{"id":30258,"date":"2019-10-31T21:34:32","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:34:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/netbios-v-rukah-hakera\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T21:34:32","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:34:32","slug":"netbios-v-rukah-hakera","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/ro\/blog\/netbios-v-rukah-hakera","title":{"rendered":"NetBIOS \u00een m\u00e2inile unui hacker","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00cen acest articol, vom povesti pe scurt despre ceea ce ne poate spune un lucru care pare at\u00e2t de obi\u0219nuit precum NetBIOS<\/i>. Ce informa\u021bii poate oferi acesta unui poten\u021bial atacator\/pentester.<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n

Domeniul demonstrat al tehnicilor de recunoa\u0219tere se refer\u0103 la re\u021bele interne, adic\u0103 izolate \u0219i inaccesibile din exterior. Astfel de re\u021bele exist\u0103, de regul\u0103, \u00een orice companie, chiar \u0219i \u00een cea mai mic\u0103.<\/p>\n

\u00cen sine, NetBIOS<\/i> este folosit, de obicei, pentru a ob\u021bine un nume de re\u021bea. \u0218i acest lucru va fi suficient pentru a face cel pu\u021bin 4 lucruri.<\/p>\n

Detectarea gazdelor<\/b>
\nDatorit\u0103 faptului c\u0103 NetBIOS poate folosi UDP ca transport, viteza sa de operare permite detectarea gazdelor \u00een re\u021bele foarte mari. De exemplu, instrumentul nbtscan<\/i>, care face parte din pachetul omonim, poate rezolva \u00een doar 2 secunde (poate suprasolicita re\u021beaua) adresele de re\u021bea de tip 192.168.0.0\/16, \u00een timp ce scanarea tradi\u021bional\u0103 TCP va dura zeci de minute. Aceast\u0103 caracteristic\u0103 poate fi utilizat\u0103 ca tehnic\u0103 de detectare a gazdelor (host sweep) \u00een re\u021bele foarte mari despre care nu se \u0219tie nimic, \u00eenainte de a lansa nmap. De\u0219i rezultatul nu garanteaz\u0103 o dete\u021bie de 100%, deoarece vor r\u0103spunde \u00een principal gazdele Windows \u0219i nu toate, totu\u0219i va permite determinarea aproximativ\u0103 a intervalelor \u00een care se afl\u0103 gazdele active.<\/p>\n

Identificarea gazdelor<\/b>
\nFolosind rezultatele ob\u021binute din numele asociate adreselor IP:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\nse poate observa: pe l\u00e2ng\u0103 faptul c\u0103 numele dezv\u0103luie proprietarul sta\u021biei de lucru (de\u0219i aceasta nu se \u00eent\u00e2mpl\u0103 \u00eentotdeauna), una dintre adrese se eviden\u021biaz\u0103 clar \u00een raport cu celelalte. Putem observa c\u0103 s-a ob\u021binut numele KALI<\/i>. Un astfel de comportament este caracteristic, de obicei, pentru unix<\/i>-implementarea SMB\/NetBIOS<\/i> \u00een cadrul pachetului software samba<\/i> sau pentru versiunile foarte vechi de Windows 2000<\/i>.
\nOb\u021binerea numelui KALI<\/i>, \u00een timp ce pe alte gazde acesta <unknown<\/i>> indic\u0103 existen\u021ba a\u0219a-numitei null-session<\/i>. Cu set\u0103rile implicite, SMB<\/i>-serverele sunt sensibile la aceasta. linux<\/i> Null-session permite pur \u0219i simplu ob\u021binerea absolut anonim\u0103 (deoarece nu am introdus niciun fel de parol\u0103, a\u0219a cum se poate vedea \u00een screenshot) de informa\u021bii suplimentare, cum ar fi politica local\u0103 de parole, lista utilizatorilor locali, grupurilor \u0219i lista resurselor partajate (share):<\/i> Adesea pe<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\nlinux SMB linux SMB<\/i>-serverele pot avea resurse publice accesibile nu doar pentru citire, ci \u0219i pentru scriere. Prezen\u021ba ambelor lucruri aduce diverse riscuri, utilizarea c\u0103rora dep\u0103\u0219e\u0219te subiectul acestui articol.<\/p>\n

NetBIOS<\/i> de asemenea permite ob\u021binerea numelui tuturor tipurilor pe care le p\u0103streaz\u0103 sta\u021bia de lucru:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\n\u00een acest caz, permite s\u0103 se afle c\u0103 gazda este de asemenea un controler de domeniu ARRIVA<\/i>.<\/p>\n

De asemenea, merit\u0103 s\u0103 acorda\u021bi aten\u021bie suplimentar\u0103 c\u0103 NetBIOS<\/i> permite ob\u021binerea mac<\/i>-adresa. \u00cen plus, spre deosebire de cererile arp, cererile NetBIOS pot dep\u0103\u0219i limita subre\u021belei. Acest lucru poate fi util dac\u0103, de exemplu, se caut\u0103 un laptop sau un echipament specific \u00een re\u021bea, cunosc\u00e2ndu-i produc\u0103torul. Deoarece primele trei octete mac<\/i>-adreselor identific\u0103 produc\u0103torul, se pot trimite astfel de NetBIOS<\/i>-cereri \u00een toate subre\u021belele cunoscute pentru a \u00eencerca s\u0103 g\u0103seasc\u0103 dispozitivul dorit (http:\/\/standards-oui.ieee.org\/oui.txt).<\/p>\n

Determinarea apartenen\u021bei la domeniu<\/a><\/b>
\nAdesea, atunci c\u00e2nd naviga\u021bi prin re\u021belele interne corporative, este necesar s\u0103 ataca\u021bi anume sta\u021bia de lucru, inclus\u0103 \u00een domeniu (de exemplu, pentru a ob\u021bine privilegii la nivel de administrator de domeniu) sau invers. \u00cen acest caz, NetBIOS<\/i> din nou poate ajuta:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\n\u00cen acest caz, folosind NetBIOS<\/i> s-au ob\u021binut toate numele tuturor tipurilor. Printre acestea, pe l\u00e2ng\u0103 numele PC-ului (ceea ce a fost ob\u021binut anterior), se poate vedea \u0219i numele grupului de lucru. Din defect, pentru windows<\/i> este, de obicei, ceva de genul WORKGROUP<\/i> sau IVAN-PC<\/i>, dar dac\u0103 sta\u021bia de lucru este \u00een domeniu, atunci grupul s\u0103u de lucru este numele domeniului.
\nAstfel, folosind NetBIOS<\/i> se poate afla dac\u0103 sta\u021bia de lucru este \u00een domeniu \u0219i, dac\u0103 da, \u00een care.
\nDac\u0103 este necesar s\u0103 ob\u021bine\u021bi o list\u0103 de gazde de domeniu \u00een cadrul subre\u021belei, atunci este suficient\u0103 o singur\u0103 cerere de broadcast cu numele domeniului dorit:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\nca urmare, toate gazdele care apar\u021bin acestui domeniu vor r\u0103spunde.<\/p>\n

Descoperirea gazdelor multihomed<\/b>
\n\u0218i \u00een cele din urm\u0103, o alt\u0103 tehnic\u0103 probabil foarte pu\u021bin cunoscut\u0103, care este pur \u0219i simplu esen\u021bial\u0103 pentru g\u0103sirea c\u0103ilor<\/i> \u00een re\u021bele fizic protejate, poate chiar izolate. Acestea pot fi re\u021bele industriale ale \u00eentreprinderilor, pline de controlere. Accesul la aceast\u0103 re\u021bea pentru un atacator \u00eenseamn\u0103 capacitatea de a influen\u021ba procesul tehnologic, iar pentru \u00eentreprindere, riscul de a suferi pierderi colosale.
\nA\u0219adar, esen\u021ba este c\u0103, chiar dac\u0103 re\u021beaua este izolat\u0103 de re\u021beaua corporativ\u0103, adesea unii administratori, fie din lene, fie din alt motiv, prefer\u0103 s\u0103 activeze o alt\u0103 plac\u0103 de re\u021bea pe calculatoarele lor pentru a avea acces la acea re\u021bea. Desigur, toate acestea se \u00eent\u00e2mpl\u0103, evident, ocolind toate regulile firewall-ului corporativ. Convenabil, nu-i a\u0219a, dar nu foarte sigur, \u00een cazul \u00een care e\u0219ti atacat, atunci devii un pod c\u0103tre acea re\u021bea \u0219i \u00ee\u021bi asumi responsabilitatea.
\nCu toate acestea, exist\u0103 o problem\u0103 pentru atacator \u2014 g\u0103sirea acelui administrator care a accesat re\u021beaua protejat\u0103 \u00eentr-un mod ilegal. Mai mult, aceasta este o problem\u0103 complicat\u0103 \u0219i pentru oamenii de securitate. La marile companii, aceasta este \u00eentr-adev\u0103r o sarcin\u0103 dificil\u0103, ca \u0219i cum ai c\u0103uta un ac \u00eentr-un stog de f\u00e2n.
\n\u00cen aceast\u0103 situa\u021bie, op\u021biunile evidente pentru atacator ar fi dou\u0103:
\n1. s\u0103 \u00eencerce s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 fiecare PC din subre\u021beaua corporativ\u0103 ca pe un gateway c\u0103tre re\u021beaua dorit\u0103. Asta ar fi foarte convenabil, dar se \u00eent\u00e2lne\u0219te rar, deoarece la windows<\/i> hosturi ip forwarding<\/i> este aproape \u00eentotdeauna dezactivat. Mai mult, o astfel de verificare este posibil\u0103 doar \u00een interiorul propriei subre\u021bele \u0219i necesit\u0103 ca atacatorul s\u0103 cunoasc\u0103 adresa \u021bint\u0103 din re\u021beaua izolat\u0103.
\n2. s\u0103 \u00eencerce s\u0103 acceseze de la distan\u021b\u0103 fiecare host \u0219i s\u0103 execute comanda banal\u0103 ipconfig\/ifconfig<\/i>. \u0218i aici lucrurile nu sunt at\u00e2t de simple. Chiar dac\u0103 atacatorul a ob\u021binut drepturile de administrator de domeniu, firewall-urile de re\u021bea \u0219i cele locale nu au fost anulate. A\u0219adar, aceast\u0103 sarcin\u0103 nu poate fi automatizat\u0103 \u00een 100%. Din cauza aceasta, r\u0103m\u00e2ne greoaie s\u0103 intri pe fiecare host, dep\u0103\u0219ind firewall-urile (care adesea blocheaz\u0103 portul 445\/tcp), \u00een speran\u021ba de a vedea \u00een sf\u00e2r\u0219it interfa\u021ba de re\u021bea dorit\u0103.<\/p>\n

Totu\u0219i, totul este mult mai simplu. Exist\u0103 o metod\u0103 extrem de simpl\u0103 care permite ob\u021binerea de pe un anumit host a listei de interfe\u021be de re\u021bea. S\u0103 presupunem c\u0103 avem un host:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\nacesta este reverse resolving ip-adres\u0103 \u2192 nume de re\u021bea. Dac\u0103 acum vom \u00eencerca s\u0103 facem resolving direct nume de re\u021bea \u2192 ip-adres\u0103:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\natunci vom descoperi c\u0103 acest host este, de asemenea, un gateway (probabil) c\u0103tre o alt\u0103 re\u021bea. Merit\u0103 men\u021bionat c\u0103 \u00een acest caz, cererea a fost broadcast. Cu alte cuvinte, doar hosturile din subre\u021beaua atacatorului vor auzi cererea.
\nDac\u0103 gazda \u021bint\u0103 se afl\u0103 \u00een afara subre\u021belei, atunci se poate trimite o cerere direc\u021bionat\u0103:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\n\u00cen acest caz se observ\u0103 c\u0103 \u021binta se afl\u0103 \u00een afara subre\u021belei atacatorului. Cu ajutorul cheii -B, s-a indicat c\u0103 cererea trebuie trimis\u0103 c\u0103tre o adres\u0103 specific\u0103 \u0219i nu c\u0103tre o adres\u0103 de difuzare.
\nAcum r\u0103m\u00e2ne doar s\u0103 colectezi rapid informa\u021biile din toat\u0103 subre\u021beaua de interes, nu doar dintr-o singur\u0103 adres\u0103. Pentru aceasta se poate folosi un mic python<\/i>-script:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\n\u0218i dup\u0103 c\u00e2teva secunde:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\nAnume gazda dedicat\u0103, \u00een acest caz improvizat, ar deveni prima \u021bint\u0103 a atacatorului, dac\u0103 ar urm\u0103ri re\u021beaua 172.16.1\/24.<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\nNumelile repetate pe IP-uri diferite indic\u0103 faptul c\u0103 gazda are de asemenea dou\u0103 pl\u0103ci de re\u021bea, dar deja \u00eentr-o singur\u0103 subre\u021bea. Aici merit\u0103 men\u021bionat c\u0103 NetBIOS<\/i> nu dezv\u0103luie alias<\/i>-urile (care pot fi calculate cu u\u0219urin\u021b\u0103 prin cereri arp ca IP-uri cu acelea\u0219i mac<\/i>). \u00cen acest caz adresa IP<\/a> au diferite mac<\/i>.<\/p>\n

Un alt exemplu de utilizare a acestei tehnici este Wi-Fi public. Uneori, se poate \u00eent\u00e2lni situa\u021bia \u00een care, printre dispozitivele invitate conectate la re\u021beaua public\u0103, se afl\u0103 personal care lucreaz\u0103 \u00een segmentul corporativ \u00eenchis. Atunci, prin intermediul acestei tehnici de spionaj, atacatorul \u00ee\u0219i poate contoura foarte rapid drumul spre re\u021beaua \u00eenchis\u0103:<\/p>\n

\"NetBIOS
\n
\n\u00cen acest caz, printre cei 65 de clien\u021bi ai Wi-Fi-ului public se aflau dou\u0103 sta\u021bii de lucru, av\u00e2nd un interface suplimentar, probabil legat de re\u021beaua corporativ\u0103.<\/p>\n

Dac\u0103 uneori \u00eentre segmentele de re\u021bea sau chiar pe sta\u021biile de lucru se observ\u0103 filtrarea traficului pe portul 445\/tcp, care \u00eempiedic\u0103 accesul de la distan\u021b\u0103 la sistem (execu\u021bia de cod de la distan\u021b\u0103), \u00een acest caz, pentru rezolvarea numelui se NetBIOS<\/i> utilizeaz\u0103 portul 137\/udp, blocarea inten\u021bionat\u0103 a acestuia fiind aproape inexistent\u0103, deoarece ar afecta semnificativ confortul utiliz\u0103rii re\u021belei, de exemplu, s-ar putea pierde mediu de re\u021bea etc.<\/p>\n

Dup\u0103 cum se spune, enumerarea este cheia<\/i>
\nExist\u0103 vreo protec\u021bie \u00eempotriva acestui lucru? Nu exist\u0103, pentru c\u0103 aceasta nu este o vulnerabilitate deloc. Este doar o func\u021bionalitate standard a ceea ce exist\u0103 de baz\u0103 la windows<\/i> (\u00een linux<\/i> comportamentul difer\u0103 pu\u021bin). \u0218i dac\u0103, dintr-o dat\u0103, te-ai conectat neautorizat, ocolind regulile de rutare a re\u021belei, atacatorul te va g\u0103si cu siguran\u021b\u0103 \u0219i o va face foarte repede.
\n
Sursa: habr.com<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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