{"id":184024,"date":"2026-10-28T23:40:36","date_gmt":"2026-10-28T21:40:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/news\/udalyonnaya-uyazvimost-v-servernyh-uefi-proshivkah-ekspluatiruemaya-cherez-otpravku-icmp-paketa"},"modified":"2026-10-28T23:40:41","modified_gmt":"2026-10-28T21:40:41","slug":"remote-vulnerability-in-server-uefi-firmware-exploitable-by-sending-an-icmp-packet","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/remote-vulnerability-in-server-uefi-firmware-exploitable-by-sending-an-icmp-packet","title":{"rendered":"Vulnerabilidade remota em firmware UEFI de servidores, explorada atrav\u00e9s do envio de pacotes ICMP","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

No TianoCore EDK II (EFI Development Kit II), uma implementa\u00e7\u00e3o de refer\u00eancia aberta do UEFI usada na maioria das placas-m\u00e3e de servidores, foi corrigida uma vulnerabilidade cr\u00edtica (CVE-2026-97631). A vulnerabilidade est\u00e1 presente no driver PXE e pode ser explorada atrav\u00e9s do envio de pacotes ICMP especialmente formatados durante o boot em redes IPv4 ou IPv6. O ataque n\u00e3o requer autentica\u00e7\u00e3o e permite que um invasor execute seu c\u00f3digo com privil\u00e9gios da firmware UEFI antes da transfer\u00eancia de controle para o sistema operacional, o que pode ser usado para contornar o mecanismo de inicializa\u00e7\u00e3o verificada UEFI Secure Boot e inserir componentes maliciosos durante a inicializa\u00e7\u00e3o.<\/p>\n

O problema \u00e9 causado por um estouro de buffer no manipulador de mensagens ICMP no driver UefiPxeBcDxe, que \u00e9 usado para boot PXE e aceita pacotes ICMP durante a inicializa\u00e7\u00e3o pela rede para registrar erros de rede. O estouro ocorre porque as mensagens de erro recebidas s\u00e3o colocadas em um buffer fixo de 504 bytes sem verificar o tamanho real dos dados recebidos. Se mais de 504 bytes forem enviados em um pacote ICMP, o excesso ser\u00e1 gravado fora do buffer e se sobrepor\u00e1 \u00e0s estruturas subsequentes. <\/p>\n

Um ataque pode ser realizado a partir da rede global \u2014 \u00e9 suficiente conhecer o endere\u00e7o IP da v\u00edtima e saber determinar o momento de boot PXE. Conhecendo qual firmware espec\u00edfico est\u00e1 sendo usado em servidor<\/a> v\u00edtima, o invasor pode preparar um exploit considerando a disposi\u00e7\u00e3o das estruturas na mem\u00f3ria de uma vers\u00e3o espec\u00edfica do firmware e explorar a vulnerabilidade para executar c\u00f3digo em n\u00edvel DXE (Driver Execution Environment), que \u00e9 executado no anel de prote\u00e7\u00e3o zero. <\/p>\n

O projeto EDK II foi iniciado em 2004 pela Intel e \u00e9 utilizado por todos os grandes fabricantes de firmware para sistemas de servidores, data centers e provedores de nuvem. Entre outras coisas, \u00e9 utilizado em firmware AMI, Insyde e Phoenix. A vulnerabilidade tamb\u00e9m est\u00e1 presente em firmwares baseados na plataforma Mu da Microsoft, que \u00e9 um fork do EDK II.<\/p>\n

O problema foi identificado por representantes das empresas Anthropic e Google, e estava planejado para uma divulga\u00e7\u00e3o p\u00fablica coordenada em janeiro de 2027. No entanto, a informa\u00e7\u00e3o precisou ser tornada p\u00fablica antes, pois um engenheiro da AMI acidentalmente quebrou o embargo e publicou um pull request p\u00fablico com a corre\u00e7\u00e3o, a partir do qual era poss\u00edvel entender a natureza da vulnerabilidade.
\n
Fonte: opennet.ru<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u0412 TianoCore EDK II (EFI Development Kit II), \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 UEFI, \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0432 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c (CVE-2026-97631). \u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441\u0443\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u0434\u0440\u0430\u0439\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0435 PXE \u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u0431\u044b\u0442\u044c \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0442\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0443 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e \u043e\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 ICMP-\u043f\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0437\u0430\u0433\u0440\u0443\u0437\u043a\u0438 \u0432 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u044f\u0445 IPv4 \u0438\u043b\u0438 IPv6. \u0410\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0435 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0443 \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0434 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":10,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-184024","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47Vulnerabilidade remota em firmware UEFI de servidores, explorada atrav\u00e9s do envio de pacotes ICMP | ProHoster","description":"No TianoCore EDK II (EFI Development Kit II), uma implementa\u00e7\u00e3o de refer\u00eancia aberta do UEFI, utilizada na maioria das placas-m\u00e3e de servidores, uma vulnerabilidade cr\u00edtica foi corrigida (CVE-2026-97631).","canonical_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/remote-vulnerability-in-server-uefi-firmware-exploitable-by-sending-an-icmp-packet","robots":"max-image-preview:large","keywords":"","webmasterTools":{"miscellaneous":""},"schema":null,"og:locale":"pt_PT","og:site_name":"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b","og:type":"article","og:title":"\ud83e\udd47\u0423\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0451\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 UEFI-\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u0438\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0445, \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u043c\u0430\u044f \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u043e\u0442\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0443 ICMP-\u043f\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0430 | ProHoster","og:description":"\u0412 TianoCore EDK II (EFI Development Kit II), \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u0442\u0430\u043b\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 UEFI, \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0432 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0448\u0438\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043c\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c (CVE-2026-97631).","og:url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/remote-vulnerability-in-server-uefi-firmware-exploitable-by-sending-an-icmp-packet","og:image":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:secure_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:width":350,"og:image:height":350,"article:published_time":"2026-10-28T21:40:36+00:00","article:modified_time":"2026-10-28T21:40:41+00:00","article:publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster"},"aioseo_meta_data":[],"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184024","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=184024"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184024\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":184025,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/184024\/revisions\/184025"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=184024"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=184024"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=184024"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}