Ukuvuza komzila we-BGP e-Rostelecom kuholele ekuphazamisekeni kokuxhumana kwamanethiwekhi amakhulu

Njengomphumela wesimemezelo se-BGP esiyiphutha, iziqalo zenethiwekhi yangaphandle ezingaphezu kwezi-8800 bazithole iqondiswe kabusha ngenethiwekhi ye-Rostelecom, okuholele ekuweni kwesikhashana komzila, ukuphazanyiswa kokuxhumana kwenethiwekhi kanye nezinkinga zokufinyelela kwezinye izinsiza emhlabeni jikelele. Inkinga ehlanganisiwe izinhlelo ezizimele ezingaphezu kuka-200 eziphethwe izinkampani ezinkulu ze-inthanethi namanethiwekhi okulethwa kokuqukethwe, okuhlanganisa i-Akamai, Cloudflare, Digital Ocean, Amazon AWS, Hetzner, Level3, Facebook, Alibaba kanye neLinode.

Isimemezelo esiyiphutha senziwe yi-Rostelecom (AS12389) ngo-April 1 ngo-22:28 (MSK), sabe sesithathwa umhlinzeki u-Rascom (AS20764) futhi ngokuqhubekayo sasakazekela ku-Cogent (AS174) kanye ne-Level3 (AS3356) , inkambu ehlanganisa cishe bonke abahlinzeki be-inthanethi ezingeni lokuqala (Isigaba-1). Izinsizakalo ukuqapha I-BGP yazisa ngokushesha i-Rostelecom ngale nkinga, ngakho-ke lesi sigameko sathatha imizuzu eyi-10 (ngokusho eminye imininingwane imiphumela yabonwa isikhathi esingangehora).

Lesi akusona isigameko sokuqala esibandakanya iphutha ohlangothini lweRostelecom. Ngo-2017 kungakapheli imizuzu emi-5-7 ngeRostelecom zaqondiswa kabusha amanethiwekhi amabhange amakhulu nezinsizakalo zezezimali, okuhlanganisa i-Visa ne-MasterCard. Kuzona zombili lezi zehlakalo kuvela ukuthi umsuka wenkinga wakhonza umsebenzi ohlobene nokuphathwa kwethrafikhi, isibonelo, ukuvuza kwemizila kungenzeka lapho kuhlelwa ukuqapha kwangaphakathi, ukubeka phambili noma ukubukisa kwethrafikhi edlula i-Rostelecom ngezinsizakalo ezithile kanye nama-CDN (ngenxa yokwanda komthwalo wenethiwekhi ngenxa yomsebenzi omkhulu ovela ekhaya ekupheleni Mashi kuxoxiwe udaba lokwehlisa ukubeka eqhulwini ukuthuthwa kwezinsiza zakwamanye amazwe ngokuvuna izinsiza zasekhaya). Ngokwesibonelo, eminyakeni embalwa edlule kwenziwa umzamo ePakistan ukusonga Amanethi angaphansi e-YouTube kusixhumi esibonakalayo esingenalutho aholele ekubonakaleni kwalawa mancanyana ezimemezelweni ze-BGP kanye nokugeleza kwayo yonke ithrafikhi ye-YouTube eya e-Pakistan.

Ukuvuza komzila we-BGP e-Rostelecom kuholele ekuphazamisekeni kokuxhumana kwamanethiwekhi amakhulu

Kuyathakazelisa ukuthi ngosuku olwandulela isigameko neRostelecom, umhlinzeki omncane "New Reality" (AS50048) ovela edolobheni. Sumerlya ngokusebenzisa Transtelecom kwaba kumenyezelwe Iziqalo ezingu-2658 ezithinta i-Orange, i-Akamai, i-Rostelecom kanye namanethiwekhi ezinkampani ezingaphezu kuka-300. Ukuvuza komzila kubangele amagagasi ambalwa okuqondisa kabusha kwethrafikhi athathe imizuzu embalwa. Ekuphakameni kwayo, inkinga ithinte amakheli e-IP afinyelela ezigidini eziyi-13.5. Ukuphazamiseka okubonakalayo emhlabeni jikelele kwagwenywa ngenxa yokusebenzisa kweTranstelecom imikhawulo yomzila kuklayenti ngalinye.

Izehlakalo ezifanayo zenzeka ku-inthanethi njalo futhi zizoqhubeka zize zisetshenziswe yonke indawo izindlela zokugunyazwa Izimemezelo ze-BGP ezisuselwe ku-RPKI (Ukuqinisekiswa Kwemvelaphi ye-BGP), okuvumela ukwamukelwa kwezimemezelo ezivela kubanikazi benethiwekhi kuphela. Ngaphandle kokugunyazwa, noma yimuphi u-opharetha angakhangisa i-subnet enolwazi olungelona iqiniso mayelana nobude bomzila futhi aqalise ukuhamba ngengxenye yethrafikhi evela kwamanye amasistimu angakusebenzisi ukuhlungwa kwezikhangiso.

Ngaso leso sikhathi, kulesi sigameko esicutshungulwayo, kwavela isheke elisebenzisa inqolobane ye-RIPE RPKI. engenamsebenzi. Ngokuqondana, amahora amathathu ngaphambi kokuvuza komzila we-BGP e-Rostelecom, phakathi nenqubo yokubuyekeza isofthiwe ye-RIPE, isuswe ngephutha Amarekhodi e-ROA angu-4100 (Ukugunyazwa Kwemvelaphi Yomzila we-RPKI). I-database ibuyiselwe kuphela ngo-Ephreli 2, futhi sonke lesi sikhathi isheke lalingasebenzi kumakhasimende e-RIPE (inkinga ayizange ithinte ama-repositories e-RPKI yabanye ababhalisi). Namuhla i-RIPE inezinkinga ezintsha kanye nekhosombe le-RPKI phakathi kwamahora angu-7 ibingatholakali.

Ukuhlunga okusekelwe kuRegistry nakho kungasetshenziswa njengesixazululo ukuvimba ukuvuza IRR (I-Internet Routing Registry), echaza amasistimu azimele lapho ukuthuthwa kweziqalo ezithile kuvunyelwe khona. Lapho usebenzisana nama-opharetha amancane, ukuze unciphise umthelela wamaphutha abantu, ungakhawulela inani eliphakeme leziqalo ezamukelwe zezikhathi ze-EBGP (ukulungiselelwa kwesiqalo esiphezulu).

Ezimweni eziningi, izigameko ziwumphumela wamaphutha ezisebenzi ngengozi, kodwa muva nje kube nokuhlaselwa okuqondiwe, lapho abahlaseli bebeka engcupheni ingqalasizinda yabahlinzeki. hlela ukuqondisa kabusha ΠΈ ukunqamuka traffic for esikhundleni amasayithi athile ngokuhlela ukuhlasela kwe-MiTM ukuze kuthathelwe indawo izimpendulo ze-DNS.
Ukwenza kube nzima kakhulu ukuthola izitifiketi ze-TLS phakathi nokuhlaselwa okunjalo, isikhulu sesitifiketi esithi Masibethele esanda kushintshwa ekuhloleni isizinda sezindawo eziningi usebenzisa ama-subnet ahlukene. Ukuze udlule lokhu kuhlolwa, umhlaseli uzodinga ukuzuza ngesikhathi esisodwa ukuqondisa kabusha komzila kumasistimu ambalwa azimele abahlinzeki abanama-uplink ahlukene, okunzima kakhulu kunokuqondisa kabusha umzila owodwa.

Source: opennet.ru

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