{"id":33659,"date":"2019-10-31T21:53:59","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:53:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T21:53:59","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:53:59","slug":"predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/pt\/blog\/news\/predstavlen-novyj-klass-uyazvimostej-v-protsessorah-intel","title":{"rendered":"Foi apresentado um novo tipo de vulnerabilidade nos processadores Intel","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"<p>A Intel <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/security-center\/advisory\/intel-sa-00233.html\">publicou<\/a><\/noindex> informa\u00e7\u00f5es sobre o novo <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">classe de vulnerabilidades<\/a><\/noindex> em seus processadores &#8212; <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">MDS<\/a><\/noindex> (Microarchitectural Data Sampling). Assim como os ataques anteriores da classe Spectre, os novos problemas podem levar ao vazamento de dados sens\u00edveis do sistema operacional, m\u00e1quinas virtuais e de outros processos. Acredita-se que os problemas foram inicialmente identificados por funcion\u00e1rios e parceiros da Intel durante uma auditoria interna, ap\u00f3s o que informa\u00e7\u00f5es sobre problemas semelhantes na Intel foram repassadas a pesquisadores independentes. Processadores AMD e ARM n\u00e3o s\u00e3o afetados pelo problema.<\/p>\n<p>Com base nos problemas identificados, pesquisadores da Universidade T\u00e9cnica de Graz (\u00c1ustria) <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cpu.fail\/\">desenvolveram<\/a><\/noindex> v\u00e1rios ataques pr\u00e1ticos por canais laterais:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/\">ZombieLoad<\/a><\/noindex>  (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/zombieload.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) &#8212; permite extrair informa\u00e7\u00f5es confidenciais de outros processos, do sistema operacional, m\u00e1quinas virtuais e enclaves protegidos (TEE, Ambiente de Execu\u00e7\u00e3o Confi\u00e1vel). Por exemplo, foi demonstrada a capacidade de determinar o hist\u00f3rico de navega\u00e7\u00e3o em um navegador Tor, executado em outra m\u00e1quina virtual, bem como identificar as chaves de acesso e senhas utilizadas em aplicativos;\n<p><center><br \/>\n<video controls=\"\" style=\"width: 720px; max-width:100%\" poster=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/images\/demo.jpg\"  src=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/videos\/demo_720.mp4\"><source src=\"https:\/\/zombieloadattack.com\/public\/videos\/demo_720.mp4\" type=\"video\/mp4\" label=\"720p\"><\/video><\/center><\/p>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">RIDL<\/a><\/noindex> (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/files\/ridl.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) &#8212; possibilita a organiza\u00e7\u00e3o de vazamentos de informa\u00e7\u00f5es entre v\u00e1rias \u00e1reas isoladas nos processadores Intel, como buffers de preenchimento, buffers de armazenamento e portas de carregamento. Exemplos de ataques foram demonstrados para organizar vazamentos de outros processos, do sistema operacional, m\u00e1quinas virtuais e enclaves protegidos. Por exemplo, foi mostrado como descobrir o conte\u00fado do hash da senha root em \/etc\/shadow durante tentativas de autentica\u00e7\u00e3o peri\u00f3dicas (o ataque levou 24 horas);\n<p><center><div class=\"youtube-placeholder\" data-id=\"JXPebaGY8RA\" onclick=\"loadVideo(this)\">\r\n        <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/img.youtube.com\/vi\/JXPebaGY8RA\/hqdefault.jpg\" alt=\"Por que no hosting comum a administra\u00e7\u00e3o do PrestaShop \u00e9 lenta, e no seu n\u00e3o \u00e9?\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"480\" height=\"360\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;\">\r\n        <div class=\"play-button\"><\/div>\r\n    <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n<p>Al\u00e9m disso, foi mostrado um exemplo de ataque utilizando JavaScript e WebAssembly ao abrir uma p\u00e1gina maliciosa no motor SpiderMonkey (em navegadores modernos, tal ataque \u00e9 improv\u00e1vel devido \u00e0 limita\u00e7\u00e3o da precis\u00e3o do temporizador e \u00e0s medidas de prote\u00e7\u00e3o contra Spectre);<\/p>\n<p><center><div class=\"youtube-placeholder\" data-id=\"KAgoDQmod1Y\" onclick=\"loadVideo(this)\">\r\n        <img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/img.youtube.com\/vi\/KAgoDQmod1Y\/hqdefault.jpg\" alt=\"Por que no hosting comum a administra\u00e7\u00e3o do PrestaShop \u00e9 lenta, e no seu n\u00e3o \u00e9?\" loading=\"lazy\" width=\"480\" height=\"360\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;\">\r\n        <div class=\"play-button\"><\/div>\r\n    <\/div><\/center><\/p>\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/\">Fallout<\/a><\/noindex> (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/mdsattacks.com\/files\/fallout.pdf\">PDF<\/a><\/noindex>) &#8212; permite ler dados recentemente escritos pelo sistema operacional e determinar o layout da mem\u00f3ria do SO para facilitar a realiza\u00e7\u00e3o de outros ataques;\n<li class=\"l\"> <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/cpu.fail\/store_to_leak_forwarding.pdf\">Store-To-Leak Forwarding<\/a><\/noindex> &#8212; explora otimiza\u00e7\u00f5es do CPU relacionadas ao funcionamento do buffer de armazenamento e pode ser usado para contornar o mecanismo de aleatoriza\u00e7\u00e3o do espa\u00e7o de endere\u00e7o do kernel (KASLR), para monitorar o estado do sistema operacional ou para <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cyberus-technology.de\/posts\/2019-05-14-zombieload.html\">organizar<\/a><\/noindex> vazamentos em combina\u00e7\u00e3o com gadgets baseados em m\u00e9todos Spectre.\n<\/ul>\n<p>Identificados <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/software-guidance\/microarchitectural-data-sampling\">no aplicativo para Windows, que permitia ao usu\u00e1rio elevar seus privil\u00e9gios no sistema para administrador (a vulnerabilidade foi causada pela intera\u00e7\u00e3o inadequada entre o cliente GUI sem privil\u00e9gios e o servi\u00e7o de sistema).<\/a><\/noindex>:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12126 &#8212; MSBDS (Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling), recupera\u00e7\u00e3o do conte\u00fado dos buffers de armazenamento. Usado no ataque Fallout. O grau de perigo foi classificado em 6.5 pontos (CVSS);\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12127 &#8212; MLPDS (Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling), recupera\u00e7\u00e3o do conte\u00fado das portas de carregamento. Usado no ataque RIDL. CVSS 6.5;\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2018-12130 &#8212; MFBDS (Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling), recupera\u00e7\u00e3o do conte\u00fado dos buffers de preenchimento. Usado nos ataques ZombieLoad e RIDL. CVSS 6.5;\n<li class=\"l\"> CVE-2019-11091 &#8212; MDSUM (Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory), recupera\u00e7\u00e3o do conte\u00fado da mem\u00f3ria n\u00e3o cache\u00e1vel. Usado no ataque RIDL. CVSS 3.8.\n<\/ul>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/software.intel.com\/security-software-guidance\/insights\/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling\">Ess\u00eancia<\/a><\/noindex> dos problemas identificados na aplicabilidade de m\u00e9todos de an\u00e1lise por canais laterais em dados em estruturas microarquiteturais aos quais as aplica\u00e7\u00f5es n\u00e3o t\u00eam acesso direto. Fala-se de estruturas de baixo n\u00edvel como buffers de preenchimento (Line Fill Buffer), buffers de armazenamento (Store Buffer) e portas de carregamento (Load Port), que s\u00e3o blocos menores do que o cache de primeiro n\u00edvel (L1D), o cache de carregamento de dados (RDCL) ou L1TF (L1 Terminal Fault), e, consequentemente, incluem menos informa\u00e7\u00f5es e s\u00e3o atualizados de forma mais intensa.<br \/>\n<center><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Foi apresentado um novo tipo de vulnerabilidade nos processadores Intel\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/205ff034e070b8b057f01c02d6381c2a.png\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/center><\/p>\n<p>Os ataques por canais laterais em estruturas microarquiteturais s\u00e3o significativamente mais dif\u00edceis de realizar em compara\u00e7\u00e3o com m\u00e9todos de recupera\u00e7\u00e3o de conte\u00fado de cache e exigem o rastreamento e a an\u00e1lise de grandes volumes de dados para determinar sua rela\u00e7\u00e3o com endere\u00e7os espec\u00edficos na mem\u00f3ria (essencialmente, o atacante n\u00e3o pode interceptar intencionalmente dados espec\u00edficos, mas pode acumular vazamentos ao longo do tempo e aplicar m\u00e9todos estat\u00edsticos para reconstruir certos tipos de dados). Al\u00e9m disso, o ataque afeta apenas os dados no mesmo n\u00facleo f\u00edsico do CPU que o c\u00f3digo do atacante.<\/p>\n<p>Os m\u00e9todos propostos para determina\u00e7\u00e3o do conte\u00fado de estruturas microarquiteturais baseiam-se no uso dessas estruturas durante a execu\u00e7\u00e3o especulativa de exce\u00e7\u00f5es (fault) ou opera\u00e7\u00f5es de carregamento e armazenamento.<br \/>\nDurante a execu\u00e7\u00e3o especulativa, o conte\u00fado de estruturas internas \u00e9 redirecionado para ser processado em registradores ou cache. As opera\u00e7\u00f5es especulativas n\u00e3o s\u00e3o conclu\u00eddas e o resultado \u00e9 descartado, mas o conte\u00fado redirecionado pode ser determinado atrav\u00e9s de m\u00e9todos de an\u00e1lise de cache por canais laterais.<\/p>\n<p>As portas de carregamento s\u00e3o utilizadas pelo processador para obter dados da mem\u00f3ria ou subsistema de entrada\/sa\u00edda e fornecer as informa\u00e7\u00f5es obtidas aos registradores da CPU. Devido a uma particularidade da implementa\u00e7\u00e3o, os dados de opera\u00e7\u00f5es de carga mais antigas permanecem nas portas at\u00e9 serem sobrescritos por novos dados, o que permite, indiretamente, determinar o estado dos dados na porta de carregamento por meio de manipula\u00e7\u00f5es com exce\u00e7\u00f5es (fault) e instru\u00e7\u00f5es SSE\/AVX\/AVX-512, que carregam mais de 64 bits de dados. Em tais condi\u00e7\u00f5es, as opera\u00e7\u00f5es de carga especulativamente revelam valores desatualizados de dados de estruturas internas em opera\u00e7\u00f5es dependentes. De forma semelhante, ocorre um vazamento atrav\u00e9s do buffer de armazenamento, usado para acelerar a grava\u00e7\u00e3o no cache da CPU e que inclui uma tabela de endere\u00e7os, valores e flags, assim como atrav\u00e9s do buffer de preenchimento, que cont\u00e9m dados que ainda n\u00e3o est\u00e3o no cache L1 (cache-miss), enquanto s\u00e3o carregados de caches de outros n\u00edveis.<\/p>\n<p><center><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/pics_base\/0_1557869220.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Foi apresentado um novo tipo de vulnerabilidade nos processadores Intel\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/1f8bf290cd6ecbec5a5f17cc3103010d.png\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/a><\/noindex><\/center><\/p>\n<p>O problema <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/engineering-new-protections-into-hardware.html\">afeta<\/a><\/noindex> modelos de processadores Intel, lan\u00e7ados a partir de 2011 (come\u00e7ando pela 6\u00aa gera\u00e7\u00e3o). Nesse caso, vulnerabilidades de hardware s\u00e3o bloqueadas, come\u00e7ando com alguns modelos da 8\u00aa e 9\u00aa gera\u00e7\u00f5es do Intel Core e a 2\u00aa gera\u00e7\u00e3o do Intel Xeon Scalable (pode ser verificado atrav\u00e9s do bit ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO no IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR). As vulnerabilidades j\u00e1 est\u00e3o <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">foram corrigidas<\/a><\/noindex> no n\u00edvel de firmwares, microc\u00f3digo e sistemas operacionais. Segundo a Intel, a perda de desempenho ap\u00f3s a ativa\u00e7\u00e3o da corre\u00e7\u00e3o para a maioria dos usu\u00e1rios <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.intel.com\/content\/www\/us\/en\/architecture-and-technology\/mds.html\">n\u00e3o ultrapassa<\/a><\/noindex> 3%. Com a desativa\u00e7\u00e3o da tecnologia Hyper-Threading, a queda de desempenho pode chegar a 9% no teste SPECint_rate_base, at\u00e9 11% em c\u00e1lculos inteiros ativos e at\u00e9 19% na execu\u00e7\u00e3o de aplica\u00e7\u00f5es Java em servidor (com HT ativado, a redu\u00e7\u00e3o de desempenho \u00e9 quase inexistente). As corre\u00e7\u00f5es praticamente n\u00e3o afetam o desempenho de opera\u00e7\u00f5es relacionadas a entrada\/sa\u00edda.<\/p>\n<p>No n\u00facleo Linux, a prote\u00e7\u00e3o contra MDS <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/git.kernel.org\/pub\/scm\/linux\/kernel\/git\/torvalds\/linux.git\/commit\/?id=fa4bff165070dc40a3de35b78e4f8da8e8d85ec5\">foi adicionada<\/a><\/noindex> nas vers\u00f5es atuais <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/\">4.19.43, 4.14.119 e 4.9.176. O m\u00e9todo de prote\u00e7\u00e3o<\/a><\/noindex>  \t5.1.2, 5.0.16,<br \/>\nbaseia-se <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/doc\/html\/latest\/x86\/mds.html#mds\">na limpeza do conte\u00fado dos buffers microarquiteturais no momento do retorno do n\u00facleo ao espa\u00e7o do usu\u00e1rio ou durante a transfer\u00eancia de controle para o sistema operacional convidado, utilizando a instru\u00e7\u00e3o VERW. Para que a prote\u00e7\u00e3o funcione, \u00e9 necess\u00e1rio que haja suporte ao modo MD_CLEAR, implementado na nova atualiza\u00e7\u00e3o de microc\u00f3digo. Para prote\u00e7\u00e3o completa, tamb\u00e9m \u00e9 recomendado desativar o Hyper-Threading. Para verificar a vulnerabilidade do sistema no n\u00facleo Linux<\/a><\/noindex> na limpeza do conte\u00fado dos buffers microarquitet\u00f4nicos no momento do retorno do kernel para o espa\u00e7o do usu\u00e1rio ou ao transferir o controle para o sistema convidado, para o qual a instru\u00e7\u00e3o VERW \u00e9 utilizada. Para que a prote\u00e7\u00e3o funcione, \u00e9 necess\u00e1rio que o suporte ao modo MD_CLEAR esteja implementado na atualiza\u00e7\u00e3o mais recente do microc\u00f3digo. Para prote\u00e7\u00e3o completa, tamb\u00e9m recomenda-se desabilitar o Hyper Threading. Para verificar a vulnerabilidade do sistema no n\u00facleo do Linux <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.kernel.org\/doc\/html\/latest\/admin-guide\/hw-vuln\/mds.html\">o sinalizador -k para integra\u00e7\u00e3o com<\/a><\/noindex> manipulador &#171;\/sys\/devices\/system\/cpu\/vulnerabilities\/mds&#187;. Para gerenciar a ativa\u00e7\u00e3o de v\u00e1rios modos de bloqueio de vulnerabilidades no kernel, foi adicionado o par\u00e2metro &#171;mds=&#187;, que pode assumir os valores &#171;full&#187;, &#171;full,nosmt&#187; (desativa\u00e7\u00e3o de Hyper-Threads), &#171;vmwerv&#187; e &#171;off&#187;.<\/p>\n<p> As atualiza\u00e7\u00f5es de pacotes j\u00e1 foram lan\u00e7adas para <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/bugzilla.redhat.com\/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2018-12127\">RHEL<\/a><\/noindex> e <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/people.canonical.com\/~ubuntu-security\/cve\/2018\/CVE-2018-12127.html\">Ubuntu<\/a><\/noindex>, mas ainda n\u00e3o est\u00e3o dispon\u00edveis para <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/security-tracker.debian.org\/tracker\/CVE-2018-12130\">Debian<\/a><\/noindex>, <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/bodhi.fedoraproject.org\/updates\/?releases=F30&#038;type=security\">Fedora<\/a><\/noindex> e <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.suse.com\/security\/cve\/CVE-2018-12127\/\">SUSE<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nA corre\u00e7\u00e3o para bloquear vazamentos de dados de m\u00e1quinas virtuais tamb\u00e9m <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/xenbits.xen.org\/xsa\/advisory-297.html\">para smartphones OnePlus One, Fairphone 2, Nexus 4, Nexus 5, Nexus 7 2013, Meizu MX4\/PRO 5, Bq Aquaris E5\/E4.5\/M10. O projeto tamb\u00e9m<\/a><\/noindex> para o hipervisor Xen. Para proteger sistemas de virtualiza\u00e7\u00e3o que fazem a chamada do comando L1D_FLUSH antes de transferir o controle para outra m\u00e1quina virtual, e para proteger enclaves Intel SGX, uma atualiza\u00e7\u00e3o de microc\u00f3digo \u00e9 suficiente.  <\/p>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"link\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<p>Fonte: <a \ncontent=\"nofollow\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.opennet.ru\/opennews\/art.shtml?num=50684\">opennet.ru<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u041a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f Intel \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0430 \u0441\u0432\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043e \u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043c \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0445 &#8212; MDS (Microarchitectural Data Sampling). \u041a\u0430\u043a \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0448\u043b\u044b\u0435 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u0438 \u043a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441\u0430 Spectre \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0433\u0443\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043a \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b, \u0432\u0438\u0440\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043c\u0430\u0448\u0438\u043d \u0438 \u0447\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0432. \u0423\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0431\u043b\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0430 \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u044b \u0441\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0438 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043d\u0451\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0438 Intel \u0432 \u0445\u043e\u0434\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0443\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0430, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043e\u0431 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":25348,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[702],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-33659","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.3 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" 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