u0442\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0442\u044c \u044d\u0442\u0443 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0442\u044f\u0436\u0435\u043b\u043e. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u0438\u0437 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0438 \u0442\u0435\u0445 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443\u044e \u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0438 \u0444\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0442\u044f\u0436\u0435\u043b\u043e \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e. \u041d\u043e \u0438\u0434\u0435\u044f \u043c\u043d\u0435 \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e […]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":27590,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-36826","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47Alexey Savvateev: Jean Tirole's Nobel Prize for the Analysis of Imperfect Markets (2014) and Collective Reputation | ProHoster","description":"","canonical_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/aleksej-savvateev-nobelevskaya-premiya-zhana-tirolya-za-analiz-nesovershennyh-rynkov-2014-i-kollektivnuyu-reputatsiyu","robots":"max-image-preview:large","keywords":"","webmasterTools":{"miscellaneous":""},"schema":null,"og:locale":"en_US","og:site_name":"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b","og:type":"article","og:title":"\ud83e\udd47\u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0435\u0439 \u0421\u0430\u0432\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0435\u0432: \u041d\u043e\u0431\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0435\u043c\u0438\u044f \u0416\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0422\u0438\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044f \u0437\u0430 \u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437 \u043d\u0435\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0440\u044b\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432 (2014) \u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u0443\u044e \u0440\u0435\u043f\u0443\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e | ProHoster","og:url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/aleksej-savvateev-nobelevskaya-premiya-zhana-tirolya-za-analiz-nesovershennyh-rynkov-2014-i-kollektivnuyu-reputatsiyu","og:image":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:secure_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:width":350,"og:image:height":350,"article:published_time":"2019-10-31T19:14:01+00:00","article:modified_time":"2019-10-31T19:14:01+00:00","article:publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster","article:author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster"},"aioseo_meta_data":{"post_id":"36826","title":null,"description":null,"keywords":null,"keyphrases":null,"primary_term":null,"canonical_url":null,"og_title":null,"og_description":null,"og_object_type":"default","og_image_type":"default","og_image_url":null,"og_image_width":null,"og_image_height":null,"og_image_custom_url":null,"og_image_custom_fields":null,"og_video":null,"og_custom_url":null,"og_article_section":null,"og_article_tags":null,"twitter_use_og":false,"twitter_card":"default","twitter_image_type":"default","twitter_image_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_fields":null,"twitter_title":null,"twitter_description":null,"schema":{"blockGraphs":[],"customGraphs":[],"default":{"data":{"Article":[],"Course":[],"Dataset":[],"FAQPage":[],"Movie":[],"Person":[],"Product":[],"ProductReview":[],"Car":[],"Recipe":[],"Service":[],"SoftwareApplication":[],"WebPage":[]},"graphName":"","isEnabled":true},"graphs":[]},"schema_type":null,"schema_type_options":null,"pillar_content":false,"robots_default":true,"robots_noindex":false,"robots_noarchive":false,"robots_nosnippet":false,"robots_nofollow":false,"robots_noimageindex":false,"robots_noodp":false,"robots_notranslate":false,"robots_max_snippet":null,"robots_max_videopreview":null,"robots_max_imagepreview":"large","priority":null,"frequency":null,"local_seo":null,"seo_analyzer_scan_date":"2026-01-22 04:59:19","breadcrumb_settings":null,"limit_modified_date":false,"reviewed_by":null,"ai":null,"created":"2021-03-01 01:38:23","updated":"2026-01-22 04:59:19","focus_keyword":null,"additional_keywords":null,"truseo_locale":null},"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36826","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36826"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36826\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27590"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36826"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36826"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36826"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}