{"id":31627,"date":"2019-10-31T21:42:14","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:42:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T21:42:14","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:42:14","slug":"informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz","title":{"rendered":"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/\"><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/acac26db4761c25a5215f37ef9e8cb5b.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><\/a><\/noindex><br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#ABOUT\">\u00c7far\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb studimi<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<p><b class=\"spoiler_title\">Lidhjet me pjes\u00eb t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb studimit<\/b><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/344740\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 1 \u2014 Bazat ekonomike.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/345194\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 2 \u2014 Infrastruktur\u00eb IT tipike e bank\u00ebs.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/350852\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 3 \u2014 Formimi i k\u00ebrkesave p\u00ebr sistemin e mbrojtjes.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/351326\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 4 \u2014 Njohja e standardeve p\u00ebr modelimin e k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/413703\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 5 \u2014 100+ lidhje tematike rreth sulmeve n\u00eb banka.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/419027\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 6 \u2014 Analiza e krimeve bankare.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/421161\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 7 \u2014 Modeli baz\u00eb i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/\">Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve <\/a><\/noindex>(<b>Ju jeni k\u00ebtu<\/b>)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Ky artikull p\u00ebrfundon ciklin e publikimeve bardh\u00eb e zi q\u00eb fokusohet n\u00eb sigurimin e siguris\u00eb informative p\u00ebr pagesat bankare pa para. K\u00ebtu ne do t\u00eb shqyrtojm\u00eb modelet tipike t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilat u referuam n\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/421161\/\">modelin baz\u00eb<\/a><\/noindex>:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNC\">Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Lidhja rrjetore<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUIS\">Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi informacionit i nd\u00ebrtuar mbi arkitektur\u00ebn klient-server<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSRD\">Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i kontrollit t\u00eb aksesit<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUMI\">Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Moduli i integrimit<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<li><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZI\">Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb informacioneve.<\/a><\/noindex><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<blockquote><p><b>HABRO-WARNING !!!<\/b> T\u00eb dashur habrov\u00e7an\u00eb, ky nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb postim arg\u00ebtues. <br \/>\nMaterialet e fshehura n\u00ebn katin 40+ faqe jan\u00eb th\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb <b>ndihmuar n\u00eb pun\u00eb ose studim<\/b> personat q\u00eb specializohen n\u00eb bankari ose sigurimin e siguris\u00eb informative. K\u00ebto materiale jan\u00eb produkti p\u00ebrfundimtar i studimit dhe jan\u00eb shkruar n\u00eb nj\u00eb ton t\u00eb zymt\u00eb zyrtar. N\u00eb thelb, k\u00ebto jan\u00eb skema p\u00ebr dokumente t\u00eb brendshme mbi Sigurimin e Informacionit. <\/p>\n<p>Dhe tradicionale \u2014 <b>\u00abp\u00ebrdorimi i informacioneve nga ky artikull p\u00ebr q\u00ebllime t\u00eb paligjshme \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me ligjin\u00bb<\/b>. Lexim produktiv!\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"habracut\"><\/a><\/noindex><br \/>\nInformata p\u00ebr lexuesit q\u00eb po njihen me studimin, duke filluar nga kjo publikim.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"ABOUT\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<h2>\u00c7far\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb studimi<\/h2>\n<p>\nPo lexoni nj\u00eb udh\u00ebzim p\u00ebr specialistin e p\u00ebrgjegjsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr sigurimin e siguris\u00eb informative p\u00ebr pagesat n\u00eb bank\u00eb. <\/p>\n<p><b>Logjika e p\u00ebrshkrimit<\/b><\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb fillim n\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/344740\/\">pjesa 1<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/345194\/\">pjesa 2<\/a><\/noindex> ndodhet nj\u00eb p\u00ebrshkrim i objektit t\u00eb mbrojtjes. Pastaj n\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/350852\/\">pjes\u00ebn 3<\/a><\/noindex> tregohet se si t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtoni sistemin e mbrojtjes, dhe flitet p\u00ebr nevoj\u00ebn e formimit t\u00eb modelit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. N\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/351326\/\">pjes\u00ebn 4<\/a><\/noindex> tregohet se cilat modele k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimesh ekzistojn\u00eb dhe si formohen ato. N\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/413703\/\">pjes\u00ebn 5<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/419027\/\">pjes\u00ebn 6<\/a><\/noindex> jepen analiza t\u00eb sulmeve reale. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/421161\/\">Pjesa 7<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/\">pjesa 8<\/a><\/noindex> p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb p\u00ebrshkrimin e modelit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve, t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar duke marr\u00eb parasysh informacionet nga t\u00eb gjitha pjes\u00ebt e m\u00ebparshme.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUNC\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>MODELI TIPIK I K\u00cbRC\u00cbNIMEVE. LIDHJA RRJETORE<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Objekti i mbrojtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin aplikohet modeli i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve (scope)<\/h3>\n<p>\nObjekti i mbrojtjes jan\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat q\u00eb transmetohen p\u00ebrmes lidhjes rrjetore, q\u00eb funksionon n\u00eb rrjetet e transmetimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuara mbi baz\u00ebn e stek\u00ebs TCP\/IP.<\/p>\n<p><b>Arkitektura<\/b><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/7fec6dc479280db22a581595ae7fc493.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrshkrimi i elementeve t\u00eb arkitektur\u00ebs:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><i>\u00abPikat fundore\u00bb<\/i> \u2014 nyjet q\u00eb shk\u00ebmbejn\u00eb informacionin e mbrojtur.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abNyjet nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebs\u00bb<\/i> \u2014 element\u00ebt e rrjetit t\u00eb transmetimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave: ruter\u00ebt, switch-at, server\u00ebt e aksesi, proxy-server\u00ebt dhe pajisje t\u00eb tjera, p\u00ebrmes t\u00eb cilave kalon trafiku i lidhjes rrjetore. N\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi, nj\u00eb lidhje rrjetore mund t\u00eb funksionoj\u00eb pa nyje nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebs (drejt midis pikave fundore).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>K\u00ebrc\u00ebnime p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin e lart\u00eb<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><\/p>\n<p>U1. Qasja e paautorizuar n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e transmetuara.<br \/>\nU2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara.<br \/>\nU3. Shkelja e autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUNCU1\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U1. Qasja e paautorizuar n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e transmetuara<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\n\u04231.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0436\u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0445:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0438\u0445 \u043d\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u043e\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet p\u00ebr U1.1.1.1.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave nga steka rrjetore e nyj\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.1.1.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432 \u044d\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0433\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet p\u00ebr U1.1.1.2.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, duke ruajtur t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e transmetuara n\u00eb cache, skedar\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohsh\u00ebm ose skedar\u00eb swap.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0445 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0447\u0438 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445:<br \/>\n\u04231.2.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043c\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0434\u043e\u043c \u0437\u0430\u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u0441\u0435\u0445 \u043f\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0442\u043e\u0432, \u043f\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0434\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0444\u0435\u0439\u0441 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430:<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet p\u00ebr U1.2.1.<\/i><br \/>\nKapja e t\u00eb gjitha paketimeve realizohet duke kaluar kart\u00ebn rrjetore n\u00eb modalitetin joshk\u00ebmbues (promiscuous mode p\u00ebr adapter\u00ebt e kabllit ose n\u00eb modalitetin monitor p\u00ebr adapter\u00ebt wi-fi).<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.2.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a \u0442\u0438\u043f\u0430 \u00ab\u0447\u0435\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043a \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435 (MiTM)\u00bb, \u043d\u043e \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0430\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 (\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0435\u0431\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0432\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432).<br \/>\nU1.2.2.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU2\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Shk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.3. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0447\u0435\u0442 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0438 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u043c \u043a\u0430\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0430\u043c (\u0422\u041a\u0423\u0418) \u0441 \u0444\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0432 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043b\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.4. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0435 \u0437\u0430 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0436\u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u044b \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432 (\u0421\u0422\u0421), \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u044a\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUNCU2\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\n\u04232.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0436\u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0445:<br \/>\n\u04232.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438 \u0432\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438\u0437\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u043e \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044f \u0438\u0445 \u043d\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432 \u0437\u0430\u043f\u043e\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0445 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u043e\u0432:<br \/>\n\u04232.1.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438:<br \/>\n\u04232.1.1.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432 \u044d\u043d\u0435\u0440\u0433\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0437\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u0430\u043c\u044f\u0442\u0438:<\/p>\n<p>\u04232.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0443\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0445 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0447\u0438 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445:<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a \u0442\u0438\u043f\u0430 \u00ab\u0447\u0435\u043b\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043a \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435 (MiTM)\u00bb \u0438 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0442\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0443\u0437\u0435\u043b \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432:<br \/>\nU2.2.1.1. Lidheni fizike e pajisjeve t\u00eb keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsve n\u00eb nd\u00ebrprerjen e lidhjes rrjet.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2. Kryerja e sulmeve ndaj protokolleve t\u00eb rrjetit:<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.2.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432\u0438\u0440\u0442\u0443\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u043b\u043e\u043a\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0435\u0442\u044f\u043c\u0438 (VLAN):<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.1.1. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/VLAN_hopping\">VLAN hopping<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.1.2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i cil\u00ebsimeve VLAN n\u00eb switch-e ose router-a.<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.2.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043c\u0430\u0440\u0448\u0440\u0443\u0442\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0442\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430:<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.2.1. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i tabelave t\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimit statik t\u00eb router-ave.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.2.2. Anonse t\u00eb rreme nga keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit p\u00ebr trajtat p\u00ebrmes protokolleve t\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimit dinamik.<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.2.3. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0430\u0432\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0444\u0438\u0433\u0443\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f:<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.3.1. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Rogue_DHCP\">Rogue DHCP<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.3.2. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.securitylab.ru\/analytics\/379619.php\">Rogue WPAD<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.2.4. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0430\u0434\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0435\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d:<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.4.1. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/ARP-spoofing\">ARP spoofing<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.4.2. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/DNS_spoofing\">DNS spoofing<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU2.2.1.2.4.3. Futja e ndryshimeve t\u00eb paautorizuara n\u00eb skedar\u00ebt lokal\u00eb t\u00eb emrave t\u00eb nyjeve (hosts, lmhosts etj.)<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUNCU3\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U3. Shkelja e autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU3.1. Neutralizimi i mekanizmave t\u00eb njohjes s\u00eb autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb informacionit p\u00ebrmes p\u00ebrcaktimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme mbi autorin ose burimin e informacionit:<br \/>\nU3.1.1. Ndryshimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave mbi autorin q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbahen n\u00eb informacionin e transmetuar.<br \/>\nU3.1.1.1. Neutralizimi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb integritetit dhe autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara:<br \/>\nU3.1.1.1.1. Referenc\u00eb: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIU4\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb informacionit.<br \/>\nU4. Krijimi i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrusit legjitim mbi t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU3.1.1.2. Neutralizimi i mbrojtjes s\u00eb autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara, realizuar p\u00ebrmes kodeve nj\u00eb her\u00eb konfirmimi:<br \/>\nU3.1.1.2.1. <noindex>SIM swap<\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U3.1.2. Ndryshimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave mbi burimin e informacionit t\u00eb transmetuar:<br \/>\nU3.1.2.1. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/IP_address_spoofing\">IP spoofing<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU3.1.2.2. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"http:\/\/xgu.ru\/wiki\/MAC-spoofing\">MAC spoofing<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUIS\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>MODEL STANDARD T\u00cb K\u00cbRC\u00cbNIMEVE. SISTEMI INFORMACIONI BAZUAR N\u00cb ARKITEKTUR\u00cbN KLIENT-SERVER<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Objekti i mbrojtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin aplikohet modeli i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve (scope)<\/h3>\n<p>\nObjekti i mbrojtjes \u00ebsht\u00eb sistemi informacioni, i nd\u00ebrtuar mbi baz\u00ebn e arkitektur\u00ebs klient-server.<\/p>\n<p><b>Arkitektura<\/b><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/f18c9c6c1e3d5372932d8c2a331284cf.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrshkrimi i elementeve t\u00eb arkitektur\u00ebs:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><i>\u00abKlienti\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 pajisja ku funksionon pjesa klient e sistemit informacionit.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abServer\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 pajisja ku funksionon pjesa server e sistemit informacionit.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abDepo e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2014 pjesa e infrastruktur\u00ebs s\u00eb serverit t\u00eb sistemit informacionit, e destinuar p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat q\u00eb p\u00ebrpunohen nga sistemi informacionit.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abShk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2014 kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb informacionit midis Klientit dhe Serverit, q\u00eb kalon p\u00ebrmes rrjetit t\u00eb transmetimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. P\u00ebr m\u00eb shum\u00eb detaje mbi modelin e elementit shih <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNC\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Shk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\n<b>Kufizimet<\/b><br \/>\nN\u00eb modelimin e objektit jan\u00eb vendosur kufizime t\u00eb m\u00ebposhtme:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>P\u00ebrdoruesi nd\u00ebrvepron me sistemin informacionit brenda intervaleve p\u00ebrfundimtare t\u00eb koh\u00ebs, t\u00eb quajtur seanca e pun\u00ebs.<\/li>\n<li>N\u00eb fillim t\u00eb \u00e7do seance pune, ndodhin identifikimi, autentikimi dhe autorizimi i p\u00ebrdoruesit.<\/li>\n<li>T\u00eb gjitha informacionet e mbrojtura ruhen n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn server t\u00eb sistemit informacionit.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>K\u00ebrc\u00ebnime p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin e lart\u00eb<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU1. Veprimet e paautorizuara t\u00eb kryera nga keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesi legjitim.<br \/>\nU2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i informacionit t\u00eb mbrojtur gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb tij nga pjesa server e sistemit informacionit.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUISU1\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U1. Veprimet e paautorizuara t\u00eb kryera nga keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesi legjitim<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Sqarime<\/b><br \/>\nZakonisht, n\u00eb sistemet informacioni, lidhja e veprimeve me p\u00ebrdoruesin q\u00eb i ka kryer ato realizohet p\u00ebrmes:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>dokumenteve t\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb sistemit (logs). <\/li>\n<li>atributeve speciale t\u00eb objekteve t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb informacione mbi at\u00eb q\u00eb i krijoi ose i ndryshoi ato.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nN\u00eb lidhje me seanc\u00ebn e pun\u00ebs, kjo k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim mund t\u00eb dekompozohet n\u00eb:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>&lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432 \u0440\u0430\u043c\u043a\u0430\u0445 \u0441\u0435\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f.<\/li>\n<li>&lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0432\u044b\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nSeanca e pun\u00ebs e p\u00ebrdoruesit mund t\u00eb inicohet nga:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>P\u00ebrdoruesi vet\u00eb.<\/li>\n<li>Keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nN\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb faz\u00eb, dekompozimi fillestar i k\u00ebsaj k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi do t\u00eb duket si vijon:<br \/>\nU1.1. Veprimet e paautorizuara u kryen brenda seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c.<br \/>\n\u04231.1.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438.<br \/>\nU1.2. Veprimet e paautorizuara u kryen jasht\u00eb seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit.<\/p>\n<p>Nga k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrimi i objekteve t\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebs informacionale q\u00eb mund t\u00eb preken nga sulmuesit, dekompozimi i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjetme do t\u00eb duket si vijon:<\/p>\n<p>Element\u00ebt<br \/>\nDekompozimi i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve<\/p>\n<p><b>U1.1.1.<\/b><br \/>\n<b>U1.1.2.<\/b><br \/>\n<b>U1.2.<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Klienti<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.<br \/>\nU1.1.2.1.<\/p>\n<p>Lidhja rrjetore<br \/>\nU1.1.1.2.<\/p>\n<p>\u0421\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440<\/p>\n<p>U1.2.1.<\/p>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU1.1. Veprimet e paautorizuara u kryen brenda seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0430\u0442\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c:<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1. Sulmuesit vepruan nga Klienti:<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1 Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete standart p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb sistemin informacionit:<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1.1. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete fizike p\u00ebr hyrje-p\u00ebrshkrim t\u00eb Klientit (tastier\u00eb, maus, monitor ose ekran prekje t\u00eb pajisjes mobile):<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1.1.1. Sulmuesit vepruan n\u00eb periudha kohore kur seanca \u00ebsht\u00eb aktive, mjetet p\u00ebr hyrje-p\u00ebrshkrim jan\u00eb t\u00eb disponueshme dhe p\u00ebrdoruesi nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb vend.<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1.2. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs n\u00eb distanc\u00eb (standart ose t\u00eb ofruara nga kodi keqdash\u00ebs) p\u00ebr t\u00eb menaxhuar Klientin:<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1.2.1. Sulmuesit vepruan n\u00eb periudha kohore kur seanca \u00ebsht\u00eb aktive, mjetet p\u00ebr hyrje-p\u00ebrshkrim jan\u00eb t\u00eb disponueshme dhe p\u00ebrdoruesi nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb vend.<br \/>\nU1.1.1.1.1.2.2. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs n\u00eb distanc\u00eb, punimi i t\u00eb cilave \u00ebsht\u00eb i paduksh\u00ebm p\u00ebr p\u00ebrdoruesin e sulmuar.<br \/>\nU1.1.1.2. Sulmuesit ndryshuan t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat n\u00eb lidhjen rrjetore midis Klientit dhe Serverit, duke i modifikuar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb perceptoheshin si veprime t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim:<br \/>\nU1.1.1.2.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU2\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Shk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\nU1.1.1.3. Sulmuesit e detyruan p\u00ebrdoruesin t\u00eb kryej\u00eb veprimet q\u00eb ato e k\u00ebrkuan, duke p\u00ebrdorur metoda t\u00eb inxhinieris\u00eb sociale.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.1.2 &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438:<br \/>\nU1.1.2.1. Sulmuesit vepruan nga Klienti (<b>DHE<\/b>):<br \/>\nU1.1.2.1.1. Sulmuesit neutralizuan sistemin e ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit t\u00eb sistemit informacionit:<br \/>\nU1.1.2.1.1.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSRDU1\">\u2018Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit. U1. Vendosja e paautorizuar e seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim\u2019<\/a><\/noindex>. <br \/>\nU1.1.2.1.2. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete standart p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb sistemin informacionit<br \/>\nU1.1.2.2. Sulmuesit vepruan nga nodet e tjera t\u00eb rrjetit t\u00eb transmetimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, nga t\u00eb cilat mund t\u00eb vendoset nj\u00eb lidhje rrjetore me Serverin (<b>DHE<\/b>):<br \/>\nU1.1.2.2.1. Sulmuesit neutralizuan sistemin e ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit t\u00eb sistemit informacionit:<br \/>\nU1.1.2.2.1.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSRDU1\">\u2018Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit. U1. Vendosja e paautorizuar e seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim\u2019<\/a><\/noindex>. <br \/>\nU1.1.2.2.2. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete t\u00eb pap\u00ebrshtatshme p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb sistemin informacionit.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U1.1.2.2.2.<\/i><br \/>\nSulmuesit mund t\u00eb ken\u00eb instaluar klientin standart t\u00eb sistemit informacionit n\u00eb nj\u00eb nod t\u00eb tret\u00eb ose kan\u00eb mundur t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorin softuer t\u00eb pap\u00ebrshtatsh\u00ebm q\u00eb realizon protokollet standart t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit midis Klientit dhe Serverit.<\/p>\n<p>U1.2 Veprimet e paautorizuara u kryen jasht\u00eb seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit.<br \/>\nU1.2.1 Sulmuesit kryen veprime t\u00eb paautorizuara dhe m\u00eb pas b\u00ebn\u00eb ndryshime t\u00eb paautorizuara n\u00eb regjistrat e pun\u00ebs s\u00eb sistemit informacionit ose atributet speciale t\u00eb objekteve t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, duke treguar se veprimet e kryera nga ata jan\u00eb kryer nga p\u00ebrdoruesi legjitim.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUISU2\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i informacionit t\u00eb mbrojtur gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb tij nga pjesa server e sistemit informacionit<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU2.1. Sulmuesit modifikojn\u00eb informacionin e mbrojtur n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet mjeteve standart t\u00eb sistemit informacionit dhe kryejn\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim.<br \/>\nU2.1.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUISU1\">\u2018Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi informacionit, i nd\u00ebrtuar mbi baz\u00ebn e arkitektur\u00ebs klient-server. U1. Kryerja e veprimeve t\u00eb paautorizuara nga sulmuesit n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim\u2019<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U2.2. Sulmuesit modifikojn\u00eb informacionin e mbrojtur duke p\u00ebrdorur mekanizma p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebna q\u00eb nuk parashikohen nga m\u00ebnyra e zakonshme e funksionimit t\u00eb sistemit informacionit.<br \/>\nU2.2.1. Sulmuesit modifikojn\u00eb skeduj q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb informacion t\u00eb mbrojtur:<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044f \u043c\u0435\u0445\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0437\u043c\u044b \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u0441 \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u0430\u043c\u0438, \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0435 \u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439.<br \/>\n\u04232.2.1.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u043e\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0432\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0444\u0430\u0439\u043b\u043e\u0432 \u0438\u0437 \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0435\u0440\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043f\u0438\u0438.<\/p>\n<p>U2.2.2. Sulmuesit modifikojn\u00eb informacionin e mbrojtur q\u00eb ruhet n\u00eb baz\u00ebn e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave (<b>DHE<\/b>):<br \/>\nU2.2.2.1. Sulmuesit neutralizojn\u00eb sistemin e ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit t\u00eb DBMS:<br \/>\nU2.2.2.1.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSRDU1\">\u2018Modeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Sistemi i ndarjes s\u00eb aksesit. U1. Vendosja e paautorizuar e seanc\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit legjitim\u2019<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\n\u04232.2.2.2. \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044f \u0448\u0442\u0430\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0444\u0435\u0439\u0441\u044b \u0421\u0423\u0411\u0414 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u043a \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u043c.<\/p>\n<p>\u04232.3. \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0430\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u043c\u043e\u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0431\u0430\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0435\u0435 \u041f\u041e.<br \/>\n\u04232.3.1. \u041c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0438\u0441\u0445\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0434 \u041f\u041e.<br \/>\n\u04232.3.1. \u041c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043c\u0430\u0448\u0438\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0434 \u041f\u041e.<\/p>\n<p>\u04232.4. \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u043c \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b.<\/p>\n<p>\u04232.5. \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0444\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0440\u0443\u044e\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u0443\u044e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0435\u0435 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0447\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b (\u043d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440, \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0431\u0430\u0437 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u043c \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439):<br \/>\n\u04232.5.1. \u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0430: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU2\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Shk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSRD\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>\u0422\u0418\u041f\u041e\u0412\u0410\u042f \u041c\u041e\u0414\u0415\u041b\u042c \u0423\u0413\u0420\u041e\u0417. \u0421\u0418\u0421\u0422\u0415\u041c\u0410 \u0420\u0410\u0417\u0413\u0420\u0410\u041d\u0418\u0427\u0415\u041d\u0418\u042f \u0414\u041e\u0421\u0422\u0423\u041f\u0410<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Objekti i mbrojtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin aplikohet modeli i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve (scope)<\/h3>\n<p>\n\u041e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b, \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437, \u0441\u043e\u043e\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437: \u00ab\u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430, \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0435 \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u044b \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442-\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>\u041f\u043e\u0434 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0443\u043c\u0435\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u044b, \u0440\u0435\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439.<\/li>\n<li>\u0410\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439.<\/li>\n<li>\u0410\u0432\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439.<\/li>\n<li>\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u043e\u043a\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>K\u00ebrc\u00ebnime p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin e lart\u00eb<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\n\u04231. \u041d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043b\u0435\u0433\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f. <br \/>\n\u04232. \u041d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0432 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSRDU1\"><\/a><\/noindex> <\/p>\n<h3>\u04231. \u041d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0441\u0435\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u044b \u043e\u0442 \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 \u043b\u0435\u0433\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f <\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Sqarime<\/b><br \/>\n\u0414\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u0437\u0438\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u043c \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0435\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0442 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u044f\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0438\u043f\u0430 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439. <\/p>\n<p>\u0412 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0442\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0430 \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0438 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u0439, \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u0442\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u043d \u0438 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044c. \u041f\u0440\u0438 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u043c \u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0430\u0442\u044c, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u043d \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u2014 \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f, \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c.<\/p>\n<p><b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\n\u04231.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u0447\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.1. \u0417\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0435 \u0438\u0445 \u0445\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f.<br \/>\n<i>\u041f\u043e\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u04231.1.1.<\/i><br \/>\n\u041d\u0430\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u0440, \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0438 \u0431\u044b\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u044b \u043d\u0430 \u0441\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0435\u0440\u0435, \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0435\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u043c \u043a \u043c\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0440\u0443.<\/p>\n<p>\u04231.1.2. \u041f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u0437\u043b\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u043c\u044b\u0441\u043b\u0443 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u043b \u0440\u0435\u043a\u0432\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0442\u044b \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0430 \u0437\u043b\u043e\u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430\u043c.<br \/>\n\u04231.1.2.1. \u041f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043b \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0432\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0432\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0435.<br \/>\n\u04231.1.2.2. \u041f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c \u0443\u043c\u044b\u0448\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043e \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0430\u043b \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438 \u0443\u0447\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435:<br \/>\n\u04231.1.2.2.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; \u043a\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0430\u043c \u043f\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u0435.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.2.2.1.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, p\u00ebr t\u00eb mund\u00ebsuar z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimin e tij gjat\u00eb periudh\u00ebs s\u00eb s\u00ebmundjes.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.2.2.2.  ndaj kontraktor\u00ebve t\u00eb pun\u00ebdh\u00ebn\u00ebsit, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt kryejn\u00eb pun\u00eb mbi objektet e infrastruktur\u00ebs informacionit.<br \/>\nU1.1.2.2.3.  ndaj pal\u00ebve t\u00eb treta.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.2.2.3.<\/i><br \/>\nNj\u00eb nga, por jo i vetmi, mund\u00ebsit\u00eb p\u00ebr zbatimin e k\u00ebsaj k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimi i teknikave t\u00eb inxhinieris\u00eb sociale nga ana e sulmuesve.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.3. Sulmuesit mor\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit p\u00ebrmes metod\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrzgjedhjes:<br \/>\nU1.1.3.1.  duke p\u00ebrdorur mekanizmat e zakonsh\u00ebm t\u00eb aksesit.<br \/>\nU1.1.3.2.  p\u00ebrmes kodit t\u00eb m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm t\u00eb kapur (p.sh., hash-et e fjal\u00ebkalimeve) t\u00eb ruajtjes s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.4. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn kod t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb kapur t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.5. Sulmuesit nxorr\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit nga lidhja rrjetore mes Klientit dhe Serverit:<br \/>\nLink: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU1\">\u201eModeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Lidhja rrjetore. U1. Qasja e paautorizuar n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat q\u00eb transmetohen\u201d<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.6. Sulmuesit nxorr\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit nga regjistrimet e sistemeve t\u00eb monitorimit t\u00eb pun\u00ebs:<br \/>\nU1.1.6.1.  sistemeve t\u00eb videov\u00ebzhgimit (n\u00ebse gjat\u00eb pun\u00ebs regjistroheshin shtypjet e tasteve n\u00eb tastier\u00eb).<br \/>\nU1.1.6.2.  sistemeve t\u00eb kontrollit t\u00eb veprimeve t\u00eb punonj\u00ebsve n\u00eb kompjuter <br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.6.2.<\/i><br \/>\nNj\u00eb shembull i till\u00eb sistemi \u00ebsht\u00eb <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.staffcop.ru\">StuffCop<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.7. Sulmuesit komprometuan t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb mang\u00ebsive n\u00eb procesin e transferimit t\u00eb tyre.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.7.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, transferimi i fjal\u00ebkalimeve n\u00eb nj\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb hapur p\u00ebrmes emailit.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.8. Sulmuesit m\u00ebsuan t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit duke v\u00ebzhguar sesionin e pun\u00ebs t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit p\u00ebrmes sistemeve t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb larg\u00ebt.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9. Sulmuesit nxorr\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit si pasoj\u00eb e rrjedhjes s\u00eb tyre p\u00ebrmes kanaleve teknike (TKUI):<br \/>\nU1.1.9.1. Sulmuesit p\u00ebrshikuan se si p\u00ebrdoruesi shkruante t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit n\u00eb tastier\u00eb:<br \/>\nU1.1.9.1.1 Sulmuesit qen\u00eb t\u00eb pozicionuar n\u00eb af\u00ebrsi t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit dhe pan\u00eb hyn e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit me sy. <br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.1.1<\/i><br \/>\nRastet e tilla p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb veprimet e koleg\u00ebve n\u00eb pun\u00eb ose situata kur tastiera e p\u00ebrdoruesit \u00ebsht\u00eb e dukshme p\u00ebr vizitor\u00ebt e organizat\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9.1.2 Saldimatar p\u00ebrdor\u00ebn mjete t\u00eb tjera teknike, si binocular\u00eb ose dron\u00eb, dhe pan\u00eb futjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit p\u00ebrmes dritares. <br \/>\nU1.1.9.2. Saldimatar\u00ebt nxorr\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit nga regjistrimet e komunikimeve radio nd\u00ebrmjet tastier\u00ebs dhe nj\u00ebsis\u00eb qendrore t\u00eb kompjuterit n\u00eb rast se ishin lidhur p\u00ebrmes nj\u00eb interface radio (p.sh. Bluetooth).<br \/>\nU1.1.9.3. Saldimatar\u00ebt kap\u00ebn t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit p\u00ebrmes rrjedhjes s\u00eb tyre p\u00ebrmes kanalit t\u00eb ndihm\u00ebs elektromagnetike dhe interferencave (PEMIN).<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.3.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj sulmi <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=tMSglPLIDYU\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cl.cam.ac.uk\/~mgk25\/pet2004-fpd.pdf\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9.4. Saldimari kap\u00ebn futjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit nga tastiera duke p\u00ebrdorur mjete teknike speciale (STS) t\u00eb destinuara p\u00ebr p\u00ebrvet\u00ebsimin e heshtur t\u00eb informacionit.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.4.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex>dispozitiv\u00eb<\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9.5. Saldimatar\u00ebt kap\u00ebn futjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit nga tastiera p\u00ebrmes <br \/>\nanaliz\u00ebs s\u00eb sinjalit Wi-Fi, i moduluesh\u00ebm nga procesi i shtypjes s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave nga p\u00ebrdoruesi.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.5.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/threatpost.com\/keystroke-recognition-uses-wi-fi-signals-to-snoop\/120135\/\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9.6. Saldimatar\u00ebt kap\u00ebn futjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit nga tastiera p\u00ebrmes analiz\u00ebs s\u00eb tingujve t\u00eb shtypjes s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.6.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/398545\/\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.9.7. Saldimatar\u00ebt kap\u00ebn futjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb identifikimit nga tastiera e pajisjeve mobile p\u00ebrmes analiz\u00ebs s\u00eb matjeve t\u00eb accelerometrit.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.9.7.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/126806\/\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.10. , paraprakisht t\u00eb ruajtura n\u00eb Klient.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.10.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, p\u00ebrdoruesi mund t\u00eb kishte ruajtur n\u00eb shfletuesin e tij emrin e p\u00ebrdoruesit dhe fjal\u00ebkalimin p\u00ebr qasje n\u00eb nj\u00eb faqe t\u00eb caktuar.<\/p>\n<p>U1.1.11. Saldimatar\u00ebt komprometuan t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e identifikimit p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb mang\u00ebsive n\u00eb procesin e pritjes s\u00eb qasjes s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesve.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.1.11.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, pas shkarkimit t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit, llogarit\u00eb e tij mbet\u00ebn t\u00eb pa bllokuara.<\/p>\n<p>U1.2.  p\u00ebrmes p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb dob\u00ebsive n\u00eb sistemin e shk\u00ebputjes s\u00eb aksesit.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSRDU2\"><\/a><\/noindex> <\/p>\n<h3>U2. Rritja e paautorizuar e privilegjeve t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit n\u00eb sistemin informatik<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU2.1  p\u00ebrmes kryerjes s\u00eb ndryshimeve t\u00eb paautorizuara n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb informacionin mbi privilegjet e p\u00ebrdoruesit.<\/p>\n<p>U2.2  p\u00ebrmes p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb dob\u00ebsive n\u00eb sistemin e shk\u00ebputjes s\u00eb aksesit.<\/p>\n<p>U2.3.  p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb mang\u00ebsive n\u00eb procesin e menaxhimit t\u00eb aksesit t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesve.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U2.3.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli 1. P\u00ebrdoruesit iu dha akses m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb se ajo q\u00eb i nevojitej p\u00ebr nevojat e sh\u00ebrbimit.<br \/>\nShembulli 2. Pas transfert\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesit n\u00eb nj\u00eb pozite tjet\u00ebr, t\u00eb drejtat e aksesit t\u00eb dh\u00ebna m\u00eb par\u00eb nuk u t\u00ebrhoq\u00ebn.<\/p>\n<p>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUMI\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>MODELI I P\u00cbRGJITHSH\u00cbM I K\u00cbRC\u00cbNIMEVE. MODULI I INTEGRIMIT<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Objekti i mbrojtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin aplikohet modeli i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve (scope)<\/h3>\n<p>\nModuli i integrimit \u2013 nj\u00eb grup objektesh t\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebs informuese, t\u00eb destinuara p\u00ebr organizimin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb informacionit midis sistemeve informuese.<\/p>\n<p>Duke marr\u00eb parasysh faktin se n\u00eb rrjetet korporative nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb e mundur t\u00eb ndahet qart\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem informatik nga tjetri, moduli i integrimit mund t\u00eb konsiderohet gjithashtu si nj\u00eb lidh\u00ebs midis komponenteve brenda nj\u00eb sistemi informatik.<\/p>\n<p><b>Arkitektura<\/b><br \/>\nSchema e p\u00ebrgjithshme e modulit t\u00eb integrimit duket si m\u00eb posht\u00eb:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/6b91d59698b761a14aef7f1c4fbec325.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrshkrimi i elementeve t\u00eb arkitektur\u00ebs:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><i>\u00abServeri i shk\u00ebmbimit (SO)\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 nyja \/ sh\u00ebrbimi \/ komponenti i sistemit informatik q\u00eb kryen funksionin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave me nj\u00eb sistem informatik tjet\u00ebr.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abMediatori\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 nyja \/ sh\u00ebrbimi, i destinuar p\u00ebr organizimin e bashk\u00ebpunimit midis sistemeve informatike, por q\u00eb nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb pjes\u00eb e tyre. <br \/>\nShembuj <i>t\u00eb \u00abMediatoreve\u00bb<\/i> mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimet e post\u00ebs elektronike, autobuzat sh\u00ebrbimi t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmarrjeve (enterprise service bus \/ arkitektura SoA), serverat e skedar\u00ebve t\u00eb pal\u00ebve t\u00eb treta etj. N\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi, moduli i integrimit mund t\u00eb mos p\u00ebrmbaj\u00eb fare \u00abMediat\u00eb\u00bb.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abSO p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 nj\u00eb sasi e programeve q\u00eb realizojn\u00eb protokollet e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave dhe transformimin e formateve. <br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, transformimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave nga formati UFBES n\u00eb formatin ABS, ndryshimi i statusit t\u00eb mesazheve gjat\u00eb transmetimit etj.<\/li>\n<li><i>\u00abShk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> p\u00ebrkon me objektin e p\u00ebrshkruar n\u00eb modelin tipik t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve \u00abLidhja e rrjetit\u00bb. Disa lidhje rrjetesh t\u00eb paraqitura n\u00eb skem\u00ebn e m\u00ebsip\u00ebrme mund t\u00eb mos ekzistojn\u00eb.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><b>Shembuj t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit<\/b><\/p>\n<p><i>Schema 1. Integrimi i ABS dhe ARM KBR p\u00ebrmes serverit t\u00eb skedar\u00ebve t\u00eb pal\u00ebve t\u00eb treta<\/i><\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr t\u00eb realizuar pagesat, nj\u00eb punonj\u00ebs i autorizuar n\u00eb bank\u00eb eksporton dokumentet elektronike t\u00eb pagesave nga ABS dhe i ruan ato n\u00eb nj\u00eb skedar (formatin e tij, p\u00ebr shembull SQL-dump) n\u00eb nj\u00eb dosje rrjetore (\u2026SHARE) t\u00eb serverit t\u00eb skedar\u00ebve. M\u00eb pas, ky skedar, me nj\u00eb skenar konvertues, transformohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb grup skedar\u00ebsh me formatin UFEBS, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt m\u00eb pas lexohen nga ARM KBR. <br \/>\nPas k\u00ebsaj, punonj\u00ebsi i autorizuar - p\u00ebrdoruesi i ARM KBR - e kripton dhe e n\u00ebnshkruan skedarin e marr\u00eb dhe e d\u00ebrgon n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb momentin e marrjes s\u00eb pagesave nga Banka e Rusis\u00eb, ARM KBR kryen dekriptimin dhe verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik, pas s\u00eb cil\u00ebs regjistron n\u00eb form\u00ebn e nj\u00eb grupi skedar\u00ebsh me formatin UFEBS n\u00eb serverin e skedar\u00ebve. Para se t\u00eb importohen dokumentet e pagesave n\u00eb ABS, ato konvertohen me nj\u00eb skenar konvertues nga formati UFEBS n\u00eb formatin ABS. <\/p>\n<p>Le t\u00eb supozojm\u00eb se n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb skem\u00eb ABS funksionon n\u00eb nj\u00eb server fizik, ARM KBR funksionon n\u00eb nj\u00eb kompjuter t\u00eb dedikuar, dhe skenari konvertues punon n\u00eb serverin e skedar\u00ebve.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/bef53aaa1deaee5adeca620204345642.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrputhja e objekteve t\u00eb skem\u00ebs s\u00eb shqyrtuar me element\u00ebt e modelit t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit:<br \/>\n<i>\u201eServerat e shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e ABS\u201d<\/i> \u2013 serveri ABS.<br \/>\n<i>\u201eServerat e shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e ARM KBR\u201d<\/i> \u2013 kompjuteri ARM KBR.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abMediatori\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 serveri i huaj i skedar\u00ebve.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abSO p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 skenari konvertues.<\/p>\n<p><i>Skema 2. Integrimi i ABS dhe ARM KBR duke vendosur nj\u00eb dosje rrjetore t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt me pagesa n\u00eb ARM KBR<\/i><\/p>\n<p>T\u00eb gjitha ashtu si n\u00eb Skem\u00ebn 1, por nuk p\u00ebrdoret nj\u00eb server i ve\u00e7ant\u00eb skedar\u00ebsh, por n\u00eb vend t\u00eb tij, dosja rrjetore (\u2026SHARE) me dokumentet elektronike t\u00eb pages\u00ebs vendoset n\u00eb kompjuterin me ARM KBR. Skenari konvertues gjithashtu punon n\u00eb ARM KBR.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/7d3ecde6d78b2c45e1249236c7da925b.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrputhja e objekteve t\u00eb skem\u00ebs s\u00eb shqyrtuar me element\u00ebt e modelit t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit:<br \/>\nAshtu si n\u00eb Skem\u00ebn 1, por <i>\u00abMediatori\u00bb<\/i> nuk p\u00ebrdoret.<\/p>\n<p><i>Skema 3. Integrimi i ABS dhe ARM KBR-N p\u00ebrmes IBM WebSphera MQ dhe realizimi i n\u00ebnshkrimit t\u00eb dokumenteve elektronike \"n\u00eb an\u00ebn e ABS\"<\/i><\/p>\n<p>ABS funksionon n\u00eb nj\u00eb platform\u00eb q\u00eb nuk mb\u00ebshtetet nga SKZI SKAD Signatura. N\u00ebnshkrimi i dokumenteve elektronike q\u00eb d\u00ebrgohen b\u00ebhet n\u00eb nj\u00eb server t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik (Serveri EP). Ky server gjithashtu verifikon n\u00ebnshkrimin elektronik t\u00eb dokumenteve q\u00eb vijn\u00eb nga Banka e Rusis\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>ABS eksporton n\u00eb Server EP skedarin e dokumenteve t\u00eb pagesave n\u00eb formatin e tij.<br \/>\nServeri EP, p\u00ebrmes skriptit konvertues, transformon skedarin n\u00eb mesazhe elektronike formati UFEBS, pas k\u00ebsaj mesazhet elektronike n\u00ebnshkruhen dhe d\u00ebrgohen n\u00eb IBM WebSphere MQ.<\/p>\n<p>ARM KBR-N lidhet me IBM WebSphere MQ dhe merr atje mesazhet e n\u00ebnshkruara t\u00eb pagesave, pas s\u00eb cil\u00ebs punonj\u00ebsi i autorizuar \u2014 p\u00ebrdoruesi i ARM KBR \u2014 i enkripton dhe i d\u00ebrgon n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb momentin e marrjes s\u00eb pagesave nga Banka e Rusis\u00eb, ARM KBR-N i dekripton ato dhe kontrollon n\u00ebnshkrimin elektronik. Pagesat e p\u00ebrpunuara me sukses, si mesazhe elektronike t\u00eb dekriptuara dhe t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruara formati UFEBS, d\u00ebrgohen n\u00eb IBM WebSphere MQ, nga ku i merr Serveri EP.<\/p>\n<p>Serveri EP kontrollon n\u00ebnshkrimin elektronik t\u00eb pagesave t\u00eb ardhura dhe i ruan ato n\u00eb nj\u00eb skedar formati ABS. Pas k\u00ebsaj, punonj\u00ebsi i autorizuar \u2014 p\u00ebrdoruesi i ABS \u2014 ngarkohet skedarin e krijuar n\u00eb ABS n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me procedurat e vendosura.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/b1bd9c224b18dc84cca5f8bdc7d69713.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrputhja e objekteve t\u00eb skem\u00ebs s\u00eb shqyrtuar me element\u00ebt e modelit t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit:<br \/>\n<i>\u00abServeri i shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e ABS\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 serveri ABS.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abServeri i shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e ARM KBR\u00bb<\/i> \u2014 kompjuteri ARM KBR.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abMediatori\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 Serveri EP dhe IBM WebSphere MQ.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abSO p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 skripti konvertues, SKZI SKAD Signatura n\u00eb Serverin EP.<\/p>\n<p><i>Skema 4. Integrimi i Serverit DBO me ABS p\u00ebrmes API-s\u00eb, e ofruar nga serveri i dedikuar p\u00ebr shk\u00ebmbim<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Do ta marrim n\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb se banka p\u00ebrdor disa sisteme t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimeve bankare n\u00eb distanc\u00eb (DBO): <\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\u00abInternet Klient-Bank\u00bb p\u00ebr individ\u00eb (IKB FL);<\/li>\n<li>\u00abInternet Klient-Bank\u00bb p\u00ebr persona juridik\u00eb (IKB JL). <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nMe q\u00ebllim t\u00eb siguris\u00eb informative, t\u00eb gjitha nd\u00ebrveprimet e ABS me sistemet DBO zhvillohen p\u00ebrmes nj\u00eb serveri t\u00eb dedikuar p\u00ebr shk\u00ebmbim, duke punuar brenda sistemit informativ \u00abABS\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>M\u00eb pas, do t\u00eb shqyrtojm\u00eb procesin e nd\u00ebrveprimit t\u00eb sistemit DBO IKB JL me ABS.<br \/>\nServeri DBO, pas marrjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb urdhri pages\u00eb t\u00eb miratuar nga klienti, duhet t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb dokumentin p\u00ebrkat\u00ebs n\u00eb ABS. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb, ai p\u00ebrmes API-s\u00eb d\u00ebrgon informacionin n\u00eb serverin e shk\u00ebmbimit, dhe ai, nga ana e tij, fut t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat n\u00eb ABS. <\/p>\n<p>Kur ndryshojn\u00eb balancat n\u00eb llogarin\u00eb e klientit, ABS krijon njoftime elektronike, t\u00eb cilat p\u00ebrmes serverit t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit d\u00ebrgohen n\u00eb serverin DBO.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/63f88ad151996e7ddaa883349a6d8e22.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nP\u00ebrputhja e objekteve t\u00eb skem\u00ebs s\u00eb shqyrtuar me element\u00ebt e modelit t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit:<br \/>\n<i>\u00abServeri i shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e DBO\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 serveri DBO IKB JL.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abServeri i shk\u00ebmbimit nga ana e ABS\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 serveri i shk\u00ebmbimit.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abMediatori\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 nuk ekziston.<br \/>\n<i>\u00abSO p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave\u00bb<\/i> \u2013 komponentet e Serverit DBO, p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr p\u00ebrdorimin e API-s\u00eb s\u00eb serverit t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit, komponentet e serverit t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit, p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr p\u00ebrdorimin e API-s\u00eb s\u00eb ABS.<\/p>\n<h3>K\u00ebrc\u00ebnime p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin e lart\u00eb<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU1. Futja e informacionit t\u00eb rrem\u00eb nga ana e keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsve p\u00ebrmes modulit t\u00eb integrimit. <br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUMIU1\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U1. Futja e informacionit t\u00eb rrem\u00eb nga ana e keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsve p\u00ebrmes modulit t\u00eb integrimit <\/h3>\n<p><b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU1.1. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave legjitime gjat\u00eb transmetimit p\u00ebrmes lidhjeve rrjetore:<br \/>\nU1.1.1 Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU2\">\u00abModeli standard i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Shk\u00ebmbimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb transmetuara\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.2. D\u00ebrgimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme nga an\u00ebtar\u00ebt legjitim t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit p\u00ebrmes kanaleve t\u00eb komunikimit:<br \/>\nU1.1.2 Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUNCU3\">\u00abModeli tipik i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Lidhja rrjetore. U3. Shkelja e autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb d\u00ebrguara\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.3. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave legjitime gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit n\u00eb Serverat e shk\u00ebmbimit ose n\u00eb Nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebs:<br \/>\nU1.3.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUISU2\">\u00abModeli standard t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Nj\u00eb sistem informatik i nd\u00ebrtuar mbi arkitektur\u00ebn klient-server. U2. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i informacionit t\u00eb mbrojtur gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit nga ana e servis t\u00eb sistemit informatik\u00bb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.4. Krijimi n\u00eb serverat e shk\u00ebmbimit ose n\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebs t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rrejshme n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00ebmarr\u00ebsi legjitim t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit:<br \/>\nU1.4.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUISU1\">\u00abModeli standard t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Nj\u00eb sistem informatik i nd\u00ebrtuar mbi arkitektur\u00ebn klient-server. U1. Veprimet e paautorizuara t\u00eb kryera nga sulmuesit n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesi legjitim\u00bb.<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<p>U1.5. Modifikimi i paautorizuar i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit me ndihm\u00ebn e softuerit t\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave:<br \/>\nU1.5.1.  p\u00ebrmes ndryshimeve t\u00eb paautorizuara t\u00eb b\u00ebra nga keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit n\u00eb parametrat (konfiguracionin) e softuerit p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave.<br \/>\nU1.5.2.  p\u00ebrmes ndryshimeve t\u00eb paautorizuara t\u00eb b\u00ebra nga keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit n\u00eb skedar\u00ebt ekzekutiv\u00eb t\u00eb softuerit p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave.<br \/>\nU1.5.3.  p\u00ebrmes kontrollit interaktiv nga ana e keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsve mbi funksionimin e softuerit p\u00ebr p\u00ebrpunimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave.<\/p>\n<p>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZI\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h2>MODEL I STANDARDIZUAR T\u00cb K\u00cbRC\u00cbNIMEVE. SISTEMI I MBROJTJES KRIPTOGRAFIKE T\u00cb INFORMACIONIT<\/h2>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Objekti i mbrojtjes, p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin aplikohet modeli i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve (scope)<\/h3>\n<p>\nObjekti i mbrojtjes \u00ebsht\u00eb sistemi i mbrojtjes kripterografike t\u00eb informacionit, i p\u00ebrdorur p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar sigurin\u00eb e sistemit informatik.<\/p>\n<p><b>Arkitektura<\/b><br \/>\nBaza e \u00e7do sistemi informatik \u00ebsht\u00eb software aplikativ (POS) q\u00eb realizon funksionalitetin e tij t\u00eb synuar. <\/p>\n<p>Mbrojtja kriptografike shpesh realizohet p\u00ebrmes thirrjes s\u00eb primitieveve kriptografike nga logjika e biznesit t\u00eb softuerit aplikativ, t\u00eb cilat vendosen n\u00eb biblioteka t\u00eb specializuara \u2013 b\u00ebrthama kriptografike.<\/p>\n<p>Primitivet kriptografike p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb funksione kriptografike t\u00eb nivelit t\u00eb ul\u00ebt, t\u00eb tilla si:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>t\u00eb enkriptoj\u00eb \/ dekryptoj\u00eb nj\u00eb bllok t\u00eb dh\u00ebnash;<\/li>\n<li>t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb \/ verifikoj\u00eb nj\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrim elektronik p\u00ebr nj\u00eb bllok t\u00eb dh\u00ebnash;<\/li>\n<li>t\u00eb llogaris\u00eb nj\u00eb funksion hash p\u00ebr nj\u00eb bllok t\u00eb dh\u00ebnash;<\/li>\n<li>t\u00eb formoj\u00eb \/ ngarkoj\u00eb \/ shkarkoj\u00eb informacionin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit;<\/li>\n<li>etj.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nLogjika e biznesit t\u00eb softuerit aplikativ me ndihm\u00ebn e primitiv\u00ebve kriptografik\u00eb realizon funksionalitete m\u00eb t\u00eb larta:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>t\u00eb enkriptoj\u00eb nj\u00eb skedar me \u00e7el\u00ebsat e marr\u00ebsve t\u00eb zgjedhur;<\/li>\n<li>t\u00eb vendos\u00eb nj\u00eb lidhje t\u00eb sigurt n\u00eb rrjet;<\/li>\n<li>t\u00eb informoj\u00eb mbi rezultatet e verifikimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik;<\/li>\n<li>e t\u00eb tjera.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nNd\u00ebrveprimi mes logjik\u00ebs s\u00eb biznesit dhe b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike mund t\u00eb b\u00ebhet:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>direkt, duke thirrur primitiv\u00ebt kriptografik\u00eb nga logjika e biznesit nga bibliotekat dinamike t\u00eb b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike (.DLL \u2013 p\u00ebr Windows, .SO \u2013 p\u00ebr Linux);<\/li>\n<li>nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsisht, p\u00ebrmes interfaceve kriptografike \u2013 mb\u00ebshtjell\u00ebsve (wrappers), p\u00ebr shembull, MS Crypto API, Java Cryptography Architecture, PKCS#11 etj. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast, logjika e biznesit i drejtohet kripto-interfacit, dhe ai e translen t\u00eb thirrjen n\u00eb b\u00ebrtham\u00ebn p\u00ebrkat\u00ebse kriptografike, e cila n\u00eb nj\u00eb rast t\u00eb till\u00eb quhet provajder kriptografik. P\u00ebrdorimi i interfaceve kriptografike lejon softuerit aplikativ t\u00eb abstenoj\u00eb nga algoritmet konkrete kriptografike dhe t\u00eb jet\u00eb m\u00eb fleksib\u00ebl.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>\nMund t\u00eb dallohet dy skema standarde p\u00ebr organizimin e b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike:<\/p>\n<p><i>Skema 1 \u2013 B\u00ebrthama kriptografike monolite<\/i><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/e5186d11e4e0e9ad9361f3935228bc30.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\n<i>Skema 2 \u2013 B\u00ebrthama kriptografike t\u00eb ndar\u00eb<\/i><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/9953d524fbee78d7e4eb917e9d56a38f.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nElement\u00ebt n\u00eb skemat e p\u00ebrmendura mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb si module t\u00eb ve\u00e7anta t\u00eb softuerit q\u00eb punojn\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb kompjuter, ashtu edhe sh\u00ebrbime rrjet\u00ebse q\u00eb nd\u00ebrveprojn\u00eb brenda nj\u00eb rrjeti kompjuterik.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimin e sistemeve t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuara sipas skem\u00ebs 1, softueri aplikativ dhe b\u00ebrthama kriptografike punojn\u00eb brenda nj\u00eb mjedisi t\u00eb vet\u00ebm funksional t\u00eb mjeteve kriptografike (MFK), p\u00ebr shembull, n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtin kompjuter, n\u00ebn menaxhimin e s\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebs sistem operativ. P\u00ebrdoruesi i sistemit, zakonisht, mund t\u00eb filloj\u00eb gjithashtu brenda k\u00ebtij t\u00eb nj\u00ebjti mjedisi funksional dhe programe t\u00eb tjera, p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb ato q\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb kod t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm. N\u00ebn kushte t\u00eb tilla, ekziston nj\u00eb rrezik t\u00eb konsideruesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr rrjedhjen e \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur kriptografik\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr t\u00eb minimalizuar rrezikun, aplikohet skema 2, ku b\u00ebrthama kriptografike ndahet n\u00eb dy pjes\u00eb:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Pjesa e par\u00eb s\u00eb bashku me softuerin aplikativ punon n\u00eb nj\u00eb mjedis t\u00eb pa besuesh\u00ebm, ku ekziston rreziku i infektimit me kod t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm. T\u00eb k\u00ebsaj pjese do ta quajm\u00eb \u2013 \"pjesa e softuerit\".<\/li>\n<li>Pjesa e dyt\u00eb punon n\u00eb nj\u00eb mjedis t\u00eb besuesh\u00ebm n\u00eb nj\u00eb pajisje t\u00eb dedikuar, e cila p\u00ebrmban nj\u00eb depo t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur. T\u00eb k\u00ebsaj pjese do ta quajm\u00eb \u2013 \"pjesa harduerike\".<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nNdarja e b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike n\u00eb pjes\u00eb softuerike dhe harduerike \u00ebsht\u00eb mjaft e kusht\u00ebzuar. N\u00eb treg ka sisteme t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuara sipas skem\u00ebs me b\u00ebrtham\u00eb t\u00eb ndar\u00eb, por \"pjesa harduerike\" e t\u00eb cilave paraqitet n\u00eb form\u00ebn e nj\u00eb imazhi t\u00eb makineris\u00eb virtuale \u2014 virtual HSM (<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.unboundtech.com\/product\/unbound-key-control\/\">shembull<\/a><\/noindex>).<\/p>\n<p>Nd\u00ebrveprimi mes t\u00eb dyja pjes\u00ebve t\u00eb b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike ndodh n\u00eb nj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb q\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsat e mbyllur kriptografik\u00eb kurr\u00eb nuk transferohen n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn softuerike dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, nuk mund t\u00eb vidhen p\u00ebrmes kodit t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n<p>Interfaca e nd\u00ebrveprimit (API) dhe grupi i primitivave kriptografik\u00eb, q\u00eb ofrohen aplikacionit t\u00eb softuerit nga pika e kriptos, jan\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb dy rastet t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00eb. Dallimi q\u00ebndron n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00ebn e realizimit t\u00eb tyre.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebshtu, kur p\u00ebrdoret skema me pika kripto t\u00eb ndara, nd\u00ebrveprimi i pjes\u00ebs programore dhe asaj harduerike kryhet mbi k\u00ebt\u00eb princip:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Primitivat kriptografik\u00eb, q\u00eb nuk k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur (p.sh., llogaritja e funksionit hash, kontrolli i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik etj.), kryhen nga pjesa programore.<\/li>\n<li>Primitivat kriptografik\u00eb, q\u00eb p\u00ebrdorin \u00e7el\u00ebsin e mbyllur (krijimi i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik, dekriptimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave etj.), kryhen nga pjesa harduerike.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nDo t\u00eb ilustrojm\u00eb funksionimin e pik\u00ebs kripto t\u00eb ndar\u00eb p\u00ebr shembullin e krijimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Pjesa programore llogarit funksionin hash t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruara dhe p\u00ebrmes kanalit t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit nd\u00ebrmjet pikave kripto d\u00ebrgon k\u00ebt\u00eb vler\u00eb n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn harduerike.<\/li>\n<li>Pjesa harduerike, duke p\u00ebrdorur \u00e7el\u00ebsin e mbyllur dhe hash-in, formon vler\u00ebn e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik dhe p\u00ebrmes kanalit t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit e d\u00ebrgon at\u00eb n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn programore.<\/li>\n<li>Pjesa programore e kthen vler\u00ebn e marr\u00eb n\u00eb aplikacionin e p\u00ebrdoruesit.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\n<b>Karakteristikat e verifikimit t\u00eb sakt\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Kur fillon tuba e pranuesit t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e n\u00ebnshkruara me n\u00ebnshkrim elektronik, ai duhet t\u00eb kaloj\u00eb disa etapa verifikimi. Nj\u00eb rezultat pozitiv i verifikimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik arrihet vet\u00ebm pas kalimit me sukses t\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha etapave t\u00eb verifikimit.<\/p>\n<p><i>Etapa 1. Kontrolli i integritetit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave dhe autor\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb tyre.<\/i><\/p>\n<p><u>P\u00ebrmbajtja e etap\u00ebs.<\/u> Kjo p\u00ebrfshin verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave sipas algoritmit p\u00ebrkat\u00ebs kriptografik. Kalimi me sukses i k\u00ebtij etape tregon q\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat nuk jan\u00eb modifikuar q\u00eb nga n\u00ebnshkrimi, dhe gjithashtu se n\u00ebnshkrimi \u00ebsht\u00eb kryer me \u00e7el\u00ebsin privat t\u00eb cilit i p\u00ebrgjigjet \u00e7el\u00ebsi publik p\u00ebr verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik.<br \/>\n<u>Vendi i kryerjes s\u00eb etap\u00ebs:<\/u> kriptoqendra.<\/p>\n<p><i>Etapa 2. Kontrolli i besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb ndaj \u00e7el\u00ebsit publik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruarit dhe kontrolli i afatit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit privat t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik.<\/i><br \/>\n<u>P\u00ebrmbajtja e etap\u00ebs.<\/u> Kjo etap\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet nga dy n\u00ebn-etapa. N\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00ebn, vendoset n\u00ebse \u00e7el\u00ebsi publik p\u00ebr verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik ishte i besuesh\u00ebm n\u00eb momentin e n\u00ebnshkrimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. N\u00eb t\u00eb dyt\u00ebn, vendoset n\u00ebse \u00e7el\u00ebsi privat i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik ka qen\u00eb aktiv n\u00eb momentin e n\u00ebnshkrimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. N\u00eb rastin e p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm, afatet e vlefshm\u00ebris\u00eb s\u00eb k\u00ebtyre \u00e7el\u00ebsave mund t\u00eb mos p\u00ebrkojn\u00eb (p.sh., p\u00ebr certifikata t\u00eb kualifikuara t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb verifikimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimeve elektronike). M\u00ebnyrat p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e \u00e7el\u00ebsit publik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruarit p\u00ebrcaktohen nga rregullat e shk\u00ebmbimit elektronik t\u00eb dokumenteve t\u00eb miratuara nga pal\u00ebt q\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunojn\u00eb.<br \/>\n<u>Vendi i kryerjes s\u00eb etap\u00ebs:<\/u> softuer aplikues \/ kriptoqend\u00ebr.<\/p>\n<p><i>Etapa 3. Kontrolli i autorizimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit.<\/i><br \/>\n<u>P\u00ebrmbajtja e etap\u00ebs.<\/u> Sipas rregullave t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuara p\u00ebr shk\u00ebmbimin elektronik t\u00eb dokumenteve, kontrollohet n\u00ebse n\u00ebnshkruesi kishte t\u00eb drejt\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrtetonte t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e mbrojtura. P\u00ebr shembull, le t\u00eb marrim nj\u00eb situat\u00eb shkeljeje t\u00eb autorizimit. Supozoni se ka nj\u00eb organizat\u00eb ku t\u00eb gjith\u00eb punonj\u00ebsit kan\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrim elektronik. N\u00eb sistemin e brendsh\u00ebm t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit elektronik t\u00eb dokumenteve arrin nj\u00eb urdh\u00ebr nga drejtori, por i n\u00ebnshkruar me n\u00ebnshkrim elektronik nga menaxheri i magazin\u00ebs. Si rrjedhoj\u00eb, nj\u00eb dokument i till\u00eb nuk mund t\u00eb konsiderohet legjitim.<br \/>\n<u>Vendi i kryerjes s\u00eb etap\u00ebs:<\/u> softuer aplikues.<\/p>\n<p><b>Supozimet e pranuara gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrshkrimit t\u00eb objektit t\u00eb mbrojtjes<\/b><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Kanalet e transferimit t\u00eb informacionit, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 kanaleve t\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave, kalojn\u00eb gjithashtu p\u00ebrmes softuerit aplikues, API dhe kriptoqendr\u00ebs.<\/li>\n<li>Informacioni mbi besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb ndaj \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb dhe (ose) certifikatave, si dhe informatat mbi autorizimin e pronar\u00ebve t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb, ruhen n\u00eb depozitat e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb.<\/li>\n<li>Softueri aplikues punon me depozitat e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb p\u00ebrmes kriptoqendr\u00ebs.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Shembull i nj\u00eb sistemi informatik t\u00eb mbrojtur me ndihm\u00ebn e SKZI<\/h3>\n<p>\nP\u00ebr t\u00eb ilustruar skemat e paraqitura m\u00eb par\u00eb, le t\u00eb shqyrtojm\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem informatik hipotez\u00eb dhe t\u00eb ndajm\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb element\u00ebt struktural\u00eb t\u00eb tij. <\/p>\n<p><b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i sistemit informatik<\/b><\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/74f3e2fd669ed97f50253fbb4b348f6f.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nDy organizata vendos\u00ebn t\u00eb implementojn\u00eb nj\u00eb shk\u00ebmbim elektronik dokumentesh (\u00cbD) me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi ligjore nd\u00ebrmjet tyre. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye, ato n\u00ebnshkruan nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje, n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebn p\u00ebrcaktohet se dokumentet do t\u00eb d\u00ebrgohen p\u00ebrmes post\u00ebs elektronike, duke u kriptuar dhe n\u00ebnshkruar me n\u00ebnshkrim elektronik t\u00eb kualifikuar. Si mjete p\u00ebr krijimin dhe p\u00ebrpunimin e dokumenteve duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoren programet zyrtare nga paketa Microsoft Office 2016, dhe si mjete p\u00ebr mbrojtjen kriptografike \u2014 SKZI KriptoPRO dhe softuerin e enkriptimit KriptoARM.<\/p>\n<p><b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i infrastruktur\u00ebs t\u00eb organizat\u00ebs 1<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Organizata 1 vendosi t\u00eb installoj\u00eb SKZI KryptoPRO dhe softuerin KryptoARM n\u00eb A\u0420\u041c-n\u00eb e p\u00ebrdoruesit \u2014 kompjuterin fizik. \u00c7el\u00ebsat e enkriptimit dhe n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik do t\u00eb ruhen n\u00eb nj\u00eb aparat ky\u00e7 ruToken, q\u00eb punon n\u00eb modalitetin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb k\u00ebtush\u00ebm. P\u00ebrdoruesi do t\u00eb p\u00ebrgatis\u00eb dokumentet elektronike lokal n\u00eb kompjuterin e tij, pas \u00e7ka do t\u2019i enkriptoj\u00eb, n\u00ebnshkruaj\u00eb dhe d\u00ebrgoj\u00eb p\u00ebrmes klientit t\u00eb post\u00ebs t\u00eb instaluar lokal.<\/p>\n<p><b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i infrastruktur\u00ebs s\u00eb organizat\u00ebs 2<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Organizata 2 vendosi t\u00eb transferoj\u00eb funksionet e enkriptimit dhe n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik n\u00eb nj\u00eb makin\u00eb virtuale t\u00eb dedikuar. T\u00eb gjitha operacionet kriptografike do t\u00eb realizohen n\u00eb modalitetin automatik. <\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb, n\u00eb nj\u00eb makin\u00eb virtuale t\u00eb dedikuar jan\u00eb organizuar dy dosje rrjetesh: &#171;&#8230;In&#187;, &#171;&#8230;Out&#187;. N\u00eb dosjen rrjet t\u00eb &#171;&#8230;In&#187; do t\u00eb vendosen automatikisht skedar\u00ebt e marr\u00eb nga kontraktori n\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb hapur. K\u00ebta skedar\u00eb do t\u00eb deshifrohen, dhe mbi ta do t\u00eb kontrollohet n\u00ebnshkrimi elektronik.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb dosjen &#171;&#8230;Out&#187; p\u00ebrdoruesi do t\u00eb vendos\u00eb skedar\u00ebt q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb kriptohen, n\u00ebnshkruhen dhe d\u00ebrgohen kontraktorit. Vet\u00eb skedar\u00ebt p\u00ebrdoruesi do t'i p\u00ebrgatis\u00eb n\u00eb APM-n\u00eb e tij.<br \/>\nP\u00ebr realizimin e funksioneve t\u00eb enkriptimit dhe n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik n\u00eb makin\u00ebn virtuale jan\u00eb instaluar SKZI KryptoPRO, softueri KryptoARM dhe klienti i post\u00ebs. Menaxhimi automatik i t\u00eb gjith\u00eb elementeve t\u00eb makin\u00ebs virtuale do t\u00eb realizohet p\u00ebrmes skripteve t\u00eb zhvilluara nga administrator\u00ebt e sistemeve. Puna e skripteve do t\u00eb protokollohet n\u00eb skedar\u00eb t\u00eb regjistrave (logs).<\/p>\n<p>\u00c7el\u00ebsat kriptografik\u00eb t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik do t\u00eb ruhen n\u00eb nj\u00eb token t\u00eb pa\u00e7armissh\u00ebm JaCarta GOST, t\u00eb cilin p\u00ebrdoruesi do ta lidh\u00eb me kompjuterin e tij lokal.<\/p>\n<p>Token do t\u00eb transmetohet n\u00eb makin\u00ebn virtuale p\u00ebrmes mjeteve t\u00eb specializuara software USB-over-IP, t\u00eb instaluara si n\u00eb A\u0420\u041c-n\u00eb e p\u00ebrdoruesit ashtu edhe n\u00eb makin\u00ebn virtuale.<\/p>\n<p>Or\u00ebt sistemike n\u00eb A\u0420\u041c-n\u00eb e p\u00ebrdoruesit n\u00eb organizat\u00ebn 1 do t\u00eb rregullohen manualisht. Or\u00ebt sistemike t\u00eb makin\u00ebs virtuale t\u00eb specializuar n\u00eb organizat\u00ebn 2 do t\u00eb sinkronizohen me or\u00ebt sistemike t\u00eb hipervizorit, i cili, nga ana e tij, do t\u00eb sinkronizohet n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet Internetit me server\u00ebt publik\u00eb t\u00eb koh\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<p><b>Dallohet elementet strukturore t\u00eb SKZI<\/b><br \/>\nN\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me p\u00ebrshkrimin e dh\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb Infrastruktur\u00ebs IT, do t\u00eb dallojm\u00eb elementet strukturore t\u00eb SKZI-s\u00eb dhe do t'i regjistrojm\u00eb ato n\u00eb nj\u00eb tabel\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p><i>Tabel\u00eb \u2014 P\u00ebrputhja e elementeve t\u00eb modelit SKZI me elementet e sistemeve informacionit<\/i> <\/p>\n<p><b>Emri i elementit<\/b><br \/>\n<b>Organizata 1<\/b><br \/>\n<b>Organizata 2<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Softueri aplikativ<br \/>\nSoftware KryptoARM<br \/>\nSoftware KryptoARM<\/p>\n<p>Pjesa programore e kripto-nuk\u00ebs<br \/>\nSKZI KryptoPRO CSP<br \/>\nSKZI KryptoPRO CSP<\/p>\n<p>Pjesa hardware e kripto-nuk\u00ebs<br \/>\nmungon<br \/>\nJaCarta GOST<\/p>\n<p>API<br \/>\nMS CryptoAPI<br \/>\nMS CryptoAPI<\/p>\n<p>Depozita e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit;<br \/>\n \u2014 depozita standarde e certifikatave t\u00eb Windows.<br \/>\nHipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit;<br \/>\n \u2014 depozita standarde e certifikatave t\u00eb Windows.<\/p>\n<p>Depozita e \u00e7el\u00ebsave privat<br \/>\nPajisja ruToken, q\u00eb punon n\u00eb modalitetin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb k\u00ebtush\u00ebm<br \/>\nPajisja JaCarta GOST, q\u00eb punon n\u00eb modalitetin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb pa\u00e7armish\u00ebm<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<\/p>\n<p>Hipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave privat<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 autobusi USB;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<br \/>\nmungon<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit midis kripto-nukave<br \/>\nnuk ka (nuk ka pjes\u00eb hardware e kripto-nuk\u00ebs)<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 autobusi USB;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 moduli programor USB-over-IP;<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore.<\/p>\n<p>Rrjeti korporativ i organizat\u00ebs 2.<\/p>\n<p>Hipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 moduli programor USB-over-IP.<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb hapura<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 mjetet e hyrjes dhe daljes;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 mjetet e hyrjes dhe daljes;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit;<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore.<\/p>\n<p>Rrjeti korporativ i organizat\u00ebs 2.<\/p>\n<p>Hipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore; <br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale: <br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore; <br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura<br \/>\nInternet.<\/p>\n<p>Rrjeti korporativ i organizat\u00ebs 1.<\/p>\n<p>A\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore.<\/p>\n<p>Internet.<\/p>\n<p>Rrjeti korporativ i organizat\u00ebs 2.<\/p>\n<p>Hipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore; <br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale: <br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore; <br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i transmetimit t\u00eb koh\u00ebs<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 mjetet e hyrjes dhe daljes;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 timeri sistematik.<\/p>\n<p>Internet. <br \/>\nRrjeti korporativ i organizat\u00ebs 2,<\/p>\n<p>Hipervizori:<br \/>\n \u2014 nd\u00ebrfaqja rrjetore;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 timeri sistematik.<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 timeri sistematik.<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i transmetimit t\u00eb komandave menaxhuese<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 mjetet e hyrjes dhe daljes;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<\/p>\n<p>(Nd\u00ebrfaqja grafike e p\u00ebrdoruesit t\u00eb softuerit KryptoARM)<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>(Skripte automatizimi)<\/p>\n<p>Kanali i pranimit t\u00eb rezultateve t\u00eb pun\u00ebs<br \/>\nA\u0420\u041c i p\u00ebrdoruesit:<br \/>\n \u2014 mjetet e hyrjes dhe daljes;<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative.<\/p>\n<p>(Nd\u00ebrfaqja grafike e p\u00ebrdoruesit t\u00eb softuerit KryptoARM)<\/p>\n<p>Makin\u00eb virtuale:<br \/>\n \u2014 memorie operative;<br \/>\n \u2014 disku i harduerit.<\/p>\n<p>(Skedar\u00ebt e regjistrave t\u00eb pun\u00ebs s\u00eb skripteve t\u00eb automatizimit)<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>K\u00ebrc\u00ebnime p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb n\u00eb nivelin e lart\u00eb<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Sqarime<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Supozimet e pranuara gjat\u00eb dekompozimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>P\u00ebrdoren algoritme kriptografike t\u00eb forta.<\/li>\n<li>Algoritmet kriptografike p\u00ebrdoren n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb sigurt n\u00eb modet e duhura t\u00eb funksionimit (p.sh., <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"http:\/\/cryptowiki.net\/index.php?title=Electronic_Code_Book\">ECB<\/a><\/noindex> nuk p\u00ebrdoret p\u00ebr enkriptimin e sasive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, duke marr\u00eb parasysh ngarkes\u00ebn e lejuar mbi \u00e7el\u00ebs etj.).<\/li>\n<li>Keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit jan\u00eb t\u00eb njohur me t\u00eb gjith\u00eb algoritmet, protokollet dhe \u00e7el\u00ebsat publik\u00eb q\u00eb p\u00ebrdoren.<\/li>\n<li>Keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit kan\u00eb akses p\u00ebr t\u00eb lexuar t\u00eb gjitha t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e enkriptuara.<\/li>\n<li>Keqb\u00ebr\u00ebsit jan\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb riprodhojn\u00eb \u00e7do element programor n\u00eb sistem.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><\/p>\n<p>U1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave kriptografik\u00eb privat.<br \/>\nU2. Enkriptimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebrguesit legjitim.<br \/>\nU3. Dekriptimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb enkriptuara nga persona q\u00eb nuk jan\u00eb marr\u00ebs t\u00eb legjitim t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave (keqb\u00ebr\u00ebs).<br \/>\nU4. Krijimi i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit legjitim me t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme.<br \/>\nU5. Marrja e nj\u00eb rezultati pozitiv n\u00eb verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme.<br \/>\nU6. Pranimi gabim i dokumenteve elektronike p\u00ebr zbatim p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb problemeve n\u00eb organizimin e dokumentacionit elektronik.<br \/>\nU7. Qasje t\u00eb paautorizuar n\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e mbrojtura gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit nga SKZI.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU1\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur kriptografik.<\/h3>\n<p>\nU1.1. Marrja e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur nga depoja e \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur.<\/p>\n<p>U1.2. Marrja e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur nga objektet e mjedisit t\u00eb funksionimit t\u00eb mjeteve kriptografike, ku ai mund t\u00eb q\u00ebndroj\u00eb p\u00ebrkoh\u00ebsisht.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.2.<\/i><\/p>\n<p>Objektet ku \u00e7el\u00ebsi i mbyllur mund t\u00eb ruhet p\u00ebrkoh\u00ebsisht p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>memoria operative, <\/li>\n<li>skedar\u00ebt e p\u00ebrkohsh\u00ebm, <\/li>\n<li>skedar\u00ebt e ndihm\u00ebs, <\/li>\n<li>skedar\u00ebt e hibernimit, <\/li>\n<li>skedar\u00ebt e snapshoteve t\u00eb gjendjes \"aktive\" t\u00eb makinerive virtuale, duke p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb skedar\u00ebt e p\u00ebrmbajtjes s\u00eb memories operative t\u00eb makinerive virtuale q\u00eb jan\u00eb pezulluar.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>\nU1.2.1. Nxjerrja e \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur nga memoria operative aktive duke ngrir\u00eb modulet e RAM-it, duke i nxjerr\u00eb ato dhe pastaj duke lexuar t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat (freeze attack).<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.2.1.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.securitylab.ru\/analytics\/452899.php\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U1.3. Marrja e \u00e7el\u00ebsi t\u00eb mbyllur nga kanali i shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.3.<\/i><br \/>\nNj\u00eb shembull i realizimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij rreziku do t\u00eb jepet. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA3\">m\u00eb posht\u00eb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U1.4. Modifikimi t\u00eb paautorizuar i b\u00ebrtham\u00ebs kriptografike, rezultati i s\u00eb cil\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb se \u00e7el\u00ebsat e mbyllur b\u00ebhen t\u00eb njohur p\u00ebr sulmuesit.<\/p>\n<p>U1.5. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur si rezultat i p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb kanaleve teknike t\u00eb rrjedhjes s\u00eb informacioneve (TKUI).<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.5.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.usenix.org\/system\/files\/conference\/usenixsecurity18\/sec18-alam.pdf\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U1.6. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur si rezultat i p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb mjeteve teknike speciale (STS) t\u00eb destinuara p\u00ebr t\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr informacione n\u00eb fsheht\u00ebsi (\"bug\").<\/p>\n<p>U1.7. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur gjat\u00eb ruajtjes s\u00eb tyre jasht\u00eb SKZI.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegime U1.7.<\/i><br \/>\nP\u00ebr shembull, nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorues ruan veglat e tij t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit n\u00eb sirtarin e tavolin\u00ebs s\u00eb pun\u00ebs, nga i cili ato mund t\u00eb nxirren leht\u00eb nga sulmuesit.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU2\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U2. Enkriptimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebrguesit legjitim.<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Sqarime<\/b><br \/>\nKy rrezik shqyrtohet vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr skemat e enkriptimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave me autentikimin e d\u00ebrguesit. Shembuj t\u00eb till\u00eb t\u00eb skemave jan\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshira n\u00eb rekomandimet p\u00ebr standardizimin. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/tc26.ru\/standarts\/rekomendatsii-po-standartizatsii\/r-1323565-1-004-2017-informatsionnaya-tekhnologiya-kriptograficheskaya-zashchita-informatsii-skhemy-vyrabotki-obshchego-klyucha-s-autentifikatsiey-na-osnove-otkrytogo-klyucha.html\">R 1323565.1.004-2017 \"Teknologji informative. Mbrojtja kriptografike e informacionit. Skemat e prodhimit t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt me autentikim n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit publik\".<\/a><\/noindex>. P\u00ebr skemat e tjera kriptografike nuk ekziston ky rrezik, pasi enkriptime b\u00ebhet me \u00e7el\u00ebsat publik\u00eb t\u00eb marr\u00ebsit, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi jan\u00eb t\u00eb njohur p\u00ebr sulmuesit.<\/p>\n<p><b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU2.1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb mbyllur t\u00eb d\u00ebrguesit:<br \/>\nU2.1.1. Lidhja: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIU1\">\"Modeli standard i rreziqeve. Sistemi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb informacionit. U1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur kriptografik.\"<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U2.2. Z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave hyr\u00ebse n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave publike.<br \/>\n<i>Sh\u00ebnime U2.2.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj t\u00eb realizimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij rreziku jepen m\u00eb posht\u00eb. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA1\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA2\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU3\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U3. Zhvillimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb enkriptuara nga persona q\u00eb nuk jan\u00eb marr\u00ebs legjitim t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave (sulmuesit).<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU3.1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur t\u00eb marr\u00ebsit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb enkriptuara. <br \/>\nU3.1.1. Referenca: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIU1\">\"Modeli standard i rreziqeve. Sistemi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb informacionit. U1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur kriptografik.\"<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U3.2. Z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb enkriptuara n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU4\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U4. Krijimi i n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit legjitim me t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme.<br \/>\n<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU4.1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit legjitim. <br \/>\nU4.1.1. Referenca: <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIU1\">\"Modeli standard i rreziqeve. Sistemi i mbrojtjes kriptografike t\u00eb informacionit. U1. Komprometimi i \u00e7el\u00ebsave t\u00eb mbyllur kriptografik.\"<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U4.2. Z\u00ebvend\u00ebsimi i t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave q\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruhen n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave publike.<br \/>\n<i>Sh\u00ebnim U4.2.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj t\u00eb realizimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij rreziku jepen m\u00eb posht\u00eb. <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA1\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex> dhe <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA2\">k\u00ebtu<\/a><\/noindex>.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU5\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U5. Marrja e nj\u00eb rezultati pozitiv n\u00eb verifikimin e n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb rreme.<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU5.1. Sulmuesit kapin n\u00eb kanalin e transmetimit t\u00eb rezultateve t\u00eb pun\u00ebs nj\u00eb mesazh mbi rezultatin negativ t\u00eb verifikimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik dhe e z\u00ebvend\u00ebsojn\u00eb at\u00eb me nj\u00eb mesazh me rezultat pozitiv.<\/p>\n<p>U5.2. Sulmuesit kryejn\u00eb nj\u00eb sulm n\u00eb besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e certifikatave t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit (<b>SKENARI \u2014 t\u00eb gjitha elementet jan\u00eb t\u00eb detyrueshme.<\/b>):<br \/>\nU5.2.1. Sulmuesit gjenerojn\u00eb nj\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebs t\u00eb hapur dhe nj\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebs t\u00eb mbyllur t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik. N\u00ebse sistemi p\u00ebrdor certifikata t\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave elektronik\u00eb t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit, ata gjenerojn\u00eb nj\u00eb certifikat\u00eb t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb sa m\u00eb af\u00ebr t\u00eb jet\u00eb e mundur me certifikat\u00ebn e d\u00ebrguesit t\u00eb supozuar t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, mesazhin e t\u00eb cilit d\u00ebshirojn\u00eb ta falsifikojn\u00eb.<br \/>\nU5.2.2. Sulmuesit b\u00ebjn\u00eb ndryshime t\u00eb paautorizuara n\u00eb depozitat e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb, duke u dh\u00ebn\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb hapur t\u00eb gjeneruar prej tyre nivelin e nevojsh\u00ebm t\u00eb besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb dhe autorizimeve.<br \/>\nU5.2.3. Sulmuesit n\u00ebnshkruajn\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme me \u00e7el\u00ebsin e n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb formuar m\u00eb par\u00eb dhe i integropozitojn\u00eb ato n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura.<\/p>\n<p>U5.3. Sulmuesit realizojn\u00eb nj\u00eb sulm duke p\u00ebrdorur \u00e7el\u00ebsa t\u00eb skaduar t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit ligjor (<b>SKENARI \u2014 t\u00eb gjitha elementet jan\u00eb t\u00eb detyrueshme.<\/b>):<br \/>\nU5.3.1. Sulmuesit komprometojn\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsa privat\u00eb t\u00eb skaduar (t\u00eb pavlefsh\u00ebm n\u00eb at\u00eb moment) t\u00eb d\u00ebrguesit legjitim.<br \/>\nU5.3.2. Sulmuesit ndryshojn\u00eb koh\u00ebn n\u00eb kanalin e transmetimit t\u00eb koh\u00ebs n\u00eb nj\u00eb koh\u00eb kur \u00e7el\u00ebsat e komprometuar ishin akoma t\u00eb vlefsh\u00ebm.<br \/>\nU5.3.3. Sulmuesit n\u00ebnshkruajn\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme me \u00e7el\u00ebsin e n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb komprometuar m\u00eb par\u00eb dhe i integrojn\u00eb ato n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura.<\/p>\n<p>U5.4. Sulmuesit realizojn\u00eb nj\u00eb sulm duke p\u00ebrdorur \u00e7el\u00ebsa t\u00eb komprometuar t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruesit ligjor (<b>SKENARI \u2014 t\u00eb gjitha elementet jan\u00eb t\u00eb detyrueshme.<\/b>):<br \/>\nU5.4.1. Sulmuesit krijojn\u00eb nj\u00eb kopje t\u00eb depozit\u00ebs s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb.<br \/>\nU5.4.2. Sulmuesit komprometojn\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsa privat\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00eb nga d\u00ebrguesit legjitim\u00eb. Ai e v\u00ebren komprometimin, t\u00ebrheq \u00e7el\u00ebsat, dhe informacioni rreth t\u00ebrheqjes s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit vendoset n\u00eb depozit\u00ebn e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb.<br \/>\nU5.4.3. Sulmuesit z\u00ebvend\u00ebsojn\u00eb depozit\u00ebn e \u00e7el\u00ebsave publik\u00eb me at\u00eb q\u00eb kishin kopjuar m\u00eb par\u00eb.<br \/>\nU5.4.4. Sulmuesit n\u00ebnshkruajn\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb rreme me \u00e7el\u00ebsin e n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb komprometuar m\u00eb par\u00eb dhe i integroni ato n\u00eb kanalin e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5. &lt;&#8230;&gt; nga shkaku i gabimeve n\u00eb zbatimin e 2-t\u00eb dhe 3-t\u00eb t\u00eb procesit t\u00eb verifikimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik:<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U5.5.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli i implementimit t\u00eb k\u00ebtij k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi \u00ebsht\u00eb paraqitur <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/422329\/#TMUSKZIA4\">m\u00eb posht\u00eb<\/a><\/noindex>.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5.1. Verifikimi i besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb ndaj \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital vet\u00ebm n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb pranis\u00eb s\u00eb besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb ndaj \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs me t\u00eb cilin \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruar, pa verifikime CRL ose OCSP.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U5.5.1.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli i realizimit <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/post\/332730\/\">k\u00ebrc\u00ebnime<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U5.5.2. Kur nd\u00ebrtosh zinxhirin e besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00eb, nuk analizohet autoriteti i \u00e7ertifikatave lansuese<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U5.5.2.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli i nj\u00eb sulmi ndaj \u00e7ertifikatave SSL\/TLS. <br \/>\nSulmuesit blen\u00eb nj\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00eb legjitime p\u00ebr e-mailin e tyre. M\u00eb pas ata b\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00eb mashtruese p\u00ebr nj\u00eb sit dhe e n\u00ebnshkruan at\u00eb me \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebn e tyre. N\u00ebse nuk kryhet verifica e autoritetit, at\u00ebher\u00eb n\u00eb verifikimin e zinxhirit t\u00eb besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb ai do t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb i sakt\u00eb, dhe p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, \u00e7ertifikata mashtruese do t\u00eb jet\u00eb gjithashtu korrekte.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5.3. Kur nd\u00ebrtosh zinxhirin e besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00eb, nuk kontrollohen \u00e7ertifikatat nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebse p\u00ebr t\u00ebrheqje.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5.4. P\u00ebrdit\u00ebsimi i CRL ndodh m\u00eb rrall\u00eb sesa l\u00ebshohen nga autoriteti certifikues.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5.5. Vendimi p\u00ebr besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb ndaj n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital merret para se t\u00eb pranohet p\u00ebrgjigja OCSP mbi statusin e \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs, e cila \u00ebsht\u00eb d\u00ebrguar pas nj\u00eb k\u00ebrkese t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb von\u00eb se koha e formimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit ose p\u00ebrpara se t\u00eb pranohet CRL-i i ardhsh\u00ebm pas formimit t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit. <br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U5.5.5.<\/i><br \/>\nN\u00eb rregulloret e shumic\u00ebs s\u00eb AC-ve, koha e t\u00ebrheqjes s\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs konsiderohet koha e l\u00ebshimit t\u00eb CRL-t\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb af\u00ebrt, q\u00eb p\u00ebrmban informacionin mbi t\u00ebrheqjen e \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs.<\/p>\n<p>U5.5.6. Kur pranohet t\u00eb dh\u00ebna t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruara, nuk kontrollohet p\u00ebrkat\u00ebsia e \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebs ndaj d\u00ebrguesit. <br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U5.5.6.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli i nj\u00eb sulmi. N\u00eb lidhje me \u00e7ertifikat\u00ebt SSL: mund t\u00eb mos kontrollohet p\u00ebrputhja e adres\u00ebs s\u00eb serverit t\u00eb ndihmuar me vler\u00ebn e fushes CN n\u00eb \u00e7ertifikat\u00eb.<br \/>\nShembulli i nj\u00eb sulmi. Sulmuesit kan\u00eb komprometuar \u00e7el\u00ebsat e n\u00ebnshkrimit digjital t\u00eb nj\u00ebrit nga pjes\u00ebmarr\u00ebsit n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave. M\u00eb pas ata kan\u00eb thyer rrjetin e nj\u00eb pjes\u00ebmarr\u00ebsi tjet\u00ebr dhe n\u00eb em\u00ebr t\u00eb tij d\u00ebrguan n\u00eb serverin e llogaris\u00eb s\u00eb sistemit t\u00eb pagesave dokumentet e pages\u00ebs, t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruara me \u00e7el\u00ebsat e komprometuar. N\u00ebse serveri analizon vet\u00ebm besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb dhe nuk kontrollon p\u00ebrputhshm\u00ebrin\u00eb, at\u00ebher\u00eb dokumentet mashtruese do t\u00eb konsiderohen legjitime.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU6\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U6. Pranimi gabim i dokumenteve elektronike p\u00ebr zbatim p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb problemeve n\u00eb organizimin e dokumentacionit elektronik.<\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><br \/>\nU6.1. An\u00ebtari q\u00eb pranon nuk zb\u53d1\u73b0 njohjen e dokumenteve t\u00eb marra.<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U6.1.<\/i><br \/>\nShembulli i nj\u00eb sulmi. Sulmuesit mund t\u00eb kapin dokumentin e transmetuar n\u00eb drejtim t\u00eb marr\u00ebsit, madje edhe n\u00eb kushte t\u00eb mbrojtura me kriptografi, dhe m\u00eb pas ta d\u00ebrgojn\u00eb at\u00eb shum\u00eb her\u00eb n\u00eb kanalin e transmetimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura. N\u00ebse marr\u00ebsi nuk identifikon dublikatat, t\u00eb gjitha dokumentet e marra do t\u00eb perceptohen dhe p\u00ebrpunohen si dokumente t\u00eb ndryshme.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIU7\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h3>U7. Qasja e paautorizuar ndaj t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb mbrojtura gjat\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb SKZI <\/h3>\n<p>\n<b>Dekompocimi<\/b><\/p>\n<p>U7.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb rrjedhjes s\u00eb informacionit p\u00ebrmes kanaleve t\u00eb jashtme (sulm nga kanali i jasht\u00ebm).<br \/>\n<i>Shpjegimet U7.1.<\/i><br \/>\nShembuj <noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.cs.tau.ac.il\/~tromer\/synesthesia\/synesthesia.pdf\">t\u00eb sulmit<\/a><\/noindex>. <\/p>\n<p>U7.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb neutralizimit t\u00eb mbrojtjes nga qasja jo e autorizuar n\u00eb informacionin q\u00eb p\u00ebrpunohen n\u00eb SKZI:<br \/>\nU7.2.1. Shfryt\u00ebzimi i SKZI me shkelje t\u00eb k\u00ebrkesave t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruara n\u00eb dokumentacionin mbi SKZI.<\/p>\n<p>U7.2.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt;, e kryer p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb pranis\u00eb s\u00eb dob\u00ebsi n\u00eb:<br \/>\nU7.2.2.1. &lt;&#8230;&gt; mjeteve t\u00eb mbrojtjes nga qasja e paautorizuar.<br \/>\nU7.2.2.2. &lt;&#8230;&gt; vet\u00eb SKZI.<br \/>\nU7.2.2.3. &lt;&#8230;&gt; mjedisin e funksionimit t\u00eb mjeteve kripto.<\/p>\n<h3>shembuj sulmesh<\/h3>\n<p>\nSkema t\u00eb trajtuara m\u00eb posht\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb q\u00ebllimisht gabime n\u00eb organizimin e siguris\u00eb informacionit dhe sh\u00ebrbejn\u00eb vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr ilustruese t\u00eb mundshmeve t\u00eb sulmimeve.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIA1\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h4>Skema 1. Shembuj i implementimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve U2.2 dhe U4.2.<\/h4>\n<p>\n<b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i objektit<\/b><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/77d51167720552df4eb9c2bafbce6765.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nSOFTWARE I ARM KBR dhe SCZI SCAD Sigantura \u00ebsht\u00eb vendosur n\u00eb nj\u00eb kompjuter fizik, i pap\u00ebrfshir\u00eb n\u00eb rrjetin e kompjuter\u00ebve. Si nj\u00eb mjet ky\u00e7 p\u00ebrdoret FKN vdToken n\u00eb modin e pun\u00ebs me nj\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebs t\u00eb pa nxjerrsh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n<p>Rregulli p\u00ebr realizimin e llogarive parashikon q\u00eb specialisti i llogarive shkarkon mesazhet elektronike nga kompjuteri i tij t\u00eb pun\u00ebs n\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb hapur (skema e vjet\u00ebr e ARM KBR) nga nj\u00eb server t\u00eb sigurt t\u00eb dosjeve, pastaj i regjistron ato n\u00eb nj\u00eb mjet t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm USB dhe i transferon n\u00eb ARM KBR, ku ato kodifikohen dhe n\u00ebnshkruhen. Pas k\u00ebsaj, specialisti transferon n\u00eb nj\u00eb mjet t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm mesazhet elektronike t\u00eb mbrojtura, dhe m\u00eb pas p\u00ebrmes kompjuterit t\u00eb tij t\u00eb pun\u00ebs i regjistron ato n\u00eb serverin e dosjeve, nga ku kalojn\u00eb n\u00eb UTA dhe m\u00eb pas n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast, kanalet e shk\u00ebmbimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb hapura dhe t\u00eb mbrojtura do t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshijn\u00eb: serverin e dosjeve, kompjuterin e pun\u00ebs t\u00eb specialistit dhe mjetin e jasht\u00ebm.<\/p>\n<p><b>Sulmi<\/b><br \/>\nHaker\u00ebt e paautorizuar instalohet n\u00eb kompjuterin e pun\u00ebs t\u00eb specialistit nj\u00eb sistem t\u00eb menaxhimit t\u00eb larg\u00ebt dhe n\u00eb momentin kur regjistrohet n\u00eb mjetin e jasht\u00ebm pagesat (mesazhet elektronike) n\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb hapur, ndryshojn\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajtjen e nj\u00ebrit prej tyre. Specialistit transferon pagesat n\u00eb ARM KBR, n\u00ebnshkruan dhe kodifikojn\u00eb ato, pa e v\u00ebn\u00eb re ndryshimin (p.sh., p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb numrit t\u00eb madh t\u00eb pagesave n\u00eb rrug\u00eb, lodhjes etj.). Pas k\u00ebsaj, pagesa e falsifikuar, duke kaluar p\u00ebrmes zinxhirit teknologjik, kalon n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIA2\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h4>Skema 2. Shembuj i implementimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve U2.2 dhe U4.2.<\/h4>\n<p>\n<b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i objektit<\/b><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/b4489290d665b359323ec6b58dde1139.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nKompiuteri me instalimet e ARM KBR, SCAD Sigantura dhe me mjetin ky\u00e7 t\u00eb lidhur FKN vdToken funksionon n\u00eb nj\u00eb ambient t\u00eb dedikuar pa akses nga ana e personelit.<br \/>\nSpecialisti i llogarive lidhet me ARM KBR n\u00eb modin e aksesit t\u00eb larg\u00ebt p\u00ebrmes protokollit RDP.<\/p>\n<p><b>Sulmi<\/b><br \/>\nHaker\u00ebt presin kredencialet q\u00eb specialisti i llogarive p\u00ebrdor p\u00ebr t'u lidhur dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb punuar me ARM KBR (p.sh., p\u00ebrmes kodit t\u00eb d\u00ebmsh\u00ebm n\u00eb kompjuterin e tij). M\u00eb pas, ata lidh\u00eb n\u00eb emrin e tij dhe d\u00ebrgojn\u00eb nj\u00eb porosi t\u00eb falsifikuar n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIA3\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h4>Skema 3. Shembuj i implementimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit U1.3. <\/h4>\n<p>\n<b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i objektit<\/b><br \/>\n<img decoding=\"async\" alt=\"Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet standarde t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve\" src=\"\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/04\/988a97dd75247780556d388566d771f0.jpg\" style=\"display:block;margin: 0 auto;\" \/><br \/>\n<br \/>\nT\u00eb shqyrtojm\u00eb nj\u00eb nga opsionet hipotetike t\u00eb implementimit t\u00eb moduleve t\u00eb integrimit \"ABS-KBR\" p\u00ebr skem\u00ebn e re (ARM KBR-N), ku n\u00ebnshkrimi elektronik i dokumenteve n\u00eb dalje ndodh n\u00eb an\u00ebn e ABS. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast, le t\u00eb presim q\u00eb ABS funksionon mbi nj\u00eb sistem operativ q\u00eb nuk mb\u00ebshtetet nga SCZI SCAD Sigantura, dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, funksionaliteti kriptografik \u00ebsht\u00eb transferuar n\u00eb nj\u00eb makin\u00eb virtuale t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb - moduli i integrimit \"ABS-KBR\".<br \/>\nSi nj\u00eb mjet ky\u00e7 p\u00ebrdoret nj\u00eb USB-tok\u00ebn e zakonshme, e cila punon n\u00eb modin e \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb nxjerrsh\u00ebm. Kur \u00ebsht\u00eb lidhur mjeti ky\u00e7 n\u00eb hipervizor, u shqyrtua se nuk kishte porte USB t\u00eb lira n\u00eb sistem, prandaj u vendos t\u00eb lidhej USB-tok\u00ebn n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet nj\u00eb koncentratori USB n\u00eb rrjet, dhe n\u00eb makin\u00eb virtuale t\u00eb instaloheshin klienti USB-over-IP, i cili do t\u00eb realizonte lidhjen me koncentratorin.<\/p>\n<p><b>Sulmi<\/b><br \/>\nHaker\u00ebt e kap\u00ebn \u00e7el\u00ebsin privat t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik n\u00eb kanalin e komunikimit midis koncentratorit USB dhe hipervizorit (t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat u d\u00ebrguan n\u00eb form\u00eb t\u00eb hapur). Duke pasur \u00e7el\u00ebsin privat, haker\u00ebt formuluan nj\u00eb porosi t\u00eb falsifikuar t\u00eb pages\u00ebs, e n\u00ebnshkruan me n\u00ebnshkrimin elektronik dhe e d\u00ebrguan p\u00ebr ekzekutim n\u00eb ARM KBR-N.<br \/>\n<noindex><a rel=\"nofollow\" name=\"TMUSKZIA4\"><\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n<h4>Skema 4. Shembuj i implementimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve U5.5.<\/h4>\n<p>\n<b>P\u00ebrshkrimi i objektit<\/b><br \/>\nLe t\u00eb shqyrtojm\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn skem\u00eb si n\u00eb skenarin e m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm. Le t\u00eb supozojm\u00eb se mesazhet elektronike q\u00eb vijn\u00eb nga APM KBR-N hyjn\u00eb n\u00eb dosjen &#8230;SHAREIn, dhe ato q\u00eb d\u00ebrgohen n\u00eb APM KBR-N dhe m\u00eb pas n\u00eb sistemin e pagesave t\u00eb Bank\u00ebs s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb, hyjn\u00eb n\u00eb &#8230;SHAREout.<br \/>\nDo t\u00eb supozojm\u00eb gjithashtu q\u00eb gjat\u00eb zbatimit t\u00eb modulit t\u00eb integrimit, listat e certifikatave t\u00eb t\u00ebrhequra p\u00ebrdit\u00ebsohen vet\u00ebm gjat\u00eb rip\u00ebrpilimit t\u00eb \u00e7elzave kriptografik\u00eb, si dhe se mesazhet elektronike q\u00eb mb\u00ebrrijn\u00eb n\u00eb dosjen ...SHAREIn kontrollohen vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr q\u00ebllime t\u00eb kontrollit t\u00eb integritetit dhe kontrollit t\u00eb besueshm\u00ebris\u00eb s\u00eb \u00e7el\u00ebsit t\u00eb hapur t\u00eb n\u00ebnshkrimit elektronik.<\/p>\n<p><b>Sulmi<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Hajdut\u00ebt, duke shfryt\u00ebzuar \u00e7el\u00ebsat e vjedhur n\u00eb skenarin e m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm, n\u00ebnshkruan nj\u00eb urdh\u00ebrpages\u00eb t\u00eb falsifikuar, q\u00eb p\u00ebrmban informacione p\u00ebr pranimin e parave n\u00eb llogarin\u00eb e klientit-mashtrues dhe e fut\u00ebn at\u00eb n\u00eb kanal p\u00ebr shk\u00ebmbimin e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb sigurt. Pasiq\u00eb kontrolli p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar q\u00eb urdh\u00ebrpagesa \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruar pik\u00ebrisht nga Banka e Rusis\u00eb nuk kryhet, ajo pranohet p\u00ebr ekzekutim.<br \/>\n<br \/>Burimi: <a content=\"nofollow\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/habr.com\/ru\/post\/422329\/\">habr.com<\/a><\/p>","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u041e \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 1 \u2014 \u042d\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 2 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f IT-\u0438\u043d\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0430. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 3 \u2014 \u0424\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 4 \u2014 \u041e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false,"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"html"}]},"author":1,"featured_media":23545,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[688],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-31627","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-administrirovanie"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.0.1 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u041e \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 1 \u2014 \u042d\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 2 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f IT-\u0438\u043d\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0430. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 3 \u2014 \u0424\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 4 \u2014 \u041e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"max-image-preview:large\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Yuri Gagarin\"\/>\n\t<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"generator\" content=\"All in One SEO (AIOSEO) 5.0.0.1\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"sq_AL\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"\ud83e\udd47\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 8 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437 | ProHoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"\u041e \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 1 \u2014 \u042d\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 2 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f IT-\u0438\u043d\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0430. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 3 \u2014 \u0424\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 4 \u2014 \u041e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:secure_url\" content=\"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"350\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2019-10-31T18:42:14+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2019-10-31T18:42:14+00:00\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster\" \/>\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO -->\n\n","aioseo_head_json":{"title":"\ud83e\udd47Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 8 \u2014 Modelet tipike t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve | ProHoster","description":"Cila \u00ebsht\u00eb tematika e hulumtimit Lidhjet me pjes\u00eb t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb hulumtimit Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 1 \u2014 Bazat ekonomike. Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 2 \u2014 Infrastruktur\u00eb tipike IT e bank\u00ebs. Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 3 \u2014 Formimi i k\u00ebrkesave p\u00ebr sistemin e mbrojtjes. Siguria informative e pagesave bankare pa para. Pjesa 4 \u2014 Rishikimi i standardeve t\u00eb modelimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve. Siguria informative e","canonical_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz","robots":"max-image-preview:large","keywords":"","webmasterTools":{"miscellaneous":""},"schema":null,"og:locale":"sq_AL","og:site_name":"ProHoster | \u041a\u0443\u043f\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0441\u0430\u0439\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0442 DDoS, VPS VDS \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u0440\u044b","og:type":"article","og:title":"\ud83e\udd47\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 8 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437 | ProHoster","og:description":"\u041e \u0447\u0435\u043c \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0435 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 1 \u2014 \u042d\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 2 \u2014 \u0422\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f IT-\u0438\u043d\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0430. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 3 \u2014 \u0424\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c\u0435 \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0442\u044b. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0431\u0430\u043d\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0436\u0435\u0439. \u0427\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c 4 \u2014 \u041e\u0431\u0437\u043e\u0440 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437. \u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f","og:url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-bankovskih-beznalichnyh-platezhej-chast-8-tipovye-modeli-ugroz","og:image":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:secure_url":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/logo-350.jpg","og:image:width":350,"og:image:height":350,"article:published_time":"2019-10-31T18:42:14+00:00","article:modified_time":"2019-10-31T18:42:14+00:00","article:publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster","article:author":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/prohoster"},"aioseo_meta_data":{"post_id":"31627","title":null,"description":null,"keywords":null,"keyphrases":null,"primary_term":null,"canonical_url":null,"og_title":null,"og_description":null,"og_object_type":"default","og_image_type":"default","og_image_url":null,"og_image_width":null,"og_image_height":null,"og_image_custom_url":null,"og_image_custom_fields":null,"og_video":null,"og_custom_url":null,"og_article_section":null,"og_article_tags":null,"twitter_use_og":false,"twitter_card":"default","twitter_image_type":"default","twitter_image_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_url":null,"twitter_image_custom_fields":null,"twitter_title":null,"twitter_description":null,"schema":{"blockGraphs":[],"customGraphs":[],"default":{"data":{"Article":[],"Course":[],"Dataset":[],"FAQPage":[],"Movie":[],"Person":[],"Product":[],"ProductReview":[],"Car":[],"Recipe":[],"Service":[],"SoftwareApplication":[],"WebPage":[]},"graphName":"","isEnabled":true},"graphs":[]},"schema_type":null,"schema_type_options":null,"pillar_content":false,"robots_default":true,"robots_noindex":false,"robots_noarchive":false,"robots_nosnippet":false,"robots_nofollow":false,"robots_noimageindex":false,"robots_noodp":false,"robots_notranslate":false,"robots_max_snippet":null,"robots_max_videopreview":null,"robots_max_imagepreview":"large","priority":null,"frequency":null,"local_seo":null,"seo_analyzer_scan_date":"2026-01-21 07:04:20","breadcrumb_settings":null,"limit_modified_date":false,"reviewed_by":null,"ai":null,"created":"2021-03-01 03:13:29","updated":"2026-01-21 07:04:20","focus_keyword":null,"additional_keywords":null,"truseo_locale":null},"gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"link","format":"url"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31627","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31627"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31627\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23545"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31627"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31627"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31627"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}