RATKing: olole cusub oo wata Trojans-ka gelitaanka fog

Dhammaadkii Maajo, waxaanu ogaanay olole lagu qaybinayo Helitaanka Fog ee Trojan (RAT) malware-barnaamijyo u oggolaanaya weeraryahannada inay meel fog ka xakameeyaan nidaamka cudurka qaba.

Kooxda aan baarnay waxaa lagu kala saaray xaqiiqda ah inaysan u dooran qoys RAT gaar ah oo cudurka ah. Dhowr Trojans ayaa lagu arkay weerarrada ololaha dhexdiisa (dhammaantood si ballaaran ayaa loo heli karaa). Iyada oo qaabkan, kooxdu waxay na xasuusisay boqorka jiirka - xayawaan khayaali ah oo ka kooban jiirka oo leh dabo isku xiran.

Asal ahaan waxaa laga soo qaatay hal-abuurka KN Rossikov "Jiirka iyo jiirka-u eg-jiirka, dhaqaalaha ugu muhiimsan" (1908)

Anagoo sharaf u ah makhluuqan, waxaan u magacownay kooxda aan tixgelineyno RATKing. Maqaalkan, waxaan si faahfaahsan ugu faah faahin doonaa sida ay weeraryahanadu u fuliyeen weerarka, agabkii ay adeegsadeen, sidoo kale waxaan wadaagi doonaa fikradahayaga ku saabsan sababta loo yeelay ololahan.

Horumarka weerarka

Dhammaan weerarrada ololahan waxay u dhaceen si waafaqsan algorithm-ka soo socda:

1. Isticmaaluhu waxa uu helay iimaylka phishing-ka oo leh xidhiidhinta Google Drive.
2. Isticmaalka isku xirka, dhibbanuhu wuxuu soo dejiyey qoraal VBS xaasidnimo leh kaasoo qeexaya maktabada DLL si uu ugu shubo culeyska ugu dambeeya ee diiwaanka Windows wuxuuna bilaabay PowerShell si uu u fuliyo.
3. Maktabada DLL waxay durtay culayska ugu dambeeya - dhab ahaantii, mid ka mid ah RAT-yada ay isticmaalaan weeraryahanadu - nidaamka nidaamka waxayna ka diwaangaliyeen qoraalka VBS ee autorun si ay u helaan meel mashiinnada cudurka qaba.
4. Culayska ugu dambeeya waxa lagu fuliyay hab nidaam oo waxa uu siiyay weerarka awood uu ku xakameeyo kombuyuutarka cudurka qaba.

Nidaam ahaan waxa loo matali karaa sidan:

Marka xigta, waxaan diiradda saari doonaa saddexda marxaladood ee ugu horreeya, maadaama aan xiisayneyno habka gaarsiinta malware. Si faahfaahsan uma sharaxi doono habka uu u shaqeeyo malware laftiisa. Si weyn ayaa loo heli karaa - ama waxaa lagu iibiyaa golayaasha gaarka ah, ama xitaa waxaa loo qaybiyaa mashruucyo il furan - oo sidaas darteed maaha kuwo u gaar ah kooxda RATKing.

Falanqaynta marxaladaha weerarka

Marxaladda 1. iimaylka phishingka

Weerarku wuxuu ku billowday dhibbanaha oo helay warqad xaasidnimo ah (Weerarayaashu waxay adeegsadeen habab kala duwan oo qoraal ah; sawirka hoose wuxuu muujinayaa hal tusaale). Fariinta ayaa ka koobneyd xiriirinta kaydka sharciga ah drive.google.com, kaas oo loo malaynayo inuu horseeday bogga soo dejinta dukumeenti PDF.

Tusaalaha iimaylka phishing

Si kastaba ha ahaatee, dhab ahaantii, ma ahayn dukumeenti PDF ah oo gebi ahaanba la raray, laakiin qoraal VBS ah.

Markaad gujiso isku xirka emaylka ee shaashadda kore, faylka la magacaabay Cargo Flight Details.vbs. Xaaladdan oo kale, weeraryahanadu xitaa iskuma dayin in ay qariyaan faylka sidii dukumeenti sharci ah.

Isla mar ahaantaana, iyada oo qayb ka ah ololahan, waxaan helnay qoraal la magac baxay Cargo Trip Detail.pdf.vbs. Waxay mar hore u gudbi kartaa PDF sharci ah sababtoo ah Windows waxay qarinaysaa kordhinta faylka si caadi ah. Run, kiiskan, shaki ayaa weli laga yaabaa inay kiciso astaanta, taas oo u dhiganta qoraalka VBS.

Marxaladdan, dhibbanuhu wuxuu aqoonsan karaa khiyaanada: kaliya u fiirso faylalka la soo dejiyay hal ilbiriqsi. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, ololayaasha phishing-ka ee noocaas ah, weerarradu waxay inta badan ku tiirsan yihiin isticmaale aan fiiro lahayn ama degdeg ah.

Marxaladda 2. Hawlgalka qoraalka VBS

Qoraalka VBS, oo isticmaaluhu si badheedh ah u furi karo, wuxuu ka diiwaan gashaday maktabada DLL gudaha diiwaanka Windows. Qoraalku waa la qariyey: xariiqyada ku dhex jira waxa loo qoray sidii bytes oo ay kala sooceen dabeecad aan caadi ahayn.

Tusaalaha qoraalka qarsoon

Algorithm-ka furfurista waa wax fudud: xaraf kasta oo saddexaad ayaa laga saaray xargaha daahsoon, ka dib natiijadii waxaa laga soo saaray base16 oo la geliyay xarriiqii asalka ahaa. Tusaale ahaan, laga bilaabo qiimaha 57Q53s63t72s69J70r74e2El53v68m65j6CH6Ct (oo lagu iftiimiyay sawirka kore) khadka natiijadu wuxuu ahaa WScript.Shell.

Si aan u kala saarno xargaha, waxaan isticmaalnay shaqada Python:

def decode_str(data_enc):   
    return binascii.unhexlify(''.join([data_enc[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(data_enc), 3)]))

Hoosta, sadarrada 9-10, waxaynu ku muujinaynaa qiimaha faqriddiisu ay keentay faylka DLL. Wuxuu ahaa kii lagu bilaabay marxaladda xigta isagoo isticmaalaya PowerShell.

Xarig leh DLL daboolan

Hawl kasta oo ku jirta qoraalka VBS waa la fuliyay iyadoo xargaha la furfuray.

Kadib socodsiinta qoraalka, shaqada ayaa la wacay wscript.sleep - waxa loo adeegsaday fulinta fulinta dib loo dhigay.

Marka xigta, qoraalku wuxuu la shaqeeyay diiwaanka Windows. Waxa uu tan u isticmaalay farsamada WMI. Caawinteeda, fure gaar ah ayaa la sameeyay, iyo jirka faylka la fulin karo ayaa lagu qoray cabbirkiisa. Diiwaanka waxaa laga galay WMI iyadoo la adeegsanayo amarka soo socda:

GetObject(winmgmts {impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\.rootdefault:StdRegProv)

Gelitaanka lagu sameeyay diiwaanka ee qoraalka VBS

Marxaladda 3. Hawlgalka maktabadda DLL

Marxaladda saddexaad, DLL-ga xaasidka ah ayaa soo shubay culayskii ugu dambeeyay, waxa uu ku duray habka nidaamka, oo uu hubiyay in qoraalka VBS uu si toos ah u bilaabmay markii isticmaaluhu soo galo.

Ku socodsii PowerShell

DLL waxaa lagu fuliyay iyadoo la adeegsanayo amarka soo socda ee PowerShell:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Amarkani wuxuu sameeyay sidan soo socota:

• helay xogta qiimaha diiwaanka oo leh magac rnd_value_name - xogtani waxay ahayd fayl DLL ah oo ku qoran madal Net;
• ku shubtay moduleka Net-ka soo baxay ee xusuusta habka powershell.exe iyadoo la isticmaalayo shaqada [System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load() (Sharaxaad faahfaahsan oo ku saabsan shaqada Load() laga heli karo degelka Microsoft);
• qabtay shaqada GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK() - fulinta maktabadda DLL waxay ku bilaabatay iyada - oo leh cabbirro vbsScriptPath, xorKey, vbsScriptName. Halbeegga xorKey lagu kaydiyay furaha si loo furfuro culayska ugu dambeeya, iyo cabirrada vbsScriptPath и vbsScriptName waxaa loo wareejiyay si loo diiwaan geliyo qoraalka VBS ee autorun.

Sharaxaada maktabadda DLL

Qaabkii burburay, bootloader-ku wuxuu u ekaa sidan:

Soodejiye qaab jajaban (shaqada ay ku bilaabatay fulinta maktabadda DLL waxay hoosta ka xariiqday casaan)

Bootloaderka waxaa ilaalinaya .Net Reactor ilaaliyaha. Utility de4dot wuxuu qabtaa shaqo aad u fiican oo meesha ka saaraysa ilaaliyahan.

Raadiyahan:

• ku duray culayska nidaamka nidaamka (tusaale ahaan it svchost.exe);
• Waxaan ku daray qoraalka VBS autorun.

Mushahar bixinta duritaan

Aynu eegno shaqada uu farta PowerShell ugu yeedhay.

Shaqada loo yaqaan qoraalka PowerShell

Shaqadani waxay samaysay falalka soo socda:

• decrypted laba qaybood oo xog ah (array и array2 ee shaashadda). Markii hore waa la isku cadeeyey iyadoo la adeegsanayo gzip waxaana lagu sireeyay XOR algorithm oo leh furaha xorKey;
• la koobiyay xogta meelaha xusuusta ee loo qoondeeyay. Xogta laga helay array - aagga xusuusta lagu tilmaamay intPtr (payload pointer ee shaashadda); xogta laga helay array2 - aagga xusuusta lagu tilmaamay intPtr2 (shellcode pointer ee shaashadda);
• loo yaqaan shaqada CallWindowProcA (sharaxaad Shaqadan waxaa laga heli karaa bogga Microsoft) oo leh halbeegyada soo socda (magacyada halbeegyada ayaa hoos ku taxan, sawirka shaashadda waxay u kala horreeyaan, laakiin leh qiyam shaqo):
  • lpPrevWndFunc - tilmaame xogta ka array2;
  • hWnd - tilmaame xadhig ka kooban dariiqa loo maro faylka la fulin karo svchost.exe;
  • Msg - tilmaame xogta ka array;
  • wParam, lParam - xuduudaha fariinta (xaaladdan, xuduudahan lama isticmaalin oo waxay lahaayeen qiimaha 0);
• abuuray fayl %AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup<name>.urlhalkaas oo <name> - kuwani waa 4-ta xaraf ee ugu horreeya ee cabbirka vbsScriptName (screenshot, jajabka koodka ee ficilkan wuxuu ku bilaabmayaa amarka File.Copy). Sidan oo kale, malware-ku wuxuu ku daray faylka URL liiska faylalka autorun markii isticmaaluhu soo galo oo uu sidaas ku xidho kombuyutarka cudurka qaba. Faylka URL wuxuu ka kooban yahay xiriirinta qoraalka:

[InternetShortcut]
URL = file : ///<vbsScriptPath>

Si aan u fahamno sida duritaanku loo fuliyay, waxaanu fur-furnay hab-dhismeedka xogta array и array2. Si tan loo sameeyo waxaan isticmaalnay shaqada Python ee soo socota:

def decrypt(data, key):
    return gzip.decompress(
        bytearray([data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)] for i in range(len(data))])[4:])
    

Natiijo ahaan, waxaan ogaanay in:

• array wuxuu ahaa faylka PE - kani waa culayska ugu dambeeya;
• array2 wuxuu ahaa shellcode loo baahan yahay si loo fuliyo duritaanka.

Shellcode ka soo diyaarsan array2 u gudubtay qiime shaqo ahaan lpPrevWndFunc galay shaqo CallWindowProcA. lpPrevWndFunc - Shaqada dib-u-soo-celinta, noociisu wuxuu u eg yahay sidan:

LRESULT WndFunc(
  HWND    hWnd,
  UINT    Msg,
  WPARAM  wParam,
  LPARAM  lParam
);

Markaa marka aad socodsiiso shaqada CallWindowProcA oo leh xuduudo hWnd, Msg, wParam, lParam Shellcode ka soo diyaarinta waa la fuliyay array2 doodo leh hWnd и Msg. hWnd waa tilmaanta xadhig ka kooban dariiqa loo maro faylka la fulin karo svchost.exeiyo Msg - tilmaanta culayska ugu dambeeya.

Shellcode wuxuu ka helay ciwaannada shaqada kernel32.dll и ntdll32.dll oo ku salaysan qiyamka xashiishka ee magacyadooda oo lagu duray culayska ugu dambeeya ee xusuusta habka svchost.exeiyadoo la adeegsanayo farsamada Goynta Geedi socodka (wax badan oo ku saabsan arrintan ayaad ka akhrisan kartaa maqaal). Marka la durayo shellcode:

• hannaan abuuray svchost.exe xaalad la hakiyey iyadoo la adeegsanayo shaqada CreateProcessW;
• dabadeed ku qari muuqaalka qaybta meesha ciwaanka ee hawsha svchost.exe iyadoo la isticmaalayo shaqada NtUnmapViewOfSection. Sidaa darteed, barnaamijku wuxuu xoreeyay xusuusta habka asalka ah svchost.exesi markaa loo qoondeeyo xusuusta culayska ciwaanka;
• xusuusta loo qoondeeyay culeyska culeyska ee goobta cinwaanka habka svchost.exe iyadoo la isticmaalayo shaqada VirtualAllocEx;

Bilawga habka duritaanka

• u qoray waxa ku jira culayska culayska saaraya goobta ciwaanka habsocodka svchost.exe iyadoo la isticmaalayo shaqada WriteProcessMemory (sida ku cad sawirka hoose);
• dib u bilaabay hawshii svchost.exe iyadoo la isticmaalayo shaqada ResumeThread.

Dhameystirka habka duritaanka

Malware la soo dejisan karo

Natiijadii falalka la sharraxay, mid ka mid ah dhowr malware-class RAT ayaa lagu rakibay nidaamka cudurka. Jadwalka hoose wuxuu taxayaa malware-ka loo adeegsaday weerarka, kaas oo aan si kalsooni leh ugu nisbayn karno hal koox oo weerrarayaal ah, maadaama muunadaha la helay isla amarka iyo kontoroolka server-ka.

Magaca malware-ka

Marka hore la arkay

SHA-256

C&C

Habka cirbadeynta lagu sameeyo

Madow

16-04-2020

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2017

xayiraad

Parallax

24-04-2020

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2019

xayiraad

Aagga DAGAALKA

18-05-2020

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:9933

xayiraad

Netwire

20-05-2020

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2000

xayiraad

Tusaalooyinka malware-ka la qaybiyay ee leh isla server-ka kontoroolka

Laba shay ayaa halkan xusid mudan.

Marka hore, xaqiiqda ah in weeraryahanadu ay hal mar adeegsadeen dhowr qoys oo RAT ah. Dabeecaddani maaha mid lagu yaqaan kooxaha internetka ee caanka ah, kuwaas oo inta badan isticmaala ku dhawaad ​​qalab isku mid ah oo ay yaqaaniin.

Marka labaad, RATKing waxay isticmaashay malware kaas oo ama lagu iibiyo golayaasha gaarka ah qiimo jaban, ama xitaa mashruuc il furan.

Liis aad u dhammaystiran oo malware-ka ah oo loo adeegsaday ololaha-oo leh hal digniin oo muhiim ah-ayaa lagu bixiyaa dhammaadka maqaalka.

Ku saabsan kooxda

Uma nisbayn karno ololaha xaasidnimada ah ee lagu tilmaamay weeraryahan kasta oo la yaqaan. Hadda, waxaan aaminsanahay in weeraradan ay fuliyeen koox asal ahaan cusub. Sida aan ku qornay bilowgii, waxaan ugu yeernay RATKing.

Si loo abuuro qoraalka VBS, kooxdu waxay u badan tahay inay adeegsadeen qalab la mid ah utility-ga VBS-Crypter ka horumariyaha NYAN-x-CAT. Tan waxaa lagu tilmaamay isku ekaanshaha qoraalka uu barnaamijkani ku abuurayo qoraalka weeraryahannada. Gaar ahaan, labaduba:

• fulinta dib u dhigista iyadoo la isticmaalayo hawsha Sleep;
• isticmaal WMI;
• u diwaangeli jirka faylka la fulin karo oo ah halbeeg muhiim ah oo diiwaan gelin ah;
• ku fuli faylkan adigoo isticmaalaya PowerShell meel ciwaanka u gaar ah.

Si loo caddeeyo, barbar dhig amarka PowerShell si aad faylka uga socodsiiso diiwaanka, kaas oo loo isticmaalo qoraal la sameeyay iyadoo la adeegsanayo VBS-Crypter:

((Get-ItemPropertyHKCU:SoftwareNYANxCAT).NYANxCAT);$text=-join$text[-1..-$text.Length];[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load([Convert]::FromBase64String($text)).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null);

oo leh amar la mid ah kii ay qoreen weeraryahanadu:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Ogsoonow in weerarradu ay adeegsadeen adeeg kale oo ka yimid NYAN-x-CAT mid ka mid ah xamuulka - LimeRAT.

Cinwaanada adeegayaasha C&C waxay muujinayaan sifo kale oo gaar ah oo RATKing ah: kooxdu waxay door bidaan adeegyada DNS firfircoon (eeg liiska C&C ee miiska IoC).

IoC

Jadwalka hoose wuxuu bixiyaa liis dhammaystiran oo qoraallada VBS ah oo ay u badan tahay in loo aanayn karo ololaha la sharraxay. Dhammaan qoraalladani waa isku mid oo waxay qabtaan ku dhawaad ​​isku taxane fal. Dhammaantood waxay ku duraan fasalka RAT malware nidaamka Windows ee la aamini karo. Dhammaantood waxay leeyihiin ciwaannada C&C ee ka diiwaan gashan adeegyada DNS Dynamic.

Si kastaba ha ahaatee, ma sheegan karno in dhammaan qoraalladan ay qaybiyeen isla weeraryahano, marka laga reebo muunado leh ciwaan C&C isku mid ah (tusaale, kimjoy007.dyndns.org).

Magaca malware-ka

SHA-256

C&C

Habka cirbadeynta lagu sameeyo

Parallax

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

00edb8200dfeee3bdd0086c5e8e07c6056d322df913679a9f22a2b00b836fd72

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

504cbae901c4b3987aa9ba458a230944cb8bd96bbf778ceb54c773b781346146

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

1487017e087b75ad930baa8b017e8388d1e99c75d26b5d1deec8b80e9333f189

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

c4160ec3c8ad01539f1c16fb35ed9c8c5a53a8fda8877f0d5e044241ea805891

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

515249d6813bb2dde1723d35ee8eb6eeb8775014ca629ede017c3d83a77634ce

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

1b70f6fee760bcfe0c457f0a85ca451ed66e61f0e340d830f382c5d2f7ab803f

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

b2bdffa5853f29c881d7d9bff91b640bc1c90e996f85406be3b36b2500f61aa1

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

c9745a8f33b3841fe7bfafd21ad4678d46fe6ea6125a8fedfcd2d5aee13f1601

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

1dfc66968527fbd4c0df2ea34c577a7ce7a2ba9b54ba00be62120cc88035fa65

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

c6c05f21e16e488eed3001d0d9dd9c49366779559ad77fcd233de15b1773c981

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

cmd

3b785cdcd69a96902ee62499c25138a70e81f14b6b989a2f81d82239a19a3aed

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

4d71ceb9d6c53ac356c0f5bdfd1a5b28981061be87e38e077ee3a419e4c476f9

2004para.ddns.net

xayiraad

00185cc085f284ece264e3263c7771073a65783c250c5fd9afc7a85ed94acc77

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

0342107c0d2a069100e87ef5415e90fd86b1b1b1c975d0eb04ab1489e198fc78

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

de33b7a7b059599dc62337f92ceba644ac7b09f60d06324ecf6177fff06b8d10

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

80a8114d63606e225e620c64ad8e28c9996caaa9a9e87dd602c8f920c2197007

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

acb157ba5a48631e1f9f269e6282f042666098614b66129224d213e27c1149bb

rajo.doomdns.org

cmd

bf608318018dc10016b438f851aab719ea0abe6afc166c8aea6b04f2320896d3

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

4d0c9b8ad097d35b447d715a815c67ff3d78638b305776cde4d90bfdcb368e38

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

e7c676f5be41d49296454cd6e4280d89e37f506d84d57b22f0be0d87625568ba

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

9375d54fcda9c7d65f861dfda698e25710fda75b5ebfc7a238599f4b0d34205f

franco20.dvrdns.org

xayiraad

128367797fdf3c952831c2472f7a308f345ca04aa67b3f82b945cfea2ae11ce5

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

09bd720880461cb6e996046c7d6a1c937aa1c99bd19582a562053782600da79d

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

0a176164d2e1d5e2288881cc2e2d88800801001d03caedd524db365513e11276

paradickhead.homeip.net

xayiraad

0af5194950187fd7cbd75b1b39aab6e1e78dae7c216d08512755849c6a0d1cbe

rajo.doomdns.org

xayiraad

warsoone

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

db0d5a67a0ced6b2de3ee7d7fc845a34b9d6ca608e5fead7f16c9a640fa659eb

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

Netwire

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

Madow

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

xayiraad

WSH RAT

d410ced15c848825dcf75d30808cde7784e5b208f9a57b0896e828f890faea0e

anekesolution.linkpc.net

RegAsm

Lime

896604d27d88c75a475b28e88e54104e66f480bcab89cc75b6cdc6b29f8e438b

softmy.duckdns.org

RegAsm

QuasarRAT

bd1e29e9d17edbab41c3634649da5c5d20375f055ccf968c022811cd9624be57

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

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Source: www.habr.com