I-RATKing: umkhankaso omusha onama-Trojan okufinyelela kude

Ekupheleni kukaMeyi, sithole umkhankaso wokusabalalisa uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha ye-Remote Access Trojan (RAT)—izinhlelo ezivumela abahlaseli ukuthi balawule bekude isistimu ethelelekile.

Iqembu esilihlolile lahlukaniswa yiqiniso lokuthi alizange likhethe noma yimuphi umndeni we-RAT othile wokutheleleka. AmaTrojan amaningana aqashelwe ekuhlaselweni ngaphakathi komkhankaso (konke obekutholakala kabanzi). Ngalesi sici, leli qembu lisikhumbuze ngenkosi yamagundane - isilwane sasenganekwaneni esiqukethe amagundane anemisila ephothene.

I-original ithathwe ku-monograph ka-K. N. Rossikov "Amagundane namagundane afana negundane, abaluleke kakhulu kwezomnotho" (1908)

Ukuhlonipha lesi sidalwa, siqambe iqembu esilicabangela i-RATKing. Kulokhu okuthunyelwe, sizongena ngemininingwane yokuthi abahlaseli bakwenze kanjani ukuhlasela, yimaphi amathuluzi abawasebenzisile, futhi siphinde sabelane ngemicabango yethu mayelana nokuchazwa kwalo mkhankaso.

Inqubekelaphambili yokuhlasela

Konke ukuhlasela kulo mkhankaso kwenzeke ngokulandela i-algorithm elandelayo:

1. Umsebenzisi uthole i-imeyili yobugebengu bokweba imininingwane ebucayi enesixhumanisi ku-Google Drayivu.
2. Kusetshenziswa isixhumanisi, isisulu silande iskripthi esinonya se-VBS esicacisa umtapo wezincwadi we-DLL ukuze ulayishe umthwalo wokugcina okhokhelwayo kurejista yeWindows futhi sethule i-PowerShell ukuze iwusebenzise.
3. Umtapo wezincwadi we-DLL ujove umthwalo wokugcina wokukhokhelwa - empeleni, enye yama-RAT asetshenziswa abahlaseli - enqubweni yesistimu futhi wabhalisa umbhalo we-VBS ku-autorun ukuze uthole indawo emshinini onegciwane.
4. Inkokhelo yokugcina yenziwe ngenqubo yesistimu futhi yanikeza umhlaseli ikhono lokulawula ikhompuyutha enegciwane.

Ngokohlelo ingamelwa kanje:

Okulandelayo, sizogxila ezigabeni ezintathu zokuqala, njengoba sinentshisekelo endleleni yokulethwa kwe-malware. Ngeke sichaze ngokuningiliziwe indlela yokusebenza kwe-malware ngokwayo. Atholakala kabanzi - athengiswa ezingosini ezikhethekile, noma asatshalaliswa njengamaphrojekthi omthombo ovulekile - ngakho-ke awahlukile eqenjini le-RATKing.

Ukuhlaziywa kwezigaba zokuhlasela

Isiteji 1. I-imeyili yobugebengu bokweba imininingwane ebucayi

Ukuhlasela kuqale ngokuthi isisulu sithole incwadi enonya (abahlaseli basebenzise izifanekiso ezihlukene ezinombhalo; isithombe-skrini esingezansi sibonisa isibonelo esisodwa). Umlayezo ubuqukethe isixhumanisi sekhosombe elisemthethweni drive.google.com, obekucatshangwa ukuthi kuholele ekhasini lokulanda amadokhumenti e-PDF.

Isibonelo se-imeyili yobugebengu bokweba imininingwane ebucayi

Kodwa-ke, empeleni, kwakungewona umbhalo we-PDF owawulayishwe nhlobo, kodwa umbhalo we-VBS.

Lapho uchofoza isixhumanisi esivela ku-imeyili kusithombe-skrini esingenhla, ifayela eliqanjwe igama Cargo Flight Details.vbs. Kulokhu, abahlaseli abazange bazame ngisho nokufihla ifayela njengedokhumenti esemthethweni.

Ngesikhathi esifanayo, njengengxenye yalo mkhankaso, sithole umbhalo oqanjwe ngawo Cargo Trip Detail.pdf.vbs. Ingase ivele idlule ku-PDF esemthethweni ngoba iWindows ifihla izandiso zefayela ngokuzenzakalelayo. Yiqiniso, kulesi simo, izinsolo zisengavuswa isithonjana sayo, esihambisana nombhalo we-VBS.

Kulesi sigaba, isisulu singabona inkohliso: vele ubhekisise amafayela alandiwe umzuzwana. Nokho, emikhankasweni enjalo yobugebengu bokweba imininingwane ebucayi, abahlaseli bavame ukuthembela kumsebenzisi ongaqaphile noma ojahile.

Isigaba 2. Ukusebenza kombhalo we-VBS

Iskripthi se-VBS, umsebenzisi angasivula engazi, sibhalise umtapo wezincwadi we-DLL kurejista ye-Windows. Iskripthi besingacaciswanga: imigqa ekuso ibibhalwe njengamabhayithi ehlukaniswe uhlamvu olungavunyelwe.

Isibonelo sesikripthi esifiphele

I-algorithm ye-deobfuscation ilula kakhulu: uhlamvu ngalunye lwesithathu lwalukhishiwe kuyunithi yezinhlamvu ezifiphele, ngemva kwalokho umphumela wakhishwa ikhodi ukusuka ku-base16 ukuya kuyunithi yezinhlamvu yoqobo. Isibonelo, kusuka kunani 57Q53s63t72s69J70r74e2El53v68m65j6CH6Ct (okuqokonyiswe kusithombe-skrini ngenhla) umugqa waba umphumela WScript.Shell.

Ukwenza izintambo zibe lula, sisebenzise umsebenzi wePython:

def decode_str(data_enc):   
    return binascii.unhexlify(''.join([data_enc[i:i+2] for i in range(0, len(data_enc), 3)]))

Ngezansi, emigqeni 9–10, sigqamisa inani ukufinyezwa kwawo kwe-deobfuscation kuphumele kufayela le-DLL. Nguye owethulwa esigabeni esilandelayo kusetshenziswa iPowerShell.

Intambo ene-Obfuscated DLL

Umsebenzi ngamunye kusikripthi se-VBS wenziwe njengoba amayunithi ezinhlamvu enziwe kalula.

Ngemva kokuqalisa iskripthi, umsebenzi wabizwa wscript.sleep - yayisetshenziselwa ukwenza ukubulawa okuhlehlisiwe.

Okulandelayo, iskripthi sisebenze ne-Windows registry. Usebenzise ubuchwepheshe be-WMI kulokhu. Ngosizo lwayo, ukhiye oyingqayizivele wadalwa, futhi umzimba wefayela elisebenzisekayo labhalwa kupharamitha yalo. Ukubhalisa kufinyelelwe nge-WMI kusetshenziswa umyalo olandelayo:

GetObject(winmgmts {impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\.rootdefault:StdRegProv)

Okufakiwe okwenziwe kurejista ngombhalo we-VBS

Isigaba 3. Ukusebenza komtapo wezincwadi we-DLL

Esigabeni sesithathu, i-DLL enonya ilayishe inkokhelo yokugcina, yayifaka enqubweni yesistimu, futhi yaqinisekisa ukuthi umbhalo we-VBS uqalisa ngokuzenzakalelayo lapho umsebenzisi engena.

Qalisa nge-PowerShell

I-DLL yenziwe kusetshenziswa umyalo olandelayo ku-PowerShell:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Lo myalo wenze okulandelayo:

• ithole idatha yenani lokubhalisa enegama rnd_value_name — le datha bekuyifayela le-DLL elibhalwe ku-platform ye-.Net;
• ilayishe imojuli ewumphumela ye-.Net kumemori yenqubo powershell.exe usebenzisa umsebenzi [System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load() (incazelo enemininingwane yomsebenzi Womthwalo () iyatholakala kuwebhusayithi yeMicrosoft);
• wenze umsebenzi GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK() - ukwenziwa komtapo wezincwadi we-DLL kwaqala ngawo - ngamapharamitha vbsScriptPath, xorKey, vbsScriptName. Ipharamitha xorKey igcine ukhiye wokukhipha ukubethela komthwalo okhokhelwayo wokugcina, namapharamitha vbsScriptPath и vbsScriptName zidluliselwe ukuze kubhaliswe umbhalo we-VBS ku-autorun.

Incazelo yelabhulali ye-DLL

Ngefomu elihlanganisiwe, i-bootloader yayibukeka kanje:

Isilayishi ngefomu elihlakaziwe (umsebenzi okwaqala ngawo ukwenziwa komtapo wezincwadi we-DLL udwetshelwe ngokubomvu)

I-bootloader ivikelwe isivikeli se-.Net Reactor. Insiza ye-de4dot yenza umsebenzi omuhle kakhulu wokususa lesi sivikeli.

Lesi silayishi:

• ifake umthwalo wokukhokha ohlelweni lwesistimu (kulesi sibonelo it svchost.exe);
• Ngengeze iskripthi se-VBS ku-autorun.

Umjovo wokulayisha

Ake sibheke umsebenzi obizwe ngumbhalo we-PowerShell.

Umsebenzi obizwa nge-PowerShell script

Lo msebenzi wenze izenzo ezilandelayo:

• isuse ukubethela amasethi edatha amabili (array и array2 kusithombe-skrini). Ekuqaleni zacindezelwa kusetshenziswa i-gzip futhi zabethelwa nge-algorithm ye-XOR ngokhiye xorKey;
• ikopishe idatha ezindaweni zememori ezabiwe. Idatha evela array - endaweni yenkumbulo ekhonjwe kuyo intPtr (payload pointer kusithombe-skrini); idatha evela array2 - endaweni yenkumbulo ekhonjwe kuyo intPtr2 (shellcode pointer kusithombe-skrini);
• ebizwa ngokuthi umsebenzi CallWindowProcA (incazelo Lo msebenzi uyatholakala kuwebhusayithi yeMicrosoft) ngamapharamitha alandelayo (amagama amapharamitha abhalwe ngezansi, esithombeni-skrini alandelana ngendlela efanayo, kodwa ngamanani asebenzayo):
  • lpPrevWndFunc - pointer idatha kusuka array2;
  • hWnd — isikhombi seyunithi yezinhlamvu equkethe indlela eya efayeleni elisebenzisekayo svchost.exe;
  • Msg - pointer idatha kusuka array;
  • wParam, lParam - amapharamitha womlayezo (kulokhu, le mingcele ayizange isetshenziswe futhi inamanani angu-0);
• udale ifayela %AppData%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup<name>.urlkuphi <name> - lezi yizinhlamvu zokuqala ezi-4 zepharamitha vbsScriptName (kusithombe-skrini, isiqeshana sekhodi esinalesi senzo siqala ngomyalo File.Copy). Ngale ndlela, uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha lungeze ifayela le-URL ohlwini lwamafayela e-autorun lapho umsebenzisi engenile futhi ngaleyo ndlela enamathiselwe kukhompuyutha enegciwane. Ifayela le-URL beliqukethe isixhumanisi esiya kuskripthi:

[InternetShortcut]
URL = file : ///<vbsScriptPath>

Ukuze siqonde ukuthi umjovo wenziwa kanjani, sisuse ukubethela kwamalungu afanayo edatha array и array2. Ukwenza lokhu sisebenzise umsebenzi olandelayo wePython:

def decrypt(data, key):
    return gzip.decompress(
        bytearray([data[i] ^ key[i % len(key)] for i in range(len(data))])[4:])
    

Ngenxa yalokho, sithole ukuthi:

• array kwakuyifayela le-PE - lokhu kuwumthwalo wokugcina wokukhokha;
• array2 kwakuyi-shellcode edingekayo ukwenza umjovo.

Ikhodi yeshell kusuka kuhlu array2 kuphasiswe njengenani lomsebenzi lpPrevWndFunc abe umsebenzi CallWindowProcA. lpPrevWndFunc - umsebenzi we-callback, i-prototype yayo ibukeka kanje:

LRESULT WndFunc(
  HWND    hWnd,
  UINT    Msg,
  WPARAM  wParam,
  LPARAM  lParam
);

Ngakho uma uqhuba umsebenzi CallWindowProcA namapharamitha hWnd, Msg, wParam, lParam I-shellcode evela kuhlelo ifakiwe array2 ngezimpikiswano hWnd и Msg. hWnd iyisikhombi seyunithi yezinhlamvu equkethe indlela eya kufayela elisebenzisekayo svchost.exe, futhi Msg — isikhombi somthwalo wokugcina wokukhokha.

I-shellcode ithole amakheli omsebenzi kusuka kernel32.dll и ntdll32.dll kususelwa kumanani we-hashi kusuka emagameni awo futhi kujove ukulayishwa kokugcina kumemori yenqubo svchost.exeusebenzisa inqubo ye-Process Hollowing (ungafunda kabanzi ngayo kulokhu isihloko). Lapho ujova i-shellcode:

• udale inqubo svchost.exe esimweni sokumiswa kusetshenziswa umsebenzi CreateProcessW;
• wabe esefihla isibonisi sesigaba endaweni yekheli lenqubo svchost.exe usebenzisa umsebenzi NtUnmapViewOfSection. Ngakho, uhlelo lwakhulula inkumbulo yenqubo yokuqala svchost.exeukuze bese ukwaba inkumbulo yomthwalo okhokhelwayo kuleli kheli;
• inkumbulo eyabiwe yomthwalo okhokhelwayo endaweni yekheli lenqubo svchost.exe usebenzisa umsebenzi VirtualAllocEx;

Ukuqala kwenqubo yomjovo

• wabhala okuqukethwe komthwalo okhokhelwayo endaweni yekheli lenqubo svchost.exe usebenzisa umsebenzi WriteProcessMemory (njengakusithombe-skrini esingezansi);
• iqale kabusha inqubo svchost.exe usebenzisa umsebenzi ResumeThread.

Ukuqedela inqubo yokujova

Uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha

Njengomphumela wezenzo ezichaziwe, enye yezinhlelo ezingayilungele ikhompuyutha ze-RAT ezimbalwa ifakiwe ohlelweni oluthelelekile. Ithebula elingezansi libonisa uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha olusetshenziswe ekuhlaselweni, esingalubalulela ngokuzethemba iqembu elilodwa labahlaseli, njengoba amasampuli afinyelele umyalo ofanayo kanye neseva yokulawula.

Igama lohlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha

Kuqale kwabonwa

I-SHA-256

I-C & C.

Inqubo lapho umjovo wenziwa khona

I-Darktrack

16-04-2020

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2017

svchost

I-Parallax

24-04-2020

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2019

svchost

ISIVIVINYO

18-05-2020

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:9933

svchost

I-Netwire

20-05-2020

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns[.]org:2000

svchost

Izibonelo zohlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha esabalalisiwe ngeseva yokulawula efanayo

Zimbili izinto eziphawulekayo lapha.

Okokuqala, lona kanye iqiniso lokuthi abahlaseli basebenzise imindeni eminingana eyahlukene ye-RAT ngesikhathi esisodwa. Lokhu kuziphatha akuvamile emaqenjini aziwa kakhulu e-inthanethi, avame ukusebenzisa cishe isethi efanayo yamathuluzi abawajwayele.

Okwesibili, i-RATKing isebenzise uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha ethengiswa ezingosini ezikhethekile ngentengo ephansi, noma iphrojekthi yomthombo ovulekile.

Uhlu oluphelele kakhulu lohlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha olusetshenziswa emkhankasweni—olune-caveat eyodwa ebalulekile—lunikezwa ekupheleni kwesihloko.

Mayelana neqembu

Asikwazi ukuthi umkhankaso ononya ochazwe uhambisana nanoma ibaphi abahlaseli abaziwayo. Okwamanje, sikholelwa ukuthi lokhu kuhlasela kwenziwa yiqembu elisha. Njengoba sabhala ekuqaleni, sayibiza ngokuthi i-RATKing.

Ukuze udale umbhalo we-VBS, iqembu kungenzeka lisebenzise ithuluzi elifana nensizakalo I-VBS-Crypter kusuka kunjiniyela I-NYAN-x-CAT. Lokhu kuboniswa ukufana kweskripthi esidalwa yilolu hlelo ngesikripthi sabahlaseli. Ngokuqondile, bobabili:

• yenza ukukhishwa okubambezelekile usebenzisa umsebenzi Sleep;
• sebenzisa i-WMI;
• bhalisa umzimba wefayela elisebenzisekayo njengepharamitha yokhiye wokubhalisa;
• sebenzisa leli fayela usebenzisa i-PowerShell endaweni yayo yekheli.

Ukuze uthole ukucaciseleka, qhathanisa umyalo we-PowerShell ukuze usebenzise ifayela ekubhaliseni, elisetshenziswa umbhalo owenziwe kusetshenziswa i-VBS-Crypter:

((Get-ItemPropertyHKCU:SoftwareNYANxCAT).NYANxCAT);$text=-join$text[-1..-$text.Length];[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.Load([Convert]::FromBase64String($text)).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null);

ngomyalo ofanayo owasetshenziswa iskripthi sabahlaseli:

[System.Threading.Thread]::GetDomain().Load((ItemProperty HKCU:///Software///<rnd_sub_key_name> ).<rnd_value_name>);
[GUyyvmzVhebFCw]::EhwwK('WScript.ScriptFullName', 'rWZlgEtiZr', 'WScript.ScriptName'),0

Qaphela ukuthi abahlaseli basebenzise enye insiza evela ku-NYAN-x-CAT njengomunye wemithwalo ekhokhelwayo - I-LimeRAT.

Amakheli eziphakeli ze-C&C akhombisa esinye isici esihlukile se-RATKing: iqembu lincamela izinsiza ze-DNS ezinamandla (bona uhlu lwama-C&C kuthebula le-IoC).

I-IoC

Ithebula elingezansi linikeza uhlu oluphelele lwemibhalo ye-VBS okungenzeka ukuthi ihlobene nomkhankaso ochaziwe. Yonke le mibhalo iyafana futhi yenza cishe ukulandelana okufanayo kwezenzo. Bonke bafaka uhlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha lwesigaba se-RAT kunqubo ethenjwayo ye-Windows. Wonke anamakheli e-C&C abhaliswe kusetshenziswa izinsizakalo zeDynamic DNS.

Nokho, asikwazi ukusho ukuthi zonke lezi zikripthi zasakazwa abahlaseli abafanayo, ngaphandle kwamasampuli anamakheli e-C&C afanayo (isibonelo, kimjoy007.dyndns.org).

Igama lohlelo olungayilungele ikhompuyutha

I-SHA-256

I-C & C.

Inqubo lapho umjovo wenziwa khona

I-Parallax

b4ecd8dbbceaadd482f1b23b712bcddc5464bccaac11fe78ea5fd0ba932a4043

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

00edb8200dfeee3bdd0086c5e8e07c6056d322df913679a9f22a2b00b836fd72

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

504cbae901c4b3987aa9ba458a230944cb8bd96bbf778ceb54c773b781346146

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1487017e087b75ad930baa8b017e8388d1e99c75d26b5d1deec8b80e9333f189

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

c4160ec3c8ad01539f1c16fb35ed9c8c5a53a8fda8877f0d5e044241ea805891

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

515249d6813bb2dde1723d35ee8eb6eeb8775014ca629ede017c3d83a77634ce

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1b70f6fee760bcfe0c457f0a85ca451ed66e61f0e340d830f382c5d2f7ab803f

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

b2bdffa5853f29c881d7d9bff91b640bc1c90e996f85406be3b36b2500f61aa1

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

c9745a8f33b3841fe7bfafd21ad4678d46fe6ea6125a8fedfcd2d5aee13f1601

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

1dfc66968527fbd4c0df2ea34c577a7ce7a2ba9b54ba00be62120cc88035fa65

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

c6c05f21e16e488eed3001d0d9dd9c49366779559ad77fcd233de15b1773c981

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

cmd

3b785cdcd69a96902ee62499c25138a70e81f14b6b989a2f81d82239a19a3aed

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

4d71ceb9d6c53ac356c0f5bdfd1a5b28981061be87e38e077ee3a419e4c476f9

2004para.ddns.net

svchost

00185cc085f284ece264e3263c7771073a65783c250c5fd9afc7a85ed94acc77

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0342107c0d2a069100e87ef5415e90fd86b1b1b1c975d0eb04ab1489e198fc78

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

de33b7a7b059599dc62337f92ceba644ac7b09f60d06324ecf6177fff06b8d10

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

80a8114d63606e225e620c64ad8e28c9996caaa9a9e87dd602c8f920c2197007

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

acb157ba5a48631e1f9f269e6282f042666098614b66129224d213e27c1149bb

hope.doomdns.org

cmd

bf608318018dc10016b438f851aab719ea0abe6afc166c8aea6b04f2320896d3

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

4d0c9b8ad097d35b447d715a815c67ff3d78638b305776cde4d90bfdcb368e38

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

e7c676f5be41d49296454cd6e4280d89e37f506d84d57b22f0be0d87625568ba

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

9375d54fcda9c7d65f861dfda698e25710fda75b5ebfc7a238599f4b0d34205f

Franco20.dvrdns.org

svchost

128367797fdf3c952831c2472f7a308f345ca04aa67b3f82b945cfea2ae11ce5

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

09bd720880461cb6e996046c7d6a1c937aa1c99bd19582a562053782600da79d

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

0a176164d2e1d5e2288881cc2e2d88800801001d03caedd524db365513e11276

paradickhead.homeip.net

svchost

0af5194950187fd7cbd75b1b39aab6e1e78dae7c216d08512755849c6a0d1cbe

hope.doomdns.org

svchost

I-Warzone

3786324ce3f8c1ea3784e5389f84234f81828658b22b8a502b7d48866f5aa3d3

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

db0d5a67a0ced6b2de3ee7d7fc845a34b9d6ca608e5fead7f16c9a640fa659eb

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

I-Netwire

6dac218f741b022f5cad3b5ee01dbda80693f7045b42a0c70335d8a729002f2d

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

I-Darktrack

ea64fe672c953adc19553ea3b9118ce4ee88a14d92fc7e75aa04972848472702

kimjoy007.dyndns.org

svchost

I-WSH RAT

d410ced15c848825dcf75d30808cde7784e5b208f9a57b0896e828f890faea0e

anekesolution.linkpc.net

I-RegAsm

Eluhlaza

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softmy.duckdns.org

I-RegAsm

I-QuasarRAT

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

71dea554d93728cce8074dbdb4f63ceb072d4bb644f0718420f780398dafd943

chrom1.myq-see.com

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

def09b0fed3360c457257266cb851fffd8c844bc04a623c210a2efafdf000d5c

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

c3193dd67650723753289a4aebf97d4c72a1afe73c7135bee91c77bdf1517f21

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

a6f814f14698141753fc6fb7850ead9af2ebcb0e32ab99236a733ddb03b9eec2

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

a55116253624641544175a30c956dbd0638b714ff97b9de0e24145720dcfdf74

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

d6e0f0fb460d9108397850169112bd90a372f66d87b028e522184682a825d213

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

522ba6a242c35e2bf8303e99f03a85d867496bbb0572226e226af48cc1461a86

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

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darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

d13520e48f0ff745e31a1dfd6f15ab56c9faecb51f3d5d3d87f6f2e1abe6b5cf

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

9e6978b16bd52fcd9c331839545c943adc87e0fbd7b3f947bab22ffdd309f747

darkhate-23030.portmap.io

I-RegAsm

Source: www.habr.com