
Kull min ipprova jħaddem magna virtwali fis-sħaba huwa konxju sew li port RDP standard, jekk jitħalla miftuħ, kważi immedjatament jiġi attakkat minn mewġiet ta 'attentati ta' forza bruta tal-password minn diversi indirizzi IP madwar id-dinja.
F'dan l-artikolu ser nuri kif Tista' tikkonfigura rispons awtomatiku għall-password brute force billi żżid regola ġdida mal-firewall. InTrust huwa għall-ġbir, l-analiżi u l-ħażna ta’ data mhux strutturata, li diġà għandha mijiet ta’ reazzjonijiet predefiniti għal diversi tipi ta’ attakki.
F'Quest InTrust tista' tikkonfigura azzjonijiet ta' rispons meta tiġi attivata regola. Mill-aġent tal-ġbir ta’ log, InTrust jirċievi messaġġ dwar attentat ta’ awtorizzazzjoni li ma rnexxiex fuq workstation jew server. Biex tikkonfigura li żżid indirizzi IP ġodda mal-firewall, trid tikkopja regola tad-dwana eżistenti biex tiskopri awtorizzazzjonijiet multipli falluti u tiftaħ kopja tagħha għall-editjar:

L-avvenimenti fir-reġistri tal-Windows jużaw xi ħaġa msejħa InsertionString. (Dan huwa login bla suċċess fis-sistema) u tara li l-oqsma li aħna interessati fihom huma maħżuna f'InsertionString14 (Workstation Name) u InsertionString20 (Source Network Address Meta tattakka mill-Internet, il-qasam Workstation Name x'aktarx). tkun vojta, għalhekk dan il-post huwa importanti li jissostitwixxi l-valur mill-Indirizz tan-Netwerk tas-Sors.
Dan huwa kif jidher it-test tal-avveniment 4625:
An account failed to log on.
Subject:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-1135140816-2109348461-2107143693-500
Account Name: ALebovsky
Account Domain: LOGISTICS
Logon ID: 0x2a88a
Logon Type: 2
Account For Which Logon Failed:
Security ID: S-1-0-0
Account Name: Paul
Account Domain: LOGISTICS
Failure Information:
Failure Reason: Account locked out.
Status: 0xc0000234
Sub Status: 0x0
Process Information:
Caller Process ID: 0x3f8
Caller Process Name: C:WindowsSystem32svchost.exe
Network Information:
Workstation Name: DCC1
Source Network Address: ::1
Source Port: 0
Detailed Authentication Information:
Logon Process: seclogo
Authentication Package: Negotiate
Transited Services: -
Package Name (NTLM only): -
Key Length: 0
This event is generated when a logon request fails. It is generated on the computer where access was attempted.
The Subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.
The Logon Type field indicates the kind of logon that was requested. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).
The Process Information fields indicate which account and process on the system requested the logon.
The Network Information fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.
The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.
- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.
- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.
- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.
Barra minn hekk, se nżidu l-valur tal-Indirizz tan-Netwerk tas-Sors mat-test tal-avveniment.

Imbagħad għandek bżonn iżżid skript li jimblokka l-indirizz IP fil-Firewall tal-Windows. Hawn taħt hemm eżempju li jista 'jintuża għal dan.
Skript għat-twaqqif ta' firewall
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
[ValidateNotNullOrEmpty()]
[string]
$SourceAddress
)
$SourceAddress = $SourceAddress.Trim()
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$ruleName = 'Quest-InTrust-Block-Failed-Logons'
$ruleDisplayName = 'Quest InTrust: Blocks IP addresses from failed logons'
function Get-BlockedIps {
(Get-NetFirewallRule -Name $ruleName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | get-netfirewalladdressfilter).RemoteAddress
}
$blockedIps = Get-BlockedIps
$allIps = [array]$SourceAddress + [array]$blockedIps | Select-Object -Unique | Sort-Object
if (Get-NetFirewallRule -Name $ruleName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) {
Set-NetFirewallRule -Name $ruleName -RemoteAddress $allIps
} else {
New-NetFirewallRule -Name $ruleName -DisplayName $ruleDisplayName -Direction Inbound -Action Block -RemoteAddress $allIps
}
Issa tista' tibdel l-isem u d-deskrizzjoni tar-regola biex tevita konfużjoni aktar tard.

Issa trid iżżid din l-iskrittura bħala azzjoni ta' rispons għar-regola, tattiva r-regola, u tiżgura li r-regola korrispondenti hija attivata fil-politika ta' monitoraġġ f'ħin reali. L-aġent għandu jkun attivat biex imexxi script ta' rispons u għandu jkollu l-parametru korrett speċifikat.

Wara li tlestew is-settings, in-numru ta' awtorizzazzjonijiet li ma rnexxewx naqas bi 80%. Qligħ? X'waħda kbira!

Kultant terġa 'sseħħ żieda żgħira, iżda dan huwa dovut għall-emerġenza ta' sorsi ġodda ta 'attakk. Imbagħad kollox jibda jonqos mill-ġdid.
Matul ġimgħa ta 'xogħol, 66 indirizz IP ġew miżjuda mar-regola tal-firewall.

Hawn taħt hawn tabella b'10 usernames komuni li ntużaw għal tentattivi ta' awtorizzazzjoni.
Isem l-utent
Numru
F'perċentwali
amministratur
1220235
40.78
admin
672109
22.46
utent
219870
7.35
contoso
126088
4.21
contoso.com
73048
2.44
amministratur
55319
1.85
servers
39403
1.32
sgazlabdc01.contoso.com
32177
1.08
administrateur
32377
1.08
sgazlabdc01
31259
1.04
Għidilna fil-kummenti kif twieġeb għat-theddid għas-sigurtà tal-informazzjoni. Liema sistema tuża u kemm hi konvenjenti?
Jekk inti interessat li tara InTrust fl-azzjoni, fil-formola ta 'feedback fuq il-websajt tagħna jew iktebli f'messaġġ personali.
Aqra l-artikoli l-oħra tagħna dwar is-sigurtà tal-informazzjoni:
(artiklu popolari)
Sors: www.habr.com
