{"id":102530,"date":"2021-12-09T15:36:49","date_gmt":"2021-12-09T13:36:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/vypusk-tor-browser-11-0-2-rasshirenie-blokirovki-sajtov-tor-vozmozhnye-ataki-na-tor"},"modified":"2021-12-09T15:36:49","modified_gmt":"2021-12-09T13:36:50","slug":"vypusk-tor-browser-11-0-2-rasshirenie-blokirovki-sajtov-tor-vozmozhnye-ataki-na-tor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/vypusk-tor-browser-11-0-2-rasshirenie-blokirovki-sajtov-tor-vozmozhnye-ataki-na-tor","title":{"rendered":"Lan\u00e7amento do Tor Browser 11.0.2. Extens\u00e3o de bloqueio de sites Tor. Poss\u00edveis ataques ao Tor.","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

Foi lan\u00e7ado o navegador especializado Tor Browser 11.0.2, focado na anonimidade, seguran\u00e7a e privacidade. Ao usar o Tor Browser, todo o tr\u00e1fego \u00e9 direcionado apenas pela rede Tor, e n\u00e3o \u00e9 poss\u00edvel acessar diretamente pela conex\u00e3o de rede padr\u00e3o do sistema atual, o que impede o rastreamento do verdadeiro endere\u00e7o IP do usu\u00e1rio (em caso de ataque ao navegador, os atacantes podem acessar os par\u00e2metros de rede do sistema; portanto, para bloquear completamente poss\u00edveis vazamentos, \u00e9 recomend\u00e1vel usar produtos como Whonix). As compila\u00e7\u00f5es do Tor Browser foram preparadas para Linux, Windows e macOS. <\/p>\n

Para garantir prote\u00e7\u00e3o adicional, o Tor Browser inclui a extens\u00e3o HTTPS Everywhere, que permite o uso de criptografia em todos os sites onde isso \u00e9 poss\u00edvel. Para reduzir a amea\u00e7a de ataques utilizando JavaScript e bloquear plugins por padr\u00e3o, a extens\u00e3o NoScript vem inclu\u00edda. Transportes alternativos s\u00e3o utilizados para combater o bloqueio e a inspe\u00e7\u00e3o do tr\u00e1fego. Para proteger contra caracter\u00edsticas espec\u00edficas de visitantes, as APIs WebGL, WebGL2, WebAudio, Social, SpeechSynthesis, Touch, AudioContext, HTMLMediaElement, Mediastream, Canvas, SharedWorker, WebAudio, Permissions, MediaDevices.enumerateDevices e screen.orientation est\u00e3o desativadas ou limitadas, assim como as ferramentas de telemetria, Pocket, Reader View, HTTP Alternative-Services e MozTCPSocket. O link rel=preconnect foi modificado. <\/p>\n

Na nova vers\u00e3o, houve a sincroniza\u00e7\u00e3o com o c\u00f3digo base da vers\u00e3o Firefox 91.4.0, que corrigiu 15 vulnerabilidades, das quais 10 foram classificadas como graves. Sete vulnerabilidades s\u00e3o causadas por problemas de gerenciamento de mem\u00f3ria, como estouros de buffer e acessos a \u00e1reas de mem\u00f3ria j\u00e1 liberadas, e potencialmente podem levar \u00e0 execu\u00e7\u00e3o de c\u00f3digo malicioso ao abrir p\u00e1ginas especificamente formatadas. Alguns fontes ttf foram removidos da compila\u00e7\u00e3o para a plataforma Linux, pois o uso deles causava interrup\u00e7\u00f5es na renderiza\u00e7\u00e3o de texto em elementos da interface no Fedora Linux. A configura\u00e7\u00e3o 'network.proxy.allow_bypass', que controla a atividade de prote\u00e7\u00e3o contra o uso inadequado da API Proxy em extens\u00f5es, foi desativada. Para o transporte obfs4, um novo gateway 'deusexmachina' foi utilizado por padr\u00e3o. <\/p>\n

Enquanto isso, a hist\u00f3ria da censura do Tor na R\u00fassia continua. O Roskomnadzor alterou no registro de sites proibidos a m\u00e1scara dos sites bloqueados. dom\u00ednios<\/a> bloqueou o acesso de 'www.torproject.org' para '*.torproject.org' e expandiu a lista de endere\u00e7os IP a serem bloqueados. Devido a essa mudan\u00e7a, a maioria dos subdom\u00ednios do projeto Tor, incluindo blog.torproject.org, gettor.torproject.org e support.torproject.org, ficou bloqueada. O forum.torproject.net, hospedado na infraestrutura Discourse, permanece acess\u00edvel. O gitlab.torproject.org e lists.torproject.org est\u00e3o parcialmente dispon\u00edveis; inicialmente o acesso foi perdido, mas depois foi restaurado, provavelmente ap\u00f3s a troca de endere\u00e7os IP (atualmente, o gitlab est\u00e1 direcionado para o host gitlab-02.torproject.org). <\/p>\n

N\u00e3o foram mais registradas proibi\u00e7\u00f5es dos gateways e n\u00f3s da rede Tor, assim como do host ajax.aspnetcdn.com (CDN da Microsoft), utilizado no transporte meek-asure. Aparentemente, os experimentos de bloqueio dos n\u00f3s da rede Tor cessaram ap\u00f3s o bloqueio do site do Tor. A situa\u00e7\u00e3o \u00e9 desafiadora com o espelho tor.eff.org, que continua funcional. O problema \u00e9 que o espelho tor.eff.org est\u00e1 vinculado ao mesmo endere\u00e7o IP<\/a>, utilizado para o dom\u00ednio eff.org da organiza\u00e7\u00e3o EFF (Electronic Frontier Foundation), portanto, o bloqueio de tor.eff.org levar\u00e1 a um bloqueio parcial do site da famosa organiza\u00e7\u00e3o de direitos humanos.

\"Lan\u00e7amento<\/center> <\/p>\n

Al\u00e9m disso, vale destacar a publica\u00e7\u00e3o de um novo relat\u00f3rio sobre poss\u00edveis tentativas de realiza\u00e7\u00e3o de ataques de desanonimiza\u00e7\u00e3o de usu\u00e1rios do Tor, vinculadas ao grupo KAX17, identificado por um email de contato fict\u00edcio espec\u00edfico nas configura\u00e7\u00f5es dos n\u00f3s. Durante setembro e outubro, o projeto Tor bloqueou 570 n\u00f3s potencialmente maliciosos. No pico, o grupo KAX17 conseguiu aumentar o n\u00famero de n\u00f3s controlados na rede Tor para 900, distribu\u00eddos em 50 diferentes provedores, o que corresponde a aproximadamente 14% do total de rel\u00e9s (para compara\u00e7\u00e3o, em 2014 os atacantes conseguiram obter controle sobre quase metade dos rel\u00e9s do Tor, e em 2020 sobre 23,95% dos n\u00f3s de sa\u00edda).

\"Lan\u00e7amento<\/center> <\/p>\n

A disponibiliza\u00e7\u00e3o de um grande n\u00famero de n\u00f3s controlados por um \u00fanico operador permite a desanonimiza\u00e7\u00e3o de usu\u00e1rios atrav\u00e9s de um ataque do tipo Sybil, que pode ser realizado quando atacantes controlam os primeiros e \u00faltimos n\u00f3s na cadeia de anonimiza\u00e7\u00e3o. O primeiro n\u00f3 na cadeia Tor conhece o endere\u00e7o IP do usu\u00e1rio, enquanto o \u00faltimo conhece o endere\u00e7o IP do recurso solicitado, o que permite a desanonimiza\u00e7\u00e3o da solicita\u00e7\u00e3o atrav\u00e9s da adi\u00e7\u00e3o de uma certa marca oculta nos cabe\u00e7alhos dos pacotes, que permanece inalterada ao longo de toda a cadeia de anonimiza\u00e7\u00e3o, e da an\u00e1lise dessa marca no n\u00f3 de sa\u00edda. Com n\u00f3s de sa\u00edda sob controle, os atacantes tamb\u00e9m podem modificar o tr\u00e1fego n\u00e3o criptografado, por exemplo, removendo redirecionamentos para vers\u00f5es HTTPS de sites e interceptando conte\u00fado n\u00e3o criptografado. <\/p>\n

De acordo com representantes da rede Tor, a maioria dos n\u00f3s desativados no outono foi utilizada apenas como n\u00f3s intermedi\u00e1rios, n\u00e3o sendo usados para processar solicita\u00e7\u00f5es de entrada e sa\u00edda. Pesquisadores individuais observam que os n\u00f3s pertenciam a todas as categorias, e a probabilidade de um usu\u00e1rio ser redirecionado para um n\u00f3 de entrada controlado pelo grupo KAX17 era de 16%, enquanto para um n\u00f3 de sa\u00edda, era de 5%. Contudo, mesmo que isso seja verdade, a probabilidade geral de um usu\u00e1rio se conectar simultaneamente a um n\u00f3 de entrada e a um n\u00f3 de sa\u00edda do grupo de 900 n\u00f3s controlados pelo KAX17 \u00e9 estimada em 0,8%. N\u00e3o h\u00e1 evid\u00eancias diretas de que os n\u00f3s KAX17 tenham sido usados para realizar ataques, mas ataques desse tipo n\u00e3o podem ser totalmente descartados.
\n
Fonte: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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