RATKing: kampanye anyar karo Trojan akses remot

Ing pungkasan Mei, kita nemokake kampanye kanggo nyebarake program malware Remote Access Trojan (RAT) sing ngidini panyerang ngontrol sistem sing kena infeksi saka jarak jauh.

Klompok sing diteliti dibedakake kanthi kasunyatan manawa ora milih kulawarga RAT khusus kanggo infeksi. Sawetara Trojan ditemokake ing serangan ing kampanye kasebut (kabeh kasedhiya). Kanthi fitur iki, grup kasebut ngelingake kita babagan raja tikus - kewan mitos sing kasusun saka rodents kanthi buntut sing gegandhengan.

Asli dijupuk saka monograf dening K. N. Rossikov "Tikus lan tikus kaya tikus, sing paling penting sacara ekonomi" (1908)

Kanggo ngurmati makhluk iki, kita menehi jeneng grup sing dianggep RATKing. Ing kirim iki, kita bakal rinci babagan cara para panyerang nindakake serangan kasebut, alat apa sing digunakake, lan uga nuduhake pikirane babagan atribusi kanggo kampanye iki.

Kemajuan saka serangan

Kabeh serangan ing kampanye iki ditindakake miturut algoritma ing ngisor iki:

1. Pangguna nampa email phishing kanthi pranala menyang Google Drive.
2. Nggunakake link kasebut, korban ndownload skrip VBS ala sing nemtokake perpustakaan DLL kanggo mbukak muatan pungkasan menyang registri Windows lan ngluncurake PowerShell kanggo nglakokake.
3. Pustaka DLL nyuntikake muatan pungkasan - nyatane, salah sawijining RAT sing digunakake dening panyerang - menyang proses sistem lan ndhaptar skrip VBS ing autorun supaya bisa entuk pijakan ing mesin sing kena infeksi.
4. Muatan pungkasan ditindakake ing proses sistem lan menehi panyerang kemampuan kanggo ngontrol komputer sing kena infeksi.

Skema bisa diwakili kaya mangkene:

Sabanjure, kita bakal fokus ing telung tahap pisanan, amarga kita kasengsem ing mekanisme pangiriman malware. Kita ora bakal njlèntrèhaké kanthi rinci mekanisme operasi malware kasebut. Kasedhiya kanthi akeh - bisa didol ing forum khusus, utawa disebarake minangka proyek sumber terbuka - lan mulane ora unik kanggo grup RATKing.

Analisis tahap serangan

Tahap 1. Email phishing

Serangan kasebut diwiwiti kanthi korban nampa layang ala (para panyerang nggunakake template sing beda karo teks; gambar ing ngisor iki nuduhake salah sawijining conto). Pesen kasebut ngemot link menyang repositori sing sah drive.google.com, sing mesthine mimpin menyang kaca download dokumen PDF.

Contoh email phishing

Nanging, nyatane, dudu dokumen PDF sing dimuat, nanging skrip VBS.

Nalika sampeyan ngeklik link saka email ing gambar ing ndhuwur, file jenenge Cargo Flight Details.vbs. Ing kasus iki, panyerang malah ora nyoba kanggo nyamar file minangka dokumen sah.

Ing wektu sing padha, minangka bagéan saka kampanye iki, kita nemokake skrip jenenge Cargo Trip Detail.pdf.vbs. Bisa uga wis dadi PDF sing sah amarga Windows ndhelikake ekstensi file kanthi standar. Bener, ing kasus iki, anggepan isih bisa ditimbulake dening lambang kasebut, sing cocog karo skrip VBS.

Ing tahap iki, korban bisa ngerteni penipuan kasebut: mung deleng file sing diunduh sedhela. Nanging, ing kampanye phishing kasebut, panyerang asring ngandelake pangguna sing ora peduli utawa kesusu.

Tahap 2. Operasi script VBS

Skrip VBS, sing pangguna bisa mbukak kanthi ora sengaja, ndhaptar perpustakaan DLL ing registri Windows. Skrip kasebut dibuwang: garis-garis ing njero ditulis minangka bait sing dipisahake kanthi karakter sing sewenang-wenang.

Tuladha skrip sing dibuwang

Algoritma deobfuscation cukup prasaja: saben karakter katelu ora kalebu saka string obfuscated, sawise asil decoded saka base16 menyang string asli. Contone, saka nilai 57Q53s63t72s69J70r74e2El53v68m65j6CH6Ct (disorot ing gambar ing ndhuwur) baris sing diasilake yaiku WScript.Shell.

Kanggo deobfuscate strings, kita nggunakake fungsi Python:

def decode_str(data_enc):   
    return binascii.unhexlify(''.join([data_enc[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(data_enc), 3)]))

Ing ngisor iki, ing baris 9-10, kita nyorot nilai sing deobfuscation ngasilake file DLL. Dheweke sing diluncurake ing tahap sabanjure nggunakake PowerShell.

String karo DLL obfuscated

Saben fungsi ing skrip VBS dieksekusi minangka strings deobfuscated.

Sawise mbukak skrip, fungsi kasebut diarani wscript.sleep - digunakake kanggo nindakake eksekusi sing ditundha.

Sabanjure, skrip bisa digunakake karo registri Windows. Dheweke nggunakake teknologi WMI kanggo iki. Kanthi bantuan, tombol unik digawe, lan awak file eksekusi ditulis ing parameter kasebut. Registri wis diakses liwat WMI nggunakake printah ing ngisor iki:

GetObject(winmgmts {impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\.rootdefault:StdRegProv)

Entri digawe ing pendaptaran dening script VBS

Tahap 3. Operasi perpustakaan DLL

Ing tahap katelu, DLL angkoro ngemot muatan pungkasan, nyuntikake menyang proses sistem, lan mesthekake yen skrip VBS diwiwiti kanthi otomatis nalika pangguna mlebu.

Mbukak liwat PowerShell

DLL dieksekusi nggunakake printah ing ngisor iki ing PowerShell:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Printah iki nindakake ing ngisor iki:

• nampa data nilai registri kanthi jeneng rnd_value_name — data iki minangka file DLL sing ditulis ing platform .Net;
• dimuat modul .Net asil menyang memori proses powershell.exe nggunakake fungsi [System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load() (deskripsi rinci babagan fungsi Load (). kasedhiya ing situs web Microsoft);
• nindakake fungsi kasebut GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK() - eksekusi perpustakaan DLL diwiwiti - kanthi paramèter vbsScriptPath, xorKey, vbsScriptName... Parameter xorKey disimpen tombol kanggo decrypting payload final, lan paramèter vbsScriptPath и vbsScriptName ditransfer kanggo ndhaptar skrip VBS ing autorun.

Katrangan saka perpustakaan DLL

Ing wangun decompiled, bootloader katon kaya iki:

Loader ing wangun decompiled (fungsi sing miwiti eksekusi perpustakaan DLL digarisi abang)

Bootloader dilindhungi dening .Net Reactor protector. Utilitas de4dot nindakake tugas sing apik kanggo mbusak pelindung iki.

Loader iki:

• nyuntikake muatan menyang proses sistem (ing conto iki svchost.exe);
• Aku nambahake skrip VBS menyang autorun.

Injeksi muatan

Ayo goleki fungsi sing diarani skrip PowerShell.

Fungsi sing diarani skrip PowerShell

Fungsi iki nindakake tumindak ing ngisor iki:

• dekripsi rong set data (array и array2 ing gambar). Dheweke asline dikompres nggunakake gzip lan dienkripsi nganggo algoritma XOR kanthi kunci xorKey;
• data disalin menyang wilayah memori diparengake. Data saka array - menyang area memori nuding intPtr (payload pointer ing gambar); data saka array2 - menyang area memori nuding intPtr2 (shellcode pointer ing gambar);
• disebut fungsi CallWindowProcA (katrangan Fungsi iki kasedhiya ing situs web Microsoft) kanthi paramèter ing ngisor iki (jeneng paramèter kasebut kapacak ing ngisor iki, ing gambar kasebut padha ing urutan sing padha, nanging kanthi nilai sing bisa digunakake):
  • lpPrevWndFunc - pointer kanggo data saka array2;
  • hWnd - pointer menyang senar sing ngemot path menyang file eksekusi svchost.exe;
  • Msg - pointer kanggo data saka array;
  • wParam, lParam - paramèter pesen (ing kasus iki, paramèter kasebut ora digunakake lan duweni nilai 0);
• digawe file %AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup<name>.urlngendi <name> - iki 4 karakter pisanan saka parameter vbsScriptName (ing gambar, fragmen kode kanthi tumindak iki diwiwiti kanthi printah File.Copy). Kanthi cara iki, malware kasebut nambahake file URL menyang dhaptar file autorun nalika pangguna mlebu lan dadi dipasang ing komputer sing kena infeksi. Berkas URL ngemot pranala menyang skrip:

[InternetShortcut]
URL = file : ///<vbsScriptPath>

Kanggo mangerteni carane injeksi ditindakake, kita dekripsi susunan data array и array2. Kanggo nindakake iki, kita nggunakake fungsi Python ing ngisor iki:

def decrypt(data, key):
    return gzip.decompress(
        bytearray([data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)] for i in range(len(data))])[4:])
    

Akibaté, kita nemokake manawa:

• array minangka file PE - iki minangka beban pungkasan;
• array2 yaiku shellcode sing dibutuhake kanggo nindakake injeksi.

Shellcode saka array array2 liwati minangka nilai fungsi lpPrevWndFunc menyang fungsi CallWindowProcA. lpPrevWndFunc - fungsi callback, prototipe katon kaya iki:

LRESULT WndFunc(
  HWND    hWnd,
  UINT    Msg,
  WPARAM  wParam,
  LPARAM  lParam
);

Dadi nalika sampeyan mbukak fungsi CallWindowProcA karo paramèter hWnd, Msg, wParam, lParam shellcode saka array dieksekusi array2 kanthi argumentasi hWnd и Msg. hWnd minangka pointer menyang string sing ngemot path menyang file sing bisa dieksekusi svchost.exelan Msg - pointer menyang payload pungkasan.

Shellcode nampa alamat fungsi saka kernel32.dll и ntdll32.dll adhedhasar nilai hash saka jenenge lan nyuntikake muatan pungkasan menyang memori proses svchost.exenggunakake teknik Proses Hollowing (sampeyan bisa maca liyane babagan iki artikel). Nalika nyuntikake shellcode:

• digawe proses svchost.exe ing negara dilereni soko tugas nggunakake fungsi CreateProcessW;
• banjur ndhelikake tampilan bagean ing papan alamat proses svchost.exe nggunakake fungsi NtUnmapViewOfSection. Mangkono, program mbebasake memori saka proses asli svchost.exekanggo banjur nyedhiakke memori kanggo payload ing alamat iki;
• memori diparengake kanggo payload ing papan alamat proses svchost.exe nggunakake fungsi VirtualAllocEx;

Miwiti proses injeksi

• nulis isi muatan menyang ruang alamat proses svchost.exe nggunakake fungsi WriteProcessMemory (kaya ing gambar ing ngisor iki);
• nerusake proses svchost.exe nggunakake fungsi ResumeThread.

Rampung proses injeksi

Malware sing bisa didownload

Minangka asil saka tumindak sing diterangake, salah siji saka sawetara malware kelas RAT diinstal ing sistem sing kena infeksi. Tabel ing ngisor iki nyathet malware sing digunakake ing serangan kasebut, sing bisa digandhengake karo siji klompok panyerang, amarga conto kasebut ngakses server perintah lan kontrol sing padha.

Jeneng malware

Pisanan katon

SHA-256

C & C.

Proses injeksi ditindakake

Darktrack

16-04-2020

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2017

svchost

parallax

24-04-2020

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2019

svchost

WARZONE

18-05-2020

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:9933

svchost

Netwire

20-05-2020

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2000

svchost

Conto malware sing disebarake kanthi server kontrol sing padha

Rong prekara sing penting ing kene.

Kaping pisanan, kasunyatan manawa para panyerang nggunakake sawetara kulawarga RAT sing beda bebarengan. Prilaku iki ora khas kanggo grup cyber sing kondhang, sing asring nggunakake alat sing padha karo sing wis dikenal.

Kapindho, RATKing nggunakake malware sing didol ing forum khusus kanthi rega murah, utawa malah dadi proyek sumber terbuka.

Dhaptar malware sing luwih lengkap digunakake ing kampanye-karo siji caveat penting-diwenehake ing mburi artikel.

Babagan grup

Kita ora bisa ngubungake kampanye angkoro sing diterangake menyang penyerang sing dikenal. Saiki, kita percaya manawa serangan kasebut ditindakake dening klompok sing dhasar anyar. Nalika kita nulis ing wiwitan, kita diarani RATKing.

Kanggo nggawe skrip VBS, grup kasebut mbokmenawa nggunakake alat sing padha karo sarana kasebut VBS-Crypter saka pangembang NYAN-x-CAT. Iki dituduhake kanthi mirip script sing digawe program iki karo skrip penyerang. Khusus, loro-lorone:

• nindakake eksekusi telat nggunakake fungsi kasebut Sleep;
• nggunakake WMI;
• ndhaftar awak file eksekusi minangka parameter kunci registri;
• eksekusi file iki nggunakake PowerShell ing papan alamat dhewe.

Kanggo gamblang, mbandhingake printah PowerShell kanggo mbukak file saka pendaptaran, sing digunakake dening script digawe nggunakake VBS-Crypter:

((Get-ItemPropertyHKCU:SoftwareNYANxCAT).NYANxCAT);$text=-join$text[-1..-$text.Length];[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load([Convert]::FromBase64String($text)).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null);

kanthi printah sing padha sing digunakake skrip penyerang:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Elinga yen panyerang nggunakake sarana liyane saka NYAN-x-CAT minangka salah sawijining muatan - LimeRAT.

Alamat server C&C nuduhake fitur khas liyane saka RATKing: grup luwih milih layanan DNS dinamis (ndeleng dhaptar C&C ing tabel IoC).

IoC

Tabel ing ngisor iki nyedhiyakake dhaptar lengkap skrip VBS sing paling mungkin digandhengake karo kampanye sing diterangake. Kabeh skrip iki padha lan nindakake kira-kira urutan tumindak sing padha. Kabeh mau nyuntikake malware kelas RAT menyang proses Windows sing dipercaya. Kabeh mau duwe alamat C&C sing didaftar nggunakake layanan Dynamic DNS.

Nanging, kita ora bisa ngaku yen kabeh skrip iki disebarake dening panyerang sing padha, kajaba conto kanthi alamat C&C sing padha (contone, kimjoy007.dyndns.org).

Jeneng malware

SHA-256

C & C.

Proses injeksi ditindakake

parallax

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

00edb8200dfeee3bdd0086c5e8e07c6056d322df913679a9f22a2b00b836fd72

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

504cbae901c4b3987aa9ba458a230944cb8bd96bbf778ceb54c773b781346146

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1487017e087b75ad930baa8b017e8388d1e99c75d26b5d1deec8b80e9333f189

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

c4160ec3c8ad01539f1c16fb35ed9c8c5a53a8fda8877f0d5e044241ea805891

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

515249d6813bb2dde1723d35ee8eb6eeb8775014ca629ede017c3d83a77634ce

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1b70f6fee760bcfe0c457f0a85ca451ed66e61f0e340d830f382c5d2f7ab803f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

b2bdffa5853f29c881d7d9bff91b640bc1c90e996f85406be3b36b2500f61aa1

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

c9745a8f33b3841fe7bfafd21ad4678d46fe6ea6125a8fedfcd2d5aee13f1601

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1dfc66968527fbd4c0df2ea34c577a7ce7a2ba9b54ba00be62120cc88035fa65

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

c6c05f21e16e488eed3001d0d9dd9c49366779559ad77fcd233de15b1773c981

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

cmd

3b785cdcd69a96902ee62499c25138a70e81f14b6b989a2f81d82239a19a3aed

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

4d71ceb9d6c53ac356c0f5bdfd1a5b28981061be87e38e077ee3a419e4c476f9

2004para.ddns.net

svchost

00185cc085f284ece264e3263c7771073a65783c250c5fd9afc7a85ed94acc77

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0342107c0d2a069100e87ef5415e90fd86b1b1b1c975d0eb04ab1489e198fc78

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

de33b7a7b059599dc62337f92ceba644ac7b09f60d06324ecf6177fff06b8d10

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

80a8114d63606e225e620c64ad8e28c9996caaa9a9e87dd602c8f920c2197007

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

acb157ba5a48631e1f9f269e6282f042666098614b66129224d213e27c1149bb

hope.doomdns.org

cmd

bf608318018dc10016b438f851aab719ea0abe6afc166c8aea6b04f2320896d3

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

4d0c9b8ad097d35b447d715a815c67ff3d78638b305776cde4d90bfdcb368e38

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

e7c676f5be41d49296454cd6e4280d89e37f506d84d57b22f0be0d87625568ba

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

9375d54fcda9c7d65f861dfda698e25710fda75b5ebfc7a238599f4b0d34205f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

128367797fdf3c952831c2472f7a308f345ca04aa67b3f82b945cfea2ae11ce5

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

09bd720880461cb6e996046c7d6a1c937aa1c99bd19582a562053782600da79d

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0a176164d2e1d5e2288881cc2e2d88800801001d03caedd524db365513e11276

paradickhead.homeip.net

svchost

0af5194950187fd7cbd75b1b39aab6e1e78dae7c216d08512755849c6a0d1cbe

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

Warzone

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

db0d5a67a0ced6b2de3ee7d7fc845a34b9d6ca608e5fead7f16c9a640fa659eb

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Netwire

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Darktrack

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

WSH RAT

d410ced15c848825dcf75d30808cde7784e5b208f9a57b0896e828f890faea0e

anekesolution.linkpc.net

RegAsm

Jeruk

896604d27d88c75a475b28e88e54104e66f480bcab89cc75b6cdc6b29f8e438b

softmy.duckdns.org

RegAsm

QuasarRAT

bd1e29e9d17edbab41c3634649da5c5d20375f055ccf968c022811cd9624be57

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

12044aa527742282ad5154a4de24e55c9e1fae42ef844ed6f2f890296122153b

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

be93cc77d864dafd7d8c21317722879b65cfbb3297416bde6ca6edbfd8166572

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

933a136f8969707a84a61f711018cd21ee891d5793216e063ac961b5d165f6c0

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

71dea554d93728cce8074dbdb4f63ceb072d4bb644f0718420f780398dafd943

chrom1.myq-see.com

RegAsm

0d344e8d72d752c06dc6a7f3abf2ff7678925fde872756bf78713027e1e332d5

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

0ed7f282fd242c3f2de949650c9253373265e9152c034c7df3f5f91769c6a4eb

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

aabb6759ce408ebfa2cc57702b14adaec933d8e4821abceaef0c1af3263b1bfa

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

1699a37ddcf4769111daf33b7d313cf376f47e92f6b92b2119bd0c860539f745

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

3472597945f3bbf84e735a778fd75c57855bb86aca9b0a4d0e4049817b508c8c

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

809010d8823da84cdbb2c8e6b70be725a6023c381041ebda8b125d1a6a71e9b1

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

4217a2da69f663f1ab42ebac61978014ec4f562501efb2e040db7ebb223a7dff

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

08f34b3088af792a95c49bcb9aa016d4660609409663bf1b51f4c331b87bae00

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

79b4efcce84e9e7a2e85df7b0327406bee0b359ad1445b4f08e390309ea0c90d

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

12ea7ce04e0177a71a551e6d61e4a7916b1709729b2d3e9daf7b1bdd0785f63a

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

d7b8eb42ae35e9cc46744f1285557423f24666db1bde92bf7679f0ce7b389af9

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

def09b0fed3360c457257266cb851fffd8c844bc04a623c210a2efafdf000d5c

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

50119497c5f919a7e816a37178d28906fb3171b07fc869961ef92601ceca4c1c

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

ade5a2f25f603bf4502efa800d3cf5d19d1f0d69499b0f2e9ec7c85c6dd49621

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

189d5813c931889190881ee34749d390e3baa80b2c67b426b10b3666c3cc64b7

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

c3193dd67650723753289a4aebf97d4c72a1afe73c7135bee91c77bdf1517f21

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

a6f814f14698141753fc6fb7850ead9af2ebcb0e32ab99236a733ddb03b9eec2

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

a55116253624641544175a30c956dbd0638b714ff97b9de0e24145720dcfdf74

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

d6e0f0fb460d9108397850169112bd90a372f66d87b028e522184682a825d213

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

522ba6a242c35e2bf8303e99f03a85d867496bbb0572226e226af48cc1461a86

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

fabfdc209b02fe522f81356680db89f8861583da89984c20273904e0cf9f4a02

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

08ec13b7da6e0d645e4508b19ba616e4cf4e0421aa8e26ac7f69e13dc8796691

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

8433c75730578f963556ec99fbc8d97fa63a522cef71933f260f385c76a8ee8d

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

99f6bfd9edb9bf108b11c149dd59346484c7418fc4c455401c15c8ac74b70c74

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

d13520e48f0ff745e31a1dfd6f15ab56c9faecb51f3d5d3d87f6f2e1abe6b5cf

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

9e6978b16bd52fcd9c331839545c943adc87e0fbd7b3f947bab22ffdd309f747

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

Source: www.habr.com