{"id":84664,"date":"2020-06-10T01:42:18","date_gmt":"2020-06-09T23:42:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/crosstalk-uyazvimost-v-cpu-intel-privodyashhaya-k-utechke-dannyh-mezhdu-yadrami"},"modified":"2020-06-10T01:42:18","modified_gmt":"2020-06-09T23:42:18","slug":"crosstalk-uyazvimost-v-cpu-intel-privodyashhaya-k-utechke-dannyh-mezhdu-yadrami","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/et\/blog\/news\/crosstalk-uyazvimost-v-cpu-intel-privodyashhaya-k-utechke-dannyh-mezhdu-yadrami","title":{"rendered":"CROSSTalk \u2014 Intel CPU haavatavus, mis toob kaasa andmete leke tuumade vahel","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

Amsterdam Vrije Universiteit'i uurimist\u00f6\u00f6r\u00fchmad avastasid uue haavatavus<\/a><\/noindex> (CVE-2020-0543) Intel'i protsessorite mikroarhitektuuriliste struktuuride seas, mida iseloomustab see, et see v\u00f5imaldab taastada m\u00f5nede k\u00e4skude, mida t\u00e4idetakse teisel protsessori tuumal, k\u00e4itamise tulemusi. See on esimene spordiklassi t\u00e4itmise k\u00e4skude haavatavus, mis lubab andmete lekkimist eraldi CPU tuumade vahel (varem piirdusid lekked sama tuuma erinevate l\u00f5imudega). Uurijad nimetasid probleemi CROSSTalk'iks, kuid Intel'i dokumentides<\/a><\/noindex> mainitakse haavatavust kui SRBDS (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling). <\/p>\n

Haavatavus kuulub esitatud<\/a><\/noindex> aasta tagasi MDS (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) probleemide klassi ja p\u00f5hineb meetodite rakendamisel andmete anal\u00fc\u00fcsimiseks k\u00f5rvalkanalite kaudu mikroarhitektuuriliste struktuuride seas. Toimimisp\u00f5him\u00f5te<\/a><\/noindex> CROSSTalk on l\u00e4hedane haavatavusele RIDL<\/a><\/noindex>, kuid eristub lekkimise allikast.
\nUus haavatavus manipuleerib lekiga varasemalt dokumenteerimata vahem\u00e4luga, mida kasutavad k\u00f5ik CPU tuumad. <\/p>\n

\"CROSSTalk<\/a><\/noindex><\/center><\/p>\n

Probleemi tuum on see, et m\u00f5ned mikroprotsessori k\u00e4sud, sealhulgas RDRAND, RDSEED ja SGX EGETKEY, on rakendatud kasutades sisemist mikroarhitektuurset operatsiooni SRR (Special Register Reads). Haavatavatel protsessoritel naasevad SRR-i jaoks tagastatud andmed vahem\u00e4lus, mis on k\u00f5igi CPU tuumade \u00fchine, seej\u00e4rel edastatakse need t\u00e4itmisvahemikku, mis on seotud konkreetse f\u00fc\u00fcsilise CPU tuumaga, millel lugemise toiming initsialiseeritakse. Edasi kopeeritakse vahemikest v\u00e4\u00e4rtus registritesse, mis on rakendustele n\u00e4htavad.<\/a><\/noindex> \u00dchise vahem\u00e4lu suurus vastab vahe-cache'i reale, mis on tavaliselt suurem kui loetletud andmete suurus ja erinevad lugemistoimingud m\u00f5jutavad vahemikus erinevaid nihkeid. Kuna \u00fchine vahem\u00e4lu kopeeritakse t\u00e4itmisvahemikku tervikuna, ei liigu mitte ainult vajalik praeguseks toiminguks, vaid ka andmed, mis on j\u00e4\u00e4nud teiste toimingute, sealhulgas teiste CPU tuumade t\u00e4idete, tagaj\u00e4rjel. <\/p>\n

Kui r\u00fcnnak on edukalt korraldatud, v\u00f5ib s\u00fcsteemis autentitud lokaalne kasutaja m\u00e4\u00e4rata RDRAND, RDSEED ja EGETKEY k\u00e4skude t\u00e4itmise tulemuse teiste protsesside v\u00f5i Intel SGX enclave'i sees, s\u00f5ltumata tuumast, millel kood k\u00e4itatakse.
\n

\"CROSSTalk<\/a><\/noindex><\/center>
\n
\"CROSSTalk<\/a><\/noindex><\/center><\/p>\n

Probleemi avastanud uurijad
\nProbleemi tuvastanud teadlased avalikustasid<\/a><\/noindex> Ekspluate protot\u00fc\u00fcp, mis demonstreerib juhuslike v\u00e4\u00e4rtuste kaudu saadud andmete lekitamise v\u00f5imalust RDRAND ja RDSEED k\u00e4skude kaudu ECDSA privaatv\u00f5tme taastamiseks, mida t\u00f6\u00f6deldakse Intel SGX enklaavis p\u00e4rast vaid \u00fche digitaalallkiri toimingu sooritamist s\u00fcsteemis.<\/p>\n


\n
\r\n \"M\u00e4ngi\r\n
<\/div>\r\n <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n

Probleem vastuv\u00f5tlik<\/a><\/noindex> lai valik Intel'i lauaarvuti, mobiilsete ja serveriprotsessorite seas, sealhulgas Core i3, i5, i7, i9, m3, Celeron (seeriad J, G ja N), Atom (seeriad C, E ja X), Xeon (E3, E5, E7, W ja D pered) ja Xeon Scalable jne. Oluline on m\u00e4rkida, et Intel sai teate haavatavusest 2018. aasta septembris ja 2019. aasta juulis esitati ekspluateerimise protot\u00fc\u00fcp, mis demonstreeris andmete leket CPU tuumade vahel, kuid paranduse v\u00e4ljat\u00f6\u00f6tamine venis selle keerukuse t\u00f5ttu. T\u00e4na esitatud mikrokoodiuuenduses on probleem blokeeritud RDRAND, RDSEED ja EGETKEY k\u00e4skude k\u00e4itumise muutmise kaudu, et arendada liigset andmete \u00fcle kirjutamist \u00fchises m\u00e4lus, et v\u00e4ltida j\u00e4\u00e4kinfosettemist. Samuti on rakendatud m\u00e4lupuhvri kasutamise peatamine enne lugemis- ja sisu \u00fcle kirjutamise toimingute l\u00f5puleviimist. <\/p>\n

Sellise kaitse k\u00f5rvaltoime on RDRAND, RDSEED ja EGETKEY sooritamise viivituste suurenemine ning l\u00e4bilaskev\u00f5ime v\u00e4henemine, kui proovida neid k\u00e4ske samal ajal erinevates loogilistes protsessorites teostada. RDRAND, RDSEED ja EGETKEY t\u00e4itmine peatab samuti m\u00e4lule juurdep\u00e4\u00e4su teistelt loogilistelt protsessoritelt. Need omadused v\u00f5ivad negatiivselt m\u00f5jutada m\u00f5nede serverirakenduste j\u00f5udlust, seet\u00f5ttu on p\u00fcsivara p\u00f5hjal ette n\u00e4htud mehhanism (RNGDS_MITG_DIS), et keelata RDRAND ja RDSEED k\u00e4skude kaitse, mis viiakse l\u00e4bi Intel SGX enklaavist v\u00e4ljaspool.<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n

Allikas: opennet.ru<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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[…]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":84665,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-84664","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47CROSSTalk \u2014 Intel'i CPU haavatavus, mis viib andmete lekkeni tuumade vahel | ProHoster","description":"Amsterdam Free University teadlaste r\u00fchmitus tuvastas uue haavatavuse (CVE-2020-0543) 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