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RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa

A karshen watan Mayu, mun gano wani kamfen don rarraba malware ta hanyar isa ga Nesa (RAT) - shirye-shiryen da ke ba maharan damar sarrafa tsarin kamuwa da cuta.

Ƙungiyar da muka bincika ta bambanta da gaskiyar cewa ba ta zaɓi wani takamaiman dangin RAT don kamuwa da cuta ba. An lura da Trojans da yawa a cikin hare-hare a cikin yaƙin neman zaɓe (dukkan su suna da yawa). Tare da wannan fasalin, ƙungiyar ta tunatar da mu game da sarkin bera - dabbar tatsuniya wacce ta ƙunshi rodents tare da wutsiyoyi masu alaƙa.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
An samo asali daga rubutun ta KN Rossikov "Mice da linzamin kwamfuta-kamar rodents, mafi mahimmancin tattalin arziki" (1908)

Don girmama wannan halitta, mun sanya sunan kungiyar da muke la'akari da RATKing. A cikin wannan sakon, za mu yi bayani dalla-dalla game da yadda maharan suka kai harin, da irin kayan aikin da suka yi amfani da su, da kuma raba ra'ayoyinmu kan ra'ayi na wannan yakin.

Ci gaban harin

Dukkan hare-hare a cikin wannan kamfen sun faru ne bisa ga algorithm mai zuwa:

  1. Mai amfani ya karɓi imel ɗin phishing tare da hanyar haɗi zuwa Google Drive.
  2. Yin amfani da hanyar haɗin yanar gizon, wanda aka azabtar ya zazzage wani mugun rubutun VBS wanda ya ƙayyadad da ɗakin karatu na DLL don ɗora nauyin kaya na ƙarshe a cikin rajistar Windows kuma ya ƙaddamar da PowerShell don aiwatar da shi.
  3. Laburaren DLL ya yi allurar nauyin biyan kuɗi na ƙarshe - a haƙiƙa, ɗaya daga cikin RATs da maharan ke amfani da su - cikin tsarin tsarin kuma sun yi rajistar rubutun VBS a cikin autorun don samun gindin zama a cikin injin da ya kamu da cutar.
  4. An aiwatar da nauyin biyan kuɗi na ƙarshe a cikin tsarin tsari kuma ya ba maharin ikon sarrafa kwamfutar da ta kamu da cutar.

A tsari za a iya wakilta kamar haka:

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa

Na gaba, za mu mai da hankali kan matakai uku na farko, tunda muna sha'awar tsarin isar da malware. Ba za mu bayyana dalla-dalla tsarin aikin malware ɗin kansa ba. Ana samun su ko'ina - ko dai ana siyar da su akan taruka na musamman, ko ma ana rarraba su azaman ayyukan buɗaɗɗen tushe - don haka ba su keɓanta ga rukunin RATKing ba.

Binciken matakan kai hari

Mataki na 1. Imel na phishing

Harin ya fara ne da wanda aka azabtar ya karɓi wasiƙar mugunta (masu hari sun yi amfani da samfura daban-daban tare da rubutu; hoton da ke ƙasa yana nuna misali ɗaya). Saƙon ya ƙunshi hanyar haɗi zuwa wurin ajiyar halal drive.google.com, wanda ake zaton ya kai ga shafin zazzage daftarin aiki na PDF.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Misalin imel na phishing

Koyaya, a zahiri, ba takaddun PDF ba ne aka ɗora shi kwata-kwata, amma rubutun VBS.

Lokacin da ka danna mahaɗin daga imel ɗin a cikin hoton da ke sama, fayil mai suna Cargo Flight Details.vbs. A wannan yanayin, maharan ba su ma yi ƙoƙari su ɓad da fayil ɗin a matsayin halaltacciyar takarda ba.

A lokaci guda, a matsayin wani ɓangare na wannan kamfen, mun gano wani rubutun mai suna Cargo Trip Detail.pdf.vbs. Zai iya riga ya wuce don halaltaccen PDF saboda Windows yana ɓoye kari na fayil ta tsohuwa. Gaskiya ne, a cikin wannan yanayin, har yanzu ana iya tayar da zato ta gunkinsa, wanda ya dace da rubutun VBS.

A wannan mataki, wanda aka azabtar zai iya gane yaudarar: kawai ku dubi fayilolin da aka sauke na dakika daya. Koyaya, a cikin irin waɗannan kamfen ɗin phishing, maharan galibi suna dogara ga mai amfani mara hankali ko gaugawa.

Mataki na 2. Ayyukan rubutun VBS

Rubutun VBS, wanda mai amfani zai iya buɗewa ba da gangan ba, ya yi rajistar ɗakin karatu na DLL a cikin rajistar Windows. Rubutun ya ruɗe: an rubuta layukan da ke cikinsa a matsayin bytes da wani hali na sabani ya raba.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Misalin rubutun rufaffe

Algorithm na deobfuscation abu ne mai sauƙi: kowane hali na uku an cire shi daga igiyar da ba a rufe ba, bayan haka an yanke sakamakon daga tushe16 zuwa asalin kirtani. Misali, daga darajar 57Q53s63t72s69J70r74e2El53v68m65j6CH6Ct (wanda aka haskaka a hoton da ke sama) sakamakon layin ya kasance WScript.Shell.

Don warware kirtani, mun yi amfani da aikin Python:

def decode_str(data_enc):   
    return binascii.unhexlify(''.join([data_enc[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(data_enc), 3)]))

A ƙasa, akan layi na 9 – 10, muna haskaka ƙimar wanda ɓarnawarsa ya haifar da fayil ɗin DLL. Shi ne wanda aka kaddamar a mataki na gaba ta amfani da PowerShell.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Zaure tare da obfused DLL

An aiwatar da kowane aiki a cikin rubutun VBS yayin da aka cire kirtani.

Bayan gudanar da rubutun, an kira aikin wscript.sleep - an yi amfani da shi don aiwatar da kisa da aka jinkirta.

Bayan haka, rubutun yayi aiki tare da rajistar Windows. Ya yi amfani da fasahar WMI don wannan. Tare da taimakonsa, an ƙirƙiri maɓalli na musamman, kuma an rubuta jikin fayil ɗin da za a iya aiwatarwa zuwa sigar sa. An isa wurin yin rajista ta hanyar WMI ta amfani da umarni mai zuwa:

GetObject(winmgmts {impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\.rootdefault:StdRegProv)

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Shigar da aka yi a cikin rajista ta rubutun VBS

Mataki na 3. Aiki na ɗakin karatu na DLL

A mataki na uku, DLL mai ƙeta ya ɗora nauyin kaya na ƙarshe, ya shigar da shi cikin tsarin tsarin, kuma ya tabbatar da cewa rubutun VBS ya fara atomatik lokacin da mai amfani ya shiga.

Gudu ta hanyar PowerShell

An kashe DLL ta amfani da umarni mai zuwa a cikin PowerShell:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Wannan umarni yayi kamar haka:

  • an karɓi bayanan ƙimar rajista tare da suna rnd_value_name - wannan bayanan fayil din DLL ne da aka rubuta akan dandalin .Net;
  • ɗora Kwatancen .Net module ɗin da aka samu cikin ƙwaƙwalwar tsari powershell.exe amfani da aikin [System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load() (cikakken bayanin aikin Load(). akwai a gidan yanar gizon Microsoft);
  • yayi aikin GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK() - an fara aiwatar da ɗakin karatu na DLL da shi - tare da sigogi vbsScriptPath, xorKey, vbsScriptName. Siga xorKey an adana maɓalli don ƙaddamar da ƙimar ƙarshe, da sigogi vbsScriptPath и vbsScriptName an canza su don yin rijistar rubutun VBS a cikin autorun.

Bayanin ɗakin karatu na DLL

A cikin sigar da ba a tattara ba, bootloader yayi kama da haka:

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Loader a cikin nau'i mai ɓarna (aikin da aka fara aiwatar da ɗakin karatu na DLL yana ƙarƙashin ja).

Ana kiyaye bootloader ta .Net Reactor kariya. De4dot mai amfani yana yin kyakkyawan aiki na cire wannan mai karewa.

Wannan Loader:

  • allurar da aka biya a cikin tsarin tsarin (a cikin wannan misalin shi svchost.exe);
  • Na kara rubutun VBS zuwa autorun.

Allurar biya

Bari mu kalli aikin da rubutun PowerShell ya kira.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Ayyukan da ake kira ta rubutun PowerShell

Wannan aikin ya yi ayyuka masu zuwa:

  • saitin bayanai guda biyu (array и array2 a cikin screenshot). An matsa su ta asali ta amfani da gzip kuma an rufaffen su tare da XOR algorithm tare da maɓalli xorKey;
  • kwafi bayanai zuwa wuraren da aka keɓe. Bayanai daga array - zuwa wurin ƙwaƙwalwar ajiya da aka nuna intPtr (payload pointer a cikin hoton allo; data daga array2 - zuwa wurin ƙwaƙwalwar ajiya da aka nuna intPtr2 (shellcode pointer a cikin hoton allo;
  • ake kira aikin CallWindowProcA (kwatancin Ana samun wannan aikin akan gidan yanar gizon Microsoft) tare da sigogi masu zuwa (sunan sigogin an jera su a ƙasa, a cikin hoton hoton suna cikin tsari iri ɗaya, amma tare da ƙimar aiki):
    • lpPrevWndFunc - mai nuna bayanai daga array2;
    • hWnd - mai nuni ga kirtani mai ɗauke da hanyar zuwa fayil ɗin da za a iya aiwatarwa svchost.exe;
    • Msg - mai nuna bayanai daga array;
    • wParam, lParam - sigogin saƙo (a wannan yanayin, ba a yi amfani da waɗannan sigogi ba kuma suna da ƙimar 0);
  • halitta fayil %AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup<name>.urlinda <name> - Waɗannan su ne haruffa 4 na farko na siga vbsScriptName (a cikin hoton allo, guntun lambar tare da wannan aikin yana farawa da umarnin File.Copy). Ta wannan hanyar, malware ɗin ya ƙara fayil ɗin URL zuwa jerin fayilolin autorun lokacin da mai amfani ya shiga kuma ta haka ya zama makala ga kwamfutar da ta kamu da cutar. Fayil ɗin URL ya ƙunshi hanyar haɗi zuwa rubutun:

[InternetShortcut]
URL = file : ///<vbsScriptPath>

Don fahimtar yadda aka yi allurar, mun ɓoye bayanan bayanan array и array2. Don yin wannan, mun yi amfani da aikin Python mai zuwa:

def decrypt(data, key):
    return gzip.decompress(
        bytearray([data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)] for i in range(len(data))])[4:])

A sakamakon haka, mun gano cewa:

  • array Fayil ɗin PE ne - wannan shine ɗaukar nauyi na ƙarshe;
  • array2 shine lambar shell da ake buƙata don aiwatar da allurar.

Shellcode daga tsararru array2 wuce azaman ƙimar aiki lpPrevWndFunc cikin aiki CallWindowProcA. lpPrevWndFunc - Aikin dawo da kira, samfurin sa yayi kama da haka:

LRESULT WndFunc(
  HWND    hWnd,
  UINT    Msg,
  WPARAM  wParam,
  LPARAM  lParam
);

Don haka lokacin da kuke gudanar da aikin CallWindowProcA tare da sigogi hWnd, Msg, wParam, lParam Shellcode daga tsararru ana aiwatar da shi array2 tare da jayayya hWnd и Msg. hWnd mai nuni ne ga kirtani mai ɗauke da hanyar zuwa fayil ɗin da za a iya aiwatarwa svchost.exeda kuma Msg - mai nuni ga kaya na ƙarshe.

Lambar shell ta karɓi adiresoshin ayyuka daga kernel32.dll и ntdll32.dll bisa la'akari da ƙimar zanta daga sunayensu kuma an yi musu allura na ƙarshe a cikin ƙwaƙwalwar ajiya svchost.exeta amfani da dabarar Hollowing Process (zaku iya karanta ƙarin game da shi a cikin wannan labarin). Lokacin yin allurar shellcode:

  • halitta tsari svchost.exe a cikin yanayin da aka dakatar ta amfani da aikin CreateProcessW;
  • sa'an nan kuma ɓoye nunin sashin a cikin sararin adireshi na tsari svchost.exe amfani da aikin NtUnmapViewOfSection. Don haka, shirin ya 'yantar da ƙwaƙwalwar ajiyar tsarin asali svchost.exeto sai a ware memory ga abin da ake biya a wannan adireshin;
  • Ƙwaƙwalwar ajiya da aka keɓe don ɗaukar nauyi a cikin sararin adireshin tsari svchost.exe amfani da aikin VirtualAllocEx;

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Fara tsarin allura

  • ya rubuta abubuwan da ke cikin nauyin biyan kuɗi zuwa sararin adireshin tsari svchost.exe amfani da aikin WriteProcessMemory (kamar yadda a cikin hoton da ke ƙasa);
  • ya ci gaba da aiki svchost.exe amfani da aikin ResumeThread.

RATKing: sabon kamfen tare da Trojans mai nisa
Kammala aikin allura

malware mai saukewa

Sakamakon ayyukan da aka bayyana, an shigar da ɗaya daga cikin nau'ikan malware da yawa na RAT akan tsarin cutar. Teburin da ke ƙasa ya lissafa malware da aka yi amfani da su a harin, wanda za mu iya amincewa da shi ga rukunin maharan guda ɗaya, tun da samfuran sun sami dama ga umarni da sabar sarrafawa iri ɗaya.

Sunan malware

An fara gani

SHA-256

C & C

Hanyar da ake yin allurar a ciki

Darktrack

16-04-2020

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2017

svchost

Parallax

24-04-2020

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2019

svchost

ZON YAKI

18-05-2020

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:9933

svchost

Netwire

20-05-2020

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2000

svchost

Misalai na malware da aka rarraba tare da uwar garken sarrafawa iri ɗaya

Abubuwa biyu abin lura anan.

Na farko, ainihin gaskiyar cewa maharan sun yi amfani da iyalai RAT daban-daban lokaci guda. Wannan ɗabi'a ba ta dace da sanannun ƙungiyoyin Intanet ba, waɗanda galibi ke amfani da kusan saitin kayan aikin da suka saba da su.

Abu na biyu, RATKing ya yi amfani da malware wanda ko dai ana siyar da shi akan taruka na musamman akan farashi mai rahusa, ko ma aikin buɗaɗɗen tushe ne.

An ba da ƙarin cikakken jerin malware da aka yi amfani da su a cikin yaƙin neman zaɓe-tare da faɗakarwa ɗaya mai mahimmanci-a ƙarshen labarin.

Game da kungiyar

Ba za mu iya danganta kamfen ɗin da aka kwatanta ga kowane sanannen maharan. A yanzu, mun yi imanin cewa wata sabuwar kungiya ce ta kai wadannan hare-hare. Kamar yadda muka rubuta a farkon, mun kira shi RATKing.

Don ƙirƙirar rubutun VBS, ƙila ƙungiyar ta yi amfani da kayan aiki mai kama da mai amfani VBS-Crypter daga mai haɓakawa NYAN-x-CAT. Ana nuna wannan ta kamannin rubutun da wannan shirin ke haifarwa tare da rubutun maharan. Musamman, su biyun:

  • aiwatar da jinkirin kisa ta amfani da aikin Sleep;
  • amfani da WMI;
  • yi rajistar jikin fayil ɗin da za a iya aiwatarwa azaman madaidaicin maɓallin rajista;
  • aiwatar da wannan fayil ta amfani da PowerShell a cikin sararin adireshinsa.

Don tsabta, kwatanta umarnin PowerShell don gudanar da fayil daga wurin yin rajista, wanda rubutun da aka ƙirƙira ke amfani da shi ta amfani da VBS-Crypter:

((Get-ItemPropertyHKCU:SoftwareNYANxCAT).NYANxCAT);$text=-join$text[-1..-$text.Length];[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load([Convert]::FromBase64String($text)).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null);

tare da irin wannan umarni wanda rubutun maharan suka yi amfani da shi:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Lura cewa maharan sun yi amfani da wani kayan aiki daga NYAN-x-CAT a matsayin ɗaya daga cikin abubuwan da aka biya - LimeRAT.

Adireshin sabar C&C suna nuna wani fasali na musamman na RATKing: ƙungiyar ta fi son ayyukan DNS masu ƙarfi (duba jerin C&Cs a cikin tebur na IoC).

IoC

Teburin da ke ƙasa yana ba da cikakken jerin rubutun VBS waɗanda za a iya danganta su ga yakin da aka kwatanta. Duk waɗannan rubutun suna kama da juna kuma suna yin kusan jerin ayyuka iri ɗaya. Dukkansu suna shigar da malware ajin RAT cikin amintaccen tsarin Windows. Dukkansu suna da adiresoshin C&C masu rijista ta amfani da sabis na DNS mai ƙarfi.

Duk da haka, ba za mu iya da'awar cewa duk waɗannan rubutun maharan iri ɗaya ne suka rarraba su ba, ban da samfurori masu adiresoshin C&C iri ɗaya (misali, kimjoy007.dyndns.org).

Sunan malware

SHA-256

C & C

Hanyar da ake yin allurar a ciki

Parallax

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

00edb8200dfeee3bdd0086c5e8e07c6056d322df913679a9f22a2b00b836fd72

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

504cbae901c4b3987aa9ba458a230944cb8bd96bbf778ceb54c773b781346146

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1487017e087b75ad930baa8b017e8388d1e99c75d26b5d1deec8b80e9333f189

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

c4160ec3c8ad01539f1c16fb35ed9c8c5a53a8fda8877f0d5e044241ea805891

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

515249d6813bb2dde1723d35ee8eb6eeb8775014ca629ede017c3d83a77634ce

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1b70f6fee760bcfe0c457f0a85ca451ed66e61f0e340d830f382c5d2f7ab803f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

b2bdffa5853f29c881d7d9bff91b640bc1c90e996f85406be3b36b2500f61aa1

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

c9745a8f33b3841fe7bfafd21ad4678d46fe6ea6125a8fedfcd2d5aee13f1601

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1dfc66968527fbd4c0df2ea34c577a7ce7a2ba9b54ba00be62120cc88035fa65

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

c6c05f21e16e488eed3001d0d9dd9c49366779559ad77fcd233de15b1773c981

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

cmd

3b785cdcd69a96902ee62499c25138a70e81f14b6b989a2f81d82239a19a3aed

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

4d71ceb9d6c53ac356c0f5bdfd1a5b28981061be87e38e077ee3a419e4c476f9

2004para.ddns.net

svchost

00185cc085f284ece264e3263c7771073a65783c250c5fd9afc7a85ed94acc77

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

0342107c0d2a069100e87ef5415e90fd86b1b1b1c975d0eb04ab1489e198fc78

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

de33b7a7b059599dc62337f92ceba644ac7b09f60d06324ecf6177fff06b8d10

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

80a8114d63606e225e620c64ad8e28c9996caaa9a9e87dd602c8f920c2197007

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

acb157ba5a48631e1f9f269e6282f042666098614b66129224d213e27c1149bb

fata.doomdns.org

cmd

bf608318018dc10016b438f851aab719ea0abe6afc166c8aea6b04f2320896d3

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

4d0c9b8ad097d35b447d715a815c67ff3d78638b305776cde4d90bfdcb368e38

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

e7c676f5be41d49296454cd6e4280d89e37f506d84d57b22f0be0d87625568ba

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

9375d54fcda9c7d65f861dfda698e25710fda75b5ebfc7a238599f4b0d34205f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

128367797fdf3c952831c2472f7a308f345ca04aa67b3f82b945cfea2ae11ce5

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

09bd720880461cb6e996046c7d6a1c937aa1c99bd19582a562053782600da79d

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

0a176164d2e1d5e2288881cc2e2d88800801001d03caedd524db365513e11276

paradickhead.homeip.net

svchost

0af5194950187fd7cbd75b1b39aab6e1e78dae7c216d08512755849c6a0d1cbe

fata.doomdns.org

svchost

warzone

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

db0d5a67a0ced6b2de3ee7d7fc845a34b9d6ca608e5fead7f16c9a640fa659eb

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Netwire

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Darktrack

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Farashin WSH

d410ced15c848825dcf75d30808cde7784e5b208f9a57b0896e828f890faea0e

anekesolution.linkpc.net

RegAsm

Lemun tsami

896604d27d88c75a475b28e88e54104e66f480bcab89cc75b6cdc6b29f8e438b

softmy.duckdns.org

RegAsm

QuasarRAT

bd1e29e9d17edbab41c3634649da5c5d20375f055ccf968c022811cd9624be57

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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chrom1.myq-see.com

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

source: www.habr.com

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