{"id":119725,"date":"2024-09-06T15:43:01","date_gmt":"2024-09-06T13:43:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/ataka-eucleak-pozvolyayushhaya-klonirovat-yubikey-5-i-drugie-klyuchi-na-chipah-infineon"},"modified":"2024-09-06T15:43:01","modified_gmt":"2024-09-06T13:43:02","slug":"ataka-eucleak-pozvolyayushhaya-klonirovat-yubikey-5-i-drugie-klyuchi-na-chipah-infineon","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/novosti-interneta\/ataka-eucleak-pozvolyayushhaya-klonirovat-yubikey-5-i-drugie-klyuchi-na-chipah-infineon","title":{"rendered":"Sulmi EUCLEAK, i cili lejon klonimin e YubiKey 5 dhe \u00e7el\u00ebsa t\u00eb tjer\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7ipat Infineon","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

K\u00ebrkuesit e siguris\u00eb nga kompania NinjaLab kan\u00eb zhvilluar nj\u00eb teknik\u00eb sulmi p\u00ebrmes kanaleve an\u00ebsore, q\u00eb lejon klonimin e \u00e7el\u00ebsave ECDSA, t\u00eb ruajtur n\u00eb tokenat kriptografik\u00eb YubiKey 5 dhe pajisje t\u00eb tjera q\u00eb p\u00ebrdorin bibliotek\u00ebn kriptografike t\u00eb kompanis\u00eb Infineon. Sulmi ka marr\u00eb emrin kodor EUCLEAK dhe, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 tokenave me \u00e7ipat Infineon SLE78, si\u00e7 \u00ebsht\u00eb YubiKey 5, mund t\u00eb aplikohet p\u00ebr shum\u00eb sisteme t\u00eb tjera me mikrocontroller\u00eb t\u00eb kompanis\u00eb Infineon, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb \u00e7ipat Infineon Optiga Trust M dhe Infineon Optiga TPM. <\/p>\n

Mund\u00ebsia e kryerjes s\u00eb sulmit \u00ebsht\u00eb konfirmuar praktikisht p\u00ebr \u00e7el\u00ebsat YubiKey 5Ci dhe TPM n\u00eb \u00e7ipat SLB96xx, nd\u00ebrsa p\u00ebr pajisje t\u00eb tjera ka natyr\u00eb teorike. N\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsat YubiKey 5, dob\u00ebsia \u00ebsht\u00eb eliminuar n\u00eb versionin e firmware 5.7, p\u00ebrmes z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimit t\u00eb bibliotek\u00ebs kriptografike (korrigjimi \u00ebsht\u00eb i aplikuesh\u00ebm vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr pajisje t\u00eb reja, pasi n\u00eb pajisjet e l\u00ebshuara m\u00eb par\u00eb YubiKey nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb parashikuar mund\u00ebsia e p\u00ebrdit\u00ebsimit t\u00eb firmware). P\u00ebr bibliotek\u00ebn Infineon jan\u00eb zhvilluar bllokues t\u00eb dob\u00ebsive, por ato ende nuk jan\u00eb aktivizuar pasi nuk kan\u00eb kaluar certifikimin. <\/p>\n

P\u00ebrve\u00e7 \u00e7el\u00ebsave YubiKey 5, problemi potencialisht prek \u00e7ipat TPM (Trusted Platform Module) t\u00eb laptop\u00ebve Lenovo, Dell dhe HP, enclave t\u00eb izoluara t\u00eb smartphone-ve Samsung dhe OnePlus, portofolat kriptografik\u00eb harduerik\u00eb, smart kartat, SIM kartat dhe EMV \u00e7ipat e kartave bankare, si dhe \u00e7ipat e pasaportave elektronike q\u00eb p\u00ebrdoren n\u00eb Kin\u00eb, Indi, Brazil, SHBA dhe disa vende t\u00eb tjera aziatike dhe evropiane. <\/p>\n

Rreziku i klonimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave kompensohet nga kushtet dhe kompleksiteti i kryerjes s\u00eb sulmit \u2014 sulmuesi duhet t\u00eb ket\u00eb qasje fizike n\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebs dhe t\u00eb \u00e7montoj\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsin, duke u liruar nga trupi plastik dhe mb\u00ebshtjellja e ekranit. Pas nj\u00eb manipulimi t\u00eb till\u00eb, trupi mund t\u00eb rinovohet me nj\u00eb printer 3D, por ta b\u00ebsh t\u00eb padukshme manipulimin me \u00e7el\u00ebsin \u00ebsht\u00eb mjaft e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb. Skanimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsit zgjat disa minuta, por rreth nj\u00eb or\u00eb nevojitet p\u00ebr \u00e7montimin e kujdessh\u00ebm dhe krijimin e nj\u00eb trupi t\u00eb ri. Pas skanimit, pajisja mund t\u2019i kthehet pronarit, por p\u00ebr t\u00eb rikrijuar \u00e7el\u00ebsin e mbyllur ECDSA mbi baz\u00ebn e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb marra, nevojiten edhe rreth 24 or\u00eb llogaritje (theksohet se procesi mund t\u00eb reduktohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb or\u00eb, duke automatizuar operacionet manuale dhe duke b\u00ebr\u00eb optimizime).

\"Sulmi<\/center> <\/p>\n

P\u00ebrve\u00e7 aksesit fizik n\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebs, p\u00ebr kryerjen e suksesshme t\u00eb sulmeve n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimet me autentifikim t\u00eb shum\u00ebfisht\u00eb, keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsi p\u00ebrve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj duhet ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb t\u00eb dij\u00eb emrin e p\u00ebrdoruesit dhe fjal\u00ebkalimin p\u00ebr sh\u00ebrbimin, p\u00ebr autentifikimin e shtuar t\u00eb cilit p\u00ebrdoret \u00e7el\u00ebsi harduerik i marr\u00eb, dhe n\u00eb rastin e p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb autentifikimit pa fjal\u00ebkalim n\u00eb modet FIDO2 Passwordless ose Passkey, \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme t\u00eb riprodhohet nj\u00eb faktor unik biometrik (p.sh., gjurm\u00eb gishtash). <\/p>\n

Metoda e sulmit p\u00ebrfshin rikrijimin e \u00e7el\u00ebsave ECDSA t\u00eb ruajtur n\u00eb token mbi t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e marra p\u00ebrmes analiz\u00ebs s\u00eb sinjalit elektromagnetik, q\u00eb emetohet nga tokeni gjat\u00eb formimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimeve digjitale dhe korrelon me informacionin rreth \u00e7el\u00ebsit efemer ECDSA, informacion mjaftues p\u00ebr rikrijimin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit sekret duke p\u00ebrdorur metoda t\u00eb m\u00ebsimit makinerik. N\u00eb rastin e YubiKey, p\u00ebr t\u00eb iniciuar operacionet e n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital, nevojitet t\u00eb dihet emri i p\u00ebrdoruesit dhe fjal\u00ebkalimi n\u00eb nj\u00ebrin nga sh\u00ebrbimet, n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebt tokeni p\u00ebrdoret si nj\u00eb lidhje shtes\u00eb e autentifikimit. <\/p>\n

Problemi shkaktohet nga p\u00ebrdorimi n\u00eb bibliotek\u00ebn Infineon t\u00eb nj\u00eb algoritmi t\u00eb pasigurt p\u00ebr llogaritjen e elementit inverse modulo, llogaritjen e t\u00eb cil\u00ebs z\u00eb nj\u00eb koh\u00eb q\u00eb varet nga vlerat e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave hyr\u00ebse (p\u00ebr vektore t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm v\u00ebrehet nj\u00eb koh\u00eb e ndryshme llogaritjeje e elementit inverse modulo). Nj\u00eb tipar i till\u00eb lejon, p\u00ebrmes analiz\u00ebs s\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshimeve t\u00eb sinjalit, t\u00eb nxirren informacionet p\u00ebr bita t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb gjat\u00eb ekzekutimit t\u00eb operacioneve me vektorin e inicializimit. N\u00eb rastin e ECDSA, p\u00ebrcaktimi edhe i disa biteve q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb informacionin p\u00ebr vektorin e inicializimit (nonce) \u00ebsht\u00eb i mjaftuesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer nj\u00eb sulm t\u00eb rind\u00ebrtimit sekuencial t\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit sekret. P\u00ebr t\u00eb rikrijuar me sukses \u00e7el\u00ebsin, \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme kapja e aktiviteteve gjat\u00eb gjenerimit t\u00eb rreth 40 n\u00ebnshkrimeve digjitale. <\/p>\n

P\u00ebr analizimin e emetimit elektromagnetik gjat\u00eb gjenerimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimeve digjitale, k\u00ebrkohet pajisje profesionale, me kosto mbi 10,000 dollar\u00eb. P\u00ebr shembull, n\u00eb procesin e sulmit, k\u00ebrkuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn nj\u00eb kompleks masash Langer ICR HH 500-6 ($2300), i p\u00ebrdorur p\u00ebr testimin e mikro\u00e7ipit p\u00ebr p\u00ebrputhshm\u00ebrin\u00eb elektromagnetike, nj\u00eb amplifikues Langer BT 706, mikromanipulator Thorlabs PT3\/M ($1000) me rezolucion 10 \u03bcm, nj\u00eb mikroskop digjital Dino-Lite AM4113TL ($450) dhe nj\u00eb osciloskop me kat\u00ebr kanale PicoScope 6424E ($7500) me rezolucion 8-bit ADC.

\"Sulmi<\/center> <\/p>\n

Skema e sulmit ndaj tokeneve YubiKey 5 p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet nga hapat e m\u00ebposht\u00ebm: <\/p>\n