Ukukhutshwa kwesiphequluli esikhethekileyo, i-Tor Browser 11.0.2, ibonakaliswe, igxininise ekuqinisekiseni ukungaziwa, ukhuseleko kunye nobumfihlo. Xa usebenzisa i-Tor Browser, zonke i-traffic ziqondiswa kuphela kwinethiwekhi ye-Tor, kwaye akunakwenzeka ukufikelela ngokuthe ngqo ngoqhagamshelwano oluqhelekileyo lwenethiwekhi yenkqubo yangoku, engavumeli ukulandelela idilesi ye-IP yomsebenzisi (ukuba isikhangeli sigqekeziwe, abahlaseli." ungafumana ufikelelo kwindlela yeparameters zenethiwekhi, ngoko ukugqibezela Ukuvala ukuvuza okunokwenzeka, kufuneka usebenzise iimveliso ezinjenge Whonix). Ukwakhiwa kweTor Browser kulungiselelwe iLinux, Windows kunye neMacOS.
Ukubonelela ngokhuseleko olongezelelweyo, iSikhangeli seTor sibandakanya i-HTTPS Yonke indawo yokongeza, ekuvumela ukuba usebenzise ufihlo lwetrafikhi kuzo zonke iisayithi apho kunokwenzeka. Ukunciphisa isoyikiso sokuhlaselwa kweJavaScript kunye ne-block plugins ngokuzenzekelayo, i-NoScript add-on ifakiwe. Ukulwa nokuvalwa kwezithuthi kunye nokuhlolwa, enye isithuthi sisetyenziswa. Ukukhusela ukugqanyiswa kweempawu ezikhethekileyo zondwendwe, iWebGL, iWebGL2, iWebAudio, iNtlalo, iSpeechSynthesis, iTouch, AudioContext, HTMLMediaElement, Mediastream, Canvas, SharedWorker, WebAudio, Permissions, MediaDevices.enumerateDevices, kunye nescreen.orientation APIs ezilinganiselweyo yiscreen. izixhobo zokuthumela itelemetry, ipokotho, iJongo loMfundi, iiNkonzo ezizezinye zeHTTP, iMozTCPSocket, "ikhonkco rel=preconnect", ilungiswe libmdns.
Inguqulelo entsha ingqamanisa kunye nesiseko sekhowudi yokukhutshwa kweFirefox 91.4.0, eyalungisa ubuthathaka be-15, apho i-10 yaphawulwa njengeyingozi. Ubuthathaka be-7 bubangelwa ziingxaki zememori, ezifana nokuphuphuma kwe-buffer kunye nokufikelela kwiindawo zememori esele zikhululiwe, kwaye zinokukhokelela ekuphunyezweni kwekhowudi yomhlaseli xa uvula amaphepha ayilwe ngokukodwa. Ezinye iifonti zettf bezikhutshiwe kulwakhiwo lweqonga leLinux, usebenziso olukhokelele ekuphazanyisweni konikezelo lombhalo kwizinto zojongano kwiFedora Linux. Ulungiselelo lwe "network.proxy.allow_bypass" luvaliwe, olulawula umsebenzi wokukhusela ekusetyenzisweni okungalunganga kweProxy API kwii-add-ons. Kuthutho lwe-obfs4, isango elitsha elithi "deusexmachina" lenziwe ngokuzenzekelayo.
Okwangoku, ibali lokuvimba iTor kwiRussian Federation iyaqhubeka. I-Roskomnadzor itshintshe imaski yeendawo ezivaliweyo kwirejista yeendawo ezithintelweyo ukusuka "www.torproject.org" ukuya "* .torproject.org" kwaye yandisa uluhlu lweedilesi ze-IP ezixhomekeke ekuvinjweni. Utshintsho lubangele ukuba uninzi lwemimandla ephantsi yeprojekthi yeTor ivalwe, kuquka iblog.torproject.org, gettor.torproject.org, kunye ne support.torproject.org. forum.torproject.net, ebanjwe kwi-Discourse infrastructure, ihlala ikhona. Ukufikeleleka ngokuyinxenye yi-gitlab.torproject.org kunye ne-lists.torproject.org, apho ukufikelela bekulahlekile ekuqaleni, kodwa emva koko kwabuyiselwa, mhlawumbi emva kokutshintsha iidilesi ze-IP (i-gitlab ngoku ijoliswe kumamkeli gitlab-02.torproject.org).
Kwangaxeshanye, amasango kunye neenodi zenethiwekhi yeTor, kunye ne-host ajax.aspnetcdn.com (i-Microsoft CDN), esetyenziswe kuthutho olululayo, ayizange iphinde ivalwe. Kuyabonakala ukuba, imifuniselo yokuthintela i-Tor network nodes emva kokuvala iwebhusayithi yeTor iyekile. Imeko enzima ivela kunye nesibuko se-tor.eff.org, esiqhubeka nokusebenza. Inyani yeyokuba isibuko se-tor.eff.org sibotshelelwe kwidilesi ye-IP efanayo esetyenziselwa indawo ye-eff.org ye-EFF (i-Electronic Frontier Foundation), ngoko ke ukuvala i-tor.eff.org kuya kukhokelela ekuthinteleni kancinci indawo yombutho owaziwayo wamalungelo oluntu.
Ukongeza, sinokuqaphela ukupapashwa kwengxelo entsha malunga neenzame ezinokwenzeka zokwenza uhlaselo lokuchaza abasebenzisi beTor abanxulunyaniswa neqela le-KAX17, elichongwe ngee-imeyile ezithile zonxibelelwano olungeyonyani kwiiparamitha ze-node. NgoSeptemba no-Okthobha, iProjekthi yeTor ivalele ii-570 ezinokuthi zibe nobubi. Kwincopho yalo, iqela le-KAX17 likwazile ukunyusa inani leendawo ezilawulwayo kwinethiwekhi yeTor ukuya kwi-900, ebanjwe ngababoneleli abahlukeneyo abangama-50, ehambelana malunga ne-14% yenani elipheleleyo le-relays (ngokuthelekisa, kwi-2014, abahlaseli bakwazile ukuphumelela. ukufumana ulawulo malunga nesiqingatha se-Tor relays, kwaye ngo-2020 ngaphezulu kwe-23.95% yeendawo eziphumayo).
Ukubeka inani elikhulu lee-nodes ezilawulwa ngumqhubi omnye kwenza kube lula uku-de-anonymize abasebenzisi usebenzisa uhlaselo lweklasi ye-Sybil, enokuthi iqhutywe ukuba abahlaseli banolawulo kwi-nodes yokuqala kunye neyokugqibela kwi-chain chainization. Indawo yokuqala kwitsheyini yeTor iyayazi idilesi ye-IP yomsebenzisi, kwaye owokugqibela uyayazi idilesi ye-IP yesixhobo esiceliweyo, esenza kube lula ukungasichazi igama lesicelo ngokongeza ileyibhile ethile efihliweyo kwiipakethe zentloko icala le-node yokufaka, ehlala ingatshintshi kulo lonke ikhonkco lokungaziwa, kunye nokuhlalutya le lebhile kwicala le-node yemveliso. Ngeendawo zokuphuma ezilawulwayo, abahlaseli banokwenza utshintsho kwi-traffic engafihlwanga, njengokususa ukuhanjiswa kwiinguqulelo ze-HTTPS zeesayithi kunye nokuthintela umxholo ongabhalwanga.
Ngokwabameli benethiwekhi yeTor, uninzi lweenodi ezisusiweyo ekwindla zisetyenziswe kuphela njengeendawo eziphakathi, ezingasetyenziswanga ukwenza izicelo ezingenayo neziphumayo. Abanye abaphandi bayaqaphela ukuba i-nodes yayizezo zonke iindidi kunye nethuba lokufikelela kwi-node yegalelo elawulwa liqela le-KAX17 laliyi-16%, kunye ne-node yokuphuma - 5%. Kodwa nokuba oku kunjalo, ke ukuba kunokwenzeka ngokubanzi komsebenzisi ngexesha elifanayo ukubetha i-input kunye ne-output nodes zeqela lama-nodes angama-900 alawulwa yi-KAX17 kuqikelelwa kwi-0.8%. Akukho bungqina buthe ngqo be-KAX17 nodes ezisetyenziselwa ukuhlasela, kodwa uhlaselo olufanayo olunokwenzeka alukwazi ukukhutshwa.
umthombo: opennet.ru