RATKing: kampeni yatsopano yokhala ndi ma Trojans akutali

Kumapeto kwa Meyi, tidapeza kampeni yogawa pulogalamu yaumbanda ya Remote Access Trojan (RAT) yomwe imalola oukira kuwongolera pulogalamu yomwe ili ndi kachilomboka.

Gulu lomwe tidafufuza lidasiyanitsidwa ndikuti silinasankhe banja lililonse la RAT kuti lipeze matenda. Ma Trojans angapo adawonedwa pakuwukira mkati mwa kampeni (zonse zomwe zidapezeka ponseponse). Ndi mbali iyi, gululo lidatikumbutsa za mfumu makoswe - nyama yopeka yomwe imakhala ndi makoswe okhala ndi michira yolumikizana.

Choyambirira chinatengedwa kuchokera ku monograph ya K. N. Rossikov "Mbewa ndi makoswe ngati mbewa, zofunika kwambiri zachuma" (1908)

Polemekeza cholengedwa ichi, tidatcha gulu lomwe tikuliganizira kuti RATKing. Mu positi iyi, tifotokoza mwatsatanetsatane momwe omwe adawukirawo adachitira, zida zomwe adagwiritsa ntchito, komanso kugawana malingaliro athu pazomwe adachita kampeniyi.

Kupita patsogolo kwa kuukira

Zowukira zonse mu kampeni iyi zidachitika motsatira algorithm iyi:

1. Wogwiritsa adalandira imelo yachinyengo yokhala ndi ulalo wa Google Drive.
2. Pogwiritsa ntchito ulalo, wozunzidwayo adatsitsa script yoyipa ya VBS yomwe idafotokoza laibulale ya DLL kuti ikweze zolipira zomaliza mu registry ya Windows ndikuyambitsa PowerShell kuti igwire.
3. Laibulale ya DLL inalowetsa malipiro omaliza - makamaka, imodzi mwa ma RAT omwe amagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi otsutsa - mu ndondomeko ya dongosolo ndikulembetsa script ya VBS mu autorun kuti athe kupeza makina omwe ali ndi kachilomboka.
4. Malipiro omaliza adachitidwa mwadongosolo ndipo adapatsa wowukirayo mphamvu yowongolera kompyuta yomwe ili ndi kachilombo.

Mwadongosolo, ikhoza kuyimiridwa motere:

Kenako, tiwona magawo atatu oyamba, popeza tili ndi chidwi ndi njira yoperekera pulogalamu yaumbanda. Sitidzalongosola mwatsatanetsatane momwe pulogalamu yaumbanda imagwirira ntchito. Amapezeka ponseponse - mwina amagulitsidwa pamabwalo apadera, kapena amagawidwa ngati mapulojekiti otseguka - motero sizosiyana ndi gulu la RATKing.

Kusanthula magawo owukira

Gawo 1. Imelo yachinyengo

Kuukiraku kudayamba pomwe wozunzidwayo adalandira kalata yoyipa (owukirawo adagwiritsa ntchito ma tempuleti osiyanasiyana okhala ndi mawu; chithunzi pansipa chikuwonetsa chitsanzo chimodzi). Uthengawu unali ndi ulalo wopita kumalo ovomerezeka drive.google.com, zomwe zikuyembekezeka kuti zidayambitsa tsamba lotsitsa zolemba za PDF.

Chitsanzo cha imelo yachinyengo

Komabe, kwenikweni, sichinali chikalata cha PDF chomwe chidakwezedwa konse, koma script ya VBS.

Mukadina ulalo kuchokera pa imelo pazithunzi pamwambapa, fayilo yotchedwa Cargo Flight Details.vbs. Pamenepa, otsutsawo sanayese ngakhale kubisa fayiloyo ngati chikalata chovomerezeka.

Nthawi yomweyo, monga gawo la kampeni iyi, tidapeza script yotchedwa Cargo Trip Detail.pdf.vbs. Itha kuperekedwa kale pa PDF yovomerezeka chifukwa Windows imabisa zowonjezera mafayilo mwachisawawa. Zowona, pankhaniyi, kukayikira kukanadzutsidwa ndi chithunzi chake, chomwe chimagwirizana ndi zolemba za VBS.

Panthawiyi, wozunzidwayo amatha kuzindikira chinyengo: ingoyang'anitsitsani mafayilo otsitsidwa kwa sekondi imodzi. Komabe, m'mipikisano yachinyengo ngati imeneyi, owukira nthawi zambiri amadalira wogwiritsa ntchito sasamala kapena wothamanga.

Gawo 2. VBS script ntchito

Zolemba za VBS, zomwe wogwiritsa ntchito amatha kutsegula mosadziwa, adalembetsa laibulale ya DLL mu registry ya Windows. Zolembazo zinali zosamveka: mizere yomwe ili mmenemo inalembedwa ngati ma byte olekanitsidwa ndi zilembo zosasintha.

Chitsanzo cha script yobisika

Dongosolo la deobfuscation ndilosavuta: munthu wachitatu aliyense adachotsedwa pa chingwe chobisika, kenako zotsatira zake zidasinthidwa kuchokera ku base16 kupita pachingwe choyambirira. Mwachitsanzo, kuchokera ku mtengo 57Q53s63t72s69J70r74e2El53v68m65j6CH6Ct (yosonyezedwa pa chithunzi pamwambapa) mzere wotsatira unali WScript.Shell.

Kuti tichepetse zingwe, tidagwiritsa ntchito Python:

def decode_str(data_enc):   
    return binascii.unhexlify(''.join([data_enc[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(data_enc), 3)]))

Pansipa, pa mizere 9-10, tikuwunikira mtengo womwe kusokoneza kwake kudapangitsa fayilo ya DLL. Ndi iye amene adayambitsidwa pagawo lotsatira pogwiritsa ntchito PowerShell.

Chingwe chokhala ndi DLL yosasinthika

Ntchito iliyonse mu script ya VBS idachitidwa pamene zingwezo zidasinthidwa.

Pambuyo poyendetsa script, ntchitoyi idatchedwa wscript.sleep - idagwiritsidwa ntchito pochita kuchedwetsedwa.

Kenako, script idagwira ntchito ndi registry ya Windows. Anagwiritsa ntchito luso la WMI pa izi. Ndi chithandizo chake, fungulo lapadera linapangidwa, ndipo thupi la fayilo yotheka linalembedwa ku gawo lake. Registry idafikiridwa kudzera pa WMI pogwiritsa ntchito lamulo ili:

GetObject(winmgmts {impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\.rootdefault:StdRegProv)

Cholowa chopangidwa mu registry ndi VBS script

Gawo 3. Ntchito ya laibulale ya DLL

Pa gawo lachitatu, DLL yoyipa idakweza malipiro omaliza, ndikuyiyika pamakina, ndikuwonetsetsa kuti zolemba za VBS zimangoyambira pomwe wogwiritsa ntchito adalowa.

Kuthamanga kudzera PowerShell

DLL idachitidwa pogwiritsa ntchito lamulo ili mu PowerShell:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Lamuloli lidachita izi:

• adalandira data ya registry yokhala ndi dzina rnd_value_name - deta iyi inali fayilo ya DLL yolembedwa pa nsanja ya .Net;
• adadzaza chotsatira .Net gawo mu ndondomeko kukumbukira powershell.exe pogwiritsa ntchito [System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load() (mafotokozedwe atsatanetsatane a Load() ntchito likupezeka patsamba la Microsoft);
• adagwira ntchitoyo GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK() - kuphedwa kwa laibulale ya DLL kudayamba nayo - ndi magawo vbsScriptPath, xorKey, vbsScriptName. Parameter xorKey adasunga kiyi kuti afotokozere zolipira zomaliza, ndi magawo vbsScriptPath и vbsScriptName adasamutsidwa kuti alembetse script ya VBS mu autorun.

Kufotokozera kwa laibulale ya DLL

Mu mawonekedwe owonongeka, bootloader imawoneka motere:

Loader mu mawonekedwe osokonekera (ntchito yomwe ntchito ya laibulale ya DLL idayamba idalembedwa mofiira)

Bootloader imatetezedwa ndi chitetezo cha .Net Reactor. Chida cha de4dot chimagwira ntchito yabwino kwambiri yochotsa mtetezi uyu.

Chojambulira ichi:

• adalowetsamo malipiro mu ndondomeko ya dongosolo (mu chitsanzo ichi svchost.exe);
• Ndawonjezera script ya VBS ku autorun.

Jakisoni wolipira

Tiyeni tiwone ntchito yomwe script ya PowerShell idayitcha.

Ntchito yotchedwa PowerShell script

Ntchitoyi idachita izi:

• decrypted ma data seti awiri (array и array2 pa skrini). Poyamba adapanikizidwa pogwiritsa ntchito gzip ndikusungidwa ndi XOR algorithm yokhala ndi kiyi xorKey;
• adakopera deta kumadera omwe aperekedwa. Deta kuchokera array - kumalo okumbukira omwe adaloza intPtr (payload pointer pa skrini); deta kuchokera array2 - kumalo okumbukira omwe adaloza intPtr2 (shellcode pointer pa skrini);
• wotchedwa ntchito CallWindowProcA (mafotokozedwewo Ntchitoyi ikupezeka patsamba la Microsoft) ndi magawo otsatirawa (mayina a magawo alembedwa pansipa, pazithunzi ali mu dongosolo lomwelo, koma ndi magwiridwe antchito):
  • lpPrevWndFunc - cholozera ku data kuchokera array2;
  • hWnd - cholozera ku chingwe chomwe chili ndi njira yopita ku fayilo yotheka svchost.exe;
  • Msg - cholozera ku data kuchokera array;
  • wParam, lParam - magawo a uthenga (panthawiyi, magawowa sanagwiritsidwe ntchito ndipo anali ndi 0);
• adapanga fayilo %AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup<name>.urlkumene <name> - awa ndi zilembo 4 zoyambirira za parameter vbsScriptName (pazithunzi, chidutswa cha code ndi izi chimayamba ndi lamulo File.Copy). Mwanjira iyi, pulogalamu yaumbanda idawonjezera fayilo ya URL pamndandanda wamafayilo a autorun pomwe wogwiritsa ntchito adalowa ndipo adalumikizidwa ndi kompyuta yomwe ili ndi kachilombo. Fayilo ya URL inali ndi ulalo wa script:

[InternetShortcut]
URL = file : ///<vbsScriptPath>

Kuti timvetsetse momwe jakisoniyo adachitidwira, tidachotsa ma data array array и array2. Kuti tichite izi tidagwiritsa ntchito zotsatirazi za Python:

def decrypt(data, key):
    return gzip.decompress(
        bytearray([data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)] for i in range(len(data))])[4:])
    

Chifukwa chake, tidapeza kuti:

• array inali fayilo ya PE - iyi ndiye malipiro omaliza;
• array2 inali shellcode yofunikira kuti agwire jekeseni.

Shellcode kuchokera mndandanda array2 idadutsa ngati mtengo wogwira ntchito lpPrevWndFunc mu ntchito CallWindowProcA. lpPrevWndFunc - callback ntchito, prototype yake ikuwoneka motere:

LRESULT WndFunc(
  HWND    hWnd,
  UINT    Msg,
  WPARAM  wParam,
  LPARAM  lParam
);

Ndiye mukamagwira ntchito CallWindowProcA ndi magawo hWnd, Msg, wParam, lParam shellcode kuchokera mndandanda imachitidwa array2 ndi mikangano hWnd и Msg. hWnd ndi cholozera ku chingwe chomwe chili ndi njira yopita ku fayilo yotheka svchost.exendi Msg - cholozera kumalipiro omaliza.

Shellcode inalandira ma adilesi ogwirira ntchito kuchokera kernel32.dll и ntdll32.dll kutengera ma hashi kuchokera ku mayina awo ndikulowetsa malipiro omaliza mu kukumbukira ndondomeko svchost.exepogwiritsa ntchito njira Hollowing (mutha kuwerenga zambiri za izi nkhani). Mukalowetsa shellcode:

• adapanga njira svchost.exe mu chikhalidwe choyimitsidwa pogwiritsa ntchito ntchitoyi CreateProcessW;
• kenako anabisa mawonekedwe a gawo mu ndondomeko adiresi danga svchost.exe pogwiritsa ntchito NtUnmapViewOfSection. Chifukwa chake, pulogalamuyo idamasula kukumbukira njira yoyambirira svchost.exekugawa zokumbukira zolipira pa adilesi iyi;
• agawa kukumbukira kwa payload mu ndondomeko adiresi danga svchost.exe pogwiritsa ntchito VirtualAllocEx;

Kuyamba kwa jekeseni

• adalemba zomwe zili muzolipira mu malo adilesi ya njira svchost.exe pogwiritsa ntchito WriteProcessMemory (monga mu chithunzi pansipa);
• anayambiranso ndondomekoyi svchost.exe pogwiritsa ntchito ResumeThread.

Kumaliza jekeseni

Mutha kutsitsa pulogalamu yaumbanda

Chifukwa cha zomwe tafotokozazi, imodzi mwazinthu zingapo zaumbanda zamtundu wa RAT idayikidwa pa pulogalamu yomwe ili ndi kachilombo. Gome ili m'munsimu limatchula pulogalamu yaumbanda yomwe imagwiritsidwa ntchito poukira, yomwe titha kunena molimba mtima kuti idapangidwa ndi gulu limodzi la owukira, popeza zitsanzozo zidapezanso seva yolamulira yomweyi.

Dzina la pulogalamu yaumbanda

Kuwona koyamba

SHA-256

C & C.

Njira imene jekeseni ikuchitika

Darktrack

16-04-2020

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2017

svchost

Parallax

24-04-2020

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2019

svchost

NKHONDO

18-05-2020

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:9933

svchost

Netwire

20-05-2020

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2000

svchost

Zitsanzo za pulogalamu yaumbanda yogawidwa ndi seva yowongolera yomweyi

Pali zinthu ziwiri zofunika kuzindikila apa.

Choyamba, mfundo yoti omwe adawukirawo adagwiritsa ntchito mabanja angapo a RAT nthawi imodzi. Mchitidwewu siwodziwika kwa magulu odziwika bwino a pa intaneti, omwe nthawi zambiri amagwiritsa ntchito zida zomwezo zomwe amazidziwa bwino.

Kachiwiri, RATKing idagwiritsa ntchito pulogalamu yaumbanda yomwe imagulitsidwa pamabwalo apadera pamtengo wotsika, kapena ndi polojekiti yotseguka.

Mndandanda wokwanira wa pulogalamu yaumbanda yomwe imagwiritsidwa ntchito pa kampeni - yokhala ndi chenjezo limodzi lofunikira - yaperekedwa kumapeto kwa nkhaniyo.

Za gulu

Sitinganene kuti kampeni yoyipa yomwe yafotokozedwayi idachitika ndi achiwembu omwe amadziwika. Pakadali pano, tikukhulupirira kuti ziwopsezozi zidachitika ndi gulu latsopano. Monga tidalembera koyambirira, tidachitcha kuti RATKing.

Kuti apange zolemba za VBS, gululo liyenera kugwiritsa ntchito chida chofanana ndi chothandizira VBS-Crypter kuchokera kwa wopanga NYAN-x-CAT. Izi zikuwonetsedwa ndi kufanana kwa script yomwe pulogalamuyi imapanga ndi zolemba za owukira. Makamaka, onse awiri:

• gwiritsani ntchito mochedwa Sleep;
• gwiritsani ntchito WMI;
• lembani thupi la fayilo yomwe ingathe kuchitidwa ngati chizindikiro cha registry;
• perekani fayiloyi pogwiritsa ntchito PowerShell mu malo ake adilesi.

Kuti mumveke bwino, yerekezerani lamulo la PowerShell kuti muthamangitse fayilo kuchokera ku registry, yomwe imagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi script yomwe idapangidwa pogwiritsa ntchito VBS-Crypter:

((Get-ItemPropertyHKCU:SoftwareNYANxCAT).NYANxCAT);$text=-join$text[-1..-$text.Length];[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load([Convert]::FromBase64String($text)).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null);

ndi lamulo lofanana ndi lomwe otsutsa adagwiritsa ntchito:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Dziwani kuti owukirawo adagwiritsa ntchito chida china kuchokera ku NYAN-x-CAT ngati imodzi mwazolipira - Mtengo wa LimeRAT.

Maadiresi a maseva a C&C akuwonetsa chinthu china chodziwika bwino cha RATKing: gulu limakonda ntchito za DNS zamphamvu (onani mndandanda wa C&C patebulo la IoC).

IoC

Gome ili m'munsili limapereka mndandanda wathunthu wa zolemba za VBS zomwe zitha kukhala chifukwa cha kampeni yomwe yafotokozedwayo. Zolemba zonsezi ndi zofanana ndipo zimagwira ntchito mofananamo. Onsewa amabaya pulogalamu yaumbanda ya RAT munjira yodalirika ya Windows. Onsewa ali ndi ma adilesi a C&C olembetsedwa pogwiritsa ntchito ntchito za Dynamic DNS.

Komabe, sitinganene kuti zolemba zonsezi zidagawidwa ndi omwe akuwukira, kupatula zitsanzo zokhala ndi ma adilesi a C&C (mwachitsanzo, kimjoy007.dyndns.org).

Dzina la pulogalamu yaumbanda

SHA-256

C & C.

Njira imene jekeseni ikuchitika

Parallax

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

00edb8200dfeee3bdd0086c5e8e07c6056d322df913679a9f22a2b00b836fd72

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

504cbae901c4b3987aa9ba458a230944cb8bd96bbf778ceb54c773b781346146

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1487017e087b75ad930baa8b017e8388d1e99c75d26b5d1deec8b80e9333f189

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

c4160ec3c8ad01539f1c16fb35ed9c8c5a53a8fda8877f0d5e044241ea805891

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

515249d6813bb2dde1723d35ee8eb6eeb8775014ca629ede017c3d83a77634ce

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1b70f6fee760bcfe0c457f0a85ca451ed66e61f0e340d830f382c5d2f7ab803f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

b2bdffa5853f29c881d7d9bff91b640bc1c90e996f85406be3b36b2500f61aa1

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

c9745a8f33b3841fe7bfafd21ad4678d46fe6ea6125a8fedfcd2d5aee13f1601

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1dfc66968527fbd4c0df2ea34c577a7ce7a2ba9b54ba00be62120cc88035fa65

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

c6c05f21e16e488eed3001d0d9dd9c49366779559ad77fcd233de15b1773c981

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

cmd

3b785cdcd69a96902ee62499c25138a70e81f14b6b989a2f81d82239a19a3aed

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

4d71ceb9d6c53ac356c0f5bdfd1a5b28981061be87e38e077ee3a419e4c476f9

2004para.ddns.net

svchost

00185cc085f284ece264e3263c7771073a65783c250c5fd9afc7a85ed94acc77

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0342107c0d2a069100e87ef5415e90fd86b1b1b1c975d0eb04ab1489e198fc78

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

de33b7a7b059599dc62337f92ceba644ac7b09f60d06324ecf6177fff06b8d10

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

80a8114d63606e225e620c64ad8e28c9996caaa9a9e87dd602c8f920c2197007

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

acb157ba5a48631e1f9f269e6282f042666098614b66129224d213e27c1149bb

hope.doomdns.org

cmd

bf608318018dc10016b438f851aab719ea0abe6afc166c8aea6b04f2320896d3

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

4d0c9b8ad097d35b447d715a815c67ff3d78638b305776cde4d90bfdcb368e38

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

e7c676f5be41d49296454cd6e4280d89e37f506d84d57b22f0be0d87625568ba

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

9375d54fcda9c7d65f861dfda698e25710fda75b5ebfc7a238599f4b0d34205f

franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

128367797fdf3c952831c2472f7a308f345ca04aa67b3f82b945cfea2ae11ce5

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

09bd720880461cb6e996046c7d6a1c937aa1c99bd19582a562053782600da79d

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0a176164d2e1d5e2288881cc2e2d88800801001d03caedd524db365513e11276

paradickhead.homeip.net

svchost

0af5194950187fd7cbd75b1b39aab6e1e78dae7c216d08512755849c6a0d1cbe

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

Warzone

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

db0d5a67a0ced6b2de3ee7d7fc845a34b9d6ca608e5fead7f16c9a640fa659eb

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Netwire

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Darktrack

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

Mtengo wa WSH RAT

d410ced15c848825dcf75d30808cde7784e5b208f9a57b0896e828f890faea0e

anekesolution.linkpc.net

RegAsm

Layimu

896604d27d88c75a475b28e88e54104e66f480bcab89cc75b6cdc6b29f8e438b

softmy.duckdns.org

RegAsm

Gawo la QuasarRAT

bd1e29e9d17edbab41c3634649da5c5d20375f055ccf968c022811cd9624be57

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

12044aa527742282ad5154a4de24e55c9e1fae42ef844ed6f2f890296122153b

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

be93cc77d864dafd7d8c21317722879b65cfbb3297416bde6ca6edbfd8166572

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

933a136f8969707a84a61f711018cd21ee891d5793216e063ac961b5d165f6c0

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

71dea554d93728cce8074dbdb4f63ceb072d4bb644f0718420f780398dafd943

chrom1.myq-see.com

RegAsm

0d344e8d72d752c06dc6a7f3abf2ff7678925fde872756bf78713027e1e332d5

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

0ed7f282fd242c3f2de949650c9253373265e9152c034c7df3f5f91769c6a4eb

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

aabb6759ce408ebfa2cc57702b14adaec933d8e4821abceaef0c1af3263b1bfa

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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Source: www.habr.com