{"id":52523,"date":"2019-11-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-11-09T21:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/blog_prohoster\/opensorsnyj-chip-opentitan-zamenit-proprietarnye-korni-doveriya-intel-i-arm"},"modified":"2020-02-18T14:00:16","modified_gmt":"2020-02-18T11:00:16","slug":"opensorsnyj-chip-opentitan-zamenit-proprietarnye-korni-doveriya-intel-i-arm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/administrirovanie\/opensorsnyj-chip-opentitan-zamenit-proprietarnye-korni-doveriya-intel-i-arm","title":{"rendered":"The open-source chip OpenTitan will replace proprietary trust roots from Intel and ARM.","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

\"The
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\nNon-profit organization lowRISC<\/a><\/noindex> with participation from Google and other sponsors on November 5, 2019 introduced<\/a><\/noindex> project OpenTitan<\/a><\/noindex>, which claims to be the \"first open-source project to create an open, high-quality chip architecture with a hardware root of trust (RoT).\"<\/p>\n

OpenTitan on the RISC-V architecture is a dedicated chip designed for installation in data center servers and any other equipment where boot authenticity is needed, firmware protection from modifications, and the elimination of rootkit risks: this includes motherboards, network cards, routers, IoT devices, mobile gadgets, and more.<\/p>\n

Of course, similar modules exist in modern processors. For example, the Intel Boot Guard hardware module serves as the root of trust in Intel processors. It verifies the authenticity of the UEFI BIOS before the OS boot through a chain of trust. But the question is, how much can we trust proprietary roots of trust given that there are no guarantees against design flaws, and we have no way to verify them? See the article \"Schr\u00f6dinger's Trusted Boot. Intel Boot Guard\"<\/a><\/noindex> , which describes how a long-replicated manufacturing error among several vendors allows a potential attacker to use this technology to create an undetectable (even by programmers) hidden rootkit in the system.
\n<\/a><\/noindex>
\nThe threat of equipment compromise in the supply chain is surprisingly real: it appears that any hobbyist electronics technician can implant a bug into a server's motherboard<\/a><\/noindex>, using equipment costing no more than $200. Some experts suspect that \"organizations with hundreds of millions of dollars in budget may have been doing this for years.\" Although there is no evidence, it is theoretically possible.<\/p>\n

\"If you cannot trust the hardware bootloader, the game is over, \u2014 says<\/a><\/noindex> Gavin Ferris, a board member of lowRISC. \u2014 It doesn't matter what the operating system does \u2014 if by the time the operating system loads you have been compromised, the rest is just technicalities. You're done.\"<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\nThis problem is what the first-of-its-kind open hardware platform OpenTitan should address (GitHub repository<\/a><\/noindex>, documentation<\/a><\/noindex>, hardware specifications<\/a><\/noindex>). Moving away from proprietary solutions will allow for a transformation of the 'clumsy and imperfect RoT industry,' according to Google.<\/p>\n

Google itself started developing Titan after discovering the Minix operating system embedded in Intel Management Engine (ME) chips. This complex OS unpredictably and uncontrollably expanded the attack surface. Google tried to eliminate Intel Management Engine (ME)<\/a><\/noindex>, but unsuccessfully.<\/p>\n

What is the root of trust?<\/h1>\n

\nEach stage of the system boot process verifies the authenticity of the next stage, thereby forming a chain of trust.<\/i>.<\/p>\n

Root of Trust (RoT) is a hardware authentication mechanism that ensures the integrity of the source of the first executable instruction in the chain of trust. RoT is a fundamental protection against rootkits. It is a key stage in the boot process that plays a role in the subsequent startup of the system\u2014from BIOS to OS and applications. It must authenticate every subsequent boot stage. To achieve this, each stage employs a set of keys with a digital signature. One of the most popular standards for hardware key protection is TPM (Trusted Platform Module).<\/p>\n

\"The
\nEstablishing the root of trust. Above is a five-stage boot process that forms a chain of trust and starts with the bootloader located in immutable memory. At each stage, a public key is used to verify the authenticity of the next component being loaded. Illustration from Perry Lee's book \"Architecture of the Internet of Things\"<\/a><\/noindex><\/i><\/p>\n

RoT can be initiated in various ways:<\/p>\n