{"id":183672,"date":"2026-10-07T22:54:13","date_gmt":"2026-10-07T20:54:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/news\/komprometacziya-registratorov-3-domennyh-zon-pozvolila-poluchit-tls-sertifikaty-k-servisam-google"},"modified":"2026-10-07T22:54:20","modified_gmt":"2026-10-07T20:54:20","slug":"compromise-of-registrars-for-three-domain-zones-enabled-tls-certificate-issuance-for-google-services","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/compromise-of-registrars-for-three-domain-zones-enabled-tls-certificate-issuance-for-google-services","title":{"rendered":"A compromiss\u00e3o de registradores de 3 zonas de dom\u00ednio permitiu obter certificados TLS para os servi\u00e7os do Google","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

A empresa Google informou sobre um incidente em que atacantes conseguiram obter certificados TLS para dom\u00ednios espec\u00edficos do Google (como google.as), servi\u00e7os online e grandes empresas nas zonas «.gh», «.sl» e «.as». O ataque foi realizado atrav\u00e9s da comprometimento de registradores de zonas de dom\u00ednio de n\u00edvel superior nacionais \u2014 «.gh» (Gana), «.sl» (Serra Leoa) e «.as» (Samoa Americana), o que permitiu substituir os servidores DNS para dom\u00ednios nessas zonas e redirecionar solicita\u00e7\u00f5es para os servidores dos criminosos. Redirecionando o tr\u00e1fego, os atacantes conseguiram confirmar a posse dos dom\u00ednios e obter certificados TLS, uma vez que, ap\u00f3s a altera\u00e7\u00e3o dos dados no DNS, as solicita\u00e7\u00f5es de verifica\u00e7\u00e3o de autoridades certificadoras foram enviadas n\u00e3o para os hosts reais, mas para hosts falsificados e processadas neles. <\/p>\n

A obten\u00e7\u00e3o n\u00e3o autorizada de certificados foi identificada a partir da an\u00e1lise dos logs de Transparency do Certificado, nos quais as autoridades certificadoras registram todos os certificados emitidos e revogados. A empresa Google bloqueou os certificados ileg\u00edtimos obtidos durante o ataque utilizando o mecanismo CRLSets no navegador Chrome, al\u00e9m de ter conseguido a revoga\u00e7\u00e3o desses certificados pelas autoridades certificadoras. Ainda n\u00e3o foi revelado para quais exatamente dom\u00ednios<\/a> foram emitidos os certificados fraudulentos e quais empresas foram afetadas pelo ataque. <\/p>\n

Para minimizar os riscos de repeti\u00e7\u00e3o de incidentes semelhantes, recomenda-se aos propriet\u00e1rios de dom\u00ednios organizar um monitoramento cont\u00ednuo dos logs p\u00fablicos de CT (Transpar\u00eancia de Certificados) para identificar emiss\u00f5es n\u00e3o autorizadas de certificados. No DNS, \u00e9 aconselh\u00e1vel adicionar registros CAA (Autoriza\u00e7\u00e3o da Autoridade de Certifica\u00e7\u00e3o), que definem a lista de centros de certifica\u00e7\u00e3o autorizados a emitir certificados para o dom\u00ednio designado. A configura\u00e7\u00e3o do registro DNS CAA n\u00e3o protege contra a solicita\u00e7\u00e3o de um certificado ap\u00f3s a modifica\u00e7\u00e3o do DNS, mas ap\u00f3s a retomada do controle sobre o DNS, impede a reemiss\u00e3o de certificados pelos criminosos, utilizando dados em cache da verifica\u00e7\u00e3o de propriedade do dom\u00ednio.
\n
Fonte: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Google \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043e\u0431 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0435, \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0443\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0435 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u043c \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c TLS-\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u044b \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432 Google (\u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440, google.as), \u043e\u043d\u043b\u0430\u0439\u043d-\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u043a\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0432 \u0437\u043e\u043d\u0430\u0445 «.gh», «.sl» \u0438 «.as». \u0410\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0430 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[…]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-183672","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47A comprometimento de registradores de 3 zonas de dom\u00ednio permitiu a obten\u00e7\u00e3o de certificados TLS para os servi\u00e7os do Google | ProHoster","description":"A empresa Google relatou um incidente em que os invasores conseguiram obter certificados TLS para dom\u00ednios espec\u00edficos do Google (por exemplo, google.as), servi\u00e7os online e grandes empresas nas zonas \".gh\", \".sl\" 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