{"id":80855,"date":"2020-05-09T01:42:59","date_gmt":"2020-05-08T23:42:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/administrirovanie\/ko-dnyu-radio-svyaz-nervy-vojny"},"modified":"2020-05-09T01:42:59","modified_gmt":"2020-05-08T23:42:59","slug":"ko-dnyu-radio-svyaz-nervy-vojny","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/en\/blog\/administrirovanie\/ko-dnyu-radio-svyaz-nervy-vojny","title":{"rendered":"On Radio Day. Communication is the nerves of war.","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

Communication is always a sacred matter,<\/i>
\nIn battle, it's even more important\u2026<\/i><\/p>\n

Today, May 7, is Radio and Communications Day. This is more than just a professional holiday \u2014 it's a whole philosophy of continuity and pride in one of humanity's most important inventions, which has permeated all areas of life and is unlikely to become outdated anytime soon. And in two days, on May 9, we will commemorate the 75th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War. In this war, communication played a huge and sometimes key role. Signalmen connected divisions, battalions, and fronts, sometimes at the cost of their own lives, becoming part of a system that allowed orders or information to be relayed. It was a true daily feat throughout the war. In Russia, Military Signalman Day is celebrated on October 20. But I know for sure that it is also celebrated today, on Radio Day. So let us remember the communication equipment and technologies of the Great Patriotic War, for it is said that communication is the nerves of war. These nerves were pushed to their limits and even beyond.<\/p>\n

\"On<\/a><\/noindex>
\nSignalmen of the Red Army in 1941 with a spool and field telephone<\/i>
\n<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n

Field telephones<\/h2>\n

\nBy the time of the Great Patriotic War, wired communication had ceased to be the prerogative of telegraphy; in the USSR, telephone lines were developing, and the first methods of communication via radio frequencies emerged. But initially, wired communication was the main nerve: telephones allowed for communication in open fields, forests, and across rivers, without requiring any infrastructure. Additionally, the signal from a wired phone could not be intercepted or pinpointed without physical access.<\/p>\n

The Wehrmacht troops were not idle: they actively searched for field communication lines and poles, bombed them, and carried out sabotage. There were even special shells designed to hook onto wires during bombings, tearing the entire network to shreds.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The first to face our soldiers in battle was the simple field phone UNA-F-31, one of those that required copper wires to ensure communication. However, wired communication was characterized by stability and reliability during the war. To use the phone, it was enough to run a cable and connect it to the device itself. Listening in on such a phone was difficult: one needed to connect directly to the cable, which was usually guarded (as a rule, signals would proceed in pairs or even in small groups). But this sounds so simple in civilian life. During combat, signalers risked their lives running wires under enemy fire, at night, and even along the bottom of water bodies. Moreover, the enemy closely monitored the actions of Soviet signalers and would destroy the communication equipment and cables at the first opportunity. The heroism of the signalers knew no bounds: they submerged into the icy waters of Ladoga and moved under gunfire, crossing the front line to assist intelligence. Numerous cases documented reveal how a signaler, before dying, would clamp a severed cable with his teeth to ensure the last spark of connection.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"On
\nUNA-F-31<\/i><\/p>\n

UNA-F (phonic) and UNA-I (induction) were produced in the city of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) at the Lenin Radio Telephone Factory<\/a><\/noindex>, starting from 1928. They were a simple device in a wooden frame with a strap, consisting of a microphone telephone handset, transformer, capacitor, lightning arrester, and a battery (or power clips). The induction phone made calls using a bell, while the phonic phone used an electric buzzer. The UNA-F model was so quiet that the telephone operator had to keep the handset near his ear throughout the duty shift (by 1943, a convenient headset was designed). By 1943, a new modification, UNA-FI, appeared \u2014 these phones had an increased range and could connect to any types of switches \u2014 phonic, induction, and phono-induction.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nThe UNA-I-43 field phones with an inducer call were intended to organize internal telephone communications in headquarters and command posts of military units and parts. In addition, inducer devices were used for telephone communication between major military headquarters and subordinate headquarters. Such communication was mainly carried out over a two-wire constant line, which simultaneously operated a telegraph device. Inducer devices became more widespread and widely used due to their convenience in switching and increased reliability.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nUNA-FI-43 \u2014 field telephone<\/i><\/p>\n

\u00a0The TA\u0418-43 telephones with an inducer call replaced the UNA series and were designed based on a detailed study of captured German field phones FF-33. The communication range over field cable was up to 25 km, and over a 3-mm constant aerial line \u2014 250 km. The TA\u0418-43 provided stable communication and was twice as light as its predecessors. This phone was used to ensure communication within units from division level and above.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"On
\nTA\u0418-43<\/i><\/p>\n

No less remarkable was the field telephone device 'PF-1' (Help to the Front) for platoon \u2014 company \u2014 battalion level, which 'overcame' only 18 km over field cable. Production of the devices began in 1941 at the workshops of MGTS (Moscow City Telephone Network). A total of about 3000 devices were produced. Although this batch seems small by our standards, it proved to be a significant help to the front, where every means of communication was accounted for and valued.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nCommunication node in Stalingrad<\/i><\/p>\n

There was another phone with an unusual story \u2014 the IIA-44, which, as the name suggests, appeared in the troops in 1944. It featured a metal casing, two capsules, and neat inscriptions and instructions, making it somewhat different from its wooden counterparts and resembling a trophy. However, the IIA-44 was produced by the American company Connecticut Telephone & Electric and supplied to the USSR via Lend-Lease. It had an inductive calling type and allowed for the connection of an additional miniature telephone handset. Moreover, unlike some Soviet models, it had an internal rather than an external battery (the so-called MB class with a local battery). The factory-installed battery capacity was 8 amp-hours, but the phone had slots for Soviet batteries of 30 amp-hours. Nonetheless, military communicators were rather reserved in their comments about the quality of the equipment.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nIIA-44<\/i><\/p>\n

Equally important elements of the military communication system were cables (reels) and switches.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Field cables, usually 500 m long, were wound on reels that were secured to the shoulder and were quite convenient to unwind and rewind. The main 'nerves' of the Great Patriotic War were the field telegraph cable PTG-19 (communication range 40-55 km) and PTF-7 (communication range 15-25 km). Since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, communication troops repaired 40,000-50,000 km of telephone and telegraph lines annually, suspending up to 200,000 km of wires on them and replacing up to 10,000 poles. The enemy was ready to do anything to disrupt communication systems, so restoration was constant and immediate. Cables had to be laid across any terrain, including the bottoms of water bodies \u2014 in this case, special weights were used to sink the cable and prevent it from rising to the surface. The most challenging work in laying and repairing telephone cables took place during the blockade of Leningrad: the city could not be left without communication, while saboteurs were doing their part, so sometimes divers worked underwater even in the harshest winters. By the way, in the same way, electric cables were laid with great difficulty to supply Leningrad with electricity.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"On
\nThe wires (cables) were subjected to both ground attacks and artillery shelling \u2014 the cable was severed in several places by fragments, and the signalman was forced to go and find and repair all the breaks. Communication needed to be restored almost instantly for coordinating further troop actions, so signalmen often crept under fire from bullets and shells. There were cases when the cable had to be run through a minefield, and the signalmen, without waiting for the sapper units, cleared a path for themselves and their cables. The fighters had their attack, and the signalmen had theirs, equally horrifying and deadly.\u00a0<\/p>\n

In addition to the direct threats from enemy weapons, the signalmen faced another danger that was more terrifying than death: since the signalman, sitting by the phone, was aware of the entire situation at the front, he was a prime target for German intelligence. Signalmen were frequently captured because they were relatively easy to approach: it was enough to cut the cable and wait in ambush for the signalman to arrive at the site in search of the next break. Later, methods of protection and countering these maneuvers emerged, and the battle for information shifted to the radio airwaves, but at the beginning of the war, the situation was dire.<\/p>\n

Single and paired switchboards were used to connect telephone sets (acoustic, inductive, and hybrid). The switchboards were designed for 6, 10, 12, and 20 (when paired) numbers and were used to service the internal telephone communications of the regimental, battalion, and divisional headquarters. Interestingly, the switchboards evolved quite rapidly, and by 1944 the army had lightweight equipment with high capacity. The last switchboards were stationary (about 80 kg) and could provide connections for up to 90 subscribers.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"On
\nTelephone switchboard K-10. Note the inscription on the casing.<\/i><\/p>\n

In the autumn of 1941, the Germans aimed to capture Moscow. Besides everything else, the capital was a central hub of all Soviet communications, and this nerve center needed to be destroyed. If the Moscow hub were destroyed, all fronts would be isolated. Therefore, the People's Commissar of Communications I.T. Peresypkin created a ring communication line around Moscow connected to important major hubs in the North, South, East, and West. These redundant hubs would ensure communication even in the event of the complete destruction of the country's central telegraph. Ivan Terentievich Peresypkin played a significant role in the war: he formed over 1,000 communications units, established courses and schools for telephone operators, radio operators, and signalers, providing the front with specialists in the shortest time possible. By mid-1944, thanks to the decisions of the People's Commissar of Communications Peresypkin, the 'radio fear' at the fronts disappeared, and the troops were equipped with more than 64,000 radio stations of various types even before Lend-Lease. At the age of 39, Peresypkin became a Marshal of Communications.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Radio Stations<\/h2>\n

\nThe war marked a period of incredible progress in radio communication. Initially, the relationship between the signal troops of the Red Army and radio stations was somewhat strained: while almost any soldier could handle a simple telephone, radio stations required signalers with specific skills. Therefore, the first signalers of the war preferred their reliable friends \u2014 field telephones. However, soon radio stations demonstrated their capabilities, became widely used, and gained special popularity among partisans and reconnaissance units.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nPortable HF Radio Station (3-R)\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n

The RB radio station (battalion radio station) with a power of 0.5 watts in its first modifications consisted of a transceiver (10.4 kg), a power supply (14.5 kg), and a dipole antenna installation (3.5 kg). The length of the dipole was 34 m, and the antennas were 1.8 m. There was a cavalry variant that was mounted on a special frame to the saddle. This was one of the oldest radio stations used at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.<\/p>\n

\"On
\nSenior Sergeant of the Red Army and RB<\/i><\/p>\n

By 1942, a modified version of the RBM had emerged, which reduced the number of electronic tube types used, enhanced the strength and rigidity of the design as required by real combat conditions. The RBM-1 with an output power of 1 watt and the RBM-5 at 5 watts were introduced. The external devices of the new stations allowed for communication from points up to 3 km away. This station became a personal radio for the commanders of divisions, corps, and armies. By using reflected beams, a stable radiotelegraphic communication could be maintained over distances of 250 km or more (by the way, unlike medium waves, which could only be effectively used with reflected beams at night, short waves up to 6 MHz reflected well off the ionosphere at any time of the day and could propagate over long distances due to multiple reflections from the ionosphere and the earth's surface, without the need for powerful transmitters). Additionally, the RBMs performed excellently in maintaining airfields during wartime.\u00a0<\/p>\n

After the war, the army used more advanced models, and RBMs became popular among geologists, being used so long that they even became the subject of articles in specialized magazines in the 1980s.<\/p>\n

RBM Diagram:<\/p>\n

\"On
\nIn 1943, the Americans requested a license to produce this successful and reliable radio station, but they were denied.<\/i><\/p>\n

The next war hero was the 'Sever' radio station, which was compared to the 'Katyusha' on the front, highlighting how urgently needed and timely this device was.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The \"Sever\" radio stations began production in 1941 and continued even during the siege of Leningrad. They were lighter than the first RB models \u2014 the full set with batteries weighed only 10 kg. It provided communication over a distance of 500 km, and under certain conditions and in the hands of professionals, it could reach up to 700 km. This radio station was primarily designed for reconnaissance and partisan units. It featured a direct amplification receiver, a three-stage design, with regenerative feedback. In addition to the battery version, there was a 'lightweight' version that, however, required mains power, as well as several separate versions for the navy. The set included an antenna, headphones, a telegraph key, a spare lamp kit, and a repair kit. To organize communication at the front headquarters, special radio nodes with powerful transmitters and sensitive receivers were deployed. These communication nodes had their own schedule, maintaining radio contact 2-3 times a day. By 1944, \"Sever\" type radio stations connected the Central Headquarters with over 1000 partisan detachments. \"Sever\" supported secret communication equipment (ZAS), but they were often declined to avoid additional equipment weight. To 'encrypt' conversations from the enemy, they used simple codes, but followed a certain schedule, used different frequencies, and included additional coding for troop locations.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"On
\nSever Radio Station<\/i>\u00a0<\/p>\n

12-RP \u2014 a Soviet portable infantry shortwave radio station, used in regimental and artillery networks of the Red Army. It consists of separate blocks: the transmitter 12-R and the receiver 5SG-2. It is a transceiver, capable of both telephone and telegraph communication, designed for use in motion and at rest. The radio station consisted of packaging for the transceiver (weight 12 kg, dimensions 426 x 145 x 205 mm) and power supply (weight 13.1 kg, dimensions 310 x 245 x 185 mm). It was carried on the back by two soldiers using straps. The station was produced from October-November 1941 until the end of World War II. Gorky State Union Factory No. 326<\/a><\/noindex> In the years of the Great Patriotic War, the factory named after M. V. Frunze made significant contributions to providing the troops with radio communications. It organized 48 front brigades, employing over 500 people. In 1943 alone, it produced 2,928 radio measuring devices of seven types. That same year, Factory No. 326 supplied the army with 7,601 radio stations of the 12-RP type and 5,839 12-RT radio stations.<\/p>\n

\"On
\n12-RP Radio Station<\/i><\/p>\n

Radio stations quickly became indispensable in aviation, transportation, and especially in tanks. Interestingly, the expansion of armored troops and aviation was the key reason for the Soviet Army units transitioning to radio waves \u2014 for communication between tanks and airplanes, wired telephones were not suitable.<\/p>\n

Soviet tank radio stations had a communication range significantly higher than their German counterparts. This was perhaps the leading edge of military communications in the early and mid-war period. At the start of the war, communication within the Red Army was quite poor \u2014 largely due to the pre-war policy of not expanding armaments. The early devastating defeats and the thousands of human casualties were largely due to the disjointed actions and the lack of communication means.<\/p>\n

The first Soviet tank radio station was the 71-TK, developed in the early 1930s. During the Great Patriotic War, it was succeeded by the 9-R, 10-R, and 12-R radio stations, which were continuously improved. Alongside the radio station, tank talk devices TPU were used. Since tank crews could not use their hands or be distracted, laryngophones and headphones (effectively earphones) were attached to the helmets of the tankists \u2014 hence the term \"helmet phone.\" Information was transmitted using a microphone or a telegraph key. In 1942, based on the infantry radio stations 12-RP, tank radio stations 12-RT were produced (based on the infantry 12-RP). Tank radio stations were primarily intended for information exchange between vehicles. Thus, 12-RP provided two-way communication with an equivalent radio station in moderately rough terrain during daytime at distances:<\/p>\n