{"id":38969,"date":"2019-10-31T22:27:06","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T19:27:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/liga-svobodnogo-interneta\/"},"modified":"2026-05-20T19:11:21","modified_gmt":"2026-05-20T17:11:21","slug":"liga-svobodnogo-interneta__trashed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/news\/liga-svobodnogo-interneta__trashed","title":{"rendered":"League of Free Internet","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

How to Resist Authoritarian Regimes on the Internet<\/h2>\n

\n\"League
\nDisconnection? A Woman in a Beijing Internet Caf\u00e9, July 2011
\nIm Chi Yin \/ The New York Times \/ Redux<\/i><\/p>\n

Well, I suppose I must preface this with a 'translator's note.' The text I found seemed intriguing and debatable. The only edits made to the text are in 'bold.' I allowed myself to express my personal viewpoint in tags. \n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\nThe dawn of the Internet was filled with lofty hopes. Authoritarian regimes, faced with the choice of becoming part of the new system of global communications or being left behind, will choose to connect to it. Thinking further with rose-colored glasses: the flow of new information and ideas from the 'outside world' would inevitably push development towards economic openness and political liberalization. In reality, however, something completely opposite occurred. Instead of spreading democratic values and liberal ideals, the Internet became the foundation for espionage by authoritarian states around the globe. Regimes in China, Russia, etc., have used Internet infrastructures to build their own national networks. At the same time, they erected technical and legislative barriers to limit their citizens' access to certain resources and to complicate Western companies' access to their digital markets.
\n<\/a><\/noindex>
\nHowever, despite concerns in Washington and Brussels about plans to divide the Internet, the last thing Beijing and Moscow want is to find themselves in their own networks and cut off from the global Internet. After all, they need access to the Internet for stealing intellectual property, spreading propaganda, interfering in elections in other countries, and being able to threaten critical infrastructure in competing nations. Ideally, China and Russia would like to recreate the Internet according to their own patterns and make the world play by their repressive rules. But they haven't been able to do that \u2014 instead, they have intensified their efforts to tightly control external access to their markets, limit their citizens' ability to go online, and exploit the vulnerabilities that are inevitably a result of digital freedom and Western openness.<\/p>\n

The United States, its allies, and partners need to stop worrying about the risk of Internet division by authoritarian regimes. Instead, they should divide it themselves<\/b>, creating a digital bloc where information, services, and products can move freely, excluding countries that do not respect freedom of expression or privacy rights, engage in subversive activities, or provide safe havens for cybercriminals. In such a system, countries that embrace the notion of a truly free and secure Internet will support and expand connectivity benefits, while those opposing this concept will not be able to harm it. The goal should be a digital version of the Schengen Agreement<\/b>, which protects the free movement of people, goods, and services across Europe. The 26 Schengen Area countries adhere to such a set of rules and enforcement mechanisms; they are not isolated countries.<\/p>\n

Such agreements are essential for preserving a free and open Internet. Washington must form a coalition that brings together Internet users, companies, and countries around democratic values, respect for the rule of law, and fair digital trade. League of Free Internet<\/b>Instead of allowing states that do not share these values unfettered access to the Internet and Western digital markets and technologies, the U.S.-led coalition should establish conditions under which non-members can remain connected, and set barriers limiting the valuable data they can obtain and the harm they can cause. The league will not erect a digital iron curtain; at least in the initial phase, much of the Internet traffic will still flow between its members and \u2018outward\u2019, and the league will primarily block companies and organizations that facilitate and engage in cybercrime, rather than entire countries. Governments that largely embrace the ideas of an open, tolerant, and democratic Internet will have an incentive to improve their compliance efforts to join the league and ensure reliable connectivity for their companies and citizens. Of course, authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, and other countries are likely to continue rejecting this vision. Instead of begging and pleading with such governments to behave, the United States and its allies must now set the law: follow the rules or be cut off.<\/p>\n

The end of dreams for a borderless Internet.<\/h2>\n

\nWhen the Obama administration released its International Strategy for Cybersecurity in 2011, it envisioned a global Internet that would be 'open, interoperable, secure, and reliable.' At the same time, China and Russia insisted on applying their own rules to the Internet. Beijing, for instance, wanted any criticism of the Chinese government that would be illegal within China to also be banned on U.S. websites. Moscow, for its part, cleverly sought an equivalent to arms control treaties in cyberspace while simultaneously ramping up its own offensive cyberattacks. In the long term, China and Russia still wish to exert influence over the global Internet. However, they see great value in creating their closed networks and leveraging the openness of the West for their own benefit.<\/p>\n

Obama's strategy warned that 'the alternative to global openness and functional interoperability is a fragmented Internet, where a significant part of the world's population will be deprived of access to complex applications and valuable content due to the political interests of a few countries.' Despite Washington's efforts to prevent this outcome, this is precisely where we find ourselves today. The Trump administration did very little to change U.S. strategy. President Donald Trump's National Cyber Strategy, released in September 2018, calls for an 'open, functionally interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet,' thereby echoing the mantra of President Barack Obama's strategy, occasionally swapping the words 'secure' and 'reliable.'<\/p>\n

Trump's strategy is based on the necessity of expanding Internet freedom, which it defines as \"the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms online, such as freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly, religion or beliefs, and the right to privacy on the Internet.\" While this is a worthy goal, it ignores the reality that in many countries where citizens do not enjoy these rights offline, let alone online, the Internet is no longer a safe haven, but rather a tool of repression. Regimes in China and other countries use artificial intelligence to help them better monitor their people and have learned to connect surveillance cameras, financial transactions, and transportation systems to create vast databases of information on individual citizens' activities. China's army of internet censors, numbering two million, is being trained to gather data for inclusion in a planned social credit system. \"social credit system\"<\/b>, which will allow the evaluation of every citizen in China and assign rewards and punishments for actions taken both online and offline. The so-called Great Firewall of China, which blocks access to online materials deemed unacceptable by the Chinese Communist Party, has become a model for other authoritarian regimes. According to Freedom House, Chinese officials have trained in developing internet surveillance systems with counterparts in 36 countries. In 18 countries, China has helped build such networks.<\/p>\n

\"League
\nNear the Beijing office of Google the day after the company announced its plans to leave the Chinese market, January 2010
\nGilles Sabrie \/ The New York Tim\u200bes \/ Redux<\/i><\/p>\n

Using \"digital\" as a lever<\/h2>\n

\nHow can the United States and its allies limit the damage that authoritarian regimes can inflict on the Internet, and prevent these regimes from using the Internet to suppress dissent? Proposals have been made to task the World Trade Organization or the United Nations with establishing clear rules to ensure the free flow of information and data. However, any such plan would be stillborn, as it would require the support of the very countries it aims to target for their malicious actions. Only by creating a bloc of countries where data can flow freely and prohibiting access for other states can Western nations gain any leverage to change the behavior of Internet \"bad actors.\"<\/p>\n

The Schengen Area of Europe offers a real model in which people and goods move freely, without undergoing customs and immigration checks. Once a person enters the area through a border post of one country, they can access any other country without going through additional customs or immigration inspections. (There are some exceptions, and several countries have implemented limited border checks following the migrant crisis of 2015.) The agreement to establish the zone became part of EU legislation in 1999; eventually, non-EU countries Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland also joined. The agreement excluded Ireland and the United Kingdom at their request.<\/p>\n

Joining the Schengen Area is linked to three requirements that can serve as a model for digital agreements. First, member states must issue uniform visas and ensure reliable security at their external borders. Second, they must demonstrate their ability to coordinate their actions with law enforcement agencies in other member countries. And third, they must use a common system for tracking entries and exits to the area. The agreement establishes rules governing cross-border oversight and the conditions under which authorities can pursue suspects on \"hot trails\" across borders. It also allows for the extradition of suspects in criminal offenses between member states.<\/p>\n

The agreement creates clear incentives for cooperation and transparency. Any European country that wants its citizens to have the right to travel, work, or live anywhere in the EU must align its border control with Schengen standards. Four EU members\u2014Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania\u2014have not been admitted to the Schengen Area partly because they do not meet these standards. Bulgaria and Romania, however, are in the process of improving their border control so they can join. In other words, the incentives are effective.<\/p>\n

However, such incentives are absent in all attempts to unite the international community to combat cybercrime, economic espionage, and other issues of the digital age. The most successful of these efforts, the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention), outlines all reasonable actions that states must take to combat cybercrime. It provides model laws, enhanced coordination mechanisms, and streamlined extradition procedures. Sixty-one countries have ratified the treaty. Nevertheless, it is hard to find advocates for the Budapest Convention because it has not worked: it offers no real benefits for joining or any real consequences for failing to meet the obligations it creates.<\/p>\n

To ensure the League of the Free Internet functions, it is essential to avoid this trap. The most effective way to bring countries into alignment with the league\u2019s requirements is to threaten them with the withdrawal of products and services<\/b> from companies such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft, and to cut off these companies' access to the wallets of hundreds of millions of consumers in the USA and Europe. The league will not block all traffic from non-participants \u2014 just as the Schengen Area does not restrict all goods and services from non-members. On one hand, the ability to meaningfully filter all malicious traffic on a national level is currently beyond technology. Moreover, this would require governments to have the capability to decrypt traffic, which would cause more harm to security than it would help, infringing upon privacy and civil liberties. However, the league will prohibit products and services from companies and organizations known to promote cybercrime in non-member countries, as well as block traffic from rule-breaking internet service providers in non-member states.<\/p>\n

For instance, imagine if Ukraine, a well-known safe haven for cybercriminals, were threatened with the cut-off of access to services that its citizens, companies, and government have already become accustomed to, which could significantly impact its technological development. The Ukrainian government would face a strong incentive to finally take a hard stance against the cybercriminal underworld that has developed within its borders. Such measures are useless against China and Russia: after all, the Communist Party of China and the Kremlin have already done everything possible to sever their citizens from the global Internet. However, the goal of the League of the Free Internet is not to change the behavior of such 'ideological' malefactors, but to reduce the harm they cause and encourage countries like Ukraine, Brazil, and India to succeed in combating cybercrime.<\/p>\n

Preserving the freedom of the Internet<\/h2>\n

\nThe fundamental principle of the league will be the support of free speech on the Internet. Members, however, will be allowed to make exceptions on a case-by-case basis. For example, while the U.S. will not be forced to accept EU restrictions on free speech, American companies will need to make reasonable efforts not to sell or display prohibited content to Internet users in Europe. This approach will largely maintain the status quo. But it would also require Western countries to more formally address the task of limiting states like China from implementing an Orwellian vision of 'information security,' insisting that certain forms of expression pose a threat to their national security. For instance, Beijing regularly sends requests to other governments to remove content hosted on servers<\/a> their territory that criticizes the Chinese regime or discusses groups banned by the regime in China, such as Falun Gong. The United States rejects such requests, but others may be tempted to concede, especially after China has retaliated against the U.S.'s refusal by launching cyberattacks on material sources. The Internet Freedom League will encourage other countries to deny such Chinese demands: this would be against the rules, and fellow member countries will help shield them from any reprisals.<\/p>\n

The league will need a mechanism to ensure its members adhere to their rules. An effective tool for this may be the maintenance and publication of performance metrics for each participant. However, a model for a stricter evaluation can be found in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an organization created by the G-7 and the European Commission in 1989 to combat money laundering, funded by its members. The 37 member countries of the FATF account for most financial transactions in the world. Participants agree to adopt dozens of policies, including criminalizing money laundering and the financing of terrorism, and require banks to perform due diligence on their clients. Instead of a rigid centralized monitoring system, the FATF employs a framework where each member takes turns assessing the efforts of others and providing recommendations. Countries that do not comply with the required policies are placed on the so-called FATF \"grey list\", necessitating closer scrutiny. Criminals can be included in the \"black list\", obligating banks to start detailed checks that can slow down or even halt many transactions.<\/p>\n

How will the League of Free Internet prevent malicious activities in its member states? Again, there is a model from the international public health system. The league will establish and fund an institution similar to the World Health Organization, which will identify vulnerable online systems, notify system owners, and work to strengthen them (analogous to global vaccination campaigns by WHO); detect and respond to emerging malware and botnets before they can cause extensive damage (equivalent to monitoring disease outbreaks); and take responsibility for the response if prevention fails (equivalent to WHO's reaction to pandemics). League members would also agree to refrain from conducting offensive cyberattacks against each other in peacetime. Such a commitment, of course, would not prevent the United States or its allies from launching cyberattacks against adversaries who are likely to remain outside the league, such as Iran.<\/p>\n

Building barriers<\/h2>\n

\nThe creation of a League of Free Internet would require a radical shift in mindset. The idea that internet access will ultimately transform authoritarian regimes is a noble wish. But that is not the case; it will not happen. The unwillingness to accept this reality is the greatest obstacle to an alternative approach. However, over time it will become clear that the technological utopianism of the early Internet era is out of place in today's world.<\/p>\n

Western tech companies are likely to oppose the creation of a League of Free Internet, as they work to appease China and gain access to the Chinese market, because their supply chains largely depend on Chinese manufacturers. However, the costs for such firms will be partially offset by the fact that cutting off China will effectively protect them from competition on that front.<\/p>\n

The League of Free Internet modeled after the Schengen Area is the only way to secure the Internet against threats posed by authoritarian states and other 'bad actors'. Such a system will evidently be less global than the current freely accessible Internet. But by raising the costs of malicious behavior, the United States and its allies can hope to diminish the dangers of cybercrime and limit the damage that regimes like those in Beijing and Moscow can inflict on the Internet.<\/p>\n

Authors:<\/p>\n

RICHARD A. CLARKE is the chairman and CEO of Good Harbor Security Risk Management. He served in the U.S. government as special advisor to the president for cybersecurity, special assistant to the president for global issues, and national coordinator for security and counterterrorism.<\/p>\n

ROB KNAKE is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior fellow at Northeastern University\u2019s Global Resilience Institute. He was the director for cyber policy at the National Security Council from 2011 to 2015.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Source: habr.com<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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