{"id":34264,"date":"2019-10-31T21:57:17","date_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:57:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/blog\/glavnaya-prichina-avarij-v-data-tsentrah-prokladka-mezhdu-kompyuterom-i-kreslom\/"},"modified":"2019-10-31T21:57:17","modified_gmt":"2019-10-31T18:57:17","slug":"glavnaya-prichina-avarij-v-data-tsentrah-prokladka-mezhdu-kompyuterom-i-kreslom","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prohoster.info\/sq\/blog\/administrirovanie\/glavnaya-prichina-avarij-v-data-tsentrah-prokladka-mezhdu-kompyuterom-i-kreslom","title":{"rendered":"Shkaku kryesor i aksidenteve n\u00eb qendrat e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave \u00ebsht\u00eb distanca midis kompjuterit dhe karriges","gt_translate_keys":[{"key":"rendered","format":"text"}]},"content":{"rendered":"

Tema e aksidenteve t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb qendrat moderne t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave ka shkaktuar pyetje p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilat n\u00eb artikullin e par\u00eb nuk ishin dh\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebrgjigje \u2014 ne vendos\u00ebm ta zgjerojm\u00eb.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n\"Shkaku<\/a><\/noindex><\/p>\n

N\u00ebse i besojm\u00eb statistikave t\u00eb Uptime Institute, pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e incidenteve n\u00eb qendrat e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave \u00ebsht\u00eb e lidhur me d\u00ebshtimet e sistemit t\u00eb furnizimit me energji elektrike \u2014 ato p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb 39% t\u00eb ngjarjeve. Pas tyre ndodh faktor\u00ebt njer\u00ebzor\u00eb \u2014 kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe 24% e aksidenteve. Arsyet e treta m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme (15%) jan\u00eb d\u00ebshtimet e sistemit t\u00eb klim\u00ebs, nd\u00ebrsa n\u00eb vendin e kat\u00ebrt (12%) jan\u00eb katastrofat natyrore. Shuma e pjes\u00ebs tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb problemeve p\u00ebrb\u00ebn vet\u00ebm 10%. Pa e v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb dyshim t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e k\u00ebsaj organizate t\u00eb nderuar, do t\u00eb ve\u00e7ojm\u00eb di\u00e7ka t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt n\u00eb aksidente t\u00eb ndryshme dhe do t\u00eb p\u00ebrpiqemi t\u00eb kuptojm\u00eb n\u00ebse ato mund t\u00eb ishin shmangur. Spoiler: mund n\u00eb shumic\u00ebn e rasteve.<\/p>\n

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Shkenca e kontakteve<\/h2>\n

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Thjesht duke folur, me energjin\u00eb ka vet\u00ebm dy probleme: ose kontakti nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb aty ku duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb, ose ai \u00ebsht\u00eb aty ku nuk duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb. Mund t\u00eb flasim gjat\u00eb p\u00ebr besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e sistemeve moderne t\u00eb furnizimit me energji t\u00eb papenguar, por ato nuk e shp\u00ebtojn\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb situat\u00ebn. Merrni rastin e njohur t\u00eb qendr\u00ebs s\u00eb p\u00ebrpunimit t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb British Airways, q\u00eb i takon grupit mam\u00eb International Airlines Group. Af\u00ebr aeroportit Heathrow ndodhen dy objekte t\u00eb tilla \u2014 Boadicea House dhe Comet House. N\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00ebn, m\u00eb 27 maj 2017, ndodhi nj\u00eb shk\u00ebputje aksidentale e energjis\u00eb, e cila \u00e7oi n\u00eb mbingarkim dhe d\u00ebshtimin e sistemit UPS. Si rezultat, nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e pajisjeve IT u d\u00ebmtua fizikisht, dhe p\u00ebr zgjidhjen e k\u00ebsaj ndodhi nevojitej tri dit\u00eb. <\/p>\n

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Kompania ajrore ishte e detyruar t\u00eb anulonte ose t\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktonte m\u00eb shum\u00eb se nj\u00eb mij\u00eb fluturime, rreth 75 mij\u00eb pasagjer\u00eb nuk arrit\u00ebn t\u00eb fluturojn\u00eb n\u00eb koh\u00eb - pagesa e kompensimeve arriti n\u00eb $128 milion, pa llogaritur shpenzimet e nevojshme p\u00ebr rikthimin n\u00eb funksion t\u00eb qendrave t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave. Historia e arsyeve t\u00eb blackouts mbetet e paqart\u00eb. N\u00ebse i besojm\u00eb rezultateve t\u00eb hetimit t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm q\u00eb u shpall\u00ebn nga drejtoresha e p\u00ebrgjithshme e International Airlines Group, Willie Walsh, ngjarja ndodhi p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb nj\u00eb gabimi nga inxhinier\u00ebt. Megjithat\u00eb, sistemi i furnizimit me energji elektrike duhet t\u00eb kishte p\u00ebrballuar nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrprerje t\u00eb till\u00eb - p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye \u00ebsht\u00eb instaluar. Qendrat e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave ishin n\u00ebn menaxhimin e specialist\u00ebve t\u00eb kompanis\u00eb s\u00eb jashtme CBRE Managed Services, prandaj British Airways p\u00ebrpiqet t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb shum\u00ebn e d\u00ebmshp\u00ebrblimit n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet gjykat\u00ebs n\u00eb Lond\u00ebr. <\/p>\n

\n\"Shkaku<\/p>\n

Aksidentet me furnizimin me energji ndodhin sipas skenar\u00ebve t\u00eb ngjash\u00ebm: fillimisht ndodh nj\u00eb ndales\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb furnizuesit t\u00eb energjis\u00eb, ndonj\u00ebher\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb motit t\u00eb keq ose problemeve t\u00eb brendshme (p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb gabim njer\u00ebzor), dhe m\u00eb pas sistemi i furnizimit t\u00eb vazhduesh\u00ebm me energji nuk p\u00ebrballon ngarkes\u00ebn ose nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrprerje t\u00eb p\u00ebrkohshme t\u00eb sinusoides shkakton d\u00ebshtimin e shum\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimeve, p\u00ebr rikuperimin e funksionit t\u00eb t\u00eb cilave nevojitet shum\u00eb koh\u00eb dhe para. A mund t\u00eb shmangen k\u00ebto aksidente? Patjet\u00ebr. N\u00ebse sistemi projektohet si\u00e7 duhet, megjithat\u00eb as krijuesit e m\u00ebdhenj t\u00eb QENDRAVE t\u00eb T\u00cb DH\u00cbNAVE nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb mbrojtur nga gabimet. <\/p>\n

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Faktori njer\u00ebzor<\/h2>\n

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Kur shkaktari kryesor i incidentit \u00ebsht\u00eb veprimi i gabuar i stafit t\u00eb nj\u00eb qendre t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, problemet shpesh (por jo gjithmon\u00eb) prekin pjes\u00ebn software t\u00eb infrastruktur\u00ebs IT. K\u00ebto aksidente ndodhin edhe n\u00eb korporatat e m\u00ebdha. N\u00eb shkurt t\u00eb vitit 2017, p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb nj\u00eb gabimi t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb nga nj\u00eb an\u00ebtar i ekipit t\u00eb mir\u00ebmbajtjes teknike t\u00eb nj\u00eb prej qendrave t\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e server\u00ebve t\u00eb Amazon Web Services u nd\u00ebrpre. Gabimi ndodhi gjat\u00eb procesit t\u00eb debugging t\u00eb faturimit p\u00ebr klient\u00ebt e sh\u00ebrbimit t\u00eb ruajtjes n\u00eb re Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3). Punonj\u00ebsi p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb fshirja nj\u00eb sasi server\u00ebsh virtual\u00eb q\u00eb ishin duke u p\u00ebrdorur nga sistemi i faturimit, por preku nj\u00eb klaster m\u00eb t\u00eb madh.<\/p>\n

\n\"Shkaku<\/p>\n

Si shkak i nj\u00eb gabimi nga inxhinier\u00ebt, jan\u00eb fshir\u00eb server\u00ebt n\u00eb t\u00eb cil\u00ebt ishin t\u00eb instaluara module t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme softuer\u00ebsh t\u00eb sistemit t\u00eb ruajtjes n\u00eb re Amazon. S\u00eb pari, u d\u00ebmtua n\u00ebn-sistemi i indeksimit, i cili p\u00ebrmbante informacion rreth metadata-s dhe vendndodhjes s\u00eb t\u00eb gjitha objekteve S3 n\u00eb rajonin amerikan US-EAST-1. Incidenti ndikoi gjithashtu n\u00ebn-sistemin q\u00eb p\u00ebrdorej p\u00ebr ruajtjen e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave dhe menaxhimin e hap\u00ebsir\u00ebs s\u00eb disponueshme p\u00ebr ruajtje. Pas fshirjes s\u00eb makinave virtuale, k\u00ebto dy n\u00ebn-sisteme k\u00ebrkuan nj\u00eb rip\u00ebrs\u00ebritje t\u00eb plot\u00eb, dhe m\u00eb pas inxhinier\u00ebt e Amazon u p\u00ebrball\u00ebn me nj\u00eb surpriz\u00eb \u2014 p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb, sistemi publik i ruajtjes n\u00eb re nuk ishte n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbente k\u00ebrkesat e klient\u00ebve. <\/p>\n

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Efekti u tregua i madh, pasi shum\u00eb burime t\u00eb m\u00ebdha p\u00ebrdorin Amazon S3. \u00c7rregullimet preken Trello, Coursera, IFTTT dhe, \u00e7ka \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e keqe, sh\u00ebrbimet e partnersve t\u00eb m\u00ebdhenj t\u00eb Amazon nga lista S&P 500. T\u00eb shp\u00ebrndahen d\u00ebm n\u00eb k\u00ebto raste \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb, por rendi i tij ishte rreth qindra miliona dollar\u00eb amerikan\u00eb. si\u00e7 e shihni, p\u00ebr t\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar sh\u00ebrbimin e platform\u00ebs m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb cloud-it, mjafton nj\u00eb urdh\u00ebr i gabuar. Kjo nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb rast i ve\u00e7ant\u00eb, m\u00eb 16 maj 2019, gjat\u00eb punimeve parandaluese sh\u00ebrbimi Yandex.Cloud fshiu<\/a><\/noindex> makinat virtuale t\u00eb p\u00ebrdoruesve n\u00eb zon\u00ebn ru-central1-c, t\u00eb cilat nj\u00ebher\u00eb kan\u00eb qen\u00eb n\u00eb statusin SUSPENDED. K\u00ebtu jan\u00eb prekur t\u00eb dh\u00ebnat e klient\u00ebve, nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e t\u00eb cilave jan\u00eb humbur pa kthim. Sigurisht, njer\u00ebzit nuk jan\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrsosur, por sistemet moderne t\u00eb siguris\u00eb informatike tashm\u00eb din\u00eb ta kontrollojn\u00eb veprimtarin\u00eb e p\u00ebrdoruesve me privilegje para se t\u00eb ekzekutojn\u00eb komandat e dh\u00ebna nga ata. N\u00ebse t\u00eb tilla zgjidhje implementohen n\u00eb Yandex ose Amazon, incidente t\u00eb ngjashme mund t\u00eb shmangen.<\/p>\n

\n\"Shkaku<\/p>\n

Ftohja e ngrir\u00eb<\/h2>\n

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N\u00eb janar 2017 ndodhi nj\u00eb aksident i r\u00ebnd\u00eb n\u00eb Qendr\u00ebn e t\u00eb Dh\u00ebnave t\u00eb kompanis\u00eb \"Megafon\" n\u00eb Dmitrov. Temperaturat n\u00eb rajonin e Mosk\u00ebs ran\u00eb deri n\u00eb -35 \u00b0C, q\u00eb \u00e7oi n\u00eb d\u00ebshtimin e sistemeve t\u00eb ftohjes t\u00eb objektit. Sh\u00ebrbimi i shtypit i operatorit nuk b\u00ebri shum\u00eb komente mbi shkakun e incidentit \u2014 kompanit\u00eb ruse jan\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb rezervuara p\u00ebr t\u00eb folur mbi aksidentet n\u00eb objektet e tyre, dhe n\u00eb aspektin e transparenc\u00ebs jemi shum\u00eb prapa Per\u00ebndimit. N\u00eb mediat sociale, qarkullonte versioni se l\u00ebnda e ftoht\u00eb kishte ngrir\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebr tubat q\u00eb kalonin n\u00eb rrug\u00eb dhe se kishte rrjedhje etileni glikoli. N\u00ebse besojm\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb, sh\u00ebrbimi i operacionit nuk arriti t\u00eb merrte shpejt 30 ton l\u00ebnde ftoh\u00ebse p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb festave t\u00eb zgjatura dhe po p\u00ebrpiqej t\u00eb improvizonte nj\u00eb sistem ftohjeje t\u00eb improvizuar duke shkelur rregullat e funksionimit t\u00eb sistemit. I ftohti i madh p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsoi problemin \u2014 n\u00eb janar, n\u00eb Rusi papritmas erdhi dimri, ndon\u00ebse askush nuk e priste. N\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim, stafi u detyrua t\u00eb \u00e7aktivizonte nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb raft\u00ebve t\u00eb server\u00ebve, q\u00eb rezultoi n\u00eb munges\u00ebn e aksesit p\u00ebr disa sh\u00ebrbime t\u00eb operatorit p\u00ebr dy dit\u00eb. <\/p>\n

\n\"Shkaku<\/p>\n

Ndoshta, k\u00ebtu mund t\u00eb flitet edhe p\u00ebr nj\u00eb anomali klimatike, por temperatura kaq t\u00eb ul\u00ebta nuk jan\u00eb di\u00e7ka e pazakont\u00eb p\u00ebr rajonin e kryeqytetit. Temperatura gjat\u00eb dimrit n\u00eb Podmoskovje mund t\u00eb bjer\u00eb edhe n\u00eb shkall\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebt, prandaj qendrat e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave nd\u00ebrtohen me parashikimin p\u00ebr pun\u00eb t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme n\u00eb \u221242\u00b0\u0421. M\u00eb shpesh, sistemet e ftohjes d\u00ebshtojn\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb ftoht\u00eb p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb nj\u00eb koncentrimi jo mjaft t\u00eb lart\u00eb t\u00eb glikol\u00ebve dhe tep\u00ebr t\u00eb ujit n\u00eb zgjidhjen e transportuesit t\u00eb nxeht\u00ebsis\u00eb. Ka gjithashtu probleme me montimin e tubave ose me llogaritjet n\u00eb projektim dhe testim t\u00eb sistemit, t\u00eb lidhura kryesisht me d\u00ebshir\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb kursyer. N\u00eb p\u00ebrfundim, ndodhin aksidente serioze q\u00eb mund t\u00eb ishin parandaluar leht\u00ebsisht.<\/p>\n

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Kataklizma natyrore <\/h2>\n

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M\u00eb shpesh, stuhi dhe\/ose uragane pengojn\u00eb pun\u00ebn e infrastruktur\u00ebs inxhinierike t\u00eb qendr\u00ebs s\u00eb t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave, duke \u00e7uar n\u00eb nd\u00ebrprerjen e sh\u00ebrbimeve dhe\/ose d\u00ebmtimin fizik t\u00eb pajisjeve. Incidentet e provokuara nga moti i keq ndodhin mjaft shpesh. N\u00eb vitin 2012, uragani Sandy me shi t\u00eb fort\u00eb kaloi p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb bregut per\u00ebndimor t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara. Qendra e t\u00eb dh\u00ebnave Peer 1, e vendosur n\u00eb nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrtes\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb n\u00eb Manhattanin e Posht\u00ebm, humbi furnizimin elektrik t\u00eb jasht\u00ebm<\/a><\/noindex>, pasi q\u00eb uji i kripur i detit mbushi bodrumet. Gjenerator\u00ebt emergjent\u00eb t\u00eb objektit ishin vendosur n\u00eb katin e 18-t\u00eb, dhe furnizimi me karburant p\u00ebr ta ishte i kufizuar - rregullat e vendosura n\u00eb New York pas sulmeve t\u00eb 9\/11 ndalojn\u00eb ruajtjen e nj\u00eb sasie t\u00eb madhe karburanti n\u00eb katet e sip\u00ebrme. <\/p>\n

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