{"id":114955,"date":"2024-04-09T21:31:00","date_gmt":"2024-04-09T19:31:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/novyj-variant-ataki-bhi-na-cpu-intel-pozvolyayushhij-obojti-zashhitu-v-yadre-linux"},"modified":"2024-04-09T21:31:00","modified_gmt":"2024-04-09T19:31:00","slug":"novyj-variant-ataki-bhi-na-cpu-intel-pozvolyayushhij-obojti-zashhitu-v-yadre-linux","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/blog\/news\/novyj-variant-ataki-bhi-na-cpu-intel-pozvolyayushhij-obojti-zashhitu-v-yadre-linux","title":{"rendered":"\u00daj BHI t\u00e1mad\u00e1si lehet\u0151s\u00e9g az Intel CPU-kon, amely megker\u00fcli a Linux kernel v\u00e9delm\u00e9t","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

A kutat\u00f3csoport az Amsterdami Szabad Egyetemen felfedezett egy \u00faj t\u00e1mad\u00e1si m\u00f3dszert, a \u201eNative BHI\u201d (CVE-2024-2201) nev\u0171t, amely lehet\u0151v\u00e9 teszi az Intel processzorokkal rendelkez\u0151 rendszereken a Linux kernel mem\u00f3ri\u00e1j\u00e1nak tartalm\u00e1nak meghat\u00e1roz\u00e1s\u00e1t a felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3i t\u00e9rben v\u00e9grehajtott exploit sor\u00e1n. Virtualiz\u00e1ci\u00f3s rendszerekre alkalmazva a t\u00e1mad\u00f3 a vend\u00e9grendszerb\u0151l k\u00e9pes az host k\u00f6rnyezet vagy m\u00e1s vend\u00e9grendszerek mem\u00f3ri\u00e1j\u00e1nak tartalm\u00e1t meghat\u00e1rozni. <\/p>\n

A Native BHI m\u00f3dszer egy alternat\u00edv technik\u00e1t k\u00edn\u00e1l a BHI (Branch History Injection, CVE-2022-0001) s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9kenys\u00e9g kihaszn\u00e1l\u00e1s\u00e1ra, amely megker\u00fcli a kor\u00e1bban megval\u00f3s\u00edtott v\u00e9delmi m\u00f3dszereket. A 2022-ben javasolt BHI t\u00e1mad\u00e1si m\u00f3dszer a priviligiz\u00e1lts\u00e1g egy szintj\u00e9n bel\u00fcli s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9kenys\u00e9g kihaszn\u00e1l\u00e1s\u00e1ra \u00e9p\u00fclt, ahol az exploit egy eBPF program v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1s\u00e1ra t\u00e1maszkodott, amelyet a felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3 t\u00f6lt\u00f6tt be a kernelbe. A s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9kenys\u00e9g blokkol\u00e1s\u00e1hoz elegend\u0151 volt a k\u00f3d v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1s\u00e1nak korl\u00e1toz\u00e1sa az eBPF sz\u00e1m\u00e1ra a norm\u00e1l felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3k sz\u00e1m\u00e1ra. <\/p>\n

A Native BHI \u00faj m\u00f3dszer nem ig\u00e9nyel hozz\u00e1f\u00e9r\u00e9st az eBPF-hez, \u00e9s lehet\u0151v\u00e9 tesz egy nem privilegiz\u00e1lt felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3 sz\u00e1m\u00e1ra a felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3i t\u00e9rb\u0151l t\u00f6rt\u00e9n\u0151 t\u00e1mad\u00e1st. A m\u00f3dszer a megl\u00e9v\u0151 kernel k\u00f3dba illeszked\u0151 gadgetek - utas\u00edt\u00e1sok specul\u00e1ci\u00f3s v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1s\u00e1hoz vezet\u0151 parancssorozatok - v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1s\u00e1n alapul. A megfelel\u0151 gadgetek kernelbeli keres\u00e9s\u00e9hez egy speci\u00e1lis InSpectre Gadget nev\u0171 eszk\u00f6zk\u00e9szletet fejlesztettek ki, amely az 6.6-rc4 kernel elemz\u00e9se sor\u00e1n 1511 Spectre-gadgetet \u00e9s 2105 diszp\u00e9cser gadgetet azonos\u00edtott.

\"\u00daj<\/center> <\/p>\n

A felfedezett gadgetek alapj\u00e1n a kutat\u00f3k egy exploitot k\u00e9sz\u00edtettek, amely lehet\u0151v\u00e9 teszi a kernel pufferjeib\u0151l a root felhaszn\u00e1l\u00f3 jelsz\u00f3 hash \u00e9rt\u00e9k\u00e9nek kiemel\u00e9s\u00e9t, amely a \/etc\/shadow f\u00e1jlb\u00f3l lett bet\u00f6ltve. A kernel mem\u00f3ria tartalm\u00e1b\u00f3l val\u00f3 adatkinyer\u00e9s sebess\u00e9ge k\u00f6r\u00fclbel\u00fcl 3.5 Kb m\u00e1sodpercenk\u00e9nt.

\r\n \"Vide\u00f3\r\n
<\/div>\r\n <\/div><\/center> <\/p>\n

A BHI m\u00f3dszer a Spectre-v2 t\u00e1mad\u00e1s kib\u0151v\u00edtett v\u00e1ltozata, amely a hozz\u00e1adott v\u00e9delem (Intel eIBRS \u00e9s Arm CSV2) megker\u00fcl\u00e9s\u00e9re \u00e9s az adatsziv\u00e1rg\u00e1s megszervez\u00e9s\u00e9re glob\u00e1lis el\u00e1gaz\u00e1si t\u00f6rt\u00e9neti puffer (Branch History Buffer) \u00e9rt\u00e9kek behelyettes\u00edt\u00e9seken kereszt\u00fcl haszn\u00e1lja, amelyet a CPU a lebeg\u00e9si j\u00f3sl\u00e1sok pontoss\u00e1g\u00e1nak n\u00f6vel\u00e9s\u00e9re alkalmaz. A t\u00e1mad\u00e1s sor\u00e1n az el\u00e1gaz\u00e1si t\u00f6rt\u00e9net manipul\u00e1l\u00e1s\u00e1val rosszindulat\u00fa el\u00e1gaz\u00f3 felt\u00e9telez\u00e9sek \u00e9s a sz\u00fcks\u00e9ges utas\u00edt\u00e1sok spekulat\u00edv v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1s\u00e1nak k\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00e9nyei j\u00f6nnek l\u00e9tre, melynek eredm\u00e9nye a gyors\u00edt\u00f3t\u00e1rban t\u00e1rol\u00f3dik. <\/p>\n

A Spectre-v2 t\u00e1mad\u00e1st\u00f3l val\u00f3 elt\u00e9r\u00e9sek l\u00e9nyege, hogy az el\u00e1gaz\u00e1si t\u00f6rt\u00e9neti puffert (Branch History Buffer) haszn\u00e1lja ahelyett, hogy az el\u00e1gaz\u00e1si c\u00e9lpuffert (Branch Target Buffer) alkalmazn\u00e1. Az adatok mem\u00f3ri\u00e1b\u00f3l val\u00f3 kinyer\u00e9s\u00e9hez a t\u00e1mad\u00f3nak olyan felt\u00e9teleket kell teremtenie, amelyek mellett a spekulat\u00edv m\u0171velet v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1sakor az c\u00edm olyan ter\u00fcletr\u0151l sz\u00e1rmazik, amelyet meg kell hat\u00e1rozni. A spekulat\u00edv k\u00f6zvetett el\u00e1gaz\u00e1s v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1sa ut\u00e1n a mem\u00f3ri\u00e1b\u00f3l olvasott el\u00e1gaz\u00e1si c\u00edm a gyors\u00edt\u00f3t\u00e1rban marad, ez\u00e9rt annak kinyer\u00e9s\u00e9re alkalmazhat\u00f3 az egyik m\u00f3dszer, amely a gyors\u00edt\u00f3t\u00e1rhoz val\u00f3 hozz\u00e1f\u00e9r\u00e9si id\u0151 v\u00e1ltoz\u00e1s\u00e1nak elemz\u00e9s\u00e9n alapul. <\/p>\n

A Native BHI t\u00e1mad\u00e1s ellen a v\u00e9delem nem ny\u00fajt v\u00e9delmet az Intel IBT (Indirect Branch Tracking) utas\u00edt\u00e1sok alkalmaz\u00e1s\u00e1val \u00e9s a Linux kernelben megval\u00f3s\u00edtott FineIBT v\u00e9delmi mechanizmussal szemben, amely egyes\u00edti az IBT hardveres utas\u00edt\u00e1sait \u00e9s a kCFI (kernel Control Flow Integrity) program-alap\u00fa v\u00e9delmet a v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1si sorrend megszak\u00edt\u00e1s\u00e1nak megakad\u00e1lyoz\u00e1s\u00e1ra. A FineIBT lehet\u0151v\u00e9 teszi az utols\u00f3 k\u00f6zvetett el\u00e1gaz\u00e1st csak az ENDBR utas\u00edt\u00e1sra, amely a funkci\u00f3 elej\u00e9n tal\u00e1lhat\u00f3. Ezen fel\u00fcl (a kCFI mechanizmussal anal\u00f3g m\u00f3don) hash-ellen\u0151rz\u00e9sek t\u00f6rt\u00e9nnek, amelyek garant\u00e1lj\u00e1k a mutat\u00f3k v\u00e1ltozatlans\u00e1g\u00e1t. <\/p>\n

Az \u00faj t\u00e1mad\u00e1si v\u00e1ltozat ellen a Linux kernelbe egy \u00faj v\u00e9delmi m\u00f3dot \u00e9p\u00edtettek be, amely az Intel \u00e1ltal javasolt hardveres v\u00e9delmi eszk\u00f6z\u00f6ket (BHI_DIS_S) vagy alternat\u00edv program-alap\u00fa v\u00e9delmet alkalmazza, amely a hiperh\u00e1l\u00f3 v\u00e9delme \u00e9rdek\u00e9ben ker\u00fclt megval\u00f3s\u00edt\u00e1sra. KVM<\/a>. A Xen hypervisor fejleszt\u0151i jav\u00edt\u00e1st adtak ki, amely a BHI_DIS_S m\u00f3dszer haszn\u00e1lat\u00e1ra \u00e9p\u00fcl, korl\u00e1tozva a predikci\u00f3t a v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1sok el\u0151zm\u00e9nyeinek alapj\u00e1n. A BHI_DIS_S t\u00e1mogat\u00e1sa el\u00e9rhet\u0151 az Intel Alder Lake processzorokban, valamint a szerver CPU-kban, kezdve az Intel Sapphire Rapids-t\u0151l. El\u00e9rhet\u0151 egy szoftveres v\u00e9delmi m\u00f3d is, amely a v\u00e9grehajt\u00e1sok t\u00f6rt\u00e9neti puffert\u00f6rl\u00e9s\u00e9nek haszn\u00e1lat\u00e1n alapul, de ez \u00e9szlelhet\u0151 teljes\u00edtm\u00e9nycs\u00f6kken\u00e9shez vezet.
\n
Forr\u00e1s: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u0413\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439 \u0438\u0437 \u0410\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0434\u0430\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043d\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 «Native BHI» (CVE-2024-2201), \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0445 \u0441 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 Intel \u043e\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430 Linux \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f. \u0412 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u043a \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u043c \u0432\u0438\u0440\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u0438\u0437 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442-\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c. \u041c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434 Native BHI \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u0438\u043d\u0443\u044e […]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":114956,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-114955","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47\u00daj BHI t\u00e1mad\u00e1si vari\u00e1ns Intel CPU-ra, amely megker\u00fcli a v\u00e9delmet a Linux kernelben | ProHoster","description":"Az Amszterdami Szabads\u00e1g Egyetem kutat\u00f3csoportja felfedezett egy \u00faj \"Native BHI\" (CVE-2024-2201) t\u00e1mad\u00e1si m\u00f3dszert, amely lehet\u0151v\u00e9 teszi az Intel processzorokkal rendelkez\u0151 rendszereken a Linux kernel mem\u00f3ri\u00e1j\u00e1nak tartalm\u00e1nak meghat\u00e1roz\u00e1s\u00e1t.","canonical_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/blog\/news\/novyj-variant-ataki-bhi-na-cpu-intel-pozvolyayushhij-obojti-zashhitu-v-yadre-linux","robots":"max-image-preview:large","keywords":"","webmasterTools":{"miscellaneous":""},"schema":null,"og:locale":"hu_HU","og:site_name":"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b","og:type":"article","og:title":"\ud83e\udd47\u041d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043d\u0442 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 BHI \u043d\u0430 CPU Intel, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u0443 \u0432 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0435 Linux | ProHoster","og:description":"\u0413\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043f\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439 \u0438\u0437 \u0410\u043c\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0434\u0430\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043d\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 "Native BHI" (CVE-2024-2201), \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430\u0445 \u0441 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 Intel \u043e\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438 \u044f\u0434\u0440\u0430 Linux \u043f\u0440\u0438.","og:url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/blog\/news\/novyj-variant-ataki-bhi-na-cpu-intel-pozvolyayushhij-obojti-zashhitu-v-yadre-linux","og:image":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:secure_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:width":350,"og:image:height":350,"article:published_time":"2024-04-09T19:31:00+00:00","article:modified_time":"2024-04-09T19:31:00+00:00","article:publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster","article:author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster"},"aioseo_meta_data":{"post_id":"114955","title":null,"description":null,"keywords":null,"keyphrases":null,"primary_term":null,"canonical_url":null,"og_title":null,"og_description":null,"og_object_type":"default","og_image_type":"default","og_image_url":null,"og_image_width":null,"og_image_height":null,"og_image_custom_url":null,"og_image_custom_fields":null,"og_video":null,"og_custom_url":null,"og_article_section":null,"og_article_tags":null,"twitter_use_og":false,"twitter_card":"default","twitter_image_type":"default","twitter_image_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_fields":null,"twitter_title":null,"twitter_description":null,"schema":{"blockGraphs":[],"customGraphs":[],"default":{"data":{"Article":[],"Course":[],"Dataset":[],"FAQPage":[],"Movie":[],"Person":[],"Product":[],"ProductReview":[],"Car":[],"Recipe":[],"Service":[],"SoftwareApplication":[],"WebPage":[]},"graphName":"","isEnabled":true},"graphs":[]},"schema_type":"default","schema_type_options":null,"pillar_content":false,"robots_default":true,"robots_noindex":false,"robots_noarchive":false,"robots_nosnippet":false,"robots_nofollow":false,"robots_noimageindex":false,"robots_noodp":false,"robots_notranslate":false,"robots_max_snippet":null,"robots_max_videopreview":null,"robots_max_imagepreview":"large","priority":null,"frequency":null,"local_seo":null,"seo_analyzer_scan_date":"2026-01-22 21:54:46","breadcrumb_settings":null,"limit_modified_date":false,"reviewed_by":null,"ai":null,"created":"2026-01-22 21:54:46","updated":"2026-01-22 21:54:46","focus_keyword":null,"additional_keywords":null,"truseo_locale":null},"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114955","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=114955"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114955\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":164266,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114955\/revisions\/164266"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/114956"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=114955"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=114955"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/hu\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=114955"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}