🥇MS Remota Desktop porta, HAProxy et password violente

Amici, salve!

Multi modi sunt iungendi a domo ad officium tuum workspace. Una earum est uti Microsoft Desktop porta longinqua. Haec RDP super HTTP. Nolo ipsum hic attingere instituendo RDGW, nolo discutere quare bonum vel malum sit, unum e longinquis instrumentorum accessu tractamus. Loqui volo de servo tuo RdgW custodiendo a malo interreti. Cum servo RDGW statuo, statim de securitate sollicitus sum, praesertim praesidium contra vim violentam tesseram. Miratus sum me non reperisse articulos in Interreti quomodo id facerem. Bene, habebis ut facias.

ipsa RDGW praesidia nulla habet. Etiam nudo interface ad retis albis exponi potest et magna operabitur. Sed hoc faciet ius administrator vel specialist informationes securitatis turbat. Insuper condicionem interclusionis rationis vitare tibi sinet, cum neglegentior operarius tesseram corporatum in computatorio domicilio suo recordatus est, et tesseram eius mutavit.

Bona via ad defendendas opes internas ab ambitu externo est per varios procuratores, systemata evulgandas, et alios WAFs. Meminerimus RDGW adhuc http, tunc solum rogat solutionem specialem obturaculum inter servientes interni et interreti.

Scio frigus esse F5, A10, Netscaler (ADC). Ut administrator unius harum systematum, dicam etiam posse praesidium contra vim in his systematis constituere. Et sic, etiam haec systemata te ab omni diluvio defendet.

Sed non omnis societas talem solutionem mercari potest (et inveniat administratorem pro tali systemate:), sed simul curam securitatis!

Omnino possibile est liberam versionem HAProxy instituere in libera systemate operante. Probavi in Debian X, versionem haproxy 10 in promptuario stabili. Probavi etiam in versione 1.8.19.xx ex probatione repositorium.

Extra ambitum huius articuli relinquemus ipsum debianum constituere. Breviter: on the white interface, claude omnia praeter portum 443, in griseo interface - secundum tuum consilium, e.g., etiam claudunt omnia praeter portum XXII. Aperi solum quod ad laborem necessarium est (VRRP pro exemplo fluitantis ip).

Imprimis haproxy figuravi in SSL variandi modo (aka http modo) et in colligationem converti ad videndum quid RDP intus ageretur. Ita dicam, in medio accepi. Ita, via /RDWeb definita in "omnibus" articulis in Rdgateway constituendis deest. Omne quod est, est /rpc/rpcproxy.dll et /remoteDesktopGateway/. Hoc in casu, normae petitiones GET/post usus non sunt, petitionis genus suum RDG_IN_DATA, RDG_OUT_DATA adhibetur.

Non multum, sed aliquid saltem.

Let's test.

Mitto mstsc, vade ad ministratorem, vide quattuor 401 (non legitimi) errores in lignis, deinde intra usoris usoris mei et vide responsionem CC.

Averto, rursus incipe, et in lignis eosdem quattuor 401 errores video: iniuriam login/password ineo et iterum quattuor 401 errores video. Hoc est quod opus est. Hoc est quod capiemus.

Cum definire url login non potuit, et praeterea nescio quomodo errorem 401 in haproxy capere, omnes 4xx errores comprehendam (non actu capio, sed computa). Item ad solvendum idoneos.

Essentia tutelae erit ut numerum 4xx errorum (in backend) per unitatem temporis numerabimus et si certum terminum excedit, omnes ulteriores nexus ab hoc ip tempore praefinito rejiciemus. .

Technice, hoc praesidium contra password violentum non erit, praesidium contra 4xx errores erit. Exempli gratia, si saepe domicilium non-exsistentem petentibus (404), tutela etiam operabitur.

Modus simplicissimus et efficacior est numerare in backendo et renuntiare si quid extra appareat;

frontend fe_rdp_tsc
    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/cert/desktop.example.com.pem
    mode http
    ...
    default_backend be_rdp_tsc


backend be_rdp_tsc
    ...
    mode http
    ...

    #создать таблицу, строковую, 1000 элементов, протухает через 15 сек, записать кол-во ошибок за последние 10 сек
    stick-table type string len 128 size 1k expire 15s store http_err_rate(10s)
    #запомнить ip
    http-request track-sc0 src
    #запретить с http ошибкой 429, если за последние 10 сек больше 4 ошибок
    http-request deny deny_status 429 if { sc_http_err_rate(0) gt 4 }
	
	...
    server rdgw01 192.168.1.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw01
    server rdgw02 192.168.2.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw02

Non optima optio, complicata. Nos in backend et scandalum in frontend numerabimus.

Nos inclementer incussorem tractabimus et nexum eius TCP omittemus.

frontend fe_rdp_tsc
    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/cert/ertelecom_ru_2020_06_11.pem
    mode http
    ...
    #создать таблицу ip адресов, 1000 элементов, протухнет через 15 сек, сохрянять из глобального счётчика
    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store gpc0
    #взять источник
    tcp-request connection track-sc0 src
    #отклонить tcp соединение, если глобальный счётчик >0
    tcp-request connection reject if { sc0_get_gpc0 gt 0 }
	
    ...
    default_backend be_rdp_tsc


backend be_rdp_tsc
    ...
    mode http
    ...
	
    #создать таблицу ip адресов, 1000 элементов, протухнет через 15 сек, сохранять кол-во ошибок за 10 сек
    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store http_err_rate(10s)
    #много ошибок, если кол-во ошибок за 10 сек превысило 8
    acl errors_too_fast sc1_http_err_rate gt 8
    #пометить атаку в глобальном счётчике (увеличить счётчик)
    acl mark_as_abuser sc0_inc_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) gt 0
    #обнулить глобальный счётчик
    acl clear_as_abuser sc0_clr_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) ge 0
    #взять источник
    tcp-request content track-sc1 src
    #отклонить, пометить, что атака
    tcp-request content reject if errors_too_fast mark_as_abuser
    #разрешить, сбросить флажок атаки
    tcp-request content accept if !errors_too_fast clear_as_abuser
	
    ...
    server rdgw01 192.168.1.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw01
    server rdgw02 192.168.2.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw02

idem, sed blande reddemus errorem http 429 ( Nimis multae petitiones )

frontend fe_rdp_tsc
    ...
    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store gpc0
    http-request track-sc0 src
    http-request deny deny_status 429 if { sc0_get_gpc0 gt 0 }
    ...
    default_backend be_rdp_tsc

backend be_rdp_tsc
    ...
    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store http_err_rate(10s)
    acl errors_too_fast sc1_http_err_rate gt 8
    acl mark_as_abuser sc0_inc_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) gt 0
    acl clear_as_abuser sc0_clr_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) ge 0
    http-request track-sc1 src
    http-request allow if !errors_too_fast clear_as_abuser
    http-request deny deny_status 429 if errors_too_fast mark_as_abuser
    ...

Cohibeo: mstsc inicio et inicio passim passwords intrantes. Post tertium conatum, intra 10 seconds me retro calcit, et mstsc dat errorem. sicut videre licet in lignis.

Resolutiones. Ego procul ab haproxy herus sum. Nescio quid, exempli gratia
http-petitionem negare 429 si sc_http_err_rate(0) gt 4}
sino te facere de 10 errata antequam operatur.

De calculis numeratione confusus sum. Praeceptores haproxy, laetabor si me compleveris, corrige me meliores.

In commentationibus aliis modis tuendi RD Gateway suggerere potes, studium studiosis erit.

Quoad Fenestra Longinquus Desktop Client (mstsc), notatu dignum est quod TLS1.2 (saltem in Fenestra 7) non sustinet, ideo relinquere habui TLS1; non current notas, sic et veteres relinquere.

Nam qui aliquid non intelligunt, iusta discunt, et iam bene facere volunt, tibi totam config.

haproxy.conf

global
        log /dev/log    local0
        log /dev/log    local1 notice
        chroot /var/lib/haproxy
        stats socket /run/haproxy/admin.sock mode 660 level admin expose-fd listeners
        stats timeout 30s
        user haproxy
        group haproxy
        daemon

        # Default SSL material locations
        ca-base /etc/ssl/certs
        crt-base /etc/ssl/private

        # See: https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/#server=haproxy&server-version=2.0.3&config=intermediate
        #ssl-default-bind-ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE
-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
        ssl-default-bind-ciphers ECDH+AESGCM:DH+AESGCM:ECDH+AES256:DH+AES256:ECDH+AES128:DH+AES:RSA+AESGCM:RSA+AES:!aNULL:!MD5:!DSS
        ssl-default-bind-ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
        #ssl-default-bind-options ssl-min-ver TLSv1.2 no-tls-tickets
        ssl-default-bind-options no-sslv3
        ssl-server-verify none


defaults
        log     global
        mode    http
        option  httplog
        option  dontlognull
        timeout connect 5000
        timeout client  15m
        timeout server  15m
        errorfile 400 /etc/haproxy/errors/400.http
        errorfile 403 /etc/haproxy/errors/403.http
        errorfile 408 /etc/haproxy/errors/408.http
        errorfile 500 /etc/haproxy/errors/500.http
        errorfile 502 /etc/haproxy/errors/502.http
        errorfile 503 /etc/haproxy/errors/503.http
        errorfile 504 /etc/haproxy/errors/504.http


frontend fe_rdp_tsc
    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/cert/dektop.example.com.pem
    mode http
    capture request header Host len 32
    log global
    option httplog
    timeout client 300s
    maxconn 1000

    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store gpc0
    tcp-request connection track-sc0 src
    tcp-request connection reject if { sc0_get_gpc0 gt 0 }

    acl rdweb_domain hdr(host) -i beg dektop.example.com
    http-request deny deny_status 400 if !rdweb_domain
    default_backend be_rdp_tsc


backend be_rdp_tsc
    balance source
    mode http
    log global

    stick-table type ip size 1k expire 15s store http_err_rate(10s)
    acl errors_too_fast sc1_http_err_rate gt 8
    acl mark_as_abuser sc0_inc_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) gt 0
    acl clear_as_abuser sc0_clr_gpc0(fe_rdp_tsc) ge 0
    tcp-request content track-sc1 src
    tcp-request content reject if errors_too_fast mark_as_abuser
    tcp-request content accept if !errors_too_fast clear_as_abuser

    option forwardfor
    http-request add-header X-CLIENT-IP %[src]

    option httpchk GET /
    cookie RDPWEB insert nocache
    default-server inter 3s    rise 2  fall 3
    server rdgw01 192.168.1.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw01
    server rdgw02 192.168.2.33:443 maxconn 1000 weight 10 ssl check cookie rdgw02


frontend fe_stats
    mode http
    bind *:8080
    acl ip_allow_admin src 192.168.66.66
    stats enable
    stats uri /stats
    stats refresh 30s
    #stats admin if LOCALHOST
    stats admin if ip_allow_admin

Cur duo servientes in tergo sunt? Quia hoc est quomodo tolerantiam culpae facere potes. Haproxy potest etiam duos facere cum albo ip.

Facultates computandi: incipere potes cum "duos cisio, duos coros, PC ludum." Secundum wikipedia, hoc satis erit parcere.

references:

Rdp-porta ab HAProxy profecta sunt
Solus articulus inveni ubi tesseram violentam vexarunt

Source: www.habr.com

MS Longinquus Desktop porta, HAProxy et password violente

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