{"id":91574,"date":"2020-08-14T19:42:27","date_gmt":"2020-08-14T17:42:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/administrirovanie\/skrytyj-vzlom-parolej-s-pomoshhyu-smbexec"},"modified":"2020-08-14T19:42:27","modified_gmt":"2020-08-14T17:42:27","slug":"skrytyj-vzlom-parolej-s-pomoshhyu-smbexec","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/ro\/blog\/administrirovanie\/skrytyj-vzlom-parolej-s-pomoshhyu-smbexec","title":{"rendered":"Spargerea ascuns\u0103 a parolelor cu ajutorul Smbexec","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Spargerea
\n
\nScriem periodic despre cum hackerii se bazeaz\u0103 adesea pe utilizarea metodelor de hacking f\u0103r\u0103 cod mali\u021bios<\/a><\/noindex>, pentru a evita detectarea. Ei practic \u201esupravie\u021buiesc cu resturi\u201d<\/a><\/noindex>, folosind instrumente standard Windows, elud\u00e2nd astfel antivirusurile \u0219i alte utilitare de detectare a activit\u0103\u021bilor mali\u021bioase. Noi, ca ap\u0103r\u0103tori, suntem acum nevoi\u021bi s\u0103 ne confrunt\u0103m cu consecin\u021bele triste ale acestor tehnici perfide de hacking: un angajat bine pozi\u021bionat poate folosi aceea\u0219i abordare pentru a fura date \u00een secret (proprietatea intelectual\u0103 a companiei, numere de carduri de credit). \u0218i dac\u0103 el nu se gr\u0103be\u0219te, ci lucreaz\u0103 \u00eencet \u0219i discret, va fi extrem de greu \u2014 dar totu\u0219i posibil, dac\u0103 se aplic\u0103 abordarea corect\u0103 \u0219i coresponden\u021ba instrumente<\/a><\/noindex>, \u2014 a identifica o astfel de activitate.<\/p>\n

Pe de alt\u0103 parte, nu mi-ar pl\u0103cea s\u0103 demonizez angaja\u021bii, deoarece nimeni nu dore\u0219te s\u0103 lucreze \u00eentr-un mediu de afaceri direct din \u201e1984\u201d al lui Orwell. Din fericire, exist\u0103 c\u00e2teva m\u0103suri practice \u0219i solu\u021bii care pot complica semnificativ via\u021ba insiderilor. Vom analiza metodele ascunse de atac<\/strong>, utilizate de hackerii angaja\u021bi cu un oarecare fundal tehnic. Apoi, vom discuta despre op\u021biunile pentru reducerea acestor riscuri \u2013 vom explora at\u00e2t op\u021biunile tehnice, c\u00e2t \u0219i cele organiza\u021bionale.
\n<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n

Ce este r\u0103u \u00een PsExec?<\/h2>\n

\nEdward Snowden a devenit, pe bun\u0103 dreptate sau nu, sinonim cu furtul de date din interior. Apropo, nu uita\u021bi s\u0103 arunca\u021bi o privire la aceast\u0103 not\u0103 <\/a><\/noindex>despre al\u021bi insideri care merit\u0103, de asemenea, un anumit statut de notorietate. Este important s\u0103 subliniem un aspect referitor la metodele folosite de Snowden \u2014 a\u0219a cum \u0219tim, el nu a instalat <\/em>niciun software mali\u021bios extern!<\/p>\n

Dimpotriv\u0103, Snowden a utilizat pu\u021bin\u0103 inginerie social\u0103 \u0219i a profitat de pozi\u021bia sa de administrator de sistem pentru a colecta parole \u0219i a crea conturi. Nimic complicat \u2014 f\u0103r\u0103 mimikatz<\/a><\/noindex>, atacuri man-in-the-middle <\/a><\/noindex>sau metasploit<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n

Angaja\u021bii organiza\u021biilor nu se afl\u0103 \u00eentotdeauna \u00eentr-o pozi\u021bie unic\u0103 ca Snowden, dar din conceptul \u201esupravie\u021buirii cu resturi\u201d se pot extrage c\u00e2teva lec\u021bii de care ar trebui s\u0103 \u021bin\u0103 cont \u2014 s\u0103 nu \u00eentreprind\u0103 nicio ac\u021biune mali\u021bioas\u0103 care poate fi detectat\u0103 \u0219i, \u00een special, s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 datele de acreditive cu precau\u021bie. Aminti\u021bi-v\u0103 aceast\u0103 idee.<\/p>\n

Psexec<\/a><\/noindex> \u0219i verii s\u0103i crackmapexec <\/a><\/noindex>au impresionat numero\u0219i pen-testeri, hackeri \u0219i bloggeri de securitate informatic\u0103. Iar \u00een combina\u021bie cu mimikatz, psexec permite atacatorilor s\u0103 se mi\u0219te \u00een interiorul re\u021belei f\u0103r\u0103 a necesita cunoa\u0219terea parolei \u00een mod deschis. <\/p>\n

Mimikatz intercept\u0103 hash-ul NTLM al procesului LSASS, apoi transmite un token sau datele de autentificare - a\u0219a-numita atac \u201epass the hash\u201d<\/strong> \u2013 \u00een psexec, permi\u021b\u00e2nd atacatorului s\u0103 se conecteze pe un alt server \u00een numele altui <\/em>utilizator. \u0218i cu fiecare mi\u0219care ulterioar\u0103 pe un server nou, atacatorul colecteaz\u0103 date de autentificare suplimentare, extinz\u00e2ndu-\u0219i modalit\u0103\u021bile de a c\u0103uta con\u021binut disponibil.<\/p>\n

C\u00e2nd am \u00eenceput pentru prima dat\u0103 s\u0103 lucrez cu psexec, mi s-a p\u0103rut pur \u0219i simplu magic \u2013 mul\u021bumesc Marcului Russinovich<\/a><\/noindex>, genialul creator al psexec, \u2013 dar \u0219tiu de asemenea \u0219i despre componentele sale zgomotoase <\/em>. Nu este deloc discret! <\/p>\n

Primul fapt interesant despre psexec este c\u0103 utilizeaz\u0103 un protocol de fi\u0219iere de re\u021bea SMB de la Microsoft. Prin intermediul SMB, psexec transfer\u0103 mici <\/strong>fi\u0219iere binare pe sistemul \u021bint\u0103, plas\u00e2ndu-le \u00een folderul C:Windows. <\/em>Apoi, psexec creeaz\u0103 un serviciu Windows folosind binarul copiat \u0219i \u00eel lanseaz\u0103 sub un nume foarte \"neobi\u0219nuit\", PSEXECSVC. \u00cen acest timp, pute\u021bi vedea toate acestea, la fel cum am f\u0103cut \u0219i eu, observ\u00e2nd ma\u0219ina de la distan\u021b\u0103 (vezi mai jos).<\/p>\n

Cartela de vizit\u0103 Psexec: serviciul \u201ePSEXECSVC\u201d. Acesta ruleaz\u0103 un fi\u0219ier binar care a fost plasat prin SMB \u00een folderul C:Windows.<\/p>\n

\"Spargerea<\/p>\n

Ca etap\u0103 final\u0103, fi\u0219ierul binar copiat deschide<\/em><\/p>\n

\no conexiune RPC la serverul \u021bint\u0103 \u0219i apoi prime\u0219te comenzi de control (\u00een mod implicit \u2013 prin shell-ul cmd Windows), execut\u00e2ndu-le \u0219i redirec\u021bion\u00e2nd intrarea \u0219i ie\u0219irea c\u0103tre ma\u0219ina de acas\u0103 a atacatorului. \u00cen acest fel, atacatorul vede consola de baz\u0103 \u2013 la fel ca \u0219i cum ar fi fost conectat direct.<\/em> Multe componente \u0219i un proces foarte zgomotos! <\/p>\n

Mecanismul complicat al proceselor interne ale psexec explic\u0103 mesajul care m-a nedumerit \u00een timpul primelor mele teste acum c\u00e2\u021biva ani: \u201eStarting PSEXECSVC \u2026\u201d \u0219i pauza ulterioar\u0103 \u00eenainte de apari\u021bia consolei.<\/p>\n

Psexec de la Impacket arat\u0103 \u00een realitate ce se \u00eent\u00e2mpl\u0103 \u201esub capot\u0103\". <\/p>\n

\"Spargerea<\/p>\n

Psexec de la Impacket arat\u0103 efectiv ce se \u00eent\u00e2mpl\u0103 \u201esub capot\u0103\u201d.<\/em><\/p>\n

\nNu este surprinz\u0103tor: psexec a realizat o cantitate imens\u0103 de munc\u0103 \"sub capot\". Dac\u0103 te intereseaz\u0103 o explica\u021bie mai detaliat\u0103, consult\u0103 aceasta <\/a><\/noindex>descriere minunat\u0103.<\/p>\n

Este evident c\u0103, utilizat ca instrument de administrare a sistemului, care era scopul s\u0103u ini\u021bial <\/em>psexec, nu exist\u0103 nimic \u00een neregul\u0103 cu \"zumzetul\" tuturor acestor mecanisme Windows. Pentru un atacator, \u00eens\u0103, psexec va crea complica\u021bii, iar pentru un insider precaut \u0219i iste\u021b, cum ar fi Snowden, psexec sau o utilitar\u0103 similar\u0103 va reprezenta un risc prea mare.<\/p>\n

\u0218i aici intervine Smbexec<\/h2>\n

\nSMB este un mod ingenios \u0219i subtil de a transfera fi\u0219iere \u00eentre servere, iar hackerii s-au infiltrat direct \u00een SMB din cele mai vechi timpuri. Cred c\u0103 toat\u0103 lumea \u0219tie c\u0103 nu trebuie s\u0103 deschizi <\/a><\/noindex>porturile SMB 445 \u0219i 139 c\u0103tre internet, nu-i a\u0219a?<\/p>\n

\u00cen 2013, la Defcon, Eric Milman (brav0hax<\/a><\/noindex>) a prezentat smbexec<\/a><\/noindex>, astfel \u00eenc\u00e2t testatorii de penetrare s\u0103 poat\u0103 \u00eencerca atacul subtil asupra SMB. Nu cunosc toat\u0103 povestea, dar apoi Impacket a rafinat \u0219i mai mult smbexec. De fapt, pentru testarea mea am desc\u0103rcat scripturi de la Impacket \u00een Python de la Github<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n

Spre deosebire de psexec, smbexec evit\u0103 <\/em>transferul unui fi\u0219ier binar poten\u021bial detectabil pe ma\u0219ina \u021bint\u0103. \u00cen schimb, utilitar\u0103 func\u021bioneaz\u0103 complet din \"m\u00e2ncare\" prin rularea comenzii<\/em> locale de linie de comand\u0103 Windows.<\/p>\n

Iat\u0103 ce face: transmite o comand\u0103 de pe ma\u0219ina atacatorului prin SMB \u00eentr-un fi\u0219ier special de intrare, iar apoi creeaz\u0103 \u0219i ruleaz\u0103 o linie de comand\u0103 complex\u0103 (ca un serviciu Windows), care le va p\u0103rea familiar\u0103 utilizatorilor de Linux. Pe scurt: porne\u0219te shell-ul nativ cmd Windows, redirec\u021bioneaz\u0103 ie\u0219irea \u00eentr-un alt fi\u0219ier \u0219i apoi \u00eel trimite prin SMB \u00eenapoi pe ma\u0219ina atacatorului. <\/p>\n

Cel mai bun mod de a \u00een\u021belege acest lucru va fi s\u0103 studiez linia de comand\u0103 pe care am reu\u0219it s\u0103 o ob\u021bin din jurnalul evenimentelor (vezi mai jos).<\/p>\n

\"Spargerea<\/p>\n

Nu este acesta cea mai mare metod\u0103 de redirec\u021bionare a inputului\/outputului? Apropo, crearea unui serviciu are un identificator de eveniment 7045.<\/em><\/p>\n

\nLa fel ca psexec, creeaz\u0103 de asemenea un serviciu care \u00ee\u0219i \u00eendepline\u0219te toat\u0103 munca, dar serviciul este apoi \u0219ters<\/em> \u2013 este folosit o singur\u0103 dat\u0103 pentru a rula comanda \u0219i apoi dispare! Un angajat \u00een domeniul securit\u0103\u021bii informa\u021biei care observ\u0103 ma\u0219ina victimei nu va putea descoperi nimic evident <\/em>indicatoare de atac: nu exist\u0103 fi\u0219iere executabile mali\u021bioase, nu se instaleaz\u0103 servicii persistente \u0219i nu exist\u0103 dovezi ale utiliz\u0103rii RPC, deoarece SMB este singurul mijloc de transmitere a datelor. Genial!<\/p>\n

Din partea atacatorului, exist\u0103 un \u00abpseudo-shell\u00bb cu \u00eent\u00e2rzieri \u00eentre trimiterea unei comenzi \u0219i primirea unui r\u0103spuns. Dar acest lucru este suficient pentru ca un atacator \u2013 fie un insider, fie un hacker extern care are deja un teren de desf\u0103\u0219urare \u2013 s\u0103 \u00eenceap\u0103 c\u0103utarea unui con\u021binut interesant.<\/p>\n

\"Spargerea
\n
\nPentru a retransmite datele de la ma\u0219ina \u021bint\u0103 la ma\u0219ina atacatorului, se folose\u0219te smbclient<\/a><\/noindex>. Da, este aceea\u0219i Samba utilitate<\/a><\/noindex>, dar reprogramat\u0103 sub script Python de c\u0103tre Impacket. De fapt, smbclient v\u0103 permite s\u0103 organiza\u021bi \u00een mod discret transferul FTP peste SMB.<\/p>\n

S\u0103 facem un pas \u00eenapoi \u0219i s\u0103 ne g\u00e2ndim la ce ar putea \u00eensemna asta pentru un angajat. \u00cen scenariul meu fictiv, s\u0103 spunem c\u0103 unui blogger, unui analist financiar sau unui consultant de securitate bine pl\u0103tit i se permite s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 un laptop personal pentru munc\u0103. Ca urmare a unui anumit proces magic, se sup\u0103r\u0103 pe companie \u0219i \u00abse las\u0103 dus\u0103 de val\u00bb. \u00cen func\u021bie de sistemul de operare al laptopului, folose\u0219te fie versiunea Python de la Impact, fie versiunea Windows smbexec sau smbclient sub form\u0103 de fi\u0219ier .exe.<\/p>\n

Ca \u0219i Snowden, afl\u0103 parola unui alt utilizator fie spion\u00e2nd-o pe furi\u0219, fie av\u00e2nd noroc \u0219i d\u00e2ndu-se peste un fi\u0219ier text cu parola. \u0218i cu aceste date de acreditive, \u00eencepe s\u0103 sape \u00een sistem la un nou nivel de privilegii. <\/p>\n

Spargerea DCC: nu avem nevoie de niciun \u00abinstrument stupid\u00bb Mimikatz<\/h2>\n

\n\u00cen post\u0103rile mele anterioare despre pentesting, am folosit foarte des mimikatz. Este un instrument minunat pentru interceptarea acreditivelor \u2013 hash-uri NTLM \u0219i chiar parole \u00een clar, ascunse \u00een interiorul laptopurilor, a\u0219tept\u00e2nd s\u0103 fie folosite.
\nTimpii s-au schimbat. Instrumentele de monitorizare s-au \u00eembun\u0103t\u0103\u021bit \u00een detectarea \u0219i blocarea mimikatz. Administra\u021biile de securitate informa\u021bional\u0103 au, de asemenea, un num\u0103r mai mare de op\u021biuni pentru reducerea riscurilor asociate atacurilor de tip \u00abpass the hash\u00bb (PtH).
\nDeci, ce ar trebui s\u0103 fac\u0103 un angajat inteligent pentru a aduna acreditive suplimentare f\u0103r\u0103 a folosi mimikatz?<\/p>\n

Pachetul de la Impacket include o utilitate denumit\u0103 secretsdump<\/a><\/noindex>, care extrage datele de autentificare din cache-ul Domain Credential Cache, sau pe scurt DCC. Din c\u00e2te \u00een\u021beleg, dac\u0103 un utilizator de domeniu se conecteaz\u0103 la server, dar controlerul de domeniu nu este disponibil, DCC permite serverului s\u0103 autentifice utilizatorul. Oricum, secretsdump v\u0103 permite s\u0103 extrage\u021bi toate aceste hash-uri, dac\u0103 sunt disponibile.<\/p>\n

Hash-urile DCC sunt nu hash-uri NTML <\/em> \u0219i ai lor nu pot fi folosite pentru un atac PtH<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Ei bine, pute\u021bi \u00eencerca s\u0103 le sparge\u021bi pentru a ob\u021bine parola original\u0103. Cu toate acestea, Microsoft a devenit mai inteligent\u0103 \u00een ceea ce prive\u0219te DCC \u0219i spargerea hash-urilor DCC a devenit extrem de dificil\u0103. Da, exist\u0103 hashcat<\/a><\/noindex>, \u00abcel mai rapid generator de parole din lume\u00bb, dar necesit\u0103 un GPU pentru a func\u021biona eficient.<\/p>\n

\u00cen schimb, s\u0103 \u00eencerc\u0103m s\u0103 g\u00e2ndim ca Snowden. Un angajat poate realiza inginerie social\u0103 fa\u021b\u0103 \u00een fa\u021b\u0103 \u0219i, posibil, s\u0103 afle informa\u021bii despre persoana al c\u0103rei parol\u0103 dore\u0219te s\u0103 o sparg\u0103. De exemplu, s\u0103 afle dac\u0103 contul online al acestei persoane a fost vreodat\u0103 spart \u0219i s\u0103 analizeze parola \u00een clar pentru orice sugestii. <\/p>\n

\u0218i acesta este scenariul pe care am decis s\u0103 urmez. S\u0103 presupunem c\u0103 un insider a aflat c\u0103 \u0219eful s\u0103u, Cruella, a fost spart de mai multe ori pe diferite site-uri web. Dup\u0103 analiza mai multor astfel de parole, el \u00ee\u0219i d\u0103 seama c\u0103 Cruella prefer\u0103 s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 formatul numelui echipei de baseball \u00abYankees\u00bb urmat de anul curent \u2013 \u00abYankees2015\u00bb.<\/p>\n

Dac\u0103 \u00eencerci acum s\u0103 reproduci asta acas\u0103, po\u021bi desc\u0103rca un mic \u00abC\u00bb cod<\/a><\/noindex>, care implementeaz\u0103 algoritmul de hashing DCC, \u0219i \u00eel po\u021bi compila. John the Ripper<\/a><\/noindex>, apropo, a ad\u0103ugat suport pentru DCC, a\u0219a c\u0103 poate fi, de asemenea, folosit. S\u0103 presupunem c\u0103 insider-ul nu vrea s\u0103 se ocupe de studierea John the Ripper \u0219i \u00eei place s\u0103 ruleze \u00abgcc\u00bb pe codul C \u00eenvechit.<\/p>\n

\u00cenf\u0103\u021bi\u0219\u00e2nd rolul insider-ului, am rulat mai multe combina\u021bii diferite \u0219i, \u00een cele din urm\u0103, am reu\u0219it s\u0103 descop\u0103r c\u0103 parola lui Cruella este \u00abYankees2019\u00bb (vezi mai jos). Misiune \u00eendeplinit\u0103!<\/p>\n

\"Spargerea<\/p>\n

Pu\u021bin\u0103 inginerie social\u0103, o f\u0103r\u00e2m\u0103 de ghicit \u0219i un praf de Maltego \u2013 \u0219i deja e\u0219ti pe calea de a sparge hash-ul DCC.<\/em><\/p>\n

Propun s\u0103 \u00eencheiem aici. Ne vom \u00eentoarce la aceast\u0103 problem\u0103 \u00een alte publica\u021bii \u0219i vom explora \u0219i alte metode de atac lente \u0219i ascunse, continu\u00e2nd s\u0103 ne baz\u0103m pe un set minunat de utilitare de la Impacket.
\n
Sursa: habr.com<\/a> <\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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