{"id":101725,"date":"2021-10-22T16:22:55","date_gmt":"2021-10-22T14:22:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/ataka-na-intel-sgx-pozvolyayushhaya-izvlech-konfidenczialnye-dannye-ili-vypolnit-kod-v-anklave"},"modified":"2021-10-22T16:22:55","modified_gmt":"2021-10-22T14:22:58","slug":"ataka-na-intel-sgx-pozvolyayushhaya-izvlech-konfidenczialnye-dannye-ili-vypolnit-kod-v-anklave","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/it\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/ataka-na-intel-sgx-pozvolyayushhaya-izvlech-konfidenczialnye-dannye-ili-vypolnit-kod-v-anklave","title":{"rendered":"Attacco a Intel SGX, che consente di estrarre dati riservati o eseguire codice all'interno dell'enclave","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

I ricercatori della Universit\u00e0 di Scienza e Tecnologia della Difesa dell'Esercito Popolare Cinese, dell'Universit\u00e0 Nazionale di Singapore e del Politecnico Federale di Zurigo hanno sviluppato un nuovo metodo di attacco agli enclave isolate di Intel SGX (Software Guard eXtensions). L'attacco \u00e8 stato denominato SmashEx e deriva da problemi di ri-entrabilit\u00e0 nella gestione delle eccezioni durante il funzionamento dei componenti runtime per Intel SGX. Il metodo di attacco proposto consente, in presenza di controllo del sistema operativo, di identificare i dati riservati memorizzati nell'enclave o di organizzare la copia del proprio codice in memoria dell'enclave per la sua esecuzione. <\/p>\n

I prototipi degli exploit sono stati preparati per enclave con runtime basato su Intel SGX SDK (CVE-2021-0186) e Microsoft Open Enclave (CVE-2021-33767). Nel primo caso, \u00e8 stata dimostrata la possibilit\u00e0 di estrazione della chiave RSA utilizzata su un server web per HTTPS, mentre nel secondo \u00e8 stato possibile determinare il contenuto ottenuto dall'utilit\u00e0 cURL eseguita all'interno dell'enclave. La vulnerabilit\u00e0 \u00e8 gi\u00e0 stata risolta tramite aggiornamenti nei rilasci di Intel SGX SDK 2.13 e Open Enclave 0.17.1. Oltre ai pacchetti Intel SGX SDK e Microsoft Open Enclave, la vulnerabilit\u00e0 si manifesta anche nell'SDK Google Asylo, EdgelessRT, Apache Teaclave, Rust SGX SDK, SGX-LKL, CoSMIX e Veracruz. <\/p>\n

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\"Attacco<\/center> <\/p>\n

Il problema \u00e8 legato al fatto che la tecnologia SGX consente al sistema operativo di interrompere l'esecuzione dell'enclave generando un'eccezione hardware, mentre all'interno delle enclave non sono implementati correttamente i primitivi per la gestione atomica di tali eccezioni. A differenza del kernel del sistema operativo e delle normali applicazioni, il codice all'interno delle enclave non ha accesso ai primitivi per organizzare azioni atomiche durante la gestione delle eccezioni che si verificano in modo asincrono. Senza i suddetti primitivi atomici, l'enclave pu\u00f2 essere interrotta in qualsiasi momento e ripresa, anche nei momenti in cui sono in esecuzione sezioni critiche e si trova in uno stato non sicuro (ad esempio, quando i registri della CPU non sono stati salvati\/ripristinati).

\"Attacco<\/center> <\/p>\n

Per un funzionamento corretto, la tecnologia SGX consente di interrompere l'esecuzione dell'enclave tramite eccezioni hardware configurabili. Questa caratteristica permette agli ambienti runtime delle enclave di gestire le eccezioni interne all'enclave o i segnali, ma pu\u00f2 anche provocare errori di riutilizzabilit\u00e0. L'attacco SmashEx si basa sull'exploitation di difetti nell'SDK che non gestiscono correttamente la situazione di una chiamata ripetuta al gestore di eccezioni. \u00c8 importante notare che, per sfruttare la vulnerabilit\u00e0, l'attaccante deve essere in grado di interrompere l'esecuzione dell'enclave, ovvero deve controllare l'ambiente di sistema. <\/p>\n

Dopo la generazione di un'eccezione, l'attaccante ottiene una breve finestra temporale in cui pu\u00f2 intercettare il flusso di esecuzione manipolando i parametri di input. In particolare, se ha accesso al sistema (all'ambiente esterno all'enclave), \u00e8 possibile generare una nuova eccezione subito dopo l'esecuzione dell'istruzione di ingresso nell'enclave (EENTER), il che porter\u00e0 al ritorno del controllo al sistema in una fase in cui la configurazione dello stack per l'enclave non \u00e8 ancora completata, inclusa la conservazione dello stato dei registri CPU. <\/p>\n

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\"Attacco<\/center>
\"Attacco<\/center>
\n
Fonte: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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